A pandemic may cause a sudden imbalance between available medical resources and medical needs where fundamental care to a patient cannot be delivered. Inability to fulfil a professional commitment to deliver care as needed can lead to distress among caregivers and patients. This distress is sometimes alleviated through mechanisms that hide the facts that care is rationed and not all medical needs are met. We have identified three mechanisms that jeopardise accountable and optimal allocation of resources: (1) hidden value judgements (...) that allow rationing under the disguise of triage or prioritisation, (2) disguised conflict of interest between societal and individual patient’s needs and (3) concealed biases in the application of medical tools. Under these three pitfalls decisions of resource allocation and who gets treated are handled as medical decisions: normative decisions are concealed and perceived as falling with the realm of medical judgement. Value judgements and moral agency are hidden to offer a ‘false sense of medical judgement’, while in fact there are several ethical judgements and biases at stake. The three pitfalls entail hidden normative deliberation and are inappropriate for sustainable healthcare delivery and resource allocation. We believe it is necessary to maintain transparency in decision making under conditions of insufficient resources to maintain trust in professional care givers and secure fair treatment allocation. Recognition of the pitfalls, by applying our recommendations, may help to ensure transparent and accountable distribution of care and contribute to public acceptance of the ethics behind rationing. (shrink)

Knowledge is power. Knowledge about human psychology is increasingly being produced using natural language processing (NLP) and related techniques. The power that accompanies and harnesses this knowledge should be subject to ethical controls and oversight. In this chapter, we address the ethical pitfalls that are likely to be encountered in the context of such research. These pitfalls occur at various stages of the NLP pipeline, including data acquisition, enrichment, analysis, storage, and sharing. We also address secondary uses of (...) the results and tools developed through psychometric NLP, such as profit-driven targeted advertising, political campaigns, and domestic and international psyops. Along the way, we reflect on potential ethical guidelines and considerations that may help researchers navigate these pitfalls. (shrink)

(2010). The Pitfalls of Misreading: What Does “Industry Funding of Medical Education” Actually Say? The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 24-25.

In this article, we discuss epistemological limitations relating to the use of ethnoracial categories in biomedical research as devised by the Office of Management and Budget’s institutional guidelines. We argue that the obligation to use ethnoracial categories in genomics research should be abandoned. First, we outline how conceptual imprecision in the definition of ethnoracial categories can generate epistemic uncertainty in medical research and practice. Second, we focus on the use of ethnoracial categories in medical genetics, particularly genomics-based precision medicine, where (...) ethnoracial identity is understood as a proxy for medically relevant differences among individuals. Notably, extensive criticisms have been made already against the genetic interpretation of races, but, nonetheless, the concept of race remains a key element of contemporary genomics. This motivates us to explore possible reasons why such criticisms may have been ineffective in redirecting attention to other (non-race-based) ways of controlling for human variability. We contend that popular arguments against the idea that human races have a genetic basis, though convincing in many respects, are not sufficient to exclude the pragmatic use of race and ethnicity as proxies for genetic variability related to complex phenotypes. Finally, we provide two further arguments to support the idea that ethnoracial categories are unlikely to provide meaningful insights into medical genetics, which implies that even the interpretation of race as a useful tool to stratify disease risk is unwarranted. (shrink)

Political philosophers often idealise, that is, they deliberately misrepresent. This differs from omitting, which is representing something with less detail, but without assuming any falsehood. Idealising is a tool that scholars can use to their advantage. However, idealising has pitfalls, and failing to avoid them can have dangerous consequences. Drawing on economics, where idealising is controversial, I illustrate two pitfalls of idealising in political philosophy: simplifying and distorting, and I show the different dangers that arise if these (...) class='Hi'>pitfalls aren’t avoided. This is not a plea against idealisations but rather a guide for their safe and secure use in political philosophy. (shrink)

Individuals who possess the virtue of epistemic autonomy rely upon themselves in their reasoning, judgment and decision making in virtuous ways. Philosophers working on intellectual virtue agree that if the pursuit of epistemic autonomy is not tempered by other virtues such as intellectual humility, it can lead to vices such as extreme intellectual individualism. Virtue theorists have made a number of empirical claims about the consequences of possessing this vice – e.g. that it will lead to significantly fewer epistemic goods (...) and a greater number of faulty beliefs. This paper reports the results of two pilot studies and initial results from a larger series of studies that attempt to shed light on some of the intellectual pitfalls of pursuing unrestricted epistemic autonomy. The studies provide empirical support for the philosophical claim that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility are mutually supporting virtues by showing that epistemic autonomy without intellectual humility leads to increased belief in misinformation, conspiracy theories and pseudoscience and decreased trust in scientific experts. They also reveal important contours of the complex and often delicate relationship between the virtue of epistemic autonomy and its more vicious cousin, strong intellectual individualism. (shrink)

Many philosophers working on the branches of philosophy that deal with the normative questions have adopted a " Reasons First" program. This paper criticizes the foundational assumptions of this program. In fact, there are many different concepts that can be expressed by the term 'reason' in English, none of which are any more fundamental than any others. Indeed, most of these concepts are not particularly fundamental in any interesting sense.

The references on the principles and methodology for developing agent-based models of social phenomena usually describe general principles and illustrate the process using worked examples, but seldom focus on the pitfalls and errors that make practical model building a tortuous and difficult task. This chapter contains a discussion of the positive and negative aspects of my personal experience in a PhD work on simulation of large scale social conflict. The purpose will be to describe the process from the initial (...) plan to the final dissertation, analyze the pitfalls and their overcoming in terms of principles of model development, and summarize the ideas that I found useful for practical development of agent-based models of social phenomena. The most serious pitfalls usually occur at the conception and design stages, when seemingly trivial points can be easily overlooked. These include starting with excessive ambition but unclear ideas on whether the purpose is understanding or prediction (i.e. what is the level of abstraction), poor knowledge of the relevant theories, and failure to identify which entities, variables and mechanisms must be considered. Several practical hints for avoiding these issues are presented, such as writing a reduced version of the “Overview, Design Concepts and Details” template that includes the bare minimum of items for a first working version, and devising efficient strategies for exploring the parameter space. This chapter will be of interest to MSc and PhD students working on social simulation, and to researchers developing projects on agent-based modeling of social phenomena, either individually or in teamwork. (shrink)

Late in his career, Thomas S. Kuhn practiced more as a philosopher of science than as a historian of science. However, his earlier work—leading up to TheStructure of Scientific Revolutions and during the majority of his tenure in the Princeton history of science group—focused on “mapping” the shape of the history of the physical sciences and on modeling the dynamics, or “motor,” of scientific traditions. This paper examines the younger Kuhn’s excursions in map and motor design. It views Kuhn as (...) a “critical historian,” that is, a historian who constructs explanatory categories in order to apply them to large-scale narratives, evaluation of which can suggest modification of those guiding categories.The younger Kuhn’s map and motor design was largely shaped by the work of his historiographical idol, Alexandre Koyré. Kuhn’s creative articulation of Koyré’s position explains his innovations concerning Scientific Revolutions (plural), his loosening of Koyré’s central category of “metaphysics,” and his invention of the crucial conception of “normal science.” Additionally, Kuhn’s devotion to Koyré explains some historiographical pitfalls and blind spots that bedeviled his historical work: for example, his ignoring early modern natural philosophizing as an institution and culture in its own right and his failure to capitalize on his correct insight into the nature of scientific discovery as the nonrevolutionary yet tradition-modifying core process in the sciences. The paper is concerned with Kuhn’s work as a critical historian and his legacy for younger historians, not with philosophical debates about his texts. (shrink)

This paper considers the use of secondary data analysis in educational research. It addresses some of the promises and potential pitfalls that influence its use and explores a possible role for the secondary analysis of numeric data in the 'new' political arithmetic tradition of social research. Secondary data analysis is a relatively under-used technique in Education and in the social sciences more widely, and it is an approach that is not without its critics. Here we consider two main objections (...) to the use of secondary data: that it is full of errors and that because of the socially constructed nature of social data, simply reducing it to a numeric form cannot fully encapsulate its complexity. However, secondary data also offers numerous methodological, theoretical and pedagogical benefits. Indeed by treating secondary data analysis with appropriate scepticism and respect for its limitations, by demanding that tacit assumptions about the unreliability of secondary data are applied equally to other research methods, and crucially by combining secondary data analysis with small-scale in-depth work, this paper argues for a return to prominence of secondary data analysis in its own right as well as becoming a central component of the new political arithmetic tradition of social research. (shrink)

This paper critically examines traditional rule-based and externalist approaches to the teaching of business ethics. The review materializes in a framework of seven pitfalls associated with the traditional approach, and bridges to overcome these perils are offered. Care is taken to avoid submitting the implausible positions of moral relativism. A perspective of methodological pluralism and normative internalism is developed and presented as a fruitful avenue for effective teaching in business ethics, and possible avenues for empirical exploration are offered.

Biomedical research recruitment today focuses on including participants representative of global genetic variation—rightfully so. But ethnographic attention to practices of inclusion highlights how this agenda often transforms into “predatory inclusion,” simplistic pushes to get Black and brown people into genomic databases. As anthropologists of medicine, we argue that the question of how to get from diverse data to concrete benefit for people who are marginalized cannot be presumed to work itself out as a byproduct of diverse datasets. To actualize the (...) equitable translation of genomics, practitioners need to place the impacts of ancestral genetic difference in the scope of much more impactful social determinants. For this to happen, multidisciplinary expertise needs to be leveraged, and current, structurally unequal health care systems ultimately need to transform. As modest steps toward this goal, new models for benefit‐sharing must be developed and implemented to mitigate existing inequality between data donors and the entities profiting from that data. (shrink)

Natural language processing based on large language models (LLMs) is a booming field of AI research. After neural networks have proven to outperform humans in games and practical domains based on pattern recognition, we might stand now at a road junction where artificial entities might eventually enter the realm of human communication. However, this comes with serious risks. Due to the inherent limitations regarding the reliability of neural networks, overreliance on LLMs can have disruptive consequences. Since it will be increasingly (...) difficult to distinguish between human-written and machine-generated text, one is confronted with new ethical challenges. This begins with the no longer undoubtedly verifiable human authorship and continues with various types of fraud, such as a new form of plagiarism. This also concerns the violation of privacy rights, the possibility of circulating counterfeits of humans, and, last but not least, it makes a massive spread of misinformation possible. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Philosophy in Non‐Philosophy Departments Definitions and Wittgensteinean Themes Tradition and Philosophy's Pitfalls Science, Poetry, Real Politics, and History: Antidotes to Scholasticism, and Their Side Effects Institutional Structures and the Road Not Taken Acknowledgments References.

In the debate on the ethics of the non-medical use of pharmaceuticals for cognitive performance enhancement in healthy individuals there is a clear division between those who view “cognitive enhancement” as ethically unproblematic and those who see such practices as fraught with ethical problems. Yet another, more subtle issue, relates to the relevance and quality of the contribution of scholarly bioethics to this debate. More specifically, how have various forms of speculation, anticipatory ethics, and methods to predict scientific trends and (...) societal responses augmented or diminished this contribution? In this paper, we use the discussion of the ethics of cognitive enhancement to explore the positive and negative contribution of speculation in bioethics scholarship. First, we review and discuss how speculation has relied on different sets of assumptions regarding the non-medical use of stimulants, namely: terminology and framing; scientific aspects such as efficacy and safety; estimates of prevalence and consequent normalization; and the need for normative reflection and regulatory guidelines. Second, three methodological guideposts are proposed to alleviate some of the pitfalls of speculation: acknowledge assumptions more explicitly and identify the value attributed to assumptions; validate assumptions with interdisciplinary literature; and adopt a broad perspective to promote more comprehensive reflection. We conclude that, through the examination of the controversy about cognitive enhancement, we can employ these methodological guideposts to enhance the value of contributions from bioethics and minimize potential epistemic and practical pitfalls in this case and perhaps in other areas of bioethical debate. (shrink)

Bioethics uses various theories, methods and institutions for its decision-making. Lately, a dialogical, i.e., dialogue-based, approach has been argued for in bioethics. The aim of this paper is to explore some of the decision-making processes that may be involved in this dialogical approach, as well as related pitfalls that may have to be addressed in order for this approach to be helpful, particularly in clinical ethics. Using informal logic, an analysis is presented of the notion of dialogue and of (...) the stages of dialogical decision-making, and then processes and related pitfalls associated with these stages in the context of clinical ethics are examined. The results of this exploration are expected to facilitate the implementation and empirical testing of dialogical bioethics. (shrink)

Environmental pragmatism has faced numerous criticisms for relativism and crude instrumentalism as well as for sidestepping the fundamental concerns of environmental ethics. Recently, Andre Santos Campos and Sofia Guedes Vaz have proposed a new ‘method’ of environmental pragmatism, justificatory moral pluralism, with the aim of overcoming these criticisms. It is argued that this new approach is plagued by the traditional concerns. Instead, the pitfalls of pragmatism can be avoided by adopting the central insight of the classical pragmatists that values (...) may be revised in light of experience in a process that resembles scientific inquiry. The resulting view may not be satisfying for those who expect pragmatism to live up to its periodic promise of immediate and concrete results. Nevertheless, pragmatism presents the environmental ethicist with a range of promising tasks. (shrink)

This paper examines the ethical pitfalls and challenges that non-ethicists, such as researchers and programmers in the fields of computer science, artificial intelligence and robotics, face when building moral machines. Whether ethics is “computable” depends on how programmers understand ethics in the first place and on the adequacy of their understanding of the ethical problems and methodological challenges in these fields. Researchers and programmers face at least two types of problems due to their general lack of ethical knowledge or (...) expertise. The first type is so-called rookie mistakes, which could be addressed by providing these people with the necessary ethical knowledge. The second, more difficult methodological issue concerns areas of peer disagreement in ethics, where no easy solutions are currently available. This paper examines several existing approaches to highlight the ethical pitfalls and challenges involved. Familiarity with these and similar problems can help programmers to avoid pitfalls and build better moral machines. The paper concludes that ethical decisions regarding moral robots should be based on avoiding what is immoral in combination with a pluralistic ethical method of solving moral problems, rather than relying on a particular ethical approach, so as to avoid a normative bias. (shrink)

Overtreatment refers to interventions that do not benefit the patient, or where the risk of harm from the intervention is likely to outweigh any benefit the patient will receive. It can account for up to 30% of health care costs, and is increasingly recognised as a widespread problem across nations and within clinical and scientific communities. There are a number of inter-related factors that drive overtreatment including the expanding definition of diseases, advertising and the influence of the pharmaceutical industry, how (...) doctors are trained and remunerated, demands from patients and the fear of complaints leading doctors to practise defensively.This paper discusses a number of ethical and practical issues arising from overtreatment that doctors and patients should be aware of. It also considers the flow-on effects of overtreatment such as the increased cost of care, increase in work load for health professionals, and wastage as resources are diverted from more genuine and pressing needs. In addition, there are references to a number of Medical Council of New Zealand statements about what good medical practice means in an environment of resource limitation. The paper concludes with a few measures that doctors and patients could take to reduce overtreatment but acknowledges that health care is extremely complex so it would be unrealistic to eliminate overtreatment entirely. (shrink)

The Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) is urging academic medical centers to ban pharmaceutical detailing. This policy followed from a consideration of behavioral and neuroeconomics research. I argue that this research did not warrant the conclusions drawn from it. Pharmaceutical detailing carries risks of cognitive error for physicians, as do other forms of information exchange. Physicians may overcome such risks; those determined to do so may ethically engage in pharmaceutical detailing. Whether or not they should do so is a (...) prudential judgment about which reasonable people may disagree. The AAMC's ethical condemnation of detailing is unwarranted and will subvert efforts to maintain a realm of physician discretion in clinical work that is increasingly threatened in our present practice environment. (shrink)

The article carries out a critical analysis of Arthur Kiefer's methodology (described in the “Ecclesiastes and the meaning of life in the ancient world”, Cambridge University Press, 2022), namely his concept of “meaning of life” applied to the analysis of the book of Ecclesiastes. The core argument made here is that the “threefold conceptual scheme” of the meaning of life, borrowed from the field of empirical psychological research (coherence – purpose – significance), cannot be effective in the analysis of theological (...) or philosophical texts, which involve a high level of generalization. On the other hand, since the concept of “meaning of life” is absent from the language of Ecclesiastes and other ancient texts, and its own meaning is extremely vague, it is unable to play the role of a useful analytical tool. (shrink)

In an age of professionalization and specialization, the practice of clinical ethics is facing an identity crisis. Are clinical ethicists moral experts, ethics experts, or merely quasi-lawyers giving legal advice? Are they extensions of the hospital, always working to advance the hospital’s interests? Or is there another option? Since 1998, when the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities first issued its Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, there has been debate about the role of standardization and proceduralism in clinical ethics (...) consultation. Now, as ASBH continues to move forward with its credentialing program, proceduralism in clinical ethics must be critically examined. In this paper, I argue that the proceduralist approach to clinical ethics consultation, as espoused by the ASBH’s call for credentialing, creates a demeaning experience for all parties involved and precludes goods internal to the practice of clinical ethics consultation from being actualized. As a practice embedded in medicine and in institutions such as the hospital, clinical ethics consultation must define and examine its own goods in order to bring about more than a sterile, law-like solution to difficult moral quandaries, as these sterile solutions leave patients, families, and providers unsatisfied, abandoned, and disappointed. Thus, in an effort to push back against this proceduralism in clinical ethics consultation, I will offer a preliminary exploration of what these goods might be. (shrink)

We discuss a recent approach to investigating cognitive control, which has the potential to deal with some of the challenges inherent in this endeavour. In a model-based approach, the researcher defines a formal, computational model that performs the task at hand and whose performance matches that of a research participant. The internal variables in such a model might then be taken as proxies for latent variables computed in the brain. We discuss the potential advantages of such an approach for the (...) study of the neural underpinnings of cognitive control and its pitfalls, and we make explicit the assumptions underlying the interpretation of data obtained using this approach. (shrink)

Media coverage of the effects of abortion restrictions on the care of pregnant patients is an important tool in advocacy for legal access to abortion care. Savita Halappanavar is remembered not onl...

Contemporary official parenting advice about disciplining children can be boiled down to ‘Be nice’. I first expand on this claim, drawing on primarily Birth to Five and secondarily Parentchannel.tv, showing that ‘Be nice’ breaks down into the absence of punishment and the expansion of both positive reinforcement and leading by example, these three components comprising an approach that is popularly described as positive parenting. Second, I examine the ways in which such apparently innocuous advice could be damaging: positive parenting is (...) arduous if not impossible, thereby setting parents up to fail, and partly because of this onerousness, it is arguably destructive of the spontaneity of the parent–child relationship. However, the difficulties of upholding a whole-heartedly spontaneous approach to parenting have led critics to endorse a model of the good parent as the reflective parent, and in conclusion I warn that this is just as coercive as the positive parenting model that it is designed to replace. (shrink)

Microphysical realism is the position that the only real entities and properties are found at the most fundamental level of nature. In this article, I challenge microphysical realism concerning properties and natural kinds. One argument for microphysical realism about entities, the “nothing-but argument,” does not apply to properties and kinds. Another argument, the “causal exclusion argument,” cannot be sustained in light of modern physics. Moreover, this argument leads to an objection against microphysical realism, based on the “illusoriness of macroproperties.” Another (...) objection is based on the possibility that there is no fundamental level but a “bottomless pit.”. (shrink)

Transparency has become a core value in AI ethics and governance, influencing both principles of trustworthy AI and legislation such as the EU AI Act. Nevertheless, the _risks_ of transparency remain under-theorized. Drawing on discussions of audit culture and recent AI safety literature, we characterize such risks through the concept of a “transparency pitfall.” This occurs when auditing and disclosure procedures impair, rather than promote, the values typically associated with transparency, including trust, accountability, and accurate risk perception. In particular, we (...) identify the regulatory transparency pitfall (RTP) as an important risk, by which even conscientious regulators could inadvertently facilitate ethics washing and safety washing. In response, we ask: through which mechanisms and features of the AI governance context could the RTP undermine effective AI regulation? And which sociological and institutional dynamics provide a plausible theoretical grounding for the RTP? We focus in particular on the socio-technical complexity of AI risks, and on the tendency for auditing regimes to end up prioritizing formal compliance over substantive effectiveness. Rather than rejecting auditing and impact assessment regimes in AI, however, we recommend a series of strategies aimed at counteracting the transparency pitfall. These involve acknowledging severe uncertainty and value trade-offs, encouraging well-informed contestation in regulatory contexts, and supporting both interdisciplinary and social diversity in decision-making. (shrink)

I urge caution when building a pragmatist, pluralist conception of health. It is tempting to let the definition of health expand almost indefinitely, so that all dimensions of life and well-being become ‘health issues.’ Such expansionist conceptions of health intersect dangerously with our pervasive cultural healthism, which is the idea that health is an indefeasible value and caring for health is always a primary responsibility. Allowing the concept of health to expand indefinitely against a background of healthism enables it to (...) be weaponized by stakeholders with social power and by institutions with specific interests in ways that undermine social justice and become tyrannical and elitist. In short, when every dimension of our well-being starts to count as part of health, then healthism starts to control every dimension of well-being. I look at three case studies, each of which is a domain in which the concept of health has expanded and become weaponized in toxic ways: healthy eating, healthy sexuality, and healthy gender identity. I end by arguing that we can understand the weaponization of health as a kind of elite capture. (shrink)

Abstractions and hypothetical constructs are a necessary part of scientific inquiry, our collective effort to understand the social and natural world. The problem of hypostatization occurs when we confuse these abstractions and hypothetical constructs used to probe reality with reality itself. However, the attempt to avoid hypostatization by denying existence to social things can end up encouraging a tendency to hypostatize the constructs social science imposes on social reality. This paper advances a remedial approach to the problem of hypostatization. It (...) advocates a practical ontology of the social, and attention to formulating falsifiable hypotheses. Lack of such a practical ontology of social reality encourages a seductive psychological disposition to hypostatize. It makes it difficult to envision how social reality might “kick back” at the constructs social science seeks to impose upon them and render them problematic. Improvement of our sense of social reality is the only effective means of combating is hypostatization. The clearer a researcher’s sense of social reality, the more falsifiable his/her hypotheses can be, the better reality can kick back and shatter hypotheses the researcher seeks to impose on it, and drive research forward. (shrink)

It is with these virile words of the Martinique poet Aimé Сésaire, an expression of assurance regained, testimony to a self-confidence once stolen but then reconquered, that I would like to open my remarks.*Africa was present at the last great international philosophical meeting two years ago in Montreal. I would like here to illustrate the meaning behind this presence and to explain the reasons why we wanted to be present, in order to avoid facile misunderstandings which could have weighty consequences.

Decision theory is a theory of rationality, but the concept of rationality has several different dimensions. Making decision theory more realistic with respect to one dimension may well have the result of making it less realistic in another dimension. This paper illustrates this tension in the context of sequential choice. Trying to make decision theory more realistic by accommodating resoluteness and commitment brings the normative assessment dimension of rationality into conflict with the action-guiding dimension. In the case of resolute choice (...) the conflict comes because of a clash of perspectives. The perspective from which resolute choice seems normatively compelling is not the perspective from which it can serve the purpose of guiding action. (shrink)

The central paradigm of arti?cial intelligence is rapidly shifting toward biological models for both robotic devices and systems performing such critical tasks as network management, vehicle navigation, and process control. Here we use a recent mathematical analysis of the necessary conditions for consciousness in humans to explore likely failure modes inherent to a broad class of biologically inspired computing machines. Analogs to developmental psychopathology, in which regulatory mechanisms for consciousness fail progressively and subtly understress, and toinattentional blindness, where a narrow (...) 'syntactic band pass' de?ned by the rate distortion manifold of conscious attention results in pathological ?xation, seem inevitable. Similar problems are likely to confront other possible architectures, although their mathematical description may be far less straightforward. Computing devices constructed on biological paradigms will inevitably lack the elaborate, but poorly understood, system of control mechanisms which has evolved over the last few hundred million years to stabilize consciousness in higher animals. This will make such machines prone to insidious degradation, and, ultimately, catastrophic failure. (shrink)

This chapter delves into “Causal AI,” spotlighting achievements, ethics, and future directions. Centered on AI’s evolving aptitude for discerning causal relationships, it explores real-world applications, ethical nuances, and emphasizes robustness, interdisciplinary collaboration, explainability, transparency, and a harmonious human–AI partnership in shaping causal AI’s future. Beginning with successful ventures, the chapter highlights achievements in causal inference techniques, interventional causal learning, and case studies, showcasing AI’s transformative impact. “Elements of Causal Inference: Foundations and Learning Algorithms” is introduced as a crucial resource, providing (...) a comprehensive foundation with a technical focus. Ethical considerations stress fairness, accountability, and transparency in operating causal AI systems, underscoring AI professionals’ crucial role in ensuring responsible use. The roadmap for causal AI prioritizes building robust models, interdisciplinary collaboration, explainability, transparency, and fostering a productive human–AI partnership. The chapter introduces integrating generative AI and foundation models in causality as the next frontier, promising exciting possibilities but demanding careful consideration of challenges. It concludes with a commitment to responsible AI development for societal benefit, offering a glimpse into the next chapter’s exploration of their incorporation in causality, addressing potential contributions and complexities. (shrink)

In depicting the Utopia's main character Raphael Hythloday, Thomas More appears to have drawn on the character Evodius in Augustine's dialogue On Free Choice. Hythloday and Evodius hold similar views on the relation between human law and the divine prohibition on homicide. Hythloday's views appear at first to be inconsistent, but Evodius's arguments for his related views can help make better sense of Hythloday's. Both characters also turn out to display similar moral-political confusions, caused by the interaction of their Christian (...) faith with their insufficient political education, that hurt their ability to serve their country as good citizens. These confusions are typical of educated Christian citizens but not inevitable: More and Augustine each offer alternative models of more clear-sighted Christians who can serve their earthly homeland in full awareness of its imperfections. (shrink)

Photo by Hannah Busing on Unsplash INTRODUCTION Religion has long provided guidance that has led to standards reflected in some aspects of medical practices and traditions. The recent bioethical literature addresses numerous new problems posed by advancing medical technology and demonstrates an erosion of standards rooted in religion and long widely accepted as almost axiomatic. In the deep soul-searching that pervades the publications on bioethics, several disturbing and dangerous trends neglect some basic lessons of philosophy, logic, and history. The bioethics (...) discourse on medical aid in dying emphasizes similarity over previously recognized important distinguishing features. For example, it overplays a likeness between assistance in dying and the withdrawal of life-saving technology. In many bioethics’ topics, arguments based on a logical continuum are used to question the lines demarcating important moral differences. l. The Line Between Ethical and Not: Logic Based on Continuum Careful case selection, often either end of a continuum, allows the tearing down or ridiculing of many rules and codes across most professions and fields of interest. This situation holds true for traffic laws as well as medical ethics guidelines. It is relatively simple for those who desire to attack a particular viewpoint by selecting a case that makes that position seem untenable. In the ethics realm, good and bad medicine exist at opposite ends of an ethical continuum, with many practices lying in between. For example, much of medical ethics exists between the Nazi criminal physicians and the most sainted nurse or physician. A gradual progression occurred over less than two decades from a utilitarian position that supported limited euthanasia for those with certain mental illnesses to genocide. German society embraced a utilitarian ethic in which the value of human life no longer was intrinsic but instrumental.[1] Many morally significant points on a continuum were then ignored as the misguided utilitarian policy rampantly continued. A point in the continuum to distinguish between ethically justifiable and that which is not can be difficult to identify compared to the two extremes. This continuum is not unique to ethics but can be applied to almost any other aspect of human life and endeavor. Between a severely ill schizophrenic person and a superbly well-adjusted individual, there is a continuum of mental and psychological function. The existence of a continuum should not paralyze thinking and prevent us from drawing lines and identifying moral differences based on objective criteria as well as moral philosophy. Yet, by focusing on a continuum, many bioethicists use logic to disregard dividing lines between an "ethical" and an "unethical" act. Unfortunately, sometimes bioethicists draw revolutionary conclusions that would change the scope of medical practices which is accepted as ethical. There are many examples of similar shifts on the continuum. Many authors argue for the ethical permissibility of abortion by pointing out that the human fetus is no different in various characteristics, one arguing it is as like an ape or chick as it is like a person,[2] and does not achieve unique human and individual characteristics until well into the first year of life.[3] While human fetuses arguably do not have certain distinctive qualities of personhood, most people shy away from the logical next conclusion: permitting infanticide. For example, Joshua Lederberg condemns infanticide, in the face of biological illogic, because of our emotional commitment to infants, to me, a relatively weak explanation. Sir Francis Crick suggests we might consider birth at two days of life in order to decide whether an infant is a "suitable" member of society.[4] Giublini and Minerva suggest that infanticide should be permissible since late pregnancy abortions are permissible, arguing there is no significant difference between a fetus just before birth and an infant just after birth.[5] Clearly the continuum approach would allow for subjective arguments in favor of later infanticide at other points many days post-birth. Years ago, with a cynical tone, I mentioned infanticide as a further step on the continuum beyond abortion, and I was rightly shouted down as being deliberately provocative to assert the logic would ever stretch so far. While it is not an accepted mainstream position, the movement in academic settings from widespread condemnation to limited possible acceptance of infanticide has taken place in an incredibly short time. Public opinion and medical opinion in these areas have shifted dramatically in a short time. In another area, from a biological and chemical point of view, there is a continuum from man down to a single carbon atom. Yet, it would not seem logical to ignore the emotional differences, the meaning of personhood, or the moral distinction between killing an insect and killing a person. ll. A False Continuum: Medical Aid in Dying I assert that there has been an erosion of ethical guidelines in recent years attributable to using continuums to camouflage important distinctions. James Rachels’ work on active and passive euthanasia, which contends that the two are ethically identical, exemplifies that logic.[6] He illustrates this thesis, using a continuum to compare different scenarios with like consequences as morally equivalent, by comparing the deliberate drowning of a child with a deliberate failure to rescue a drowning child when easily able to do so. The author's comparison proposes that since much of the medical profession has already made peace with withholding treatment in order to hasten death, consistency inexorably demands that we permit active euthanasia as well.[7] When permission for active euthanasia was first introduced, it was limited exclusively to patients suffering severely from an intractable, incurable, and irreversible disease. These guidelines have been continuously eroded. There is now a substantial serious consideration for permitting active euthanasia of healthy elderly individuals who feel that they have completed their lives and are "tired of living."[8] There are many moral and factual differences along the ethical continuum. In human life, there is a difference between a live baby and a fetus, between a viable fetus and one that is not, between a fetus and a zygote, and between a zygote and a sperm cell. Similarly, there is a difference between pulling a trigger to kill someone and not interfering in preventing his death, which is reprehensible though both may be. There is a difference between not resuscitating an 80-year-old man with cancer when his heart stops and injecting him with a fatal dose of potassium chloride. I argue that an overt act of taking life repels civilized human beings is to be commended and encouraged as the reverence for human life or even for just a moment of human life is one of the great contributions of our civilization. CONCLUSION As an orthodox Jew, I feel that divinely inspired guidelines that have stood the test of centuries shape my beliefs, and such guidelines contradict medical aid in dying. I cannot speak to the viewpoint of those who do not access religion in defining their moral stance, nor do I implicate them in the current bioethics' trends, as I am not aware of the personal role of religion in the lives of most such authors. While many nonreligious people have a firm philosophical grounding and oppose medical aid in dying, I suggest that in the absence of any religious or other absolute standards, developing logically defensible ethical guidelines may be challenging. At the least, religion may play a role in defining the points on the continuums that are ethically meaningful and refuting the trending beliefs that if the endpoint is the same, allowing different methods of arriving at that end are somehow ethically equal. The continuum of ways death may result does not negate analysis of whether death is brought about in ways that recognize the importance of life. The German philosopher Hans Jonas said, "It is a question whether without restoring the category of the sacred, the category most thoroughly destroyed by the scientific enlightenment, we can have an ethics able to cope with the extreme powers that we possess today and constantly increase and are compelled to use."[9] While countries vary on the role of religion in policy, with many emphasizing freedoms of religion, a recent position paper released by a group of Jewish, Christian, and Moslem leaders suggested the need for agreement on the unique sanctity of human life.[10] I would recommend that such a document serve as an example of consensus on critical foundational bioethical guidelines for democratic secular societies. - [1] Alexander L Medical science under dictatorship. New England Journal of Medicine, 241, p39-47 DOI10.1056/NEJM194907142410201 [2] Lederberg J. A geneticist looks at contraception and abortion, Annals of Internal Medicine 67, sup 2, 25-27. https:/doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-67-3-25 [3] Ibid. [4] Editorial, Sociology: Logic of biology. Nature 220, 429 https://www.nature.com/articles/220429b0 [5] Giublini A Minerva F After-birth abortion: why should the baby live. J Med Ethics 39, 261- [6] Rachels J Active and passive euthanasia. New England Journal of Medicine 292, 78-80 [7] Ibid. [8] Cohen-Almagor R Euthanizing people who are "tired of life". in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide-Lessons from Belgium. Ch 11 of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, Cambridge University Press pp173-187. 2017 and DOI; https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108182799.012 [9] Hans Jonas, Technology and Responsibility: Reflections on the New Tasks of Ethics, 1972, found as Chapter IX, Philosophical Essays, 1980. https://inters.org/jonas-technology-responsability [10] A position paper of the Abrahamic Monotheistic religions on matters concerning the end-of-life. Vatican Press 28 October 2019 https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2019/10/28/191028f.html. (shrink)

I'd rather not be an idiot and neither would you. One useful tool in avoid idiocy and figuring out what's true is to be aware of logical fallacies. Some errors in thinking are so common that they have been named in infamy. This article is an anti-idiocy vaccine to immunize you to common fallacies such as poisoning the well, begging the question, false dichotomy, and others, in order to give you a better shot at avoiding fallacy and finding out what's (...) true. (shrink)

This chapter centers on another claim made by Costello in her praise of poetry: that the understanding of the animal other needs to be embodied and not abstract. This claim informs important trends in contemporary animal ethics, which look back at Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment to support it, so the chapter proposes first a summary of Merleau-Ponty theses and adds to them some ethical claims. The question of embodiment, however, is accompanied by the differences that inhere to different forms of (...) embodiment, so the chapter looks at the links between animality and disability and the problems they generate in the contemporary debate. This analysis leads to acknowledge the limits of any epistemology and ethics based on embodiment. (shrink)

Ragnar Frisch’s criticism of descriptive (or explanatory or interpretative) modelling has left some unanswered questions. In order to answer them, Frisch should have declared the descriptive and interpretative modelling to be not only useless and unreliable for rational planning, but also impossible for the science of man and his behaviours, for the same reasons already outlined in the discussion of Gunnar Myrdal (in Chaps. 10.1007/978-3-319-78057-3_1 and 10.1007/978-3-319-78057-3_2).

In this paper, I present and extend Neta’s : 180–187 2007) counter-example against interest-relative invariantism. I first outline IRI, briefly explaining the content of the view and illustrating how it diverges from more classical approaches to epistemology. I then distinguish between two forms the view can take: a strong and a moderate formulation. After this, I argue that Neta’s counter-example only succeeds at undermining the strongest variant, leaving the weaker counterpart unscathed. After all of this is accomplished, I extend Neta-style (...) counter-examples to undermine a more moderate variant. I close the paper by considering and responding to several objections. (shrink)