An instructive comparison can be drawn between Jacques Ellul’s 1936 Esprit article portraying “Fascism as Liberalism’s Child” and Georges Bataille’s 1938 lecture on “The Sacred Sociology of Today’s World”. Both rely on Durkheim’s sociology in assuming modernity’s amorphousness, leaving passive masses of atomized individuals susceptible to mobilization into totalized entities by charismatic leadership. Bataille welcomes the postwar intensification of social aggregates but criticizes their militant, militaristic regimentation as not violent and sacred enough, whereas for Ellul, the resurgent social sacred (...) (whether orgiastic or dictatorial), as the active mass, is the enemy of the free person as the sole meaningful whole. (shrink)

Despite the recent rise in studies that approach fascism as a transnational phenomenon, the links between fascism and internationalist intellectual currents have only received scant attention. This book explores the political thought of Bertrand de Jouvenel and Alfred Fabre-Luce, two French intellectuals, journalists and political writers who, from 1930 to the mid-1950s, moved between liberalism, fascism and Europeanism. Daniel Knegt argues that their longing for a united Europe was the driving force behind this ideological transformation-and that we (...) can see in their thought the earliest stages of what would become neoliberalism. (shrink)

The Progressive Revolution Volume III continues the historical and literary series systematically chronicling both the historical significance and political deconstruction that the Progressive Revolution or the Progressive Age (circa 1860–present) has perpetrated against Western Civilization and American society even to this day.

The Progressive Revolution Volume IV continues this historical and literary series by systematically chronicling both the historical significance and political deconstruction that the Progressive Revolution or the Progressive Age (circa 1860–present) has perpetrated against Western Civilization and American society.

The Progressive Revolution (Volume V)—continues his legal, historical and literary series based on Natural Law, Natural Rights and the original political philosophy of the constitutional Framers and original jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Marxist theory has always maintained that a strict continuity exists between liberalism and fascism, and has even proclaimed that there is a causal connection between the two. Therefore fascism comes to be portrayed as the ‘armed wing’ of the bourgeoisie. The Marxist thesis is weak for two reasons: first, because the connection between liberalism and fascism, though it doubtless exists, is considerably more complex, mediated and contradictory than it suggests; and second, because it axiomatically denies the revolutionary (...) nature of fascism, which despite what Marxists claim, represents a rupture with the liberal tradition and demonstrates a relative autonomy from it. In the case of Italy, this autonomy arises from the fact that Fascism was born from the turmoil surrounding the genesis, the course and the outcome of the Great War, and was fed by fragments of philosophies and political theories radically opposed to liberalism, democracy and Marxism (though not to socialism) which arose in Europe at the turn of the 19th century. A birth in such a turbulent cultural and political climate could not give rise to an internally consistent and coherent ideology. The theoretical works of philosophers such as Giovanni Gentile encouraged liberalism to fool itself into seeing in fascism an unruly brother who could be put to good use by opposing socialism. This delusion enabled the rise to power of Mussolini. The revolutionary side to Fascism could draw on Italian populism’s latent revolutionary tradition which developed in the 50 years following unification as a transfiguration of ideological currents which contributed to the Risorgimento but which had been defeated by Cavourian liberalism. These included Mazzinianism and a particular type of radical anti-monarchism. (shrink)

What follows is a series of provocations, loosely interconnected, centered on the ambiguous relationship between liberalism and fascism in our age of democratic decline. Together they seek to trouble the established binaries and analytic frameworks that would position liberalism and fascism as antithetical and suggest instead that both emerge from the same condition of possibility: imperial racialism. In doing so, they reflect on the discursive function of fascism in sustaining liberal democracy as a project of white supremacy.

A translation of a Japanese text written by philosopher Tosaka Jun in 1935, at the moment the country had begun to embark upon a course of fascist authoritarianism that led to war and total destruction. Titled The Japan Ideology, the text purposely recalls its derivation and kinship with Marx and Engels's The German Ideology and expands on the role played by philosophic idealism in preparing the population for both the new politics of fascism and the demands of the eventual (...) war it brought. In its penetrating analysis of the relationship between philosophy and the formation of ideology in a politically critical and crucial historical time, this foundational work in the Japanese Marxist tradition remains accessible and timely, speaking forcibly to conditions that continue to persist in Japan and everywhere in today's world. (shrink)

This article examines the anti-fascist rhetoric of the self-proclaimed `revolutionary liberal', Piero Gobetti, in Italy in the early 1920s. Gobetti is interesting from a rhetorical perspective for two reasons: first, for his efforts to redefine liberalism as an emancipatory ethic of struggle that extended to the revolutionary worker's movement; and second, for his rejection of fascism as essentially continuous with the anti-conflictual tendencies of the liberal parliamentary regime. An exemplary `ideological innovator', Gobetti's `paradiastolic' redescription of liberalism and his metaphorical (...) reading of fascism underscored a commitment to the value of rhetorical disputation over the meaning and form of liberty. This contrasts with contemporary approaches to fascism — and purportedly similar ideologies — which demonize or objectify in a way that forestalls such a debate. Yet, paradoxically, the cost of Gobetti's innovations was an inability to secure what Perelman calls the `universal audience', a task that preoccupied Gobetti's Marxist friend, Gramsci. (shrink)

This is a conversation that took place at Dr. Vladimir Safatle’s São Paulo home on 16 February, 2019, during Dr. Samir Gandesha’s time as a Visiting Professor at the Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas -FFLCH-USP. It addresses the South American roots of the authoritarian Neoliberalism that has now become a truly global phenomenon.

ABSTRACT This paper seeks an integral part of the two concepts of the political theorist William E. Connolly's ‘aspirational fascism’ and the intellectual historian Enzo Traverso's ‘postfascism’, thereby revealing the conceptual relevance of each concept. Its primary purpose is to give details of why movements as depicted by these concepts should be categorised as postfascism, rather than as aspirational fascism, and thereby to unravel these movements that have prospered in advanced countries under liberal democracy. Since fascism emerged (...) in the first half of the twentieth century, many prominent scholars, including the two aforementioned theorists, have been engaged in its discourse. In the light of a comparative analysis, I argue that although Connolly's aspirational fascism works by deciphering certain far-right movements, it has severe conceptual difficulties. Finally, I conclude that theorists should prefer to use Traverso's postfascism in that it captures the essence of broader far-right and authoritarian political movements in the West and is more convincing due to its accurate understanding of the key elements of those movements in liberal democracies in terms of involuntary and unconscious practice, rather than in strategical terms. (shrink)

The recent increased prominence of far-right movements and nationalism has led to a renewed focus on the political thought of the early twentieth century. This era is defined by large strands of anti-liberalism, fascism, communism, and other political inclinations and practices that have largely fallen out of favour. Nevertheless, there are a multitude of thinkers that occupy unique niches that avoid these classifications but are associated with these movements to categorise and minimise their heterogeneous thoughts. This paper counters arguments (...) that claim that Georges Bataille is a fascist or left-fascist thinker. Specifically, these arguments claim that his “anarchism” is founded on a valorisation of violence and reckless usage of social effectivities. However, these arguments often misinterpret his writings or force his thought into easily understandable categories in which it does not fit. (shrink)

The idea of a Europe of its peoples, or a post-nation-state ‘regionalist Europe’, is largely applauded by radical democratic and post-colonial theorists who considered this development an antidote to nationalism. What is hardly heeded by liberal as well as left-wing intellectuals, however, is that several fascist and neo-fascist intellectuals during the inter-war and the post-war eras have also been attracted by the idea of a post-nation-state, ‘Europe des peoples’. By analyzing the complementary ideologies of two French intellectuals associated with (...) class='Hi'>fascism and post-war neo-fascism – Pierre Drieu La Rochelle and Alain de Benoist – this article traces the attempts to shed new light onto some of the shortcomings embedded in the concept of the ‘Europe des peoples’. Building upon Drieu and de Benoist’s ideas on the future of Europe as a post-national exclusionist ‘Europe of the peoples’, this article sets an alert that a new type of ethnic exclusionism may be strengthened precisely with the end of old states nationalism. (shrink)

If one looks at the controversial premises of analytical approaches to fascism according to Roger Griffin, it is not surprising that a yawning distance has opened up between Marxist and non-Marxist schools of interpretation. In this situation whereby two camps are mutually ignorant of one another, it is certainly suggestive that the liberal British theoretician of fascism should put himself forward to play the role of a ‘mediator’, even if he faces the danger of significant criticism from both (...) schools of interpretation. But Griffin’s attempt takes place on a predominantly theoretical level. The author of this essay instead places the notion of revolution in historical-empirical perspective, in order to distinguish it from the account associated with (liberal) representatives of the ‘new consensus’. He then examines, in particular, whether National Socialism represented a utopia which satisfied revolutionary aspirations. The author further asks whether fascism could separate itself from its (early) conservative support to an extent that would permit commentators to meaningfully identify a revolutionary breakthrough. And finally he clarifies what the modernizing achievements of fascism during its time in power actually were. Against this background, there does seem at least the possibility of a dialogue between the two approaches that would advance each of them. (shrink)

Heidegger's ontological theories, his observations about liberalism and fascism, and his evaluation of Being are three premises of an argument for fascism. The ontological premise is that integrated wholes and instruments or objects of will are ontologically superior, as Being and Time suggests in discussing Being‐a‐whole and using tools. The social premise is that fascist societies are wholes integrated by dictatorial will, while liberal societies are looser aggregates of free individuals, as Heidegger describes in his 1930s seminars. The (...) evaluative premise, shared with the medieval tradition and expressed in his notebook remarks about war, is that ontological superiority makes things better. The conclusion that fascism is better than liberalism should be rejected along with the evaluative premise. (shrink)

In the contest between the three major modern political ideologies—liberalism, socialism, and fascism—the Nordic countries found a middle way with social democracy. For over four decades, Finland r...

While it is clear what those attracted to fascism today are against, it is less clear what they are for. Not in the sense of how they want to remake society—this is usually clear enough. What is less clear is the fundamental values that are driving their desire to create a different kind of order. Compounding this difficulty, too many liberals are stubbornly sticking to some conventional beliefs: that human nature is as liberals think it is, not something that (...) is fundamentally disputed; that facts are what liberals think they are, even if some people choose to ignore them; and that everybody is pursuing basically the same conception of the good, even if some of them are deluded as to where we are now and how to get where we want to go. -/- But this move to the right is not being driven simply by mistakes; it is a principled move, backed by a coherent, consistent, and historically well-sourced value system, even if this value system is perverse. Fascism has its own conception of the moral subject; of the need for a rigid social hierarchy of men; of the nature of individual rights; and of the importance of purity in blood, soil, and ideology. It believes in the unity of the people, the leader, and the state; it embraces very different and (to liberals) often disturbing moral ends; and it employs starkly different rules of social interaction. And it believes, in the end, that this all leads to the greatest expression of democracy ever invented. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy realizes that time, like language and embodiment, is not an obstacle to truth and reality but one of its primary mediums. Time is dimensionality, past, present, future, and directionality, before and after. Politics has its own temporality. Conservatives aim to restore a selected past; progressives to create a better future; and authoritarians to reinforce the present status quo. In each case, however, the dominant temporal dimension is the future. Time, as Levinas has shown, is also inter-subjective, that is (...) to say, social, and as such also ethical. Hence, in some important sense politics is a struggle over time, a contention between its dimensions, to select a past, to close off a present, or to create a future. This helps us to better understand our contemporary political triangulation of liberalism, socialism and fascism. The peculiarity of fascist politics, and key to its negativity and viciousness, is that it rejects history altogether, past and future, preferring the frenzy of the moment, the violent delirium of immanence, to the short- and long-term responsibilities of justice, liberal or social. (shrink)

Acclaimed throughout the world as a philosopher of liberation and revolution, Herbert Marcuse is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. His penetrating critiques of the ways modern technology produces forms of society and culture with oppressive modes of social control indicate his enduring significance in the contemporary moment. This collection of unpublished or uncollected essays, unfinished manuscripts, and correspondence between 1942 and 1951, provides Marcuse's exemplary attempts to link theory with practice, and develops ideas that can (...) be used to grasp and transform existing social reality. These papers vividly chronicle Marcuse's increasing, yet reluctant estrangement from Max Horkeimer, director of the Institute for Social Research and his years as an analyst with various U.S. government agencies. Marcuse's later attempts to link theory and practice in the 1960s and 1970s in regard to the New Left, National Liberation Movements and other new social movements were grounded in his work from the 1940s. As the 1940s witnessed the rise to global prominence of German fascism and its defeat in World War Two, and the emergence of the Cold War, Marcuse strived to preserve the radical vision of his youth during a difficult historical period while many turned toward more conservative positions. Precisely the sort of broad theoretical and political theorizing that Marcuse undertook througout his life is needed today to analyze the momentous changes that we are currently undergoing. Excerpt: Personal history is interwoven with intellectual and political events in these papers. We debated whether letters belonged here: whether some should be published at all. My father had a deep sense of personal privacy, both as a character trait and as a political expression of resistance to the commodification of the private. Yet the letters contain substantive discussions also. We could have edited out, expurgated some of the material. While not publishing every letter my father wrote, our selection was based on interest, and every letter that is included is included in full. That decision was in part painful for me personally. The juxtaposition of the letters to Horkeimer and the exchange with Heidegger highlights the point. --from the Foreword by Peter Marcuse. (shrink)

This brand new and fully updated edition builds upon nearly three decades of research, thought, conversation, and teaching of the most powerful political ideologies of our era. The Fourth Edition expands the treatment with significantly updated treatments of each ideology and new discussions of conservatism, neoconservativism, imperialism, Islamism, modernity, colonialism, and globalization. It contextualizes and explains the ideological foundations of the American war on terrorism and ongoing developments in nation states where pivotal ideological developments are occurring, especially the United States, (...) China, and Iran. The authors also offer fully updated introductory and concluding chapters on the ongoing significance of studying ideologies and their meaning in a new global era. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente artículo es interpretar desde la obra de Karl Polanyi las alternativas políticas, económicas y sociales de la sociedad moderna ante la crisis del capitalismo contemporáneo. En primer lugar, precisaremos la problemática del artículo y la posición interpretativa desde la que la abordaremos. En segundo lugar, evaluaremos la vigencia de su crítica de la utopía liberal del mercado autorregulado a la luz de las transformaciones provocadas por el modelo neoliberal. En tercer lugar, examinaremos las distintas alternativas a (...) las que se enfrenta la sociedad ante la incompatibilidad que muestran la economía de mercado autorregulado y las instituciones democráticas. Para finalizar, expondremos la trascendencia teórica y práctica que el pensamiento de Polanyi puede tener en la resolución de esta importante problemática para el futuro de la humanidad en el siglo XXI. (shrink)

The article examines the question of the return of fascism to the political mainstream in European liberal democracies. This is done through a reading of Alberto Toscano’s work on late fascism, and his contention that to understand the popularity of the contemporary ultra right we have to give up the idea of a direct analogy with the classical fascist period. The article develops the argument that although Toscano presents a powerful account of the aesthetic simulacra through which ultra-right (...) parties have re-packaged fascist ideology, they retain the absolute racial hostility that is essential to the mass appeal of all fascist movements. This argument is developed through a rereading of Derrida’s late writings on the nature of political inheritance, which maintains that there is a quasi-messianic significance to the return of fascism that opens the possibility both of ultra-reactionary and ethico-political responses to the developing global crisis. (shrink)

Fifteen years ago, revelations about the political misdeeds of Martin Heidegger and Paul de Man sent shock waves throughout European and North American intellectual circles. Ever since, postmodernism has been haunted by the specter of a compromised past. In this intellectual genealogy of the postmodern spirit, Richard Wolin shows that postmodernism's infatuation with fascism has been widespread and not incidental. He calls into question postmodernism's claim to have inherited the mantle of the left--and suggests that postmodern thought has long (...) been smitten with the opposite end of the political spectrum.In probing chapters on C. G. Jung, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Georges Bataille, and Maurice Blanchot, Wolin discovers an unsettling commonality: during the 1930s, these thinkers leaned to the right and were tainted by a proverbial "fascination with fascism." Frustrated by democracy's shortcomings, they were seduced by fascism's grandiose promises of political regeneration. The dictatorships in Italy and Germany promised redemption from the uncertainties of political liberalism. But, from the beginning, there could be no doubting their brutal methods of racism, violence, and imperial conquest.Postmodernism's origins among the profascist literati of the 1930s reveal a dark political patrimony. The unspoken affinities between Counter-Enlightenment and postmodernism constitute the guiding thread of Wolin's suggestive narrative. In their mutual hostility toward reason and democracy, postmodernists and the advocates of Counter-Enlightenment betray a telltale strategic alliance--they cohabit the fraught terrain where far left and far right intersect.Those who take Wolin's conclusions to heart will never view the history of modern thought in quite the same way. (shrink)

Liberal and socialist worldviews are often seen as being in a fundamental opposition. This is reinforced immensely either by Francis Fukuyma's apostrophised end of history or by the thesis put forward by authors such as Patrick Deneen that liberalism has failed. The question that arises on closer examination of this assumption is whether or not it is accurate. Based on Carlo Rosselli's work Socialismo Liberale (Liberal Socialism), this article attempts to systematically challenge this thesis. Against the backdrop of the rise (...) of fascism in Italy, Rosselli comes to the realisation - contrary to many representatives of orthodox Marxism - that the liberal and socialist worldviews are not necessarily antagonistic to one another. In fact, they may even be mutually dependent - an important insight to think social change anew. (shrink)

Today, liberals face a predicament: how to defend liberal principles, when adherence to them seems to constitute a fatal disadvantage against unprincipled opponents. The challenge is not new. In the early years of the twentieth century, liberalism was attacked, by critics on both the right and, especially, the left for being hypocritical, naïve, irresponsible, and impotent. It couldn't, for example (anti-liberalists thought), address the acute inequality of imperial rule, racial segregation, and socio-economic poverty. These issues of social justice it was (...) claimed by critics required a politics marked by an uncompromising commitment to ultimate ends, and an unrelenting use of power. Faced with such sentiments and the practical successes of anti-liberal ideologies (i.e. Fascism, Nazism, and Communism) liberals felt pressure to silence their scruples and doubts, and embrace the confidence, ruthlessness, and intransigence exhibited by their opponents. But doing so seemed tantamount to abandoning liberal hopes for, and commitments to, human freedom and all they valued in the first place. In Liberalism for Dark Times, Cherniss tells the story of the liberal response to this challenge in the twentieth century. Through a close study of five leading intellectuals engaged in these debates-Max Weber, Raymond Aron, Albert Camus, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Isaiah Berlin-Cherniss reconstructs a distinctive, neglected strand of liberal thought. This strand defines and defends liberalism as a political ethos: a complex of dispositions, temperament, and sensibility and style-which include skepticism; openness to experience; and careful, discriminating judgment-that shape how individuals make choices, meet challenges, understand and pursue possibilities, and conduct themselves toward others in the course of political struggle. In reconstructing the history of, what he calls, a tempered liberalism, and formulating it as a distinctive political perspective, Cherniss offers an alternative to the prevalent ways of thinking about both, liberalism's history and the intellectual resources available to it today. (shrink)

In this article, Brzozowski’s much discussed connections with fascism are reconsidered in the context of interpretations of fascism by Sternhell and Gentile. At the end of his life, Brzozowski tried to reconcile socialism and nationalism. He criticized orthodox Marxism and liberal democracy, underlined the political and cultural importance of the nation, praised irrationalism, strength, imperialism, heroism, asceticism, the labourer and the soldier as ideal attitudes with regard to the world. He wanted to turn Poland into a modern nation, (...) but feared some consequences of modernity. Brzozowski’s ambivalent attitude towards modernity precludes finding an adequate description for them, in particular in the Polish and Central European context, although his concepts were similar to those of some of his contemporaries from France or Italy, such as Georges Sorel or the “La Voce” group, as well as “antimoderns” as described by Antoine Compagnon. At present labels such as “fascism” or even “proto-fascism” seem to be too ambiguous to grasp the originality of Brzozowski’s thinking. The Polish thinker’s case suggests a reconsideration of Sternhell’s thesis that Eastern-European Marxism remained loyal to the Heglian, rationalist, and materialist essence of Marxism. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to problematize, from a sociopolitical and psychoanalytic point of view, the current rise of the new rights, especially in Latin America. Although this extremist renaissance is loosely and indicatively referred to as fascism, we believe that, after careful analysis, today’s far-rights are not simple repetitions of the fascisms of the s. XX. It is about an unprecedented governmentality and ideology that, on the one hand, is not reduced to neoliberalism and, on the other (...) hand, surpasses the European-Anglo-Saxon alt-right and contemporary libertarianism. We give it the particular name of liber-fascism, to the extent that it brings a new mode of political subjectivation: the defender of himself. We divide the text into two sections. In the first, we discuss the sociopolitical particularities of liber-fascism: the emergence of a social ontology of the defender of himself that conceives of the capitalist market as an instance to be defended using false news, conspiracy theories and, of course, organized violence. In the second, we clarify the functioning of the liber-fascist unconscious by analyzing the peculiarity of its fantasy: it is an ideology that, in its relationship with others, uses violence no longer as a simple means, but as a vehicle for jouissance. (shrink)

_Has liberalism failed because it has succeeded?__ “___Why Liberalism Failed___ offers cogent insights into the loss of meaning and community that many in the West feel, issues that liberal democracies ignore at their own peril.’—President Barack Obama__ “Deneen’s book is valuable because it focuses on today’s central issue. The important debates now are not about policy. They are about the basic values and structures of our social order.”—David Brooks, ___New York Times__ Of the three dominant ideologies of the twentieth century— (...) class='Hi'>fascism, communism, and liberalism—only the last remains. This has created a peculiar situation in which liberalism’s proponents tend to forget that it _is _an ideology and not the natural end-state of human political evolution. As Patrick Deneen argues in this provocative book, liberalism is built on a foundation of contradictions: it trumpets equal rights while fostering incomparable material inequality; its legitimacy rests on consent, yet it discourages civic commitments in favor of privatism; and in its pursuit of individual autonomy, it has given rise to the most far-reaching, comprehensive state system in human history. Here, Deneen offers an astringent warning that the centripetal forces now at work on our political culture are not superficial flaws but inherent features of a system whose success is generating its own failure. (shrink)

Hayek claimed that he always made it his rule ‘not to be concerned with current politics, but to try to operate on public opinion.’ However, evidence suggests that he was a party political operative with ‘free’ market scholarship being the vehicle through which he sought – and achieved – party political influence. The ‘main purpose’ of his Mont Pelerin Society had ‘been wholly achieved’. Mises promoted ‘Fascists’ including Ludendorff and Hitler, and Hayekians promoted the Operation Condor military dictatorships and continue (...) to maintain a ‘united front’ with ‘neo-Nazis.’ Hayek, who supported Pinochet’s torture-based regime and played a promotional role in ‘Dirty War’ Argentina, is presented as a saintly figure. These chapters place ‘free’ market promotion in the context of the post-1965 neo-Fascist ‘Strategy of Tension’, and examine Hayek’s role in the promotion of deflation that facilitated Hitler’s rise to power; his proposal to relocate Gibraltarians across the frontier into ‘Fascist’ Spain; the Austrian revival of the 1970s; the role of ‘neutral academic data’ on behalf of the ‘International Right’ and their efforts to promote Franz Josef Strauss and Ronald Reagan and defend apartheid and the Shah of Iran. (shrink)

This paper responds to a remark I found in Tim Crane’s review of a Marxist history of analytic philosophy by Christoph Schuringa. The remark is by Frankfurt School theorist Max Horkheimer: logical positivism is “only a miserable rearguard action of the formalistic epistemology of liberalism, which also in this area turns into open servility to fascism.” In earlier years, I would have dismissed Horkheimer. But I have made a speculative proposal which converges with Horkheimer’s thinking. Even though it is (...) a speculation, it probably makes more sense to people than Horkheimer. Even if the leading figures of analytic philosophy are liberal, they need people to teach for them and run departments, etc. I speculated that they face a choice between highly tactical liberals and racist xenophobic nationalists and prefer the latter, because these people maintain craft excellence or lapse only slightly from it. An R.K. Narayan short story, “Father’s Help,” although set in South India, presents the development of the tactical type. (shrink)

This article deploys Spinoza’s ethic of joy alongside Deleuze and Guattari’s exposition of micropolitics to expose how fascist desires and affects bloom and circulate through digital communications ecosystems that generally promote a diffusion or decentralisation of power. Beyond the steady barrage of alt-right content conscientiously documented by liberal journalists and progressive watchdogs, a more persistent and widespread fascist impulse permeates the very forms of some of our most banal digitally mediated acts and encounters. Rather than a sole looming authoritarian figurehead, (...) the network itself – particularly with the new image paradigms propelled by apps such as Instagram and TikTok – has become the rallying point for the circulation of fascistic affects, burnished through the art and ethos of following: of rules, routines, protocols, accounts. I contend that a joyful passion accompanies much of this everyday experience of keeping up with one’s feeds, engaging the platforms, participating in the spectacles. This is what Sontag, interrogating the appeal of the Third Reich, calls the ‘joy of followers’, a joy in fascist belonging, which is to suggest that fascist movements thrive not only on the circulation of negative affects like hatred and fear, but also on the profusion of pleasure and affiliation. Deleuze’s Spinoza, resolutely anti-fascist, helps us parse this situation as it plays out in the social media sphere. Spinoza offers a bipartite conceptualisation of joy that allows us to diagnose the pleasures particular to fascist belonging and network belonging alike as passive, partial and indirect. Ultimately, what we today share with historical fascisms is a ubiquitous aesthetic that merges art with life and bodies with information, and a corresponding ethos that cultivates conformism, barbarises critical thought and redirects joyful impulses into reactionary social forms. As fascistic power relations spread anew through digital cultures’ newly evolving modes of visuality, hapticity, vibration and expression, one can observe something of what Deleuze calls ‘sad joy’, a sort of joy rooted in conquest and domination. The aim of this article is to root out such sad joys, to appreciate their appeal, and ultimately to reject them in all their various forms. (shrink)

No one could have admired and respected Ludwig von Mises more than did Murray Rothbard, who dedicated his magnum opus in economic theory, Man, Economy, and State, to his great mentor. Yet Rothbard did not shy away from criticizing Mises when he believed such criticism to be called for. Thus, in The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard subjects Mises’s utilitarian liberalism to a searching critique, concluding that it is ultimately incapable of serving as the intellectual foundation for a free society. It (...) is in this Rothbardian spirit of respectful engagement with the thought of Ludwig von Mises that this paper, dealing with a few key issues of politics raised by Mises’s Liberalism, is offered. (shrink)

What is the political function of monstrosity? What is the nature of our political relationship with the dead? Why are the undead so threatening? In _The Monstrous and the Dead_, Mark Neocleous explores such questions as they run through three major political traditions: conservatism, Marxism and fascism. One of the things uniting these otherwise opposing traditions is that they share a common interest in the dead. This is therefore a book about the politics of remembrance, showing that how and (...) why the dead register in our political lives constitutes a major dividing line for the political traditions in question: are the dead to be reconciled with the living in a conservative fashion, resurrected for the cause of fascism or are their hopes and struggles to be redeemed for a communist future? Exploring these issues reveals that, as well as leaving traces in memories, dreams and unfulfilled wishes, the dead also generate fears, most notably the fear that they are not really dead: they are undead and thus monstrous. The book therefore simultaneously considers the function of monstrosity as a rhetorical political device: in Burke’s response to the monstrous revolution, Marx’s use of the vampire and fascism’s concept of the Marxist-liberal-Jewish menace. The outcome is an original reading of key thinkers and movements in western politics, a provocative account of the role of political metaphor and an eclectic argument concerning the place of the dead in historical struggles. (shrink)

The Euro-American far-right represents a highly diverse political movement comprising numerous ideological tendencies. It includes the European New Right, the US ‘alt-right’ and ‘alt-lite’, far-right accelerationism, traditionalism, and new forms of political misogyny. Despite the diversity in ideas and activities, this article argues that an overarching theme of the ‘fear of white extinction’ travels across and animates each major contemporary far-right tendency. The article explores a variety of older and contemporary metaphysical themes that are deployed in contemporary fascism. These (...) include new configurations of racism, occultist ideas of nature and vitalism, the rendering of culture and civilization in ‘biocultural’ and ‘anthropological’ terms, and ideas about cosmic destiny. The article considers how older ideas from Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Hans Günther, Ludwig Klages, Arnold Gehlen and others are mobilized in contemporary fascism to generate a critique of liberal modernity, one which leads remorselessly to a logic of white supremacy and apocalyptic violence. (shrink)

This article examines the ‘revolutionary liberal’ outlook expounded by the young Italian journalist and intellectual, Piero Gobetti, immediately following the First World War. It considers the historical evolution of his ‘agonistic’ liberalism according to which conflict rather than consensus serves as the basis of social and political renewal. The article traces the formation of Gobetti's thought from his idealist response to the crisis of the liberal state through to his endorsement of the communist revolutionaries in Turin and his denunciation of (...) fascism as the continuation of Italy's failed tradition of compromise. Whilst Gobetti's views presently resonate with a growing interest in the agonistic dimension of politics, it is argued that his elitism and his understanding of liberalism as a ‘civic religion’ reveal challenging tensions in his thought. (shrink)

This paper assesses the contribution of Karl Polanyi, a theorist largely ignored in fascism scholarship, toward understanding fascism’s interwar rise and present-day implications. In exploring Polanyi’s work in The Great Transformation and lesser-known and unpublished writings, a sophisticated and largely original conception of fascism emerges, rooted in the idea of ‘anti-individualism’ as its foundational trait. Polanyi accounts for fascism’s philosophical content, ideological plasticity, political function and societal form, intervening in debates over how to define fascism, (...) its ambiguity with the populist far-right, and on its both economically reactionary and socially revolutionary qualities. Polanyi’s analysis suggests an enduring vulnerability on the part of liberal capitalism to fascist currents as (1) a solution to the instability of the market economy (and broader incompatibility between capitalism and democracy) at the systemic level, and (2) to the crisis of the individual subject on a social and moral level. I end by considering how Polanyi’s theory might be applied to locate current neo-fascist movements and elucidate the sociological problems underpinning their existence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Dark Arts of Politics:Aesthetics and Engineering in Nazism and FascismJonathan AllenThe Cult of Art in Nazi Germany, by Eric Michaud, translated by Janet Lloyd. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, 271 pp.Building Fascism, Communism, and Liberal Democracy: Gaetano Ciocca—Architect, Inventor, Farmer, Writer, Engineer, by Jeffrey T. Schnapp. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, 291 pp.Despite their obvious centrality to the history of the twentieth century, sixty years after the (...) defeat of the Axis powers fascism and Nazism remain elusive phenomena, hard to define with any real clarity. Scholars wrangle not only over the identification of their central characteristics but also over whether the similarities between fascism and Nazism are close enough to justify considering them as parts of a single category. A growing number of studies, however, ranging from general histories such as Norman Davies's Europe: A History and Mark Mazower's Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, to more specialized works such as Zeev Sternhell's Neither Left Nor Right and Robert Paxton's fine The Anatomy of Fascism, argue the case for treating fascism and Nazism together.1 A mark of all of these books is their willingness to give serious attention to fascist ideologies and to the interactions between these ideologies and fascist practice and culture. This interest, in turn, makes it necessary to examine anew broader questions about the relations between fascism and the circumstances and attitudes of modern life.The two works under consideration here—The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany, by Eric Michaud, and Building Fascism, Communism, and Liberal Democracy, by Jeffrey T. Schnapp—share the growing concern to take seriously fascist ideology and culture as essential to an understanding of the movement. Michaud sets out to present an analysis of Nazi myth, which he argues was constructed with reference to two models: art and Christianity (xii). His immensely erudite study relates Nazi conceptions of the leader to Romantic views of genius and Christian doctrines concerning the role of the Savior. This allows him to present a distinctive view of Nazi ideology, one that relates it to themes and debates that have figured prominently in the history of European culture and belief. [End Page 113]Schnapp, on the other hand, focuses on the career of a single man—Gaetano Ciocca. Though Ciocca is now an obscure figure, unlikely to be familiar even to most students of fascism, Schnapp argues that his career deserves attention for several reasons. In the first place, he "strove to translate a fascist politics into the language of modern technics in the domains of architecture, urbanism, theater design, animal husbandry, drainage and transportation systems" (7). What is more, Ciocca was no power-hungry opportunist but rather a committed and reflective intellectual, who spent much of his time writing books and articles aimed at explaining and justifying his various projects to a general audience. Last but not least, though Ciocca's passionate commitment to fascism cooled as World War II wore on, this had no visible effect on his engineering projects. In the aftermath of the war, Ciocca presented himself as a nonpolitical "rebuilder" concerned to provide for popular need. In this guise, he served Italy's postwar liberal democracy as enthusiastically as he had previously devoted his projects to the cause of fascism. Ciocca thus presents us with an intriguing puzzle: a committed and reflective fascist intellectual—no Eichmann, Schnapp insists—who was nevertheless able to function equally effectively after the demise of the fascist regime. Schnapp argues that Ciocca's career forces us to examine with care the complex relations between technologies and political ideologies. In fact, I think it compels us to consider more general questions about the extent to which Ciocca's conception of himself as a modernizing technocrat could be equally at home in the political contexts of fascism and a certain kind of elite-centered liberal democracy. Schnapp hints at this issue at several moments but does not address it in a sustained way.Though there have been some notable exceptions, most studies of Nazism in particular have tended to gravitate toward one of two explanatory options. The first, more common in philosophical circles, has been to view... (shrink)

Fifteen years ago, revelations about the political misdeeds of Martin Heidegger and Paul de Man sent shock waves throughout European and North American intellectual circles. Ever since, postmodernism has been haunted by the specter of a compromised past. In this intellectual genealogy of the postmodern spirit, Richard Wolin shows that postmodernism's infatuation with fascism has been widespread and not incidental. He calls into question postmodernism's claim to have inherited the mantle of the left--and suggests that postmodern thought has long (...) been smitten with the opposite end of the political spectrum.In probing chapters on C. G. Jung, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Georges Bataille, and Maurice Blanchot, Wolin discovers an unsettling commonality: during the 1930s, these thinkers leaned to the right and were tainted by a proverbial "fascination with fascism." Frustrated by democracy's shortcomings, they were seduced by fascism's grandiose promises of political regeneration. The dictatorships in Italy and Germany promised redemption from the uncertainties of political liberalism. But, from the beginning, there could be no doubting their brutal methods of racism, violence, and imperial conquest.Postmodernism's origins among the profascist literati of the 1930s reveal a dark political patrimony. The unspoken affinities between Counter-Enlightenment and postmodernism constitute the guiding thread of Wolin's suggestive narrative. In their mutual hostility toward reason and democracy, postmodernists and the advocates of Counter-Enlightenment betray a telltale strategic alliance--they cohabit the fraught terrain where far left and far right intersect.Those who take Wolin's conclusions to heart will never view the history of modern thought in quite the same way. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article examines the prominent Japanese postwar thinker Maruyama Masao’s critical engagement with his contemporary German legal theorist Carl Schmitt. Maruyama engaged with Schmitt’s decisionistic notion of “the political” and sovereignty since he found it useful in addressing the pathological elements of Japanese political culture, namely, the widespread political passivity and fatalistic ethos of the Japanese public. In his view, such a “decision-avoiding” political culture, which had contributed to the rise of fascism in interwar and wartime Japan, posed (...) a fundamental threat to the viability of Japan’s postwar democracy. Although Maruyama objected to Schmitt’s authoritarian theory of political leadership, he nevertheless believed Schmitt provided important insights into the key concepts of modern politics, such as political agency and the constituent power of the people. In his efforts to foster political subjectivity and liberal individuality in postwar Japan, Maruyama attempted to strike a balance between two extremes: Schmittian normless decisionism, on the one hand, and a politically naïve liberal constitutionalism, on the other. I conclude by suggesting that the hitherto overlooked intellectual affinity between Maruyama and one of the leading Weimar-era constitutional theorists—Hermann Heller—can enrich our understanding of Maruyama’s unceasing effort to formulate and insist on the imperative role of political subjectivity and liberal individuality in consolidating liberal democracy in postwar Japan. (shrink)

The concept of ressentiment is increasingly being drawn upon to analyse current political developments, but in doing so it is important to have a clear understanding of its original meaning in the work of Nietzsche and Scheler, who applied it to the inner logic of democracy, rather than political movements opposed to liberal democracy. This article introduces an important essay written in 1937, ‘National Socialism as a doctrine of rancour’, by the Dutch modernist writer, Menno ter Braak. Despite having been (...) highly influential in Dutch literature and scholarship, he is virtually unknown in the Anglophone world, since none of his work has been translated. This article is an important contribution both as a rare examination of how ressentiment can be used to analyse 1930s National Socialism, and as an analysis of the role of ressentiment as a moral sentiment in democratic politics, especially its populist variants. (shrink)

The paper offers an explanation why Duterte won the election in 2016 and how his phenomenal rise can be accounted. Some scholars on Philippine politics attribute the rise of Duterte to the failure of liberal democracy. On the other hand, this paper argues that “failure of liberal democracy” explanation merely scratches the surface of the question and does not address the source of the failure. Gramsci’s notion of passive revolution this paper maintains point to the root of the failures of (...) the liberal democratic regimes established after EDSA People Power revolt in 1986. The main contention of the paper is Duterte is a product of passive revolution. If Italy swung to fascism in the 1920s, this paper asserts Philippines in 2016 turned to Dutertismo. (shrink)

Operation Condor was a Latin American organization—the relationship between General Augusto Pinochet and the Italian Neo-Fascists also provides a fascinating and unique picture of Fascism’s transnational features. Firstly, it demonstrates the persistence of transnational relations between Fascists and Fascist sympathizers over decades. The influence of Fascism on Chilean nationalist movements and the link between Pinochet and Junio Valerio Borghese, who represented a myth for different Fascist generations, is illustrative. This feature ensured the survival of the Fascist transnational network, (...) which originated from the relations that revolved around the spreading of Fascism at a transnational level, throughout several decades. A further factor fostering the survival of the network was the logistic support provided by friendly regimes to the network’s members. Former Nazi and Fascist militants wanted for war crimes as well as Italian Neo-Fascists seeking to avoid judicial prosecution in Italy were all welcomed by sympathetic regimes such as Spain, Chile and Argentina. The opportunity of finding a safe refuge in those countries also promoted regular exchanges between the interwar Fascist generation and the post-war one. This chapter examines the dynamic transnational trajectories of Fascist militants and ideas and the resilience of relations within the transnational network. The collaboration between Pinochet and Italian Neo-Fascists was mutually beneficial—in 1975, they cooperated in the attempted murder of Bernardo Leighton in Rome. In 1976, thanks to the transnational links between Latin American Juntas, Fernandez Larios and Pinochet’s agent Michael Townley obtained fake Paraguayan passports which they used to enter the US and assassinate Orlando Letelier. (shrink)

El presente trabajo analiza el pensamiento liberal de Ortega y Gasset y María Zambrano ante la crisis de los años 30 y sus derroteros teórico-prácticos hasta la proclamación de la II República. En el primer epígrafe, se enmarca la reflexión de Ortega en torno a la Restauración dentro del ciclo europeo de desarrollo del hombre-masa y la necesidad de levantar una élite rectora de la cultura y de la vida. En un segundo momento, se reflexiona sobre las propuestas de superación (...) fascista de la Dictadura, para presentar el análisis de Ortega sobre el fascismo, como culminación del proceso de rebelión de las masas. Ortega, ante la situación de la monarquía española, seguiría atado a la idea de organizar la decencia nacional. En este espacio, la Agrupación al Servicio de la República jugará una papel determinante como intento de revitalizar un cierto liberalismo de corte republicano. Por su parte, Zambrano apostó por un liberalismo de influencia socialista y comunitarista capaz de acometer la cuestión social bajo el mandato de una aristocracia espiritual. En este contexto, la incapacidad de Ortega de erigirse como maestro de una generación llevará a algunos de sus discípulos más exaltados a fundar el Frente Español, un partido nacional, que aspiraba a superar las divisiones de clases. Otros discípulos tomarán caminos más radicales. (shrink)