Core sustainability issues concerning the governance of seeds revolve around knowledge aspects, such as intellectual property rights over genetic information or the role of traditional knowledge in plant breeding, seed production and seed use. While the importance of knowledge management for efficient and equitable seed governance has been emphasized in the scientific discourse on Seed Commons, knowledge aspects have not yet been comprehensively studied. With this paper, we aim to (i) to analyze the governance of (...) class='Hi'>knowledge aspects in both global and local/regional Seed Commons, (ii) to highlight disconnections in knowledge governance between the local Seed Commons and global governance of plant genetic resources, and (iii) to investigate the contribution of knowledge commoning to environmentally sustainable and culturally adapted food systems. For this purpose, we will analyze knowledge governance by the International Seed Treaty (ITPGRFA) and by two local Seed Commons, a Philippine farmer-led network and a German organic-breeding association. We take the analytical lens of commoning, focusing on social practices rather than specific resources. The main challenges include finding institutional arrangements, which fruitfully integrate aspects from both traditional and scientific knowledge systems, taking into account the complex interrelation between knowledge-related, material and cultural aspects of seeds. (shrink)

Carnal Knowledge is an outcome of the renewed energy and interest in moving beyond the discursive construction of reality to understand the relationship between what is conceived of as reality and materiality, described as the "material turn." It draws together established and emerging writers, whose research spans dance, music, film, fashion, design, photography, literature, painting and stereo-immersive VR, to demonstrate how art allows us to map the complex relations between nature and culture, between the body, language and (...) class='Hi'>knowledge. These writings are unique in the field because they represent the authors' commitment to a new materialism through the creative arts. The questions they address include: Does the material turn in the creative arts take a different turn from continental epistemology, philosophy and the humanities? How does the agency of matter, the material nature of artistic practice and the notion of "truth to materials" affect what we understand as the "new materialism?" In engaging with these questions the book offers perspectives on the emergence of this exciting fresh field of new materialism. (shrink)

Materialism/physicalism that generally dominates in the contemporary analytic philosophy is challenged by fairly powerful anti-materialist arguments, notably the zombie argument (most influentially defended by David Chalmers) and the knowledge argument (the most widely discussed version of which was advanced and defended by Frank Jackson). These arguments highlight the explanatory gap from the physical (which, if materialism is true, should constitute everything that exists, including consciousness) to phenomenal mental states, the principal impossibility to explain the latter by the former, and (...) from this conclude that phenomenal consciousness is not physical, and so materialism is false. Materialist philosophers attempt to neutralize these arguments in several ways, the most influential of which is the strategy of phenomenal concepts. This article analyzes the main points of this debate with a focus on the knowledge argument, examines and responds to the main objections to the knowledge argument — that it should be mistaken because the alternative is epiphenomenalism, which is unacceptable; that no new knowledge but only new capacities and/or acquaintance are involved; that the knowledge is the same but in different forms; that the knowledge argument affects only type physicalism but not token physicalism. The case is made that psychophysical identities assumed by a posteriori physicalism are unexplainable in principle, and the postulation of brute unexplainable psychophysical identities glossed over by the strategy of phenomenal concepts amounts to dogmatic commitment (motivated by scientism) to a view despite its apparent falsity and its unintelligibility (the impossibility to explain how it can be true), made less unpalatable by offering an ad hoc theory about the mindbrain arrangement that makes us unable to see how the view can be true. As opposed to this, the position of the supporters of the knowledge argument and the zombie argument can be seen as guided by the principle of rational trust in obviousness and our capacities of judgement. (shrink)

The project of the paper is a critical examination of the "strong thesis of eliminative materialism" in the philosophy of mind--The claim that all the mental entities that constitute the framework of commonsense psychology are, In principle at least, Eliminable from our ontology. The central conclusion reached is that the traditional formulation of this thesis is demonstrably untenable as it rests on a mistaken view of the relationship between our psychological self-Knowledge and language.

Susan Hekman believes we are witnessing an intellectual sea change. The main features of this change are found in dichotomies between language and reality, discourse and materiality. Hekman proposes that it is possible to find a more intimate connection between these pairs, one that does not privilege one over the other. By grounding her work in feminist thought and employing analytic philosophy, scientific theory, and linguistic theory, Hekman shows how language and reality can be understood as an indissoluble unit. In (...) this broadly synthetic work, she offers a new interpretation of questions of science, modernism, postmodernism, and feminism so as to build knowledge of reality and extend how we deal with nature and our increasingly diverse experiences of it. (shrink)

In his unpublished 1979 Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, Saul Kripke offers a knowledge argument against materialism focusing on deaf people who lack knowledge of auditory experience. Kripke's argument is a precursor of Frank Jackson's better‐known knowledge argument against materialism (1982). The paper sets out Kripke's argument, brings out its interest and philosophical importance, and explores some similarities and differences between Kripke's knowledge argument and Jackson's.

New materialism, in contrast to classical materialism's approach which treats matter as a passive and inert element, argues that matter, technology, and non-human actors play an active and constitutive role in knowledge production processes. In digital age, processes of knowledge production, control, and circulation are being reshaped through algorithmic systems; this raises ethical issues such as transparency, accountability, and justice. This research examines transformation of knowledge production, ethical responsibility, and understanding of the subject in digital age from (...) a sociological perspective within the theoretical framework of new materialism. In this context, the research questions the limitations of anthropocentric epistemological models and argues that knowledge is a relational process that emerges from the interaction of multiple actors. The theoretical framework of the research is based on Karen Barad's active realism approach, Rosi Braidotti's posthuman ethics understanding, and Bruno Latour's actor-network theory. This study, conducted using a qualitative research method, analyzed data obtained from semi-structured interviews with academics studying in the fields of philosophy and religious studies using thematic analysis. The findings demonstrate that artificial intelligence, algorithms, and digital networks are not merely technical tools, but have become active non-human actors in information production, social action, and ethical decision-making processes. Participants' opinions reveal that the subject-object distinction is increasingly blurred, and ethical responsibility has become a distributed structure between human and non-human actors. Consequently, the research emphasizes that in digital age, knowledge should be considered not merely a mental activity, but a holistic production process with material, technological, and ethical dimensions. In this respect, the study will offer an original contribution to both new materialism literature and the discussions on digital transformation, ethics, and the sociology of knowledge. (shrink)

This special issue presents six research papers that were developed within the Taiwanese-German working group “Materialities of Medical Cultures in/between Europe and East Asia.” Our working group uses the concept of “in/between” as an umbrella term to study the cultural history of drugs and the practices of medicine and care. This issue's articles address the question of how drugs and medical knowledge emerged from the various in/between spaces created by encounters between East Asian and European medical cultures. Their focus (...) is on the entanglements of matters and knowledge in the contexts of mission and colonialism, the production of medicinal substances and helminthology, as well as on premodern knowledge cultures concerning childbirth and the preparation and consumption of animals with a medicinal background. The contributions present a comparative perspective on material and knowledge cultures surrounding medical materials from plants, animals, and humans. In this introduction, we summarize the discussions within our Taiwan-German working group as case studies on how scholars of East Asian and European studies can meet under the “in/between” umbrella term as a productive approach to an interdisciplinary and comparative history of knowledge. (shrink)

Estuaries, the dynamic transitional zones where rivers converge with oceans, represent complex ecosystems characterized by the mixing of fresh and saltwater, resulting in what is known as brackish water. These coastal interfaces, along with tidal flats and other littoral features, embody a unique duality, existing as neither fully terrestrial nor entirely marine environments. This ambiguous nature poses significant challenges for scientific inquiry when coastal regions become the focus of study. Inspired by Stefan Helmreich’s (2011) call to ‘think with seawater’, we (...) propose the concept of “brackish knowledge” as a way to engage with knowledge practices that are entangled with both the material complexity of the environments they describe and the practical contingencies of the contemporary science system. In this paper, we follow the development and maintenance of the General Estuarine Transport Model (GETM), a hydrodynamic model designed to represent the complex tidal processes in estuaries and shallow shelf-sea areas such as those along the Dutch coast. We show how the model’s developers move across and recombine properties that are often framed in opposition to one another, namely the physical and ecological, social and computational, and public and private, in order to continue making knowledge about coastal and estuarine environments. We conclude that the material, epistemic, and institutional dimensions of brackish knowledge should be considered alongside one another in the governing of scientific knowledge about environmental change, since this ultimately shapes what can be known about potential coastal futures. (shrink)

This chapter presents an original theoretical-methodological framework developed in Latin America: cognitive materialism. Cognitive materialism is a social theory that starts from studying knowledge on the basis of the material bearers in which such knowledge exists, assuming that different bearers confer different ontological, economic and legal properties to such knowledge. On this basis cognitive materialism develops a systematic framework that addresses some of the fundamental questions raised by the social sciences: the stages of capitalism, the theory (...) of value, social classes, among others. This chapter does not address this array of issues, but rather presents a summary of the fundamental notions of cognitive materialism and systematizes the literature that has made use of them in the last decade. The text is organized in five sections. First, the emergence of cognitive materialism is presented in relation to various theoretical traditions. Second, the main analytical tools of cognitive materialism are outlined. Third, studies on the relationship between knowledge production and appropriation, in particular around intellectual property, are summarized. Fourth, theoretical and empirical works that deal with digital technologies and the Internet, through the differential perspective of cognitive materialism are analyzed. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future use by readers. (shrink)

Argument that Marx has a realist ontology and a correspondence theory of truth. His views are compared to both Hegel's and Kant's. This interpretation departs from more Hegelian, 'idealist' interpretations that often rely on misunderstanding some of the work of the early Marx. There is also a discussion and partial defence of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

1. The spatial perception requirementCassam surveys arguments for what he calls the ‘Spatial Perception Requirement’. This is the following principle: " SPR: In order to perceive that something is the case and thereby to know that it is the case one must be capable of spatial perception. " A couple of preliminary glosses. By ‘spatial perception’ Cassam means either perception of location, or perception of specifically spatial properties of an object, such as its size and shape. Second, Cassam takes it (...) that there is something basic about cases in which one's perceiving that something is the case depends on perception of an object. That is, he takes it that there is something basic about such cases as that in which, for example, you perceive that the door is open by perceiving the door.On this second point, it is not quite obvious that one could not perceive that things are thus and so if one could not perceive material objects. Cannot someone lost in fog, for example, perceive that it is foggy, even if they cannot see a thing because of the fog? Moreover, suppose we have someone who cannot perceive that things are thus and so. This person has only a series of sensations. Is it obvious that this person could not come to have knowledge of their world by reasoning about the probable causes of those sensations? These points seem to me to have some interest, but I will not pursue them here. I will assume we are considering cases in which propositional knowledge is grounded in perception that such and such is the case, and that this in turn depends on perception of objects.One sort of argument you might give for SPR runs as follows. Perception of an object demands that you have perceptually differentiated the object from its …. (shrink)

Since all theories of knowing deal with the being of subjects, objects, instruments and environments, they can be viewed as onto-epistemological. This chapter examines key ideas that emerge from the work of Julia Kristeva – 'the speaking subject', 'materiality of language' and 'heterogeneity' – to demonstrate how ontology and epistemology are inextricably entwined in knowledge production. Kristeva also affirms both the agency of matter and the dimension of human/subjective agency implicated in cultural production. This is contrasted with Gilles Deleuze (...) and Felix Guattari’s account creative practice. The article also draws on the artistic work of researcher-practitioner Brian Martin, and his account of the relationship between Indigenous Australian art and culture to demonstrate that in an Indigenous world view, the real, the immaterial, the imaginary and the representational occur concurrently. (shrink)

The end of the nineteenth century and the whole of the twentieth may justifiably be called a time of great discoveries in the micro-, macro-, and megaworlds. All bearing witness to the dynamic life of the universe, these discoveries have resulted primarily from progress in the instruments of research, leading to the discovery of many new elementary particles, new forms of interaction, fields, and astrophysical objects — quasars, pulsars, sources of X-ray emissions, and others. An understanding of the essence of (...) the processes involved in these objects and phenomena, however, comes up against certain difficulties , the overcoming of which is to be sought primarily along the lines of further improvement of the tools of research and processing of the information acquired, the application of existing theories and the development of new ones in physics and astrophysics, and the utilization of the achievements of the science of the most general laws of the motion and development of nature, society, and thought, i.e., dialectical materialism, as the general methodology of acquisition of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

What do the technical practices, procedures, and systems that have shaped institutions of higher learning in the United States, from the Ivy League and women's colleges to historically black colleges and land-grant universities, teach us about the production and distribution of knowledge? Addressing media theory, architectural history, and the history of academia, Knowledge Worlds reconceives the university as a media complex comprising a network of infrastructures and operations through which knowledge is made, conveyed, and withheld. Reinhold Martin (...) argues that the material infrastructures of the modern university-the architecture of academic buildings, the configuration of seminar tables, the organization of campus plans-reveal the ways in which knowledge is created and reproduced in different kinds of institutions. He reconstructs changes in aesthetic strategies, pedagogical techniques, and political economy to show how the boundaries that govern higher education have shifted over the past two centuries. From colleges chartered as rights-bearing corporations to research universities conceived as knowledge factories, educating some has always depended upon excluding others. Knowledge Worlds shows how the division of intellectual labor was redrawn as new students entered, expertise circulated, science repurposed old myths, and humanists cultivated new forms of social and intellectual capital. Combining histories of architecture, technology, knowledge, and institutions into a critical media history, Martin traces the uneven movement in the academy from liberal to neoliberal reason. (shrink)

This round table discussion takes the diversity of discourse and practice shaping modern knowledge about childhood as an opportunity to engage with recent historiographical approaches in the history of science. It draws attention to symmetries and references among scientific, material, literary and artistic cultures and their respective forms of knowledge. The five participating scholars come from various fields in the humanities and social sciences and allude to historiographical and methodological questions through a range of examples. Topics include (...) the emergence of children's rooms in US consumer magazines, research on the unborn in nineteenth-century sciences of development, the framing of autism in nascent child psychiatry, German literary discourses about the child's initiation into writing, and the sociopolitics of racial identity in the photographic depiction of African American infant corpses in the early twentieth century. Throughout the course of the paper, childhood emerges as a topic particularly amenable to interdisciplinary perspectives that take the history of science as part of a broader history of knowledge. (shrink)

The process of self-awareness and awareness of the surrounding world for Muslim scholars has been categorized into divisions such as experiential and acquired awareness. However, the ontology of awareness, meaning the discussion of whether awareness is immaterial or material, as well as the material or immaterial nature of the origin and end of awareness, has been a particularly challenging topic among Muslim theologians. Some Muslim scholars, denying the existence of a factor beyond the human body for his movement (...) and life, considered both awareness and the process of awareness formation in humans and the factor shaping awareness in humans to be within the same body. They engaged in critiquing the perspectives and foundations of philosophers, especially Ibn Sina, on this matter and, utilizing specific principles in their philosophical physicalistic psychology, regarded awareness as a material entity. In this discussion, after examining the foundations of this group of Muslim theologians regarding the material nature of awareness and their criticisms of considering awareness as immaterial, we will focus on the philosophical and epistemological consequences arising from their materialistic view of awareness in their thought. (shrink)

Taking as his point of departure Norbert Weiner's statement that information is basic to understanding materialism in our era, Ronald Schleifer shows how discoveries of modern physics have altered conceptions of matter and energy and the ...

Experimental archaeology is often understood both as testing hypotheses about processes shaping the archaeological record and as generating tacit knowledge. Considering lithic technologies, I examine the relationship between these conceptions. Experimental archaeology is usefully understood via “maker’s knowledge”: archaeological experiments generate embodied know-how enabling archaeological hypotheses to be grasped and challenged, and further, well-positioning archaeologists to generate integrated interpretations. Finally, experimental archaeology involves “material speculation”: the constraints and affordances of archaeologists and their materials shape productive exploration of (...) the capacities of objects and human skill in ways relevant to archaeological questions. (shrink)

메이야수는 현대 철학의 주목받는 흐름인 실재론 운동에서 중심적이고도 독특한 자리를 차지한다. 그는 ‘상관주의’라는 명칭을 고안함으로써 다양한 실재론들을 반-상관주의로 아우를 수 있는 이론적 기초를 마련했다. 그러나 메이야수가 주장하는 사변적 유물론은 상관주의 내부에서 상관주의를 벗어나고자 한다는 점에서 다른 실재론들과 명확히 구별된다. 우리는 이 연구에서 메이야수가 자신의 주저 『유한성 이후』에서 전개한 사변적 유물론의 중심 논변이 과연 상관주의를 실제로 논박할 수 있는지를 비판적으로 검토할 것이다. 메이야수는 자신의 사변적 유물론이 상관주의가 성립하기 위한 필수적인 암묵적 전제라고 주장한다. 그러나 우리는 상관주의가 그러한 전제를 수용하지 않고서도 일관된 입장일 (...) 수 있음을 보여줄 것이다. 또한, 그의 논증을 있는 그대로 받아들일 경우 그의 입장은 수행적 모순을 범하지 않을 수 없다. 다음으로 우리는 메이야수가 상관주의의 난점을 보여주기 위해 고안한 원화석의 문제는 사실상 상관주의에게 심각한 위협이 되지 못한다는 점을 보여줄 것이다. 상관주의가 말하는 상관성은 선조적 진술을 문제 없이 수용할 수 있는 개방성으로 이해되어야 하기 때문이다. 마지막으로, 메이야수의 초-카오스 개념에 대한 검토를 통해서 우리는 그의 사변적 유물론이 사실상 절대적 무지의 존재론적 투사에 불과하다는 결론에 이를 것이다. (shrink)

In Averroes’s epistemology, knowledge is universal, but it is always singular in terms of the known. Averroes believes that there is no need for an activity, even in the sense that used by those who have the idea of "kumūn" rational forms being formed by other rational forms of the same kind, or for a power such as in the example of polishing a mirror to reflect an image. Similarly, he argues that there are no discrete abstract forms of (...) existing things because otherwise, everyone would have to know everything. Although there are different degrees and levels, the existence of absolute metaphysical forms is subject to change and increases with the multiplication of their subjects. There are three means of knowledge: sensation, imagination, and intellect. Unlike the sensation and perception modes in animals, humans perceive the outer appearance of objects as well as their unique meanings and distinctions. Like animals, the function of sensation in humans is to mediate the self. While perception is abstract and spiritual in one sense, it is material and concrete in another. Averroes does not find it correct to link the knowledge of the contingents of the world to the eternal knowledge of God. Beacuse this implies that there is a difference in God's knowledge between the state of the world's existence and non-existence. In addition, human knowledge about contingents is deficient and changeable, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the existence of contingents and is unchanging. Ultimately, it does not seem possible for humans to comprehend the nature of God's knowledge. It is agreed with Alexander of Aphrodisias that there should be a distinction between the active and imaginative intellects, but he differs from him in the point that the imaginative intellect disappears. According to Averroes, the active intellect in action is eternal, unlike Themistius’ view. According to Averroes, the intellect is neither a pure potentiality nor a distinct substance. That is to say, if the imaginative intellect were an actual thing, it could not perceive other things. If the intellect were absolute, everyone would know the same things. Similarly, if the intellect were absolute plurality, there would be no unity and connection between intellects. If the intellect were merely an accepting capacity, it could not perceive absence. According to Averroes, the active intellect is not a distinct intellect that gives form or governs the spheres, but rather the form and purpose of the imaginative intellect. There are two powers of this intellect: to abstract the concepts in their potential state from their matter and to make them actual and accepting them. In conclusion, it can be said that Averroes made a substance-centered philosophy regarding the possibility and reality of knowledge, and while he did not deviate from the Aristotelian line, he had to make new openings. Paradoxically, he tries to explain both the actual/abstract and potential/material aspects of the intellect that are postulated by introducing an original soul theory with the imaginative intellect. Therefore, he places importance on both a priori knowledge and sensation and imagination. (shrink)

Martin Mulsow's Knowledge Lost provides a window into the precarious world of intellectuals in northern Germany around 1700. This essay considers that book's place in Mulsow's work and in the intellectual history of radical enlightenment through the prism of contemporary activity in Hamburg and its surroundings, in particular as informed by the work of those who exchanged ideas most extensively with English intellectual culture. It suggests that themes of obligation and expectation as they emerge in dialogue with Mulsow's work (...) might provide means to extend his consideration of the material culture of knowledge around 1700 and to reshape its engagement with religious orthodoxy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Locke on the Knowledge of Material Things ROBERT FENDEL ANDERSON IT IS nOT John Locke's intention, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, to deal with matter and material substance nor with how these are able to affect the mind. These are considerations for natural philosophy; Locke counts himself rather among the moral philosophers. He does not propose, therefore, to meddle with the physical aspects of the (...) mind, nor with the physical production of sensations through the organs, nor with the production of ideas in the understanding, nor even with whether ideas depend upon matter for their source. He defers to the wisdom of such men as Boyle, Sydenham, Huygens and Newton in these considerations, and finds it "... ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge....,, 1 It is true that Locke's Essay is characterized chiefly not by an interest in matter and the mechanics of perception but rather by an interest in epistemology and in the ordering and assessment of our knowledge. Because of the very nature and emphasis of this epistemology, however, Locke finds that he must, from time to time, at least mention the nature of matter and how it affects us. Finally, it becomes apparent, certain changes or ambiguities in his point of view regarding the mode of our knowledge and its certainty are consequences of his understanding of matter. It is a demonstration of these elements of his doctrine, which seem not to have obtained the full attention of such scholars as Aaron, Fraser, and Gibson, that I shall attempt in this paper. Fundamentally, Locke's theory of matter appears to be that of Democritus and Epicurus. Like the Greek atomists, he conceives of matter as consisting of particles or corpuscles infinite in number. At least some of these are so minute as to be individually insensible, and probably he intends that all are, although, to my knowledge, he never states that this is so. In the aggregate, in any case, particles do constitute perceptible bodies. As for the Greeks, so also for Locke, the particles arc all extended, having size and shape. They are said also to possess motion or rest, although he takes care to say that matter cannot produce motion in itself,e Locke frequently mentions other properties as being "primary" or "really in" material things. Some of these are solidity, texture, cohesion of parts, situation, and number. Apparently some of these may be ranked under others since, as he 1"Epistle to the Reader," Vol. I, p. 14. All footnotes refer to passages in John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, collated and annotated, with prolegomena, biographical, critical, and historical by Alexander Campbell Fraser, in two volumes (New York, Dover Publications, Inc., 1959). Large Roman numerals refer to books of the Essay; small Roman numerals refer to chapters of the books; Arabic numerals refer to sections of the chapters. 2 IV, x, 10. [205] 206 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY remarks, figure presupposes extension, and receiving or communicating motion through impact presupposes solidity. The influences of these particles upon one another are treated by Locke under the topic of "powers," a notion which includes in it some kind of "secret relation of parts." 3 The capacities in any substance to give alterations of primary qualities are active powers; the capacities to receive such alterations are passive powers. This alteration must be accomplished by impact or impulse since this, Locke says, is the only way in which bodies can be conceived to operate. Sensation in the percipient being then is to be understood as a special case of this impact of particles upon others. It is evident to Locke that from external obiects some motion must be conveyed by some parts of our bodies to the brain or seat of sensation to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of these external objects. We are able by sight to perceive at a distance the primary qualities of bodies of observable size. Locke reasons that therefore "... some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to... (shrink)

I will defend a principle at work in Thomas Aquinas’s argument that the human intellect must be immaterial in order to know material things in SummaTheologica, Ia, q.75, a.2. Thomas relies on the position that whatever knows certain things would be impeded in this knowledge if it contained in itself thesesame things. Thus, if humans can, in principle, know all material things, then the intellect cannot be material. The position that a material intellect would be (...) limited in knowledge of material things is perhaps the most controversial part of the argument. I will articulate a version of this argument and argue that two objections to Thomas’s argument, offered by Norman Kretzmann and Robert Pasnau, fail, due in large part to a misunderstanding of proper objects of cognition. (shrink)

Rahner presents an example of an ambivalent stance towards human materiality. the essay provides a discussion of rahner's use of the concept of materiality in his metaphysics of human knowledge and shows that rahner's anthropology contains two arguments which define the limitations of human materiality in different ways. one of these arguments affirms that human materiality is essential and good, whereas the other stand seems to deny the goodness and the permanence of human materiality.

On the anniversary of Lenin's work of genius, the significance of this book for Marxist philosophy as a whole and, particularly, for the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge can be understood especially clearly. Turning today to the history of Marxist-Leninist thought in the twentieth century, we comprehend fully the enormous role played both by Lenin's defense of the principal propositions of dialectical materialism against revisionists and open enemies of Marxism dabbling in philosophy and his creative development of the underlying (...) foundations of Marxist theory — those foundations that, in the final analysis, determine both the manner of posing and the method of resolving all other problems in Marxism, not just those of a theoretical nature but those of a practical political nature as well. Many questions elaborated in Lenin's work of genius acquire particular timeliness for Marxist-Leninist philosophy specifically at the present stage in the development of science and under current conditions in the ideological struggle. In the present article we shall deal with the significance of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism for the interpretation of certain pressing problems of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. (shrink)

New Materialisms brings into focus and explains the significance of the innovative materialist critiques that are emerging across the social sciences and humanities. By gathering essays that exemplify the new thinking about matter and processes of materialization, this important collection shows how scholars are reworking older materialist traditions, contemporary theoretical debates, and advances in scientific knowledge to address pressing ethical and political challenges. In the introduction, Diana Coole and Samantha Frost highlight common themes among the distinctive critical projects that (...) comprise the new materialisms. The continuities they discern include a posthumanist conception of matter as lively or exhibiting agency, and a reengagement with both the material realities of everyday life and broader geopolitical and socioeconomic structures. Coole and Frost argue that contemporary economic, environmental, geopolitical, and technological developments demand new accounts of nature, agency, and social and political relationships; modes of inquiry that privilege consciousness and subjectivity are not adequate to the task. New materialist philosophies are needed to do justice to the complexities of twenty-first-century biopolitics and political economy, because they raise fundamental questions about the place of embodied humans in a material world and the ways that we produce, reproduce, and consume our material environment. Contributors Sara Ahmed Jane Bennett Rosi Braidotti Pheng Cheah Rey Chow William E. Connolly Diana Coole Jason Edwards Samantha Frost Elizabeth Grosz Sonia Kruks Melissa A. Orlie. (shrink)

From Knowledge to Wisdom argues that there is an urgent need, for both intellectual and humanitarian reasons, to bring about a revolution in science and the humanities. The outcome would be a kind of academic inquiry rationally devoted to helping humanity learn how to create a better world. Instead of giving priority to solving problems of knowledge, as at present, academia would devote itself to helping us solve our immense, current global problems – climate change, war, poverty, population (...) growth, pollution... of sea, earth and air, destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species, injustice, tyranny, proliferation of armaments, conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear, depletion of natural resources. The basic intellectual aim of inquiry would be to seek and promote wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides. This second edition has been revised throughout, has additional material, a new introduction and three new chapters. (shrink)

A new understanding of Kant’s theory of a priori knowledge and his natural philosophy emerges from Jeffrey Edwards’s mature and penetrating study. In the Third Analogy of Experience, Kant argues for the existence of a dynamical plenum in space. This argument against empty space demonstrates that the dynamical plenum furnishes an a priori necessary condition for our experience and knowledge of an objective world. Such an a priori existence proof, however, transgresses the limits Kant otherwise places on transcendental (...) arguments in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ because it establishes a _material_ transcendental condition of possible experience. This finding motivates Edwards to examine the broader context of Kant’s views about matter, substance, causal influence, and physical aether in connection with the developmental history of his theory of transcendental idealism. Against the backdrop of early modern metaphysics and contemporaneous physical theory, Edwards explicates the origins of the Third Analogy in Kant’s early work on the metaphysics of nature. The argument against empty space presented in the Third Analogy reveals a central aspect of Kant’s transcendental theory of experience that Edwards explains lucidly. By clarifying the epistemological standpoint at issue in the Third Analogy, he shows that the fundamental revisions to which Kant subjects his theory of knowledge in the _Opus postumum_ not only originate in his precritical metaphysics of nature but are developments of an argument central to the _Critique of Pure Reason_ itself. Edwards’s work is important to scholars working in the history of philosophy and the history and philosophy of science, as well as to Kant specialists. (shrink)

본 연구의 목표는 주재형의 논문 ｢인간적 지식 너머의 지식? 메이야수의 사변적 유물론 비판｣을 독해하고 그의 비판으로부터 사변적 유물론을 방어하는 데 있다. 이를 위해서 본 연구는 우선 메이야수의 사변적 유물론을 재구성한 뒤(1장), 메이야수가 상관주의를 제대로 이해하지 못했다는 주재형의 진단을 논박한다(2장). 이어서 본 연구는 상관주의를 신조(信條)로서의 고독한 상관주의와 논변(論辯)으로서의 보편적 상관주의로 구별하고 주재형의 논증이 양자 사이에서의 왕복에 의해 뒷받침되고 있음을 보이는 동시에 그 왕복이 궁극적으로는 지탱될 수 없음을 보인다(3장). 마지막으로 본 연구는 주재형이 자신의 메이야수 비판으로부터 이끌어 내는 다른 몇몇 귀결 역시 이 (...) 왕복에 의거하고 있음을, 그리고 주재형이 철학적 지향이 다시금 메이야수의 구도 안으로 빠져듦을 보인다(4장). (shrink)

According to one interpretation of Aristotle’s famous thesis, to say that action is the conclusion of practical reasoning is to say that action is itself a judgment about what to do. A central motivation for the thesis is that it suggests a path for understanding the non-observational character of practical knowledge. If actions are judgments, then whatever explains an agent’s knowledge of the relevant judgment can explain her knowledge of the action. I call the approach to action (...) that accepts Aristotle’s thesis so understood Normativism. There are many reasons to doubt Normativism. My aim in this paper is to defend Normativism from a pair of arguments that purport to show that a normative judgment could not constitute an event in material reality and also the knowledge of such a happening. Both highlight a putative mismatch between the natures of, on the one hand, an agent’s knowledge of her normative judgment and, on the other, her knowledge of her own action. According to these objections, knowledge of action includes (a) perceptual knowledge and (b) knowledge of what one has already done. But knowledge of a normative judgment includes neither. Hence knowledge of action cannot simply be knowledge of a normative judgment. (shrink)

This article seeks to examine the political connotations of a recent ‘material turn’ in social and political theory and its implications for theorizations of political agency. ‘New materialist’ theories are premised upon transcending the limits which social constructivism places upon thought, viewed as a reification of the division of subject and object and so a hubristic anthropocentrism which places human beings at the centre of social existence. Yet new materialist theories have tended to locate the conditions of the separation (...) of mind and world they seek to overcome upon the terrain of epistemic or ethical error. By taking the work of Quentin Meillassoux, Jane Bennett and Karen Barad as exemplary, this article contends that new materialist theories not only fall short of their own materialist pretensions insofar as they do not interrogate the material conditions of the separation of the mental and material, but that the failure to do so has profound repercussions for the success of their accounts of political agency. This essay seeks to offer a counter-narrative to new materialist theories by situating the hierarchy between thought and world as a structural feature of capitalist social relations. (shrink)

A word of warning concerning the aims of this volume is in order. Other wise some readers might be unpleasantly surprised by the fact that two of the chapters of an ostensibly historical book are largely topical rather than historical. They are Chapters 7 and 9, respectively entitled 'Are Logical Truths Analytic?' and 'A Priori Truths and Things-In-Them selves'. Moreover, the history dealt with in Chapter 11 is so recent as to have more critical than antiquarian interest. This mixture of (...) materials may seem all the more surprising as I shall myself criticize (in Chapter I) too facile assimilations of earlier thinkers' concepts and problems to later ones. There is no inconsistency here, it seems to me. The aims of the present volume are historical, and for that very purpose, for the purpose of understanding and evaluating earlier thinkers it is vital to know the conceptual landscape in which they were moving. A crude analogy may be helpful here. No military historian can afford to neglect the topo graphy of the battles he is studying. If he does not know in some detail what kind of pass Thermopylae is or on what sort of ridge the battle of Bussaco was fought, he has no business of discussing these battles, even if this topographical information alone does not yet amount to historical knowledge. (shrink)