In Norms in the Wild, distinguished philosopher Cristina Bicchieri argues that when it comes to human behavior, social scientists place too much stress on rational deliberation. In fact, she says, many choices occur without much deliberation at all. Two people passing in a corridor automatically negotiate their shared space; cars at an intersection obey traffic signals; we choose clothing based on our instincts for what is considered appropriate. Bicchieri's theory of social norms accounts for these automatic components of (...) coordination, where individuals react automatically to cues that focus their attention on what the norm is in that situation. Social norms thus act as rules for making choices in a social world where people expect others -- often unconsciously -- to follow the same rule. Some norms enable seamless social co-operation, while others are less beneficial to human flourishing.Bicchieri is famous for her interdisciplinary work on game theory and most recently her work on social norms, and Norms in the Wild represents her latest challenge to many of the fundamental assumptions of the social sciences. Bicchieri's work has broad implications not only for understanding human behavior, but for changing it for better outcomes. People have a strongly conditioned preference for following social norms, but that also means that manipulating their expectations can cause major behavioral changes. Bicchieri has been working recently with UNICEF and other NGO's to explore the applicability of her views to issues of human rights around the world. Is it possible to change social expectations around forced marriage, genital mutilations, and public health practices like vaccinations and sanitation? If so, how? What tools might we use? This short book explores how social norms work, and how changing them - changing preferences, beliefs, and especially social expectations - can potentially improve lives all around the world. It will appeal to an unusually broad range of readers including philosophers, psychologists and others in behavioral sciences, and anyone involved in public policy or at NGOs. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Prima Facie Duty to Obey: A Brief History Implications of Catechistic Metaethics for the Duty of Obedience Implications of Commonalist Metaethics for the Duty of Obedience Conclusion References.

In their paper titled “I Can’t Make You Worship Me”, Campbell Brown and Yujin Nagasawa (2005) argue that divine command theory is incompatible with the view that we have a moral obligation to worship God. In this paper I examine their concern and suggest ways we could reconcile the two views together.

This article shows that social norms are better explained as correlating devices for a correlated equilibrium of the underlying stage game, rather than Nash equilibria. Whereas the epistemological requirements for rational agents playing Nash equilibria are very stringent and usually implausible, the requirements for a correlated equilibrium amount to the existence of common priors, which we interpret as induced by the cultural system of the society in question. When the correlating device has perfect information, we need in addition only (...) to posit that individuals obey the social norm when it is costless to do so. When the correlating device has incomplete information, the operation of the social norm requires that individuals have a predisposition to follow the norm even when this is costly. The latter case explains why social norms are associated with other-regarding preferences and provides a basis for analyzing honesty and corruption. (shrink)

Supporters of political realism and republicanism as well as students of political feasibility and non-ideal theory progressively focus on the dimension of power in the political relation. Yet we lack the theoretical framework to represent these features of power. In this essay, I take a first step towards designing the necessary conceptual tools for such a framework by analyzing the relations between the concepts of power and normativity that define the political relation. Adopting a ‘methodological cynicism’, I analyse the reasons (...) that motivate cynics who are only interested in power to obey a norm against force or violence and to seek legitimacy. This allows us to characterize external or mediate relations between power and normativity (such as the relation underlying political theory’s ambition of offering normative guidance for power) and identify internal and immediate relations between power and normativity. (shrink)

In his recent book Democratic Authority, David Estlund defends a strikingly new and interesting account of political authority, one that makes use of a distinctive kind of hypothetical consent that he calls ‘normative consent’: a person can come to have a duty to obey another when it is the case that, were she given the chance to consent to the duty, she would have a duty to consent to it. If successful, Estlund’s account promises to provide what has arguably so (...) far remained elusive: the basis for the authority of suitably democratic laws. In this paper, I argue that, despite its promise, the account Estlund develops is, in a crucial respect, incoherent: the principle of normative consent that he offers relies on a claim about a hypothetical situation, but the hypothetical situation at issue is one that, according to the principle itself, is morally impossible. (shrink)

I argue that the "why be rational?" challenge raised by John Broome and Niko Kolodny rests upon a mistake that is analogous to the mistake that H.A. Pritchard famously claimed beset the “why be moral?” challenge. The failure to locate an independent justification for obeying rational requirements should do nothing whatsoever to undermine our belief in the normativity of rationality. I suggest that we should conceive of the demand for a satisfactory vindicating explanation of the normativity of rationality instead (...) in terms of the demand for a philosophical characterisation of rationality that can do something to explain why rational requirements are the kinds of things that are, by their very nature, normative. I consider several accounts that have recently been offered – the distinctive-object account, the proper functioning account, and the subjective reasons account – and argue that none succeeds in meeting this challenge. I then sketch a new account, the “first-personal authority account”, which holds that rational requirements are what I call “standpoint-relative demands” concerning the attitudes we ought to have and form; and that complying with rational requirements is a matter of honouring our first-personal authority as agents. I suggest that the first-personal authority account does a better job of meeting the challenge. (shrink)

I raise a dilemma for an epistemology based on the idea that there are hinge propositions or primitive certainties: either such propositions are norms or rules in the 'grammatical' sense, but they cannot regulate our inquiries since they are not genuine propositions obeying truth or evidential standards, or they are epistemic norms, but compete with the classical norms of belief and knowledge. Either there are hinges, but they have nothing to do with epistemology, or hinges are (...) part of our knowledge, and their epistemology is part of ordinary epistemology. (shrink)

Why should anyone be bound by cognitive norms, such as the norms of reason or mathematics? To become a mathematician is to learn to obey the norms of the mathematical community. A self becomes intentional by binding itself to communal norms. Only then can it have the freedom to think or make assertions about the community’s objects -- triangles or imaginary numbers, for example. Norms do not bind selves from the outside: being bound by (...) class='Hi'>norms is what constitutes a self. (shrink)

Experiments in psychology and experimental philosophy suggest that judgments about actual causation are partially governed by norms: norm violations are more likely to be singled out as causes, while structurally analogous factors that obey the norms are unlikely to be singled out. The norm-sensitivity of causal judgment has, in turn, lent support to a normative analysis of causation itself. In this paper, I question whether the support stands. I articulate and examine two principal reasons support might be so (...) derived. For each, I argue that, in fact, a non-normative analysis is better supported. (shrink)

This study aims to analyse the pros and cons of imposing penalties or fines in law enforcement regulations for violating health protocols in Indonesia. Some people consider that the norm of the fine sanctions in statutory provisions regulating health protocol violators is unconstitutional, but others say it is constitutional. As a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, a study of the perspective of Islamic law is essential. This article uses a normative legal research methodology using two main (...) approaches: the statutory and conceptual approaches. The results show that fines are found in the criminal law clusters and state administrative law. Penalties in state administrative law in their enforcement do not require intervention from other institutions. Still, they can be carried out directly by government officials whose authority has been determined in the laws and regulations. Meanwhile, from the Islamic perspective, the fine sanctions can be applied, in the context of hifz Al-Insan, in Maslahah Mursalah as part of the maqasid al-Syari’ah. The obligation to obey government regulations is part of a person’s obedience to God’s commands. Contribution: This study’s findings can support the government in enforcing the law to combat the spread of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Indonesia and other countries because, constitutionally, the law is legal. Then, the legality of fines for violators of the COVID-19 health protocol, from an Islamic perspective, does not contradict maqasid al-shari’ah. So, there should be no doubts for Muslims to obey these regulations. (shrink)

Bayesian epistemology provides a popular and powerful framework for modeling rational norms on credences, including how rational agents should respond to evidence. The framework is built on the assumption that ideally rational agents have credences, or degrees of belief, that are representable by numbers that obey the axioms of probability. From there, further constraints are proposed regarding which credence assignments are rationally permissible, and how rational agents’ credences should change upon learning new evidence. While the details are hotly disputed, (...) all flavors of Bayesianism purport to give us norms of ideal rationality. This raises the question of how exactly these norms apply to you and me, since perfect compliance with those ideal norms is out of reach for human thinkers. A common response is that Bayesian norms are ideals that human reasoners are supposed to approximate – the closer they come to being ideally rational, the better. To make this claim plausible, we need to make it more precise. In what sense is it better to be closer to ideally rational, and what is an appropriate measure of such closeness? This article sketches some possible answers to these questions. (shrink)

This chapter distinguishes between several senses of “normativity”. For example, that we ought to abstain from causing unnecessary suffering is a normative, not descriptive, claim. And so is the claim that we have good reason, and ought to drive on the right, or left, side of the road because the law requires us to do that. Reasons and oughts are normative, by definition. Indeed, it may be that “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, (...) or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons” (Raz 1999, 67) . That is what the “reasons-first” view holds, but there are also other views, and what is by definition a normative statement, or a normative fact if you like, depends on how we define normativity. -/- It may seem that requirements are also by definition normative. But it seems that there can also be requirements that one has no reason to meet: it is less clear whether such requirements are normative in the same sense that reasons and oughts are normative. This paper will go through various further phenomena, which are candidates for being normative in some other sense than normative reasons and oughts, defending however the view that not all of them are. But arguably four or so different senses of normativity can be distinguished. -/- The paper will accept the view that the normativity of reasons and oughts, which is here called normativity1, is central. It is an open question whether all requirements or expectations or socially constructed norms are normative in that sense. Arguably it depends on the contents and content-independent authority of the legislators, whether we have good reasons, or ought, to meet the requirements, obey the law, or to follow the etiquette, or to conform to others’ interpersonal expectations, requests, demands or prescriptions. Whether and when we do have such reasons is a difficult and important substantive question, which concerns the normativity1 of requirements of law. -/- In another sense, norms (intended to guide behavior) are trivially or by definition normative, and constitute normativity: some forms of behavior are ruled as acceptable (e.g. driving on the right) and others as unacceptable (e.g. driving on the left) in light of the norm. Even in the case of a bad norm (that we have no reason to follow, and which ought to be changed, and ought not prevail) classifies behaviours as acceptable or unacceptable in light of the norm. Surely norms are by definition normative? Call this conformity to social norms and actual expectations normativity2. It is not an open question whether social norms are normative in that sense – they are by definition normative2. But importantly, it is an open question whether one has good reasons, or sufficient reason, or ought, to follow any social norm – that is, whether the norm in question is normative1. -/- The first section of the article characterizes further the difference between these two senses of normativity, and additionally introduces various other candidate senses of “normativity”. These possible senses of “normativity” may be at stake in the debates about normative requirements of rationality , about so called ought-to-be -rules , about normativity of linguistic meaning , about “directions of fit” of beliefs and desires , about subjective authority of intentions and decisions and interpersonal authority or co-authority of concrete others. -/- In later sections these cases are discussed. Do they constitute separate senses of normativity? And are the later phenomena such that they give agents good reasons: do they include normativity1 – the core sense? A “normative power -model” is suggested as a framework for examining whether actual social norms, laws, expectations provide good reasons and oughts or not. Once we understand the relation between the first two senses of normativity, do the later phenomena follow the same pattern – is the “normative powers – model” relevant for them as well? (shrink)

Philosophy, despite its typical attitude of detachment and abstraction, has for most of its long history been engaged with the practical and mundane-seeming question of whether there is a duty to obey the law. As Matthew Kramer has recently summarized: “For centuries, political and legal theorists have pondered whether each person is under a general obligation of obedience to the legal norms of the society wherein he or she lives. The obligation at issue in those theorists' discussions is usually (...) taken to be prima-facie, comprehensively applicable, universally borne, and content-independent.” This essay is a commentary on the current state of discussion of this perennial philosophical topic. (shrink)

Authority is an important feature of military life. Political and military superiors claim the power to give binding orders to their subordinates. If they have the authority they claim (and that many citizens and soldiers take them to possess), then the subordinates are morally required to do as commanded. Tadros’ To Do, To Die, To Reason Why challenges the authority claims that political and military superiors make in giving orders: the kinds of considerations ordinarily thought to underpin their authority – (...) in particular, the instrumental benefits of authoritative decision-making in politics and military life – cannot justify it. Tadros’ claim is not that subordinates are never required to do what their superiors order. Trivially, superiors may order subordinates to do what they are anyway required to do. (The captain orders the privates not to kill the prisoners.) Less trivially, superiors’ orders may change the subordinates’ factual or epistemic circumstances, which results in their having duties that they would otherwise have lacked. (The captain orders a private to jump into the sea. His order startles a child on the shore so it loses its balance and plunges into the water. The private may now have a duty to jump in to save the child, and he may have that duty because the superior gave the order.) Yet this way of changing the subordinates’ duties is not, for Tadros, a genuine exercise of authority: authority brings about normative change directly, rather than by changing the subordinate’s factual or epistemic circumstances. It is authority so understood that, according to Tadros, military and political superiors claim and yet lack. Tadros offers two complementary arguments for this anarchist conclusion. First, he argues that superiors have practical authority over subordinates only if the subordinates have duties to obey (or follow) the superiors’ orders, rather than merely to conform with them (by doing something which happens to be what they were ordered to do). There must be a suitable link between order and action. But, Tadros argues, soldiers don’t have a duty to obey their superiors’ orders. (Call this the Obedience Claim.) So military superiors lack practical authority vis-à-vis their subordinates. (Call this the Authority Claim.) Second, Tadros argues that authority is either unjustified or otiose. Exercises of practical authority, by imposing duties, restrict their subjects’ freedom. Moral duties are difficult to justify precisely because they are freedom-restricting in this way; and only certain kinds of considerations suffice to make an action morally obligatory. Tadros argues that there are sufficient reasons for a superior to have and exercise the power to make ving morally obligatory by issuing a directive only if there are already sufficient reasons for ving being independently morally obligatory. (We call this the No Duty, No Authority Claim.) We challenge both arguments. Sections 2 and 3 show that, even if the Obedience Claim is true, it does not entail the Authority Claim. Section 4 casts doubt on the No Duty, No Authority Claim. (shrink)

Observe social distancing. Tip your waiter. Give priority to the elderly. Stop at the red light. Pay your taxes. Do not chew with your mouth open. These are imperatives we face every day, imposed upon us by norms that happen to be generally accepted in our environment. Call these 'socially constructed norms'. A constant presence in our lives, these norms elicit mixed feelings. On the one hand, we treat them as valid standards of behaviour and respond to (...) their violation with emotions such disapproval, resentment, and guilt. On the other hand, we look at them with suspicion: after all, they are arbitrary human constructs that may contribute to oppression and injustice. In light of this ambivalence, it is important to have a criterion telling us when, if ever, we are morally bound by socially constructed norms and when we should instead disregard them. Morality and Socially Constructed Norms systematically develops such a criterion. It traces the moral significance of those norms to the agential commitments that underpin them, and explains why those commitments ought to be respected, provided the content of the corresponding norms is consistent with independent moral constraints. The book then explores the implications of this view for three core questions in moral, legal, and political philosophy: the grounding of moral rights, the obligation to obey the law, and the wrong of sovereignty violations. Morality and Socially Constructed Norms shows how much progress can be made in normative theorizing when we give socially constructed norms their (moral) due. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show that context is normative. Perceiving and acting, speaking and understanding, reasoning and evaluating, judging and deciding, doing and not doing, as accomplished by humans, invariably occur within a context. The context dictates, or at least constrains, the proper accomplishment of the act. One may construe this undisputed fact in a naturalistic way: one can think of the context as a positive given, and of the constraints it creates as constituting a natural fact. Whether the act (...) is carried out in conformity with these constraints is then a mere matter of correct functioning of the cognitive system. However, I argue, this is not the only, nor the more plausible way of considering the matter. The context is not a determinate function of situation and task, nor is the outcome of a task a determinate function of a given context: context choice and contextual constraints are irreducibly normative. The norm they obey is sui generis, and goes under the (disreputable) name of intelligence. (shrink)

The notion of malfunction is critical to biological explanation. It provides a test-bed for the normative character of functional attribution. Theories of biological functioning must permit traits to operate but, at the same time, be judged as malfunctioning (in some naturalized, non-arbitrary sense). Whereas malfunctioning has attracted most attention and discussion in evolutionary etiological approaches, systemic and organizational ones have been less discussed. The most influential of the organizational approaches (by Saborido, Moreno and Mossio) takes a dual-order approach to malfunctions, (...) as a set of functions that fit first-order constitutive norms but fail to obey second-order regulatory ones. We argue that this conception is unnecessarily complicated (malfunctions do not need to arise as a result of two conflicting orders of norms) and too narrow (it excludes canonical cases of malfunctioning). We provide an alternative organizational account grounded on viability theory. The dynamics of the traits that constitute an organism define the normative field of its viability space: sugar must be replaced at certain rate, blood must be pumped at a certain pace, etc. A trait operates normatively when its effects on the viability space correlate positively with the normative field. Three senses of dysfunctionality might be distinguished: subfunctional operations are those that positively correlate with the normative field but quantitatively fail to match the required speed; malfunctional operations are those that do not positively correlate with the normative field; and, nonfunctional traits either don’t operate at all or operate with null effect on the normative field. (shrink)

How do socially imposed rules develop into internalized pro-social codes? In the article “From Bodo Ethics to Distributive Justice”, Russell Hardin discusses one of the central themes of his work: How we “export” social order from a small, insular community to a large, anonymous society. In Bodo’s small village, everyone knows everyone else, interactions are face-to-face, and people live relatively isolated from other communities. In this context, the social norms developed by the community are easily enforceable. But what about (...) large, anonymous societies, where monitoring is difficult and costly and sanctioning transgressions carries a greater risk? When unobserved, only someone with an inner motivation to behave in a socially beneficial way will continue to obey the informal rules. How such an inner motivation develops is a topic of debate in moral philosophy and psychology, especially whether pro-social decisions are a matter of rationality or are driven by emotions. Supporters of the emotional drivers of pro-social behavior argue that anger and empathy play an essential role. In this chapter, we will focus on the role of these emotions in compensatory and sanctioning behavior. (shrink)

In this paper I want to present the guiding lines of a research programme into the economics of scientific knowledge, a programme whose ultimate goal is to develop what I would like to call a contractarian epistemology. The structure of the paper is as follows: in the first section I will comment on two conflicting approaches to the topic of rationality in science: the view of the rationality of scientific knowledge as deriving from the employment of sound methodological norms, (...) and the view of scientists as rational agents pursuing the optimisation of their own personal and professional interests. In section 2 I will try to make both approaches mutually consistent by showing that a competition among rational "recognition-seekers" is only possible if they agree in accepting some system of methodological norms. Section 3 will be devoted to analyse the main kinds and properties of these norms. Finally, in section 4 I will discuss a question which is far from being easy and innocent: why are scientific norms obeyed by researchers, once they have been established in a scientific discipline? (shrink)

Norms are tools for manipulating human conduct through the manipulation of our goals and choices. It is impossible to understand the efficacy and working of norms without a modeling of how Ns work in our mind and how do they cut or give us goals. They are built for that. Thus, a sophisticated ontology of goals is necessary. Ns also have goals and have “functions”: a different kind of goal. We do not understand and intend all the functions (...) of Ns. The subject is not supposed or requested to understand even all the goals of Ns and to obey on condition that she agrees and cooperates. Ns also imply a meta-goal about our mind, about the reasons, motives that should induce us to obey; motives that ideally are not sanctions avoidance or convenience. (shrink)

IN THIS ESSAY I EXPLORE THE WAYS IN WHICH OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY functions as a moral norm in evangelical ethics, with the potential of constraining and even endangering the multifaceted nature of Christian morality. I consider two particular sources of moral authority in evangelicalism: the Bible and leaders. I discuss the reasons and ways in which obedience to these two sources of moral authority functions in evangelical ethics and provide an ethical critique to these two moral norms and ethical (...) practices. My primary aim is to expand an understanding of Christian morality that takes seriously the narrative dimensions of Christian ethics, conscience formation, moral agency, and skills in moral discernment. (shrink)

Often, we should obey conventional, or socially constructed, norms. You should tip in America, queue up in England, take your hat off when you enter a church in Italy. But why? Laura Valentini has recently suggested that obeying conventional norms respects the agency of those who support such norms. In this article, I argue that this is not why we should obey conventional norms. Instead, we should think of the moral force of such norms (...) in terms of doing our fair share. This line of thought starts with the idea that we have many weighty collective obligations: obligations to fairly allocate goods, to help people author their own lives, to ensure workers are paid sufficiently for their work. It is very difficult to motivate and coordinate everyone so as to discharge these obligations. But human beings are norm-following creatures—we are strongly disposed to adopt and comply with social norms. So the most reliable means to discharging these collective obligations is to set up and maintain good social norms. Thus, we have a duty to do our fair share toward upholding such norms. Obeying social norms is doing our fair share in promoting the more fundamental moral goals. (shrink)

Why should we obey the rules that constitute a code of conduct? If a rule is justified by conclusive moral reasons, then those reasons are sufficient, from a rational point of view (rather than, sa...

Many philosophers working today on the normativity of language have concluded that linguistic activity is not a matter of rule following. These conversations have been framed by a conception of linguistic normativity with roots in Wittgenstein and Kripke. In this paper I use conceptual resources developed by the classical American pragmatists and their descendants to argue that punctate linguistic acts are governed by rules in a sense that has been neglected in the recent literature on the normativity of language. In (...) the course of arguing for this conclusion I defend a Kantian conception of rationality as rule-obeying activity, and I argue that this conception is compatible with a naturalistic understanding of ourselves as rational beings governed by rules of thought and action. (shrink)

This article aims to make conceptual room for a view about political legitimacy called the power-liability account. The view claims that politi- cal legitimacy is a form of normative power that entails moral liability, but not necessarily a moral claim-right that entails moral duty. The power-liability account supports appealing interpretations of justified civil disobedience in the face of legitimate but unjust law at home and of justified human rights interventions that violate legitimate international law abroad. I argue here only for (...) the conceptual possibility of this view, not for its normative correctness. I believe that the power-liability view indeed is correct, but it often is thought that the view not only is false but also incoherent. Many hold that entailed duty and immunity are built into the meaning of the concept of political legitimacy. My task is to loosen these conceptual strictures. (shrink)

There are two primary approaches to understanding the legitimacy of political institutions: sociological and normative legitimacy. Despite the conceptual distinction between these two approaches, it proves challenging to entirely separate the sociological or subjective aspect from the normative or objective account of legitimacy. Taking the service conception (SC) as a normative standard of legitimacy, this article explores whether it pays due regard to the perceptions of legitimacy prevalent in a political community (sociological legitimacy). In doing so, it argues that sociological (...) legitimacy is relevant to political legitimacy in three different ways: (i) methodologically, (ii) consequently, and (iii) circumstantially. While the methodological connection underscores the role that sociological legitimacy plays in concretising abstract moral reasons, the other connections draw attention to the mutually reinforcing relationship between effectiveness and sociological legitimacy. Consequently, the article suggests seeing SC as a normative filter that allows political communities to obey their political authority for non-instrumental considerations, in particular when they perceive it legitimate when it garners their support and is deemed trustworthy. (shrink)

In The Force of Law, Frederick Schauer maintains that in order to analyze the normative force of the law, one should adopt a particular strategy to ‘isolate’ the effect of laws in determining the behavior of citizens and legal officials. To understand the law’s capacity to motivate human behavior, one should look only at the cases where the law conflicts either with a person’s best moral judgment or her own self-interest in the matter at stake. In these situations, according to (...) the argument developed in the book, it is an empirical fact that people very rarely obey the law merely by deference to its authority. My point in this paper is to discuss and criticize this methodological assumption and draw some implications about the study of the normativity of law. Firstly, I think that Schauer’s argument only makes sense if we accept from the start his own conception of legality, which takes for granted the concept of law defended by exclusive positivism, and the undemonstrated empirical assumption that the people in general and the legal officials also share this conception of legal validity. To counter these hidden assumptions, I argue that exclusive positivism is just one of the plausible forms of explaining the nature of law, and that Schauer’s own reservations against philosophical essentialism provide a reason to resist the conclusion that the law must always be defined in a content-independent way. Secondly, I advocate that Schauer’s strategy to ‘isolate’ the effect of law leaves the ‘core cases ’ of legal provisions out of the realm of jurisprudence. To understand the effect of the law and its capacity to motivate the action of citizens and officials, jurisprudence should neither focus on the individual attitudes towards a legal rule, as Schauer appears to be doing in his book, nor concentrate in the cases where the law comes into conflict with one’s interests or moral convictions. (shrink)

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Valentini searches for a unifying principle that underlies whatever genuine obligations we might have to obey the norms of any and all social practices, ranging from line queueing norms, through offsides rules in soccer, to obligations not to break the law. I argue that this search is driven, and distorted, by a commitment to what Bernard Williams labeled the ‘morality system’. Once we see this, we should question the value of the (...) unifying project. Most social norms can be considered on their own terms, as part of a rich and variegated ethical life, without subsuming them under the question of whether others’ moral rights are at stake. Similarly, political obligation needs to be understood in relation to the practical activity of politics, not as an abstract moral quandary. (shrink)

Definition of the problem “Ulysses contracts” are advance directives by means of which a patient authorizes compulsory treatment for a phase of a temporary inhibition of competence. Ethical discussion of Ulysses contracts usually focuses on the question of the “moral authority” or the “binding force” of Ulysses contracts, i.e., of whether Ulysses contracts should be honored or whether the competent patient’s prospective wishes for compulsory treatment are overridden by the patient’s actual preferences in the situation of treatment. Arguments In this (...) contribution, I argue that, even if the Ulysses contract undoubtedly applies to the actual situation, there may be reasons for not acting upon it. The main argument is that acting in conformity to a Ulysses contract may be justified but nevertheless wrong. After some terminological clarifications, I argue that Ulysses contracts justify the use of compulsory treatment but do not necessarily make it the right course of action. They authorize physicians to act in accordance with the patient’s advance directive and, thereby, protect them from blame and sanctions in case they administer compulsory treatment. Whether compulsory treatment is right or wrong, however, hinges on whether the patient retrospectively consents to it. It may be the case that administering compulsory treatment in conformity to the Ulysses contract is justified but turns out to be wrong if the patient does not retrospectively consent to it. It may also be the case that not obeying the Ulysses contract turns out to be right if the patient retrospectively consents to not following it. Conclusion In view of this, I conclude that Ulysses contracts should not be seen as morally binding and that they should not be made legally binding. They are not normatively on par with other advance directives that relate to, for example, states of dementia. (shrink)

This paper examines Laura Valentini’s attempt to explain political obligations through her account of social norms, her ‘Agency-Respect View’ (ARV). A great strength of ARV is preserving the ‘content-independence’ of political obligations. However, ARV does not mesh well with the moral phenomenology of political obligations. ARV is able to generate moral requirements that are strikingly weak. Accounting for the far stronger moral force of requirements to obey the law requires appealing to law-independent considerations. Valentini’s account of these factors suggests (...) greater explanatory force of an alternative view she dismisses, to which she refers as the ‘deflationary view.’ In addition, among alternative theories that Valentini rejects is one based on the principle of fair play. I respond to Valentini’s criticisms, thereby demonstrating the continuing applicability of fair play. (shrink)

Although most contemporary utilitarians believe that their theory can be held only in a modified form, Sartorius contends that the traditional position, act-utilitarianism, is defensible. He explains the traditional position and defends it against the often made objection that it does not require sufficiently strict adherence to socially valuable legal and moral rules. Act-utilitarianism makes every useful act right, but utility sometimes is maximized if rules are adopted which disallow individually useful violations. If all useful acts are right regardless of (...) any rule they violate, then general rules become nothing more than summary rules or rules of thumb which, in appropriate circumstances, need not be followed. Act-utilitarians need not, according to Sartorius, consider general rules to be only summary ones. Once a rule is seen to be most productive of utility if no exceptions are allowed, the adoption of sanctions to enforce the rule would be justified; when enforced by sanctions, summary rules become genuine social norms because they are capable of directing behavior into desired channels. Besides his account of social norms, Sartorius discusses many other issues related to the utilitarian theory; he criticizes Rawls’ account of distributive justice, provides utilitarian analyses of the obligations to keep promises and obey the law, supports Narveson’s well-known solution to the population problem and discusses how the principle of utility can be vindicated. Because this book deals so clearly with many important issues, it should be read by all those interested in normative ethical theories.—M.G. (shrink)

I argue here that the theoretically central aspect of Stanley Milgram’s “experiments on obedience to authority” continues to elude main current commentators because it does not fit into the current paradigm of Milgram’s studies: the presentation and the justification of a set of rules to the subjects. I argue that taking this fact into account radically changes the interpretation of the subjects’ conduct: they are not submitting to an authority, they are not obeying orders, but they are applying a (...) justified rule. If such is indeed the case, the interpretation of the experiments should not be primarily psychological, but normative. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Berkeley’s Passive Obedience, moral duties are negative and positive as well as civil or legal and natural. Natural duties are from God and therefore valid norms. The supreme civil authority makes civil laws. We must obey the law because loyalty to supreme civil power is one of our natural duties: to be loyal is to obey, which means ‘do not rebel.’ This is a negative duty and as such categorical or unconditional. Positive duties are conditional on conscientious (...) acceptance. I show in detail how this system of norms and duties works. These key ideas have not been studied in detail before. Next, can we criticize Berkeley’s unquestioning acceptance of chattel slavery if we apply his own notion of duties to it? The slave laws are necessarily evil, and hence they, according to Berkeley’s own doctrine, cannot be accepted. But first we need a clear conception of his idea of conscience and, a fortiori, conscientious objection and its legitimate scope. This paper fills the gap and helps us understand Passive Obedience better. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to examine the nature of moral and legal norms in a broader context: first, taking into account logical and methodological assumptions, second, in the perspective of psychology of emotions and legal policy. The basic subject of the research carried out by Leon Petrażycki was represented by law. Originally, it had a psychological character, not an objective, eternal, and unchanging one. To fully understand the genesis and nature of morality and law, Petrażycki addressed the (...) study of mental phenomena, especially emotional experiences. First, however, he developed appropriate rules of logic and scientific methodology. Then he developed a new classification of mental phenomena, among which the fundamental role is played by bilateral (passive-active) emotions. At some stage, emotions begin to cooperate with cognitive processes, first of all with imaginations. Imaginations of acts, such as theft, betrayal, murder, can cause repulsive emotions, and type imaginations, such as truthfulness, charity, justice can evoke apulsive emotions. On the basis of such associations, judgments are created over time, the content of which becomes a basis for fundamental rules of conduct, that is, for norms. There are two fundamentally different types of norms: moral norms and legal norms. The norms of the first type are imperative and represent the nature of validity (they are obeyed), while the norms of the second type are imperative-attributive and they also always entitle someone to something, i.e. they give someone a right. This division determines a fundamental difference between morality and law. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:SCRIPTURAL GROUNDS FOR CONCRETE MORAL NORMS 1. Is JJ1oral Theology Really Theology? 0 BE CHRISTIAN theology moral theology ought to be firmly grounded in the Bible as understood in the living tradition of the Church. Yet the moralist who asks help from the biblicist today is to be met with a host cf objections.1 I will mention eight I have encountered: l) Attempts to develop a biblical theology (...) unified by some central concept such as promise fulfillrnent, salvation history, or liberation have all broken down. The Bible contains many diverse, even contradictory, or at least dialectically opposed theologies and ethical To harmonize them is to distort them.2 1 See Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., The Use of Scriptures in Moral Theology (Readings in Moral Theology No. 4. New York: Paulist, 1984) for a representative selection of essays, and Robert J. DaLy, S.J. in cooperation with.J. A. Fischer, C.M., T. J. Keegan, O.P., A..J. Tambasco, L. J. Topel, S.J., and F. E. Schuele, Christian Biblical Ethfos Ji'rorn Biblical Revelation to Contemporary Christian Praxis, Method and Content {New York: Paulist, 1984) for a more systematic argument.. In these notes these will be referred to as US and CBE. See also William C. Spohn, S.J., What Are '!'hey Saying About Bcriptiire a,nd Ethics? (New York: Paulist, 1983) ; David Kelsey, Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia : Fortress, 1975); and Bruce C. Birch and Larry Rasmussen, Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life (l\finneapolis: Augsburg, 1976). Valuable hermeneutical suggestions ·will be found in Rudolf Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New Testarnent (New York: Seabury, 1973) and the two works of Pierre Grelot, Sens Oh1·etien de l'Ancien Testarnent 2nd ed. (Paris: Desclee, 1962) and Problemes de ilforale JJ'ondarnentale: Un eclairar1e biblique (Paris: Cerf, 1982) and the essa\)'s in :M:. Gilbert, J. L'Hour and,J. Scharbet, Morale et Ancien Testament, (Universite Catholique du Louvain, 1976). 2 See H. G. Reventlow, Problems of Old Testament Theology in the Twen· tieth Cent·ury (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985, pp. 44,65; 125-133, and 1 BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, O.P. 2) The predominant literary form of the Bible which holds it together is narrative. How then can we draw moral principles from such narratives? To treat them as cautionary tales with an obvious moral does great injustice to their psychological richness and moral ambiguity.3 3) The Bible primarily uses not a literal but a symbolic type of language appropriate to the mysteries it reveals. These symbols or images can mold ethical attitudes and affections but they cannot be reduced to literal concrete moral norms without danger of distortion.4 4) Granted that both Testaments contain many prescriptive statements, they are so embedded in their historical contexts and so related to situations that are now obsolete, that it is impossible to believe they oblige us today. Can we really believe that women must be veiled (I Cor 11: 10) or that slaves should obey their masters (Ti 2: 9)? 5 5) The early Church, and perhaps Jesus himself, expected the eschaton within a lifetime. Consequently, the New Testament provides only an " interim ethics " which is useless as a guide in a continuing sinful world.6 6) We read in Ephesians 2: 15 that Jesus "in his own flesh John H. Hayes and Frederick Prussner, Old Testament Theology: Its Nature and Development (Atlanta: John Knox, 1985), especially pp. 254-279 for a discussion of the search for a unifying concept for the Bible and its present status. s James A. Fischer, C.M., "Story and Image", CBE, pp. 156-169. 4 CBE, pp. 289-295. 5 Thus James M. Gustafson, in an influential article, "The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics: A Methodological Study" (US, pp. 151-177) distinguishes the uses of Scripture as moral law, as moral ideal, as moral analogy, and finally what he calls its "loose" use to inspire reflection on current problems. He is especially critical of the first method and gives preference to the last. s" To put the matter most sharply, Jesus does not provide a valid ethics for today. His... (shrink)

According to Pariente-Butterlin’s interpretive hypothesis, the level of explicit laws cannot represent the paradigm of the norm. In other words, the construction of normativity refers to an implicit dimension which sheds light on its explicit workings. In this sense, one can grant that conduct is not an expression of the law. This point of view completely displaces the problematic pertaining to the determination of a possible meaning in the production of conducts, for « how is it that we obey legal (...) rules whose existence we are unaware of? » In most of our actions, we do not regulate our conduct according to the value and injunction of the law. This implies that even our relation to laws implies an implicit reference to norms. Hence it becomes conceivable that forms of resistance or acceptance of laws be understood as modalities of action or conduct falling under the implicit horizon of normativity. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers of law believe that one of the central problems of the field is that of explaining the normativity of law. But it is not clear that this is a problem at all, or at least that it is different from the problems that have been exhaustively addressed and analyzed for generations. Once we deconstruct the alleged problem of normativity into its component parts, we can appreciate that legal normativity is either conditional, or is instead but a small (...) variation on age-old questions about the moral obligation, if any, to obey the law simply because of its status as law. There are interesting modern versions of these positions, but in the final analysis David Enoch is correct in labeling the problem of legal normativity as a “pseudo-problem.”. (shrink)

Gaski (1999) is critical of marketing ethics and suggests that its ethical guidelines amount to no more than "obey the law" and "act in your self-interest". This reply questions Gaski''s critique and clarifies possible misconceptions about the field that might otherwise result. It identifies the limitations and assumptions of Gaski''s argument and shows that there are exceptions to his central proposition even when narrowly circumscribed. It is not disputed that there is merit to reminding managers of their obligations to obey (...) the law and to act in their enlightened self-interest. However, although fulfilling these obligations is generally a necessary requirement for good conduct, it is not sufficient. There are situations where ethics demands more of marketing managers than "obey the law" and "act in your self-interest". In addition, managers may face situations where ethics, the law and self-interest are inconsistent. The article incorporates observations on the role of normative marketing ethics, including the requirement to develop ethical theory for marketing as well as ethical guidelines. (shrink)

In liberal political philosophy, a prevalent view holds that groups are typically voluntary associations. Members of voluntary associations can accept, revise or reject group practices as a matter of choice. In this article, I challenge this view. Appealing to the concept of joint commitment developed in philosophy of social science, I argue that individuals who jointly commit their wills to a goal or a belief form a ‘We’-group. Members of ‘We’-groups are under an obligation to defer to ‘Our’ will embodied (...) in ‘Our’ norms as a matter of course. I further show the ubiquity of We-groups. This joint commitment account of group authority raises a much-overlooked question of group legitimacy: Do members have good reasons to obey norms of their group? I show that state-centric views of legitimacy are inapt to answer it. A group-centric view, revived from the old communitarian literature, is defended. (shrink)

How important is the concept of solidarity in our society's calculus of consent as regards the legitimacy and ethical and political support for public health, health policy, and health services? By the term “calculus of consent,” we refer to the answer that people give to rationalize and justify their obedience to laws, rules, and policies that benefit others. The calculus of consent answers questions such as, Why should I care? Why should I help? Why should I contribute to the public (...) provision of others? Consent here does not have to be a deliberate, explicit act of informed agreement. And a calculus does not have to be a quantifiable, quasimathematical operation; more often, such a calculus takes narrative form in stories that a society tells about itself and that individuals tell about their place in it. One vital function of bioethics is to inform and shape those stories. Bioethics has the potential to offer society a keener insight into and perception of what is ethically at stake in controversies concerning health, science, and society. This insight is what we shall refer to as a “moral imagination,” by which we do not mean make-believe or fantasy but, rather, the capacity to take a critical distance from the given, to think reality otherwise. The moral imagination enables one to see connections between factors at work in history, in large social and communal structures, and in the shape of one's own life, thoughts, and feelings. Here we are especially concerned with the contribution that the concept of solidarity can make to the moral imagination of bioethics. We contend that solidarity must become more widely active and explicit in bioethics analysis and argumentation as it endeavors to shape reasons for obeying norms and rules of common benefit in an open, diverse society. (shrink)

This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents.

A prominent way of justifying civil disobedience is to postulate a pro tanto duty to obey the law and to argue that the considerations that ground this duty sometimes justify forms of civil disobedience. However, this view entails that certain kinds of uncivil disobedience are also justified. Thus, either a) civil disobedience is never justified or b) uncivil disobedience is sometimes justified. Since a) is implausible, we should accept b). I respond to the objection that this ignores the fact that (...) civil disobedience enjoys a special normative status on account of instantiating certain special features: nonviolence, publicity, the acceptance of legal consequences, and conscientiousness. I then show that my view is superior to two rivals: the view that we should expand the notion of civility and that civil disobedience, expansively construed, is uniquely appropriate; and the view that uncivil disobedience is justifiable in but only in unfavorable conditions. (shrink)

Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards are not intrinsically reason-providing in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sanction for violations. This chapter develops a novel account of the normativity of (...) formal standards where the role they play in our practical lives explains a distinctive kind of reason to obey them. We have this kind of reason to be polite because etiquette is important to us. We also have this kind of reason to be moral because morality is important to us. This parallel suggests that the importance we assign to morality is insufficient to justify it being substantive. (shrink)

Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards are not intrinsically reason-providing (or “substantive”) in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sanction for violations. This chapter develops a novel account of the (...) normativity of formal standards where the role they play in our practical lives explains a distinctive kind of reason to obey them. We have this kind of reason to be polite because etiquette is important to us. We also have this kind of reason to be moral because morality is important to us. This parallel suggests that the importance we assign to morality is insufficient to justify it being substantive. (shrink)

How should you decide what to do when you’re uncertain about basic normative principles? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order:" norm: e.g., obey the most probable norm or maximize expected choiceworthiness. But what if you’re uncertain about second-order norms too—must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty appears doomed to a vicious regress. This paper aims to rescue second-order norms from the threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend (...) the claim some philosophers have made that the regress problem forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm is incumbent on all agents regardless of their normative beliefs. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order norms, thus closing off any question of how agents should respond to normative uncertainty. Rather, we can head off the threat of regress by ascribing external force to a single second-order norm: the enkratic principle. (shrink)

This chapter rethinks the legitimacy of international law by challenging the assumption that legitimate authority must generate a moral duty to obey. It argues instead that legitimacy is better understood as a moral power to impose and enforce institutional obligations, rendering subjects liable to changes in their normative situation, rather than as the source of exclusionary reasons for compliance. The chapter criticizes the dominant service conception for producing a piecemeal account of international legal authority, particularly through subject fragmentation that undermines (...) equality and coordination. Furthermore, it struggles to guide action under conditions of reasonable disagreement and risks entrenching global power asymmetries. By contrast, the power-liability account shifts attention from obligations to obey particular directives to liability to be bound by an institutional order as a whole. This shift supports a systemic and relational approach to legitimacy, on which international legal authority cannot be assessed at the level of individual rules or institutions, but must be evaluated in light of the interdependencies among legal regimes, international institutions, and states. The chapter concludes that recent erosions of multilateralism, human rights protection, and constraints on the use of force point to a deeper legitimacy crisis of the international legal order. (shrink)

In this paper, I take issue with Arthur Isak Applbaum’s power-liability view of political legitimacy. In contrast to the traditional view that legitimate rule entails a moral duty to obey, here called the right-duty view, Applbaum argues that political legitimacy is a moral power that entails moral liability for the subjects of political rule. According to Applbaum, the power-liability view helps us explain how responsible citizens in some cases can act contrary to law while still recognizing the claims of law. (...) Against Applbaum’s attempt at establishing the power-liability view through conceptual analysis, I argue that we cannot specify the moral implications of de jure legitimacy without considering the moral argument that justifies the right to rule. I further argue that Applbaum’s normative account of political legitimacy implies commitment to a normative idea that forms the basis of a strong case in favor of the right-duty view. Finally, I argue that the present defense of the right-duty view has resources to account for the moral phenomena that prompt Applbaum’s advocacy of the power-liability view. (shrink)

Normative literature on the Catalan crisis is largely occupied with the conflict’s central legalistic problem: can political units like Catalonia be allowed to split off from Spain unilaterally? This article reframes the issue and asks why secessionist Catalans should ever abide by Spanish legal constraints, given that Spanish law is precisely the institution they are politically trying to get rid of. It focuses on the anti-secessionist role played by the Spanish Constitutional Court between 2010 and 2017 and studies three arguments (...) why Catalans supposedly have to accept the Court’s authority. The article contends that two arguments—the “mutual benefit argument” and the “law and democracy” argument—will not be independently persuasive to Catalan secessionists. Instead, the Constitutional Court’s authority must ultimately be grounded in a different type of argument: the “law and order argument.” Secessionist Catalans’ supposed duty to obey the orders of the Constitutional Court is ultimately not rooted in a positive service provided by the Court, but in the disruptive effects of disobeying. That exposes an explanatory defect in Joseph Raz’s influential theory of authority, which seeks to ground authority exercises in a concept in prior reason or their capacity to make our life better. That conceptualization misses the key decisionistic element to political authority: its capacity to constitute our reasons, that is, to define the terms that give meaning to our evaluations. (shrink)