Can we think of a task in a distinctively practical way? Can there be practical concepts? In recent years, epistemologists, philosophers of mind, as well as philosophers of psychology have appealed to practical concepts in characterizing the content of know-how or in explaining certain features of skilled action. However, reasons for positing practical concepts are rarely discussed in a systematic fashion. This paper advances a novel argument for the psychological reality of practical concepts that relies on evidence for a distinctively (...) productive kind of reasoning. (shrink)

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically (...) reasons about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

This article uses Foucault’s lecture courses to illuminate his reading of Marx’s Capital in Discipline and Punish. Foucault finds in Marx’s account of cooperation a precedent for his own approach to power. In turn, Foucault helps us rethink the concepts of productive force and labour power in Marx. Foucault is shown to be particularly interested in one of Marx’s major themes in Capital, parts III–IV: the subsumption of labour under capital. In Discipline and Punish and The Punitive Society, Foucault (...) offers a genealogy of the forms of labour power ( Arbeitskraft) and productive force ( Produktivkraft). One of his central problems is to understand how labour power is converted in productive force and how, prior to that, productive subjects who can properly bear and dispose of their labour power are formed. Foucault’s reading of Capital resonates with those currents of Marx interpretation today that seek to repoliticize the concept of productive force and to offer a materialist account of subject formation. (shrink)

Although productive imagination has played a highly significant role in (post-) Kantian philosophy, there have been very few book-length studies explicitly dedicated to its analysis. In his new book, Saulius Geniusas develops a phenomenology of productive imagination while relying on those resources that we come across in Edmund Husserl’s, Max Scheler’s, Martin Heidegger’s, Ernst Cassirer’s, Miki Kiyoshi’s, Jean-Paul Sartre’s, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s, and Paul Ricoeur’s writings, while also engaging in present-day philosophical discussions of the imagination. Investigating the relation between (...) imagination and embodiment, affectivity, perception, language, selfhood, and intersubjectivity, the book provides a phenomenological conception of productive imagination, which is committed to basic phenomenological principles and which is sensitive to how productive imagination has been conceptualized in the history of phenomenology. Against such a background, Geniusas develops a new conception of productive imagination: It is a basic modality of intentionality that indirectly shapes the human experience of the world by forming the contours of action, intuition, knowledge, and understanding. It is not so much a blind and indispensable function of the soul, but an art concealed in the body, for it springs out of instincts, drives, desires, and needs. The author demonstrates unexpected ways in which phenomenology of productive imagination enriches our understanding of embodied subjectivity. (shrink)

Viewed this way, the texts yield striking examples of language and notation that are irreducibly ambiguous and productive because they are ambiguous.

Stockart et al. make a well-intentioned attempt to build consensus over the measurement of awareness, a topic of controversy for 40 years. But their recurring slippage between subjective and objective measures overlooks a neural tension between fundamentally distinct modes of understanding. Opposing Domains Theory explains why: disagreements persist, “triple tasks” can backfire, and “cross-validation” needs to be reconceptualized.

This paper reports on an ongoing ARC Discovery Project that is conducting design research into learning in collaborative virtual worlds (CVW).The paper will describe three design components of the project: (a) pedagogical design, (b)technical and graphics design, and (c) learning research design. The perspectives of each design team will be discussed and how the three teams worked together to produce the CVW. The development of productive failure learning activities for the CVW will be discussed and there will be an (...) interactive demonstration of the project's CVW. (shrink)

For several decades, intercultural philosophers have produced an extensive body of scholarly work aimed at mutual intercultural understanding. They have focused on the ideal of intercultural dialogue that is supported by dialogue principles and virtuous attitudes. However, this ideal is challenged by decolonial scholarship as one which neglects power inequalities. Decolonial scholars have emphasized the differences between cultures and worldviews, shifting the focus to colonial history and radical alterity. In return, intercultural philosophers have worried about the very possibility of dialogue (...) and mutual understanding in frameworks that use coloniality as their singular pole of analysis. In this paper, we explore the complex relations between decolonial and intercultural philosophies. While we diagnose tensions between both intellectual discourses, we argue that these tensions turn out to be productive: for intercultural philosophers, decolonial challenges provide an opportunity to critically rethink ideals of equitable dialogue in light of colonial inequity and its deep entrenchment in global philosophical encounters. For decolonial scholars, intercultural philosophies provide an opportunity to sharpen positive proposals of equitable encounters beyond the critique of current forms of colonial domination. Rather than developing a general compromise, we propose a contextualist strategy, highlighting that different situations require different responses that can be strongly confrontational or dialogical in character. Decolonial and intercultural motifs serve different functions in the articulation of a critical global philosophy and can sharpen each other without integrating into a middle ground that is “a little bit intercultural” and “a little bit decolonial”. (shrink)

This is the result of research financed by PROCIENCIA-CONCYTEC, whose objective is to analyze the rural communication forms in the processes of productive innovation and the positioning of the aguaymanto as a native product of the Peruvian Andes, to propose communication strategies in rural sectors of Arequipa, physalis peruviana is a fruit of Andean origin, whose properties and characteristics surpass other similar fruits; the method of analysis is qualitative-quantitative, of the correlational, transectional type, the exploration is carried out in (...) five rural districts of Arequipa, applying 125 surveys and 10 interviews. (shrink)

This article will delve into the profound impact of new productive forces on the innovation and development of red publications in the Beijing area. The article will elaborate on how red publications carry rich party history culture and revolutionary spirit, as well as the diverse forms they present. As a treasure trove of red publication resources, Beijing not only possesses a vast amount of historical documents and materials but also has a wide audience for its red publications, including young (...) students, history enthusiasts, and middle-aged and elderly groups. These publications perform well in the market, with their influence continuously growing. The application of new productive forces in the field of red publications is extremely extensive, for example, the emergence of digital publishing platforms enables red publications to achieve more efficient dissemination and provide more personalized services. In addition, the application of various advanced technologies, such as Augmented Reality and Virtual Reality, greatly enhances the reading experience, making red cultural education more vivid and appealing. The integrated marketing strategy of social media and new media matrices has also effectively enhanced the dissemination effect and market penetration of red publications. Looking to the future, red publications in the Beijing area are expected to continue innovating in various aspects such as technological innovation, content creativity, and market expansion. (shrink)

RESUMO A série Black Mirror, transmitida entre 2011 e 2023 pela Netflix, tornou-se um fenômeno de mídia e seus episódios mostraram formas de interação homem-máquina (terminologia também referida como humano-computador). O nome da série se refere ao fato de que, quando uma tela é desligada, ela se torna um espelho negro que reflete a imagem do usuário. Este artigo1 tem como objetivo analisar os efeitos da interação homem-máquina nas organizações produtivas apresentadas em Black Mirror. Esta pesquisa utilizou a análise do (...) discurso, principalmente a partir das contribuições de Mikhail Bakhtin. O método consistiu em três etapas que contaram com a colaboração de estudantes de graduação e pós-graduação em Engenharia de Produção, integrando ensino e pesquisa e desenvolvendo o senso crítico dos pesquisadores-iniciantes. Os resultados indicam que, nas organizações apresentadas na série Black Mirror, há uma transição do conceito de fatores humanos para fatores ciborgues, bem como o uso da interação homem-máquina para promover o controle social. (shrink)

A doctrine of intelligent design through evolution is not going to find many friends. It is destined to encounter opposition on all sides. Among scientists the backlog of evolution will have little patience for intelligent design. Among religiousists, many who form intelligent design have their doubts about evolution. In the general public s mind there is a diametrical opposition between evolution and intelligent design: one excludes the other. This book will argue that this view of the matter is not correct, (...) and that in actuality one can regard evolution itself as a pathway to intelligent design. We would do well to go beyond The Origin of Species and taking as our guide such works as W. Wentworth Thomson s On Growth and Form acknowledging that evolutionary adaptation can result in solutions of a sort that intelligence could readily ratify. Accordingly, what the present book seeks is a naturalization of Intelligent Design that sees such design as itself the result of natural and evolutionary processes.". (shrink)

Kant’s theory of citizenship replaces the French revolutionary triptych of liberty, equality and fraternity with freedom (Freiheit), equality (Gleichheit) and civil self-sufficiency (Selbständigkeit). The interpretative question is what the third attribute adds to the first two: what does self-sufficiency add to free consent by juridical equals? This article argues that Selbständigkeit adds the idea of interdependent independence: the independent possession and use of citizens’ interdependent rightful powers. Kant thinks of the modern state as an organism whose members are agents possessed (...) of rightful (productive) powers, whose interdependent mode of exercise independently of unilateral permission matters for right. The empirical form of that ideal, according to Kant, is a republic of independent commodity producers. I will show that this reading of Selbständigkeit can consistently explain Kant’s disenfranchisement of women, wage labourers and landless farmers; that it offers a robust alternative to influential republican, libertarian and proprietarian interpretations of the Kantian state; and that it can buttress an original account of community as productive interdependence. (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre´s criticism of Modernity essentially refers to the problem of compartmentalization, which restricts the possibility of achieving excellence in an integral lifestyle. Among other reasons, compartmentalization is especially derived from an insular valorization of the workplace based on a reductionist understanding of productivity in terms of mere efficiency. Aimed at overcoming the moral confusion derived from the overestimation of technical, skilled productivity and individualistic cooperation in private corporations, this article offers a thicker explanation of MacIntyre’s theory of productive (...) work in light of a narrative approach that opens up the possibility of achieving standards of excellence in modern production. To do so, it follows MacIntyre’s understanding of productivity in terms of craftsmanship by explaining what excellence in production is and the role it plays in achieving unity of life and excellence in modern corporations based on two criteria derived from a historical definition of production, namely, craftsmanship and collegiality. (shrink)

The notion of productive imagination is not only of crucial importance for Kant’s idea of pure reason, and for the unity of our theoretical experience, it is also stunningly seminal for post-Kantian philosophy: think, for instance, of Fichte, Schelling, the German Romantics, and of Hegel’s Glauben und Wissen. For the historian of philosophy, in particular, it is a very intriguing notion. Yet, however fundamental the notion of productive imagination is, it is not easy to determine its precise role (...) in the Critique of Pure Reason; the question of its historical genealogy is even more obscure. (shrink)

Theories of culture and action, especially after the cognitive turn, have developed more complex understandings of how unconscious, embodied, internalized culture motivates action. As our theories have become more sophisticated, our methods for capturing these internal processes have not kept up and we struggle to adjudicate among theories of how culture shapes action. This article discusses what I call “productive” methods: methods that observe people creating a cultural object. Productive methods, I argue, are well suited for drawing out (...) moments of shared automatic cognition and resonance. To demonstrate the value of productive methods, I describe my method of asking focus group participants to devise and draw AIDS campaign posters collectively. I then 1) show how this productive method made visible distinct moments of both automatic and deliberative cognition, 2) offer an operational definition of resonance and demonstrate how the process of drawing revealed moments of resonance, and 3) suggest how this method allowed me to investigate the relationship between cognition and resonance and their effect on action. To conclude, I discuss strategies for using productive methods and advocate for their use in measuring culture. (shrink)

Although overarching if not foundational conceptualizations of digital governance in the field of critical data studies aptly account for and explain subjection, calculated resistance is left conceptually unattended despite case studies that document instances of resistance. I ask at the outset why conceptualizations of digital governance are so bleak, and I argue that all are underscored implicitly by a Deleuzian theory of desire that overlooks agency, defined here in Foucauldian terms. I subsequently conceptualize digital governance as encompassing subjection as well (...) as resistance, and I cast the two in relational perspective by making use of the concepts “affordance” and “assemblage” in conjunction with multiple subjectivities and Foucault's view of power as productive as well as his view of resistance as an “antagonism of strategies” in his late scholarship on resistance, ethics, and subjectivity. I offer examples of salient modes of what I call “productive” resistance, and from a Foucauldian perspective I explain how each mode targets and subverts technologies of repressive power to produce new elements of the digital environment and construct new truths. I conclude by recognizing the agency embodied in resistance as an end in itself, but I also consider that modes of productive resistance can have extrinsic value as they affect the fluid interaction among elements of the digital environment, potentially disrupting the presumed structure of dominance and dependence, and opening our conceptualization of algorithmic life to hopeful possibilities for change. (shrink)

La relation de Ludwig Wittgenstein à la psychologie de la Gestalt est généralement comprise à travers le prisme de son travail sur l’œuvre de Wolfgang Köhler. Bien que précieux, ce cadre peut occulter certaines similitudes plus larges entre l’approche méthodologique de Wittgenstein et l’école de la Gestalt considérée dans son ensemble. Dans ce qui suit, je m’inscris dans cette ligne de pensée en comparant la discussion de Wittgenstein sur le respect des règles dans les Investigations philosophiques avec le concept de (...) pensée productive de Max Wertheimer. Je soutiens que l’accent mis par Wertheimer sur les aspects partagés et publics des phénomènes de Gestalt contrecarre la tendance de Köhler à caractériser les Gestalts comme des entités essentiellement privées. Je suggère qu’à cet égard au moins, l’approche de Wertheimer est plus proche que celle de Köhler de l’orientation philosophique ultérieure de Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This chapter uses one particular proposal for interdisciplinary collaboration – in this case, between early Heideggerian phenomenology and enactivist cognitive science – as an example of how such partnerships may confront and negotiate tensions between the perspectives they bring together. The discussion begins by summarising some of the intersections that render Heideggerian and enactivist thought promising interlocutors for each other. It then moves on to explore how Heideggerian enactivism could respond to the challenge of reconciling the significant differences in the (...) ways that each discourse seeks to apply the structures it claims to uncover. (shrink)

We describe a unified framework for the understanding of structure representation in primate vision. A model derived from this framework is shown to be effectively systematic in that it has the ability to interpret and associate together objects that are related through a rearrangement of common “middle-scale” parts, represented as image fragments. The model addresses the same concerns as previous work on compositional representation through the use of what+where receptive fields and attentional gain modulation. It does not require prior exposure (...) to the individual parts, and avoids the need for abstract symbolic binding. (shrink)

If I had read Ted Nannicelli’s (2020) thoughtful and wide-ranging book before writing my own, I would not have written the same book that I did, and my book almost certainly would have been better for it. Ted Nannicelli’s 2020 book has many keen insights, and I learnt much from reading it.There is a great deal of overlap in our philosophical interests as well as in our views. Our books were written at the same time—at least, our writing times overlapped (...) significantly—and by the time Nannicelli's was published, mine was already finalized, and it was too late for me to incorporate his insights into my own book. So I welcome the opportunity, however belated, to think carefully about Nannicelli’s ideas in conversation with my own.The first and most important thing to emphasize is my agreement with Nannicelli on many significant matters. Both Nannicelli and I are critical of the overwhelming focus in the ethical criticism of art on what Nannicelli calls ‘perspectivism’, the view that works of art should be judged morally on the basis of the perspective they take up (or attitude they prescribe, or similar). We are also both sceptical about the strength of the arguments concerning the moral-cognitive benefits of art. Both of us think that we need a more expansive toolkit for thinking about art and morality, including attention to the circumstances under which an artwork is produced. (The latter is something that I discuss only briefly, but Nannicelli is right that it is deserving of more careful attention.) Both of us are neutral about specific normative ethical theories. Nannicelli and I are both worried about the problem of relativism and how that affects how we think about moral judgements of artworks. And I think Nannicelli shares my scepticism about the search for easy answers to hard moral questions about the value of art. (shrink)

I aim to develop a new framework for thinking about several of the key distinctions in play in Kant’s discussions of freedom in relation to reason, particularly the discussions found in the Third Antinomy of the first Critique, the Groundwork, and the second Critique. Kant’s discussions here have seemed at best puzzling and at worst incoherent: in the Third Antinomy and the Groundwork, for example, Kant seems to both affirm and deny that we can have cognition of the freedom of (...) our reason; in the second Critique, he seems to both affirm that we can know that our reason is free (in the ‘fact of reason’) but then also insist that we can only ‘postulate’ that we have the requisite freedom. My aim here will be to develop a novel version of the idea that, at crucial points in these writings, Kant is distinguishing between several different senses of ‘freedom’, and that it is important to keep track of these different senses if we are to avoid ascribing to Kant a contradictory or otherwise incoherent position on freedom, whether across the key Critical writings from the 1780s or even within the same text. The main distinction that I myself will draw attention to is that between what I will call (drawing on Aristotelian traditions) merely practical freedom, on the one hand, and genuinely productive freedom on the other. As will emerge below, the freedom specific to the ‘practical’ use of reason, in the classical sense of ‘practical’, is the freedom that pertains specifically to reason in its determination of our ‘power of choice [Willkür]’, and hence is something whose cause (reason) and effect (choice) both lie entirely within our soul. Productive freedom, on the other hand, is the freedom that pertains (or would pertain) to a causality of reason whose cause (as reason) is in the soul, but whose effect lies outside our soul, in ‘outer’ nature (for Kant: in physical space). (shrink)

Commenting on Jean-Paul Sartre's theory of imagination, Paul Ricoeur argues that Sartre fails to address the productive nature of imaginative acts. According to Ricoeur, Sartre's examples show that he thinks of imagination in mimetic terms, neglecting its innovative and creative dimensions. Imagination, Ricoeur continues, manifests itself most clearly in fiction, wherein new meaning is created. By using fiction as the paradigm of imaginative activity, Ricoeur is able to argue against Sartre that the essence of imagination lies not in its (...) ability to reproduce absent objects, but rather in the ability to transform reality through creative acts. Motivated by the intuition that Sartre the writer could not have forgotten to address such crucial dimensions of imagination, I examine Sartre's philosophical and literary work, showing that not only does he develop a notion of productive imagination, he also puts this notion to work by articulating the relationship between imagination, narrative, and identity formation, well before Ricoeur advanced his narrative-identity theory. I argue that Sartre, like Ricoeur and MacIntyre, another representative of narrative-theory whose criticism of Sartre I address in this essay, views imagination and narrativity as necessary conditions for the formation of a coherent and meaningful sense of self. (shrink)