Through reading the early work of Walter Benjamin—up to and including the Trauerspiel, author Monad Rrenban elicits a cohesive conception of the wild, inforgettable form, philosophy, as inherent in everything. This book, distinct in its analysis and depth of analysis, elaborates the wild, unforgettable form—philosophy in relation to language, the discipline and the practice of philosophy, criticism, and the politics of death.

This contribution aims to study the late husserlian conception of monad based on a phenomenological interpretation of the Leibnizian appetitus. The study of transcendental subjectivity as a monad provides an opportunity for Husserl to explore phenomenologicals problems such as the relation between time and instinct in the origin of organic life and therefore the individuation of the ego. This axe of research entail to consider the development of the ego in a genetic way, where passive shynthesis and instincts (...) build the deepest dimension of the ego life, and where the ego itself finds his individuation in constant dialogue with the hyletic side of life. In particular, Husserl’s latest analyses try to think of the individuation of transcendental subjectivity as self-objectification of the monad into a personal ego, that is, as an associative temporalization based on instinctual intentionality. In this way phenomenology discovers new domains of investigation such as the connection and biogeneration of life in the notion of phylogenesis and the emergence of consciousness as ontogenesis. The monad makes possible to think about these questions within a philosophical-transcendental horizon, allowing a dialogue with the life sciences without, however, naturalizing intentional subjectivity. (shrink)

The article is a critical notice of Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad. Garber presents a developmental reading of Leibniz's metaphysics that focuses on Leibniz's evolving analysis of body and force as the key to his account of substance. Garber claims that Leibniz shifts from an early theory of body to a theory of corporeal substance in his middle years, and only develops a theory of monads in his later writings—and that even then Leibniz looks not to abandon the (...) scheme of corporeal substances but to reconcile it with that of monads. The present article considers several challenges to Garber's interpretation, questioning, among other things, Garber's claims about development and Garber's account of Leibniz's primary arguments for the theory of monads. The article concludes that while crucial elements of the standard interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist can be defended against Garber's critique, the original traditional view that takes the theory of monads as the first and most fundamental principle of Leibniz's metaphysics is no longer sustainable. (shrink)

In this article I try to illustrate the reasons why Husserl included such a metaphysically challenging concept as the monad in his phenomenology. I will first offer a brief historical reconstruction of that path that led Husserl to such an introduction, and then focus on some key features of the Husserlian monad (immortality and unbornness, epistemic substantiality, plurality of monads, and uniqueness of the objective world). I will finally turn to a reflection concerning the phenomenological tenability of Husserlian (...) monadology and weigh its merits and shortcomings. (shrink)

The chapter makes the case for considering the notion of monad or concrete subject as Husserl develops it in the Cartesian Meditations as the actual reply to Heidegger’s own analytics of Dasein. More specifically, three dimensions of the monad’s concreteness are identified: the monad’s worldly concreteness; its historical concreteness; and its ontological form of concreteness. The chapter also claims that the way in which Husserl presents his transcendental idealism in §41 of the Cartesian Meditations should be construed (...) as a direct consequence of his conception of the monad and in contrast to the idea of “pure consciousness” first presented in Ideas I. (shrink)

Daniel Garber’s Leibniz: Body, Substance and Monad . When I first entered graduate school Dan’s previous book Descartes’s Metaphysical Physics had recently appeared, and it made a huge and lasting impression on me. All of a sudden I saw Descartes’s project in a much different, more intriguing light. This Garber fella had managed to open up a new area of Descartes’s thought to me, to tease out with great care his philosophical arguments, and to situate both in a broader (...) historical context in which they seemed to me at least much more at home. In short, Dan’s Descartes’s book is one of the main reasons why I work on Leibniz. And now we have his rich, learned, and provocative book on Leibniz to wrestle with. I am certain that it will similarly inspire another generation of early modern scholars as well – hopefully they won’t all be moved to work on Kant! (shrink)

The present paper explores the development of Lotman’s cultural semiotics from the point of view of the history of ideas. Focusing on the notion of “semiotic monad,” coined by Lotman in 1989 as the “minimally functioning structure” of culture, in the first part of the paper we will explore the origin of this unique term. We will present as its main source a 1967 epistolary between British historian Arnold Toynbee and Soviet Orientologist Nikolaj I. Konrad, where the term ‘ (...) class='Hi'>monad’ is referenced in relation to the notion of ‘culture’. In the second part of the paper, we will reconstruct Konrad’s influence on Lotman’s theory of culture and translation. (shrink)

포스트휴머니즘은 인간의 위상과 의미에 대해 새롭게 고찰하면서 전통적 휴머니즘에서의 인간관과는 전적으로 구별되는 현대의 기술시대에 적합한 새로운 포스트휴먼 개념을 정립하고자 한다. 기존의 휴머니즘에 대해 비판적인 태도를 취하면서 포스트휴먼의 존재의미를 인간과 비인간과의 혼합적 관계 속에서 찾고자 하는 브라이도티의 포스트휴머니즘 이론은 인간과 세계와의 관계 속에서 인간의 의미를 새롭게 정립하고자 한다는 점에서 현상학적 관점에서 의미를 지닌다. 현상학은 주체와 세계와의 긴밀한 관계성에 기반해 이 세계의 의미를 밝히고자 한다는 점에서 브라이도티의 이론과 그 구조와 형식면에서 공통성을 보이며, 브라이도티 이론과의 긴밀한 연관성을 드러낸다. 특히 후설의 모나드공동체 이론은 모나드 (...) 개념을 통해 모든 존재 간의 긴밀한 연관성과 공동체성을 다양한 각도에서 드러내고 있다는 점에서 브라이도티 이론과의 근접성을 드러냄과 동시에, 그녀의 이론을 방법론적으로 보완하면서 이를 보다 구체화하고 심화, 확장시킬 수 있는 하나의 발판으로 해석할 수 있다. 이러한 점에서 후설과 브라이도티는 방법론적 관점과 태도의 면에서 공감대를 지니며 향후 생산적인 논의를 위한 공통의 토대를 공유할 수 있다. (shrink)

Throughout his life, Jurij Lotman lived at the crossroad between different worlds, ages, and cultures. The many authors, cultures, and ideas that shaped his thought and influenced his theories are scattered at either side of countless geographical, political, and cultural borders, beginning with the one that separates “Russian culture” from “European culture,” porous and ambiguous as any boundary.The task of reconstructing how Lotman’s ideas came to being, how they shifted their meaning as their context shifted, is more and more a (...) crucial task not only for the historian. Many Lotmanian concepts, first and foremost that of semiosphere, are acquiring major relevance not only for semiotics itself and its branches, such as the rising political semiotics, but also for many neighboring disciplines, such as cultural studies and political sciences. Therefore, gaining a better understanding of the meaning of Lotman’s ideas could be of value also for the applied semiotician or the political analyst.The present paper is the result of research started in the Lotman Archives in Tallin, Estonia. Through an analysis of archival material, it aims at reconstructing the origins and meaning of the most political tropes of Lotman’s theories, especially what I will call his theory of the political subject. In the first part, I will argue that, in order to understand this political aspect of Lotman, it is necessary to take into consideration the intellectual debates inside which the author started his intellectual journey in 1930s–1940s Soviet Russia, and how he sought answers to those debates in the works of G. W. Leibniz.In the final part of the paper, I will try to show how this reconstruction of Lotman’s history could contribute to the contemporary debate in semiotics and other connected disciplines. (shrink)

It is well known that the modern atomists assumed the ancient thesis that things are composed of simple entities. It is also known that Leibniz went beyond atomism, since he affirmed that the true substances on which things are founded, the so-called monads, cannot be divisible or extended, for they are souls. For Christian Wolff, the elements of bodies are not extended; these elements have no figure and no magnitude whatsoever, they fill no space and are indivisible. In the Monadologia (...) physica, published in 1756, Kant also argues that the ultimate principles of bodies are the monads or simple substances. The goal of this work is to reconcile the confronted positions of “metaphysics” and “geometry”. (shrink)

Questions about Leibniz's views on the ontological status of the corporeal world have been at the center of debate in Leibniz scholarship for more than two decades. One of the major players in these debates has been Daniel Garber. Having sketched his influential position in a number of articles over the years, he now gives full expression to his view in this highly anticipated and long-awaited book.

The basic concepts 'person' (Person), I/self (Ich) and 'subject' (Subjekt) structuring the Russian discourse of personhood (Personalität) developed during the philosophical discussions of the 1820s-1840s. The development occurred in the course of an intense reception of German Idealism and Romanticism. Characteristic of this process is that the modern meaning of personhood going back to the theological and natural-law interpretations of the person in Western Europe does not exist in the Russian cultural consciousness. Therefore the Russian concepts of personhood demonstrate the (...) influence of the semantic innovations of Romanticism. Correspondingly, the semantic core of the Russian discourses on personhood is not the idea of an 'autonomous person' but that of an 'unique individuality'. Here, personhood is not the indefeasible attribute of every man, but the mark of inimitable individuality. Accordingly, the basic distinction underlying the discourse on personhood in Russia is not the differentiation between 'person' and ' thing' as in the European tradition, but the distinction between 'individual' and (anonymous) 'community'. Also, in the meaning of the concept of I/self the dominant differentiation is not that between I/self (Ich) and not-I/not-self (Nicht-Ich), but that between I and We. This discourse on personhood centring on the idea of individuality took form in Russia starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, in particular in aesthetics, psychology, and educational theory, as well as in the philosophy of history. The comparative intercultural analysis of the history of concepts pertaining to personhood in the German-Russian cultural transfer brings to light the dialectic of European modernity in which a degree of tension is visible between the idea of personal autonomy and individuality. (shrink)

Many scholars hold that Leibniz's monads are not located in space at all, and some attribute situations to simple substances directly. A more nuanced position is that monads have a situation only indirectly, namely through the situation of their bodies. It has been objected, however, that this intermediate position is untenable since it involves a viciously circular argument. Leibniz is clear that the situation is the basis for the extension. But if a substance is situated only through its own (extended) (...) body, then the situation would appear to presuppose the extension of the body. Thus extension presupposes situation, but the situation would presuppose extension. In this paper (1) we present textual evidence that Leibniz did indeed hold that monads are situated via their own bodies; (2) we suggest that, even if what is properly speaking situated are (extended) bodies, there is no circularity in holding that the extension of a body results from the mutual situations of its parts: a non-vicious infinite regress of explanations in terms of extended parts is possible; and (3) we defend this solution against a possible objection. (shrink)

Cappelen and Hawthorne present a powerful critique of fashionable relativist accounts of truth, and the foundational ideas in semantics on which the new relativism draws. They argue compellingly that the contents of thought and talk are propositions that instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth and falsity.

Monadic MV-algebras are an algebraic model of the predicate calculus of the Łukasiewicz infinite valued logic in which only a single individual variable occurs. GMV-algebras are a non-commutative generalization of MV-algebras and are an algebraic counterpart of the non-commutative Łukasiewicz infinite valued logic. We introduce monadic GMV-algebras and describe their connections to certain couples of GMV-algebras and to left adjoint mappings of canonical embeddings of GMV-algebras. Furthermore, functional MGMV-algebras are studied and polyadic GMV-algebras are introduced and discussed.

The variety MBA of monadic bounded algebras consists of Boolean algebras with a distinguished element E, thought of as an existence predicate, and an operator ∃ reflecting the properties of the existential quantifier in free logic. This variety is generated by a certain class FMBA of algebras isomorphic to ones whose elements are propositional functions. We show that FMBA is characterised by the disjunction of the equations ∃E = 1 and ∃E = 0. We also define a weaker notion of (...) "relatively functional" algebra, and show that every member of MBA is isomorphic to a relatively functional one. (shrink)

One of the main obstacles for panpsychism, the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, is the difficulty of explaining how simple subjects could combine to form complex subjects. Known as the subject combination problem, it poses a possibly insurmountable challenge to the view. In this paper, I will assume that this challenge cannot be overcome and instead present a version of panpsychism that completely avoids talk of combination. Inspired by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s metaphysics of monads, I will focus on (...) a relational explanation of how simple subjects could constitute complex experiences, without them having to combine in virtue of their subjectivity. I call this view monadic panpsychism. Additionally, my proposal will not rely on emergence and so it will circumvent problems commonly faced by emergentist accounts. As I will argue, monadic panpsychism is preferable to combinatory and emergentist panpsychism because it faces a significantly less worrisome set of objections. Apart from being unaffected by the seemingly insuperable issue of subject combination, I will demonstrate that monadic panpsychism also has tools to address other kinds of the combination problem. That alone justifies the need for a new formulation of panpsychism, one which faces unique difficulties but also offers unique solutions. (shrink)

Aiming for applications in monadic second-order model theory, we study first-order theories without definable pairing functions. Our main results concern forking-properties of sequences of indiscernibles. These turn out to be very well-behaved for the theories under consideration.

In this paper we extend Mundici’s functor Γ to the category of monadic MV-algebras. More precisely, we define monadic ℓ -groups and we establish a natural equivalence between the category of monadic MV-algebras and the category of monadic ℓ -groups with strong unit. Some applications are given thereof.

This chapter offers a novel account of how to understand Leibniz’s views on compossibility when applied to infinite worlds constituted by unextended, immaterial substances or ‘monads’. The first section sets the stage by taking up some essential questions about the relationship between monads and space. The second section argues that—with a better understanding of that relationship—it is possible to see how the so-called ‘packing strategy’ can be applied quite directly, even intuitively, to monadic worlds and substances. The third section argues (...) that thinking through the application of the packing strategy to monadic worlds highlights an important, neglected Leibnizian commitment and reveals surprising affinities between the packing strategy and recent cosmological interpretations. (shrink)

In this new work, Richard T. W. Arthur offers a fresh interpretation of Leibniz's theory of substance. He goes against a long trend of idealistic interpretations of Leibniz's thought by instead taking seriously Leibniz's claim of introducing monads to solve the problem of the composition of matter and motion.

In this paper we extend Mundici's functor? to the category of monadic MV- algebras. More precisely, we define monadic?- groups and we establish a natural equivalence between the category of monadic MV- algebras and the category of monadic?- groups with strong unit. Some applications are given thereof.

In our paper, monadic modal pseudocomplemented De Morgan algebras are considered following Halmos’ studies on monadic Boolean algebras. Hence, their topological representation theory is used successfully. Lattice congruences of an mmpM is characterized and the variety of mmpMs is proven semisimple via topological representation. Furthermore and among other things, the poset of principal congruences is investigated and proven to be a Boolean algebra; therefore, every principal congruence is a Boolean congruence. All these conclusions contrast sharply with known results for monadic (...) De Morgan algebras. Finally, we show that the above results for mmpM are verified for monadic tetravalent modal algebras. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Kant’s investigation of the nature of bodies, although it was largely based on Newtonian science, was more dependent on notions and debates in German logic and metaphysics. In section 1, I introduce the role of material substance in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, arguing that the systematic framework of Kant’s “metaphysics of corporeal nature” cannot be described as a “foundation of Newtonian philosophy” and is best understood in the context of the reception of (...) Newton’s physics in Wolffian metaphysics. In section 2, I analyze the crucial role of monads, monadology and materialism in the development of Kant’s dynamics. In section I3, I address Kant’s “continuum” theory of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations, pointing out that it depended on non-Newtonian (or post-Newtonian) models. In section 4, I examine the methodological background of Kant’s critique of the “solidity” of bodies, tracing it back to Kant’s earlier debate on the method of science and metaphysics with Johann Heinrich Lambert. (shrink)

This paper examines a widely accepted reading of monads as the most fundamental elements of reality. Garber [Leibniz – Body, Substance, Monad, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009] argues that simple monads – seen as mind-like atoms without parts and extension – replace the corporeal substance of Leibniz’s middle period. Phemister [Leibniz and the Natural World – Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy, Dordrecht: Springer, 2005] argues that monads figure also at the top as complete corporeal substances. Building (...) on Fichant [‘L’invention métaphysique’ in G.W. Leibniz, Discours de métaphysique suivi de Monadologie et autres textes, edited by Michel Fichant, Paris: Gallimard, 2004], I argue that, for Leibniz, monads function not only as building blocks at the bottom level of composition but also at the top, as grounding the unity and hence the being of complete substances and organic unities. Since organic unities or living beings are seen by Leibniz as natural machines with a nested structure, and since monads are likened to living beings, this would imply that the use of the concept ‘monad’ holds not only at the bottom, and not only at the top, but all over the range between them. (shrink)

This article discusses the final development of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s metaphysics: the theory of monads. It examines Leibniz’s arguments for monads as mindlike “simple substances,” his description of the properties of monads, and the distinction he draws among different types of monads. The remainder of the article focuses on two problems that attend Leibniz’s claim that reality ultimately consists solely of monads and their internal states (perceptions and appetitions). The first problem is whether a relation among monads can account for (...) the supposed unity of a living body or corporeal substance; the second is whether the metaphysics of monads supports a plausible explanation of the reality of matter. With regard to the second problem, the article explores Leibniz’s thesis that monads are, in two senses, “requisites” of matter. It concludes with reflections on the limits of his attempt to explain the physical world in terms of monads alone. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce the variety of algebras, which we call monadic k×j\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$k\times j$$\end{document}-rough Heyting algebras. These algebras constitute an extension of monadic Heyting algebras and in 3×2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$3\times 2$$\end{document} case they coincide with monadic 3-valued Łukasiewicz–Moisil algebras. Our main interest is the characterization of simple and subdirectly irreducible monadic k×j\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$k\times j$$\end{document}-rough Heyting algebras. (...) In order to this, an Esakia-style duality for these algebras is developed. (shrink)

The main purpose of this work is to introduce the class of the monadic dynamic algebras (dynamic algebras with one quantifier). Similarly to a theorem of Kozen we establish that every separable monadic dynamic algebra is isomorphic to a monadic (possibly non‐standard) Kripke structure. We also classify the simple (monadic) dynamic algebras. Moreover, in the dynamic duality theory, we analyze the conditions under which a hemimorphism of a dynamic algebra into itself defines a quantifier. (© 2006 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & (...) Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

We define and study monadic MV-algebras as pairs of MV-algebras one of which is a special case of relatively complete subalgebra named m-relatively complete. An m-relatively complete subalgebra determines a unique monadic operator. A necessary and sufficient condition is given for a subalgebra to be m-relatively complete. A description of the free cyclic monadic MV-algebra is also given.

This paper reconstructs Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz’s understanding of logic, accentuating the differences in his evaluation of logic and systems of ‘logistics’. Leśniewski’s theory of collective sets (mereology) exemplifies logistics as understood by Witkiewicz. I present an outline of Leśniewski’s nominalism, which entails a belief in a non-abstract nature of sets. I focus on these features of mereology that could have led Witkiewicz to interpreting it as an ontological system. Witkacy (Witkiewicz’s penname) was skeptical of the usefulness of formal systems (or (...) logistics), and of mereology in particular, for the purposes of designing a unified ontological system describing essential properties of objects (the world). According to Witkiewicz, such formal systems assumed the role of ontology but severely lacked in philosophical justification. I argue that regardless of his nominalism and corporeal conception of individuals, mereology cannot be considered a formal theory of Witkiewicz’s monads. (shrink)

In this paper, we are concerned with the development of a general set theory using the single axiom version of Leśniewski’s mereology. The specification of mereology, and further of Tarski’s geometry of solids will rely on the Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC). In the first part, we provide a specification of Leśniewski’s mereology as a model for an atomless Boolean algebra using Clay’s ideas. In the second part, we interpret Leśniewski’s mereology in monadic second-order logic using names and develop a (...) full version of mereology referred to as CIC-based Monadic Mereology (λ-MM) allowing an expressive theory while involving only two axioms. In the third part, we propose a modeling of Tarski’s solid geometry relying on λ-MM. It is intended to serve as a basis for spatial reasoning. All parts have been proved using a translation in type theory. (shrink)