Numerous studies have found that many people believe that a provocatively dressed woman is at greater risk for sexual assault and bears some responsibility for her assault if she is attacked. Furthermore, in legal, academic, and public debates about sexual assault the appropriateness of the term ‘provocative’ as a descriptor of certain kinds of women’s clothing is rarely questioned. Thus, there is a widespread but largely unquestioned belief that it is appropriate to describe revealing or suggestive women’s clothing as ‘provocative’ (...) and that women who wear such clothing could provoke sexual assault and harassment from men. Yet it is rarely noted that only women’s clothing is described as sexually provocative. Men’s clothing, no matter how revealing, is never described as provocative. Why is this the case? This Article challenges the assumption that it is appropriate to describe women’s clothing as provocative. Drawing on on models of the legal defense of provocation and research on objectification and responsibility, this Article demonstrates that continued use of ‘provocative’ term normalizes and entrenches deeply problematic attitudes about women’s responsibility for men’s sexual behavior. The social interpretation of women’s clothing as provocative arises from the privileged social and legal status of men’s sexual arousal and the objectification of women’s bodies. Describing women’s clothing as provocative thus reinforces a problematic conception of women’s bodies and sexuality that is connected to women’s experiences of their bodies, their clothes, and shapes their vulnerability to sexual assault and social and legal attitudes to such attacks. (shrink)

We explore a particular type of propagandistic message, which we call “provocative insinuation”. For example: ‘Iraqi refugee is convicted in Germany of raping and murdering teenage girl’. Although this sentence seems to merely report a fact, it also conveys a potentially hateful message about Iraqi refugees. We look at the argumentative roles that these utterances play in public discourse. Specifically, we argue that they implicitly address the question of the integration of refugees and migrants, and in fact aim to tilt (...) the audience against these groups by strongly inviting hearers to make generalisations based on “striking” properties. We examine different strategies to counteract the conveyed hateful message. (shrink)

In this paper we analyse utterances that, without explicitly constituting hate speech, nevertheless convey a hateful message. For example, in the headline “Iraqi Refugee is convicted in Germany of raping and murdering teenage girl”, the presence of “Iraqi refugee” does not seem arbitrary. To the contrary, it is responsible for inviting a racist inference against Iraqi refugees. We defend that these inferences cannot be described as slurs, ethnic or social terms used as insults, dogwhistles or conversational implicatures. Rather, we propose (...) that these inferences are insinuations, specifically provocative insinuations, as no conversational response seems effective at blocking them. (shrink)

Reflections on the linkage between and the provocative force of problems in the analogy of city and soul, in the simile-bound characterization of the Good, and in the performative tension between what Plato has Socrates say about the philosopher's disinclination to descend into the city and what he has Socrates do in descending into the Piraeus to teach, with a closing recognition of the analogy between Socratic teaching and Platonic writing.

Training artificial intelligence (AI) systems requires vast quantities of data, and AI developers face a variety of barriers to accessing the information they need. Synthetic data has captured researchers’ and industry’s imagination as a potential solution to this problem. While some of the enthusiasm for synthetic data may be warranted, in this short paper we offer critical counterweight to simplistic narratives that position synthetic data as a cost-free solution to every data-access challenge—provocations highlighting ethical, political, and governance issues the use (...) of synthetic data can create. We question the idea that synthetic data, by its nature, is exempt from privacy and related ethical concerns. We caution that framing synthetic data in binary opposition to “real” measurement data could subtly shift the normative standards to which data collectors and processors are held. And we argue that by promising to divorce data from its constituents—the people it represents and impacts—synthetic data could create new obstacles to democratic data governance. (shrink)

The first detailed study of the effect of provocation on culpability in morality and law, this book traces the fascinating history of the legal doctrine of provocation, right up to present-day controversies over the scope of the doctrine's application in murder cases.

Pithy, direct, and bold: essays that propose new ways to think about old problems, spanning a range of philosophical topics. In Philosophical Provocations, Colin McGinn offers a series of short, sharp essays that take on philosophical problems ranging from the concept of mind to paradox, altruism, and the relation between God and the Devil. Avoiding the usual scholarly apparatus and embracing a blunt pithiness, McGinn aims to achieve as much as possible in as short a space as possible while covering (...) as many topics as possible. Much academic philosophical writing today is long, leaden, citation heavy, dense with qualifications, and painful to read. The essays in Philosophical Provocations are short, direct, and engaging, often challenging philosophical orthodoxy as they consider issues in mind, language, knowledge, metaphysics, biology, ethics, and religion. McGinn is looking for new ways to think about old problems. Thus he writes, about consciousness, “I think we have been all wrong,” and goes on to suggest that both consciousness and the unconscious are mysteries. Summing up his proposal on altruism, he remarks, “My suggestion can now be stated, somewhat brutally, as follows: human altruism is the result of parasitic manipulation.” He takes a moment to reflect: “I really don't know why it is good to be alive, though I am convinced that the standard suggestions don't work.” McGinn gets straight to the point and states his position with maximum clarity. These essays offer provocative invitations to think again. (shrink)

This paper explores why victims who provoke their aggressors seem to compromise their right to self-defence. First, it argues that one proposed answer – the victims are partially responsible for the threats they face – fails. It faces counterexamples that it cannot adequately address. Second, the paper develops the Protective Duty View according to which we incur protective duties towards others when we interfere with their reasonable opportunities to avoid suffering harm. Since provokers wrongfully interfere with prospective aggressors’ opportunities to (...) avoid posing a threat and thus to be defensively harmed, they incur protective duties towards the aggressors. This can require that they significantly limit or even refrain from using defensive force. The paper ends by drawing out some of the implications of the Protective Duty View for issues related to war and punishment. (shrink)

Drawing on recent research in the philosophy of the emotions and empirical evidence from social psychology, this paper argues that the concept of loss of self-control at common law mischaracterises the relationship between the emotions and their effects on action. Emotions do not undermine reason in the ways offenders describe ; nor do they compel people to act in ways they cannot control. As such, the idea of ‘loss of self-control’ is an inaccurate and misleading description of the psychological mechanisms (...) at play in cases of emotionally motivated killing, where there may not be any ‘loss of self-control’ as such. (shrink)

Although the ‘metaverse’ is still the feverish pipedream of tech companies and venture capitalists, it is also a powerful imaginary for channelling enormous resources towards deepening and extending ongoing processes of digitalization and datafication. It is thus likely that an increasing amount of human activity – both professional as well as leisure-related – will take place in metaversal spaces, and that the paradigm of ‘Big Data’ is about to be expanded with massive amounts of new and varied or multimodal data (...) that capture even more (corporeal, sensorial, spatial, and temporal) information produced by and about people as well as their interactions as these unfold in (mixed) spaces over time. Much like the rise of big data, the emergence of metaversal data gives rise to important tensions and issues. From the perspective of critical data studies, media studies, and science and technology studies, this paper spotlights the role of data obtained about, in, and through metaverse technologies and environments as well as how this can be understood as both an intensification and extension of the datafication of social life, the quantification of research methodologies, and the exacerbation of social inequality. We discuss these issues through a series of six provocations that each address a distinct tension between metaverse data, the production of knowledge, research methodologies, and various social issues that are central to the datafication of contemporary societies. (shrink)

There are cases where we think that poor offenders should not be held criminally responsible or punished to the same extent as non-poor (and, a fortiori, privileged) ones. Despite sharing this judgment, philosophers have offered different accounts of why or how poverty matters for criminal responsibility or penal judgments. In this paper, I present a new account of how poverty matters for criminal responsibility and corresponding penal judgments. The crux of the argument is this: a reasonable person who is trapped (...) in poverty can be (and sometimes is) provoked to offend following reasonable emotional reactions prompted by how that person is treated while in poverty. Call this the provocation view. I discuss how this view applies to some of the cases where poor citizens offend, address some objections against it, and briefly explain why provocation aims to supplement, rather than supplant or subsume other normative accounts which argue that poor offenders are (or should be held) less criminally responsible or be punished more leniently than non-poor ones. (shrink)

What follows is a series of provocations, loosely interconnected, centered on the ambiguous relationship between liberalism and fascism in our age of democratic decline. Together they seek to trouble the established binaries and analytic frameworks that would position liberalism and fascism as antithetical and suggest instead that both emerge from the same condition of possibility: imperial racialism. In doing so, they reflect on the discursive function of fascism in sustaining liberal democracy as a project of white supremacy.

Increasing numbers of women in Turkey are murdered by their relatives, spouses or significant others. The perpetrators plead provocation for their crimes, claiming their actions are provoked by women’s initial acts which they deem to violate societal norms. Pleading provocation enables more lenient sentences. This article investigates the interplay of the legal rules and societal norms on ‘proper’ female behaviour in femicide, based on data drawn from the Journal of Legal Proceedings, which publishes select rulings of the Court (...) of Cassation – the Highest Court in the Turkish legal system – from 2004 to 2018. This article argues that there is a collision between cultural, societal norms and legal rulings in criminal law, and displays linkages between legal processes and social norms which perpetuate patriarchal structures. Accordingly, the article proposes that legal rulings on femicide reflect societal norms and traditional expectations on women’s roles in Turkish society through employing provocation defence. Consequently, law becomes complicit in femicide through provocation, and provocation could be seen as the legal system’s concession to patriarchy. (shrink)

The daily work of the clinical ethics teacher and clinical ethics consultant falls into the routine of classifying clinical cases by ethical type and proposing ethically justified alternatives for the professionally responsible management of a specific type of case. Settling too far into this routine creates the risk of philosophical inertia, which is not good either for the clinical ethicist or for the field of clinical ethics. The antidote to this philosophical inertia and resultant blinkered vision of clinical ethics is (...) sustained, willing exposure to philosophical provocation. The papers in this clinical ethics issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy provide just such philosophical provocation related to core topics in clinical ethics: the distinction between clinical practice and clinical research; telemedicine, or medicine at a distance; illness narratives; the concept of the placebo effect; and sex reassignment. (shrink)

This research article is a collaborative set of reflections and provocations stemming from the National Science Foundation (NSF) funded workshop on STS as a Critical Pedagogy, hosted online during the summer of 2021 by Shannon N. Conley and Emily York at James Madison University. The workshop occurred over four separate sessions, bringing together forty participants (including six undergraduate students who contributed as both facilitators and research assistants). Participants self-organized into panels, leading the workshop collective to engage a host of questions, (...) challenges, methods, and practices related to STS and critical pedagogy. Questions included the following. What characterizes critical STS pedagogies? How are critical STS pedagogies enabled and constrained by our institutional and disciplinary locations? What makes STS pedagogies travel? How might we imagine STS pedagogies otherwise? How do our pedagogies shape our research and engagement in the world? How might we critically interrogate the boundaries between research, teaching, service, and engagement, and what becomes visible when we do so? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Catullan Provocations: Lyric Poetry and the Drama of PositionCarole E. NewlandsWilliam Fitzgerald. Catullan Provocations: Lyric Poetry and the Drama of Position. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1995. x 1 310 pp. Cloth, $45 (US), £35 (foreign). (Classics and Contemporary Thought, 1)Fitzgerald’s richly provocative book on Catullus is the first in a promising series edited by Tom Habinek entitled Classics and Contemporary Thought. As the (...) title Catullan Provocations suggests, Fitzgerald’s book and Catullus’ poetry are related in their provoking of readers to reflect on the specific nature of poetic practice. Fitzgerald aims to replace the Romantic construct of Catullus as the individualistic, confessional sufferer with a poet “who explores the terms and possibilities of the poetic licence we have given him” (236). Fitzgerald pursues three layers of argument in each chapter: he explores the positional drama that takes place between poet, poem, and reader in Catullus’ lyric poetry; he situates that poetry within a Roman cultural context, broadly defined; and he critically examines the agenda underlying modern constructs of Catullus. Yet for a book that self-consciously claims an innovative approach, Catullan Provocations is curiously lacking in attention to specifics of gender and readership.Fitzgerald’s methodology is ambitious. He reads together poems that are usually put in separate categories. For instance, in chapter 2 he groups with c. 2 not c. 3, the other sparrow poem, but c. 15 and c. 16 (along with references to other poems), on the grounds that all three poems engage the position of the reader in relationship to the poet’s teasing sexuality. This unconventional grouping is refreshing and forces us to examine entrenched preconceptions. However, Fitzgerald’s habit of often excerpting from the poems and treating them piecemeal sometimes makes the line of argument hard to follow. In addition, wrong citations within the text—poem 16 instead of poem 15 (48), poem 98 instead of poem 58 (79)—give the reader unnecessary provocation. His method depends on careful editing, and here the University of California Press has done Fitzgerald a disservice by omitting two or three columns—around 30 poems—from the “Index of Catullun [sic] Poems Cited.”Catullan Provocations performs a valuable task in undermining the narratives that underpin the traditional constructs of Catullus. In chapter 1 Fitzgerald provides an enjoyable critique of two aspects of the scholarly refashioning of Catullus: first, the anchoring of a varied collection of poems to a single novelistic psyche, and second, the relationship between the poet and the modern scholar who, in producing a master narrative of love and betrayal, becomes, so Fitzgerald suggests, a better substitute for Lesbia in his or her putative greater understanding of the poet. Fitzgerald concludes the book with an interesting examination in chapter 9 of the misogynistic response to Catullus’ poetry by recent creative writers.In the main chapters of the book (2 through 8) Fitzgerald removes the tormented individual from center stage and focuses on the aggressive poetics that [End Page 468] situate Catullus in relation to questions of masculinity, obscenity, urbanity, social and sexual hierarchies, and cultural identity. Through a daring range of linguistic and dramatic strategies Catullus plays with the ambiguous nature of the poet’s position and unsettles the rigid “positives” of Roman social relations, such as the aristocratic network of mutual obligations. These chapters are stimulating, particularly chapter 8, where Fitzgerald argues that not passion for Lesbia or grief for his brother so much as Catullus’ anxieties about his Transpadane origins produce the poet’s most daring experiments in poetic mode and form. However, Fitzgerald’s conscious decision to position Catullus’ poetry not specifically within the culture of the 60s and 50s B.C. but “more broadly in the culture of his time in order to describe the meeting of the lyric genre with Roman preoccupations and norms” (236) sometimes leads to a lack of historical specificity. Aesthetic considerations dominate ethical, social, and political concerns, and questions of publication, circulation, and actual performance within the turbulent cultural milieu of late Republican Rome are not addressed.In addition, Fitzgerald’s judgments are not always supported by full analysis of the poems in question, but rather... (shrink)

Several personality dispositions with common features capturing sensitivities to negative social cues have recently been introduced into psychological research. To date, however, little is known about their interrelations, their conjoint effects on behavior, or their interplay with other risk factors. We asked N = 349 adults from Germany to rate their justice, rejection, moral disgust, and provocation sensitivity, hostile attribution bias, trait anger, and forms and functions of aggression. The sensitivity measures were mostly positively correlated; particularly those with an (...) egoistic focus, such as victim justice, rejection, and provocation sensitivity, hostile attributions and trait anger as well as those with an altruistic focus, such as observer justice, perpetrator justice, and moral disgust sensitivity. The sensitivity measures had independent and differential effects on forms and functions of aggression when considered simultaneously and when controlling for hostile attributions and anger. They could not be integrated into a single factor of interpersonal sensitivity or reduced to other well-known risk factors for aggression. The sensitivity measures, therefore, require consideration in predicting and preventing aggression. (shrink)

There is a growing recognition of Levinas's importance. It can in part be attributed to an increasing concern that twentieth-century continental philosophy seems to have no place for ethics. In making ethics fundamental to philosophy, rather than a problem to which we might one day return, Levinas transforms continental thought. The book brings together some of the most interesting and far-reaching responses to the work of Levinas, in three different areas: contemporary feminism, psychotherapy, and Levinas's relation to other philosophers. It (...) includes a newly translated paper by Levinas on suffering, and a specially commissioned interview. (shrink)

Fifty years ago, Zwicky demonstrated the slur‐neutral counterpart vocative divergence thesis (SNCVD):Slurs occur freely as vocatives. Neutral counterparts do not. In this article, I craft a novel problem for theories of slurs. The Vocatives Problem is the challenge to explain the SNCVD. I argue that there are two strong solutions. One construes slurs as encoding non‐expressive pejorative evaluation. Another construes them as expressives, as tools for expressing speaker‐contempt. I advance further rationales for treating slurs as expressives as a best solution. (...) I argue that four alternative accounts, none of which place restrictions on slurs’ semantics, fail to explain SNCVD. Finally, I show how the Vocatives Problem presents a formidable challenge to leading analyses of slurs that explain slurs’ derogatory force exclusively via appeal to pragmatics, socio‐linguistic rules like prohibitions, or articulations. (shrink)

Since their publication, the Muhammad cartoons featured in Jyllands Posten and Charlie Hebdo have become a symbol of free speech and Western values. These cartoons used provocation as a tool to discuss the limits of free speech and the scope of social self-censorship. In a just society, should the possibility of laughter be distributed equally? Should cartoonists and editors only publish jokes that are universally laughable? What is the proper reaction to these kinds of provocative jokes once the possibility (...) of censorship is ruled out in a liberal context? Is counterspeech or even cancellation a legitimate response? (shrink)

This case note considers the availability in the United Kingdom of the provocation defence in cases of intimate homicide in the context of the recent House of Lords decision in Rv. Smith [2000] 3 W.L.R. 654. The note argues that the expansion of the objective component of the defence to encompass the mental infirmities of individual defendants is dangerous for women. Although it has the potential to help some abused women who kill to use the defence, it has, at (...) the same time, exposed women who are abused by sexually possessive, violent men to even greater danger. It is thus argued that the defence should be restricted in the way envisaged by the minority judgement of Lord Millett so that abused women will still be able to use the defence, but by anon-medical route. Alternatively, the defence should be abolished and defences which pose no risk of encompassing violent men should be developed to accommodate abused women. (shrink)

While all of the great philosophers are difficult to read, Heidegger and Wittgenstein seem to be so in striking ways. Their writings are oddly reluctant to yield up to us what we might think of as ‘their philosophical claims’; and both seem to manifest an attitude towards argument unlike that of most contemporary philosophers. This paper will re-consider these features of Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s work in the light of some common themes in their understanding of philosophical confusion. Given that understanding, (...) writings that would combat such confusion must meet rather distinctive objectives and, as a result, may be required to take on rather distinctive forms. The paper will explore these possibilities, drawing, in particular, on the motif of ‘recollection’ upon which both Heidegger and Wittgenstein draw, Heidegger's scattered remarks on 'formal indication', and The Sophist lectures’ discussion of Platonic dialectic. (shrink)

The argument against innatism at the heart of Cognitive Gadgets is provocative but premature, and is vitiated by dichotomous thinking, interpretive double standards, and evidence cherry-picking. I illustrate my criticism by addressing the heritability of imitation and mindreading, the relevance of twin studies, and the meaning of cross-cultural differences in theory of mind development. Reaching an integrative understanding of genetic inheritance, plasticity, and learning is a formidable task that demands a more nuanced evolutionary approach.

Liberal and socialist worldviews are often seen as being in a fundamental opposition. This is reinforced immensely either by Francis Fukuyma's apostrophised end of history or by the thesis put forward by authors such as Patrick Deneen that liberalism has failed. The question that arises on closer examination of this assumption is whether or not it is accurate. Based on Carlo Rosselli's work Socialismo Liberale (Liberal Socialism), this article attempts to systematically challenge this thesis. Against the backdrop of the rise (...) of fascism in Italy, Rosselli comes to the realisation - contrary to many representatives of orthodox Marxism - that the liberal and socialist worldviews are not necessarily antagonistic to one another. In fact, they may even be mutually dependent - an important insight to think social change anew. (shrink)

In this essay we expand the notion of thinking by emphasizing the provocation and urgency to think and by reconceptualizing thinking as an embodied practice. The aim is to expand Lipman and Sharp’s approach to philosophical inquiry with children and show how other ways of thinking can be included. We strive to unfold a way of “thinking” that is both different from rationality (critical thinking) as well as from creative and caring thinking. In the first part of the paper, (...) we discuss the merits of Lipman and Sharp’s critical, creative and caring thinking within the Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CPI). We then expand Lipman/Sharp’s philosophical method through Ekkehart Marten’s Five-finger Model, which allows for different philosophical approaches. In the second half of the paper, we draw on Martin Heidegger’s What is called thinking? to develop his concept of the “call” to think together with its related notions of provocation and urgency. Building on this, we draw on Maurice Merleau-Ponty to show how this call is not an intellectual activity or mere exercise of the “mind” but rather affects our entire existence. As such, thinking becomes a response to an existential urgency that is an embodied practice. Using concepts like embodiment, affect, and sensibility, we try to widen our conception of thinking in a CPI. Finally, we hope this will allow facilitators to hear the unique voice of every child so that no one is left unheard. (shrink)

Our reflection on the work of Andrew Stables begins by considering the distinctive approach, informed by literary criticism, that he brought to the study of education. His acute sense of the significance of the reader’s relation to the text, inspired in large part by Coleridge, led him to a robust appreciation of the importance of critical reading. This sensitivity led him in turn to the more obviously philosophical consideration of the nature of meaning and the relation between language and thought. (...) In exploring these matters he drew somewhat eclectically on the writings of Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Lyotard. In due course he came to think of poststructuralism as too relativistic in tendency, but he had greater hopes for Wittgenstein. In tandem with a burgeoning interest in Peirce, he came to the view that Wittgenstein’s work might contribute to a fully semiotic perspective. As is well known, semiotics was to define the theoretical territory within which Stables’ later thinking unfolded. It was surely through his deepening knowledge of Peirce that his philosophy developed its fullest expression. His ambitions were large, and many have been drawn by his enthusiasm and commitment. Our discussion sets out to acknowledge these achievements and to show appreciation for the insights that Stables brought to educational debate, but also to question the basis for his turning away from some of those earlier influences and to take issue in some ways with the philosophical stance that he came to espouse. (shrink)

This introduction considers Lars von Trier’s own reflections on art and his work as presented in his most recent movie The House that Jack Built. It then presents a brief overview of the topics and problems addressed in the book’s chapters, framing each chapter in terms of how it engages in philosophical investigations provoked by von Trier’s work.

The article introduces some aspects of Levinas's writings which are important to review his reception within feminist circles. It then analyses his text `And God Created Woman', and shows to what extent his view of women can be criticized as being traditional and patriarchal. Finally, it deals with the relation between Levinas and feminism of difference, and rejects the idea that his theory can be effectively applied to move beyond the debate equality vs difference.

In the heyday of functionalist sociology and anthropology it was common to speak of the 'functional requisites' or basic functions of societies, one of which was what Parsons called pattern maintenance, a term which referred primarily to the reproduction of social practices through the socialization of children. Marxists speak of the base of social formations, and include in this the reproduction of capitalist work relations. A common thread in the two concepts is the thought that there are necessary conditions for (...) the continuation of a given social form which are not 'external' but are integral to the social form itself. Academics and scientists arc in the business of mastering a tradition and passing it on, so one may ask an analogous question about the reproduction of academic or scientific perspectives: what is required for the continuation or reproduction of an academic or scientific perspective, and how does this 'requisite' exert a selective effect between perspectives in given environments? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ProvocationsHerbert Fingarette (bio)Our Other LifeWe live, each of us, two interconnected lives. One we respect and take seriously. The other we dismiss as fantastical, accidental, and wholly unreal. I refer here, of course, to our waking life and our dream life.My concern with the dream life is not the one that has occasional popularity—the dream as the embodiment of rather arcane symbols which decipher into messages about our deep (...) unconscious life. Freud and others who have interpreted dreams in this way may have a point. But in any case it is not the point I want to make here.What is a dream, after all? It is an experience, an experience we live through. Often it has an intensity that surpasses the intensity with which we live our waking experience. Often the experience embodies flights of fantasy and imagination that are both amazing and wholly untypical of our experience in waking life.Whence come these startling, fantastic situations that we live when asleep? There is only one possible answer, the obvious one. They come from us. The dreamer is the creator. If there is amazing novelty, it is the dreamer whose imagination has created this.The dream-life is an often powerful, evocative, imaginative world which we create and in which we live a substantial part of our life. Why do we dismiss it?One obvious reason, perhaps the sole and only necessary reason, is that what happens in the dream is disconnected with the structure and content of our waking life. We view it as "unreal," and refer to waking life as "real" life.Yet a moment's reconsideration reveals that both of these lives are "real," they really happen, we really experience them. The difference lies not in their reality but in the seeming incompatibility of the two. What happens in the dream is not consistently continued when we wake. Moreover the way things happen in a dream is often strikingly different from the way they happen when we're awake. In my dream I am in one place, and then instantaneously in a very distant place. The person I dream is my mother but also my grown daughter, and yet at the next moment my daughter at a childhood age. [End Page 861]I live exciting, fearful, and strange situations in which I am being attacked. Such things have never happened in my waking life. I dream that I'm a professor who realizes he is grossly late for his class, and can't remember what the assignment was or what I am to lecture on. In my waking life I am also a professor, but I've rarely been late for class, and never have forgotten the assignment or the lecture material.Yes, there is at times an obvious connection—my role as professor, the identity of someone as my mother or daughter. But what happens, and the way it happens in one life are dramatically unlike and disconnected with the other life.Why should I dismiss my dream life? It constitutes a goodly portion of my total life. I live it. I feel it, I react emotionally. It reveals an extraordinarily free and intense imagination that I largely fail to use when awake. What if the question were put to one, but without context or prejudgments: Which life would you find more interesting, challenging, exciting—day life or dream life? Try to think about that question in its own terms, without bias.Am I proposing something contrary to human nature? Not at all. We know there are cultures ("primitive?") in which dream life is viewed as an important, meaningful dimension of one's existence. We in the contemporary Western world are the exceptions. We dismiss this other life of ours. As a result, we fail to fully appreciate it in its own right.Indeed, as I've said, there are often connections. One needs no arcane theory of unconscious symbols to recognize this in my professorial dream. My embarrassing dream life as an unprepared professor is obviously related to my quasi-obsessive concern when awake to be prompt and thoroughly prepared. Clearly, in this regard, my two lives form a... (shrink)

Most academics write in a dispassionate, third-person voice. That stylistic choice is so expected in academic contexts that when an evocative, first-person voice is used instead, it feels unsettling and out of place to many of us. But why should we react so negatively to such a subversion of expectations? Is it because of the subversion itself, or is it because of an inherent incompatibility between evocative writing and realist analytical traditions? In this paper I’ll show that the freedom of (...) first-person, evocative writing in autoethnography is a strength to be embraced rather than something to be avoided. I’ll further show how offering readers a more complete sensory understanding of experience and meaning isn’t incompatible with realist analytical traditions. I will do this through an exploration of my current research on childhood sexual abuse, which has inspired me to set aside my initial unease with evocative writing and embark on a journey from autoethnographic skeptic to advocate. (shrink)