The interaction of automated vehicles with vulnerable road users is one of the greatest challenges in the development of automated driving functions. In order to improve efficiency and ensure the safety of mixed traffic, ADF need to understand the intention of vulnerable road users, to adapt to their driving behavior, and to show its intention. However, this communication may occur in an implicit way, meaning they may communicate with vulnerable road users by using dynamic information, such as speed, (...) distance, etc. Therefore, investigating patterns of implicit communication of human drivers with vulnerable road users is relevant for developing ADF. The aim of this study is to identify the patterns of implicit communication of human drivers with vulnerable road users. For this purpose, the interaction between right-turning motorists and crossing cyclists was investigated at a traffic light controlled urban intersection. In the scenario, motorists and cyclists had a green signal at the same time, but cyclist had right-of-way. Using the Application Platform for Intelligent Mobility Research Intersection, trajectory and video data were recorded at an intersection in Braunschweig, Germany. Data had been recorded for 4 weeks. Based on the criticality metric post-encroachment time and quality of the recorded trajectory, 206 cases of interaction were selected for further analyses. According to the video annotation, when approaching the intersection, three common communication patterns were identified: no yield, motorists, who should yield to cyclists, crossed the intersection first while forcing right-of-way; active yield, motorists, who were in front of cyclists, gave the right-of-way; passive yield, motorists, who were behind cyclists, had to give the right-of-way. The analysis of the trajectory data revealed different patterns of changes in time advantage in these three categories. Additionally, the communication patterns were evaluated with regard to frequency of occurrence, efficiency, and safety. The findings of this study may provide knowledge for the implementation of a communication strategy for ADF, contributing to traffic efficiency as well as ensuring safety in the interaction with vulnerable road users. (shrink)

Becoming effective hunters of manipulative communicative moves is far from an easy capacity to develop. This book aims at offering a guide to the most dangerous traps of deceptive language as triggered by implicit communication strategies such as presupposition, implicature, topicalization and vague expressions. A look at different contexts of language use highlights some of the most remarkable implications of using indirect speech and of how it affects the correct comprehension of a message. Within the remit of (...) class='Hi'>communication and pragmatics studies, this work marks an advancement in the direction of delving into the linguistic manifestations of manipulative discourse, its most common contexts of use and the educational paths that can be undertaken to master it in everyday interactions. (shrink)

The development of new highly technological and highly personalized therapies for ultra-rare diseases is one of the fast-advancing areas in biomedicine. Yet such an approach is experimental, resource-intensive, and accessible mostly in affluent countries, thereby provoking ethical concerns. From a constructivist perspective, those therapies are not neutral tools, and ethical concerns are not merely added to science but embedded in the very choices researchers and technology developers make. Early research decisions about how therapy goals are defined, which patients are included, (...) and which diseases are prioritized already include implicit normative decisions that set the further therapy development trajectory. Nonetheless, the perspectives of researchers working on these individualized therapies remain underinvestigated. In this study, we aim to address this gap and explore how researchers developing such therapies understand and enact ethically loaded choices in early therapy development in practice. We conducted 15 semi-structured interviews with researchers developing a standardized platform for discovering personalized ASOs for ultra-rare neurodevelopmental disorders. Interviews were subjected to inductive thematic analysis, focusing on semantic themes. We report this study according to the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research. From the analysis, four main semantic themes were developed inductively. Researchers described patient and disease selection as a matter of feasibility, focusing mainly on the technical aspects of therapy development. They saw emotions as a potential source of bias in the selection process and thus advocate for selection committees and decision-making algorithms that reduce personal involvement. Communication with patients and their families was perceived as an ethically fragile area due to false hope phenomena and the emotional pressure of personal communication. Perceptions of therapy’s value varied, ranging from symptom relief and reduced family burden to doubts about whether the intervention was justified given the high translational uncertainty. Finally, researchers identified various barriers to therapy accessibility, yet described them as parts of the landscape rather than as sites for personal actions. The early stages of individualized therapy development for ultra-rare diseases include implicit ethical choices that are often seen as purely technical. Explicating the ethical component of these choices can help make the process of therapy development more transparent and fair. (shrink)

Our understanding of implicit bias and how to measure it has yet to be settled. Various debates between cognitive scientists are unresolved. Moreover, the public’s understanding of implicit bias tests continues to lag behind cognitive scientists’. These discrepancies pose potential problems. After all, a great deal of implicit bias research has been publicly funded. Further, implicit bias tests continue to feature in discourse about public- and private-sector policies surrounding discrimination, inequality, and even the purpose of science. (...) We aim to do our part by reconstructing some of the recent arguments in ordinary language and then revealing some of the operative norms or values that are often hidden beneath the surface of these arguments. This may help the public learn more about the science of implicit bias. It may also help both laypeople and scientists reflect on the values, interests, and stakeholders involved in establishing, justifying, and communicating scientific research. (shrink)

It is widely accepted in the received literature that the decisive feature in the constitution of community, and indeed its ontological core, is some sort of collective acknowledgement of the community, and mutual recognition between the members. A prominent version of this claim is that communities exist insofar as their members believe they exist, and that the communal bond is mutual sympathy. Yet this view is at odds with rather obvious facts: community members often dislike each other, and are far (...) from acknowledging the existence of any such bond. How can these phenomena be accommodated in the view that community is a matter of attitude rather than of brute objective facts? This paper suggests an answer that is inspired by the work of the German phenomenologist Hermann Schmalenbach (1885–1950). The claim is that the basic communal ties are plural implicit self-knowledge of the participants as members of the community. Implicit self-knowledge is often not reflectively transparent. Community members are plurally self-aware without thinking of themselves in “we”-terms. Where individuals consciously conceive of themselves as members, the community is turned into what Schmalenbach proposes to call a communion. (shrink)

Are communicators perceived as committed to what they actually say (what is explicit), or to what they mean (including what is implicit)? Some research claims that explicit communication leads to a higher attribution of commitment and more accountability than implicit communication. Here we present theoretical arguments and experimental data to the contrary. We present three studies exploring whether the saying–meaning distinction affects commitment attribution in promises, and, crucially, whether commitment attribution is further modulated by the degree (...) to which the hearer will actually rely on the promise. Our results support the conclusion that people perceive communicators to be committed to ‘what is meant’, and not simply to ‘what is said’. Our findings add to the experimental literature showing that the saying–meaning distinction is not as pivotal to social relations as often assumed, and that its role in commitment attribution might be overestimated. The attribution of commitment is strongly dependent on the (mutually known) relevance of ‘what is meant’. (shrink)

People often deny having meant what the audience understood. Such denials occur in both interpersonal and institutional contexts, such as in political discourse, the interpretation of laws and the perception of lies. In practice, denials have a wide range of possible effects on the audience, such as conversational repair, reinterpretation of the original utterance, moral judgements about the speaker, and rejection of the denial. When are these different reactions triggered? What factors make denials credible? There are surprisingly few experimental studies (...) directly targeting such questions. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments focusing on (i) the speaker’s incentives to mislead their audience, and (ii) the impact of speaker denials on audiences’ moral and epistemic assessments of what has been said. We find that the extent to which speakers are judged responsible for the audience’s interpretations is modulated by their (the speakers’) incentives to mislead, but not by denials themselves. We also find that people are more willing than we expected to revise their interpretation of the speaker’s utterance when they learn that the ascribed meaning is false, regardless of whether the speaker is known to have had incentives to deceive their audience. In general, these findings are consistent with the idea that communicators are held responsible for the cognitive effects they trigger in their audience; rather than being responsible for, more narrowly, only the effects of what was “literally” said. In light of our findings, we present a new, cognitive analysis of how audiences react to denials, drawing in particular on the Relevance Theory approach to communication. We distinguish in particular: (a) the spontaneous and intuitive re-interpretation of the original utterance in light of a denial; (b) the attribution of responsibility to the speaker for the cognitive effects of what is communicated; and (c) the reflective attribution of a particular intention to the speaker, which include argumentative considerations, higher-order deniability, and reputational concerns. Existing experimental work, including our own, aims mostly at (a) and (b), and does not adequately control for (c). Deeper understanding of what can be credibly denied will be hindered unless and until this methodological problem is resolved. (shrink)

Since sending explicit messages can be costly, people often utilize “what is not said,” i.e., informative silence, to economize communication. This paper studies the efficient communication rule, which is fully informative while minimizing the use of explicit messages, in cooperative environments. It is shown that when the notion of context is defined as the finest mutually self-evident event that contains the current state, the efficient use of informative silence exhibits the defining property of indexicals in natural languages. While (...) the efficient use of silence could be complex, it is also found that the efficient use of silence can be as “simple” as the use of indexicals in natural languages if and only if the information structure satisfies some centrality and dominance properties. (shrink)

_Thoughts and Utterances_ is the first sustained investigation of two distinctions which are fundamental to all theories of utterance understanding: the semantics/pragmatics distinction and the distinction between what is explicitly communicated and what is implicitly communicated.

This article argues that Jacques Derrida’s Politics of Friendship presents an implicit but significant critique of Maurice Blanchot’s The Unavowable Community. In Blanchot’s text, the Other disrupts any sense of fusional or essentialist community. But Derrida criticises Blanchot for neglecting the need to negotiate my responsibility to infinite others. Derrida proposes a logic of the plus un, playing on this double meaning in French, where a need to count singularities (‘plus one’) disrupts the unity of community (‘no longer one’). (...) For Derrida, this offers a greater emphasis on those outside the boundaries of constituted communities, something he finds lacking in Blanchot. I demonstrate that Derrida’s position is a challenge to an emerging xenophobic discourse in 1980s French politics. I propose, therefore, that Derrida’s difference with Blanchot is motivated as much by a political difference as a philosophical one, with Derrida judging Blanchot’s account inadequate for contemporary political concerns. (shrink)

While traffic signals, signs, and road markings provide explicit guidelines for those operating in and around the roadways, some decisions, such as determinations of “who will go first,” are made by implicit negotiations between road users. In such situations, pedestrians are today often dependent on cues in drivers’ behavior such as eye contact, postures, and gestures. With the introduction of more automated functions and the transfer of control from the driver to the vehicle, pedestrians cannot rely on such non-verbal (...) cues anymore. To study how the interaction between pedestrians and automated vehicles (AVs) might look like in the future, and how this might be affected if AVs were to communicate their intent to pedestrians, we designed an external vehicle interface called automated vehicle interaction principle (AVIP) that communicates vehicles’ mode and intent to pedestrians. The interaction was explored in two experiments using a Wizard of Oz approach to simulate automated driving. The first experiment was carried out at a zebra crossing and involved nine pedestrians. While it focused mainly on assessing the usability of the interface, it also revealed initial indications related to pedestrians’ emotions and perceived safety when encountering an AV with/without the interface. The second experiment was carried out in a parking lot and involved 24 pedestrians, which enabled a more detailed assessment of pedestrians’ perceived safety when encountering an AV, both with and without the interface. For comparison purposes, these pedestrians also encountered a conventional vehicle. After a short training course, the interface was deemed easy for the pedestrians to interpret. The pedestrians stated that they felt significantly less safe when they encountered the AV without the interface, compared to the conventional vehicle and the AV with the interface. This suggests that the interface could contribute to a positive experience and improved perceived safety in pedestrian encounters with AVs – something that might be important for general acceptance of AVs. As such, this topic should be further investigated in future studies involving a larger sample and more dynamic conditions. (shrink)

Within the philosophy of language, pragmatics has tended to be seen as an adjunct to, and a means of solving problems in, semantics. A cognitive-scientific conception of pragmatics as a mental processing system responsible for interpreting ostensive communicative stimuli (specifically, verbal utterances) has effected a transformation in the pragmatic issues pursued and the kinds of explanation offered. Taking this latter perspective, I compare two distinct proposals on the kinds of processes, and the architecture of the system(s), responsible for the recovery (...) of speaker meaning (both explicitly and implicitly communicated meaning). (shrink)

Over the last two decades the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben has attracted widespread attention both within philosophy and more broadly across the human sciences. Central to the thinking of Nancy and Agamben is a shared theory of community that offers a model of resistance to oppressive power through radical passivity. This article argues that this model inherits the inadequacies of Martin Heidegger’s attempts to conceptualize society and history. More specifically, Heidegger’s understanding of collective history in terms of (...) ‘destiny’ implicitly regulates the figure of community proposed by Nancy and Agamben. This alignment with the Heideggerian notion of destiny means that these later thinkers fail to offer a credible model of resistance in terms of concretely determined means of productive counter-practices. As a consequence the usefulness of the thinking of Nancy and Agamben as a conceptual framework for emancipatory politics is at best extremely limited. (shrink)

According to standard assumptions in semantics, ordinary users of a language have implicit beliefs about the truth-conditions of sentences in that language, and they often agree on those beliefs. For example, it is assumed that if Anna and John are both competent users of English and the former utters ‘grass is green’ in conversation with the latter, they will both believe that that sentence is true if and only if grass is green. These assumptions play an important role in (...) an intuitively compelling picture of communication, according to which successful communication through literal assertoric utterances is normally effected thanks to our shared beliefs about the truth-conditions of the sentences uttered in the course of the conversation. Against these standard assumptions, this paper argues that the participants in a conversation rarely have the same beliefs about the truth-conditions of the sentences involved in a linguistic interaction. More precisely, it argues for Variance, the thesis that nearly every utterance is such that there is no proposition which more than one language user believes to be that utterance’s truth-conditional content. If Variance is true, we must reject the standard picture of communication. Towards the end of the paper I identify three ways in which ordinary conversations can be communication-like despite the truth of Variance and argue that the most natural amendments to the standard picture fail to explain them. (shrink)

Anglo-American and continental philosophy are often con sidered sharply divergent, even hostile, movements of thought. However, there have been several attempts to cross the divide between them, leading some theorists to very interesting and promising new projects. Apel has been one of the first German philosophers whose serious preoccupation with continental themes has not impeded his thorough and responsible investigation of analytic and post-analytic issues. Thus, Apel promotes a linguistic analysis that aspires to unveil the hidden, implicit, but non (...) circumventible linguistic-pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation and to explore its implications for epistemology, ethics and politics. Key Words: communicative and strategic rationality • . discourse ethics • . fallibilism • . foundationalism • . normative presuppositions of argumentation • . pragmatics . transcendentalism. (shrink)

Does the cultivation of liberty undermine communities of practice? The answer depends significantly on what is meant by the cultivation of liberty and on what is meant by a community of practice. On the question of community, the work of Rawls and Sandel serves as a starting point. I examine three conceptions — the instrumental, the sentimental and the constitutive — and attempt to illustrate them with examples of communities of practice. I argue that Sandel's criterion for distinguishing between the (...) sentimental and constitutive conceptions of community does not do the work required of it.On the question of liberty undermining community, I argue that if liberty is taken as license then it is a threat both to communities and to practices, whereas if it is taken as independence then it threatens neither. Two conceptions of independence can be distinguished. One, which is central to liberal political theory, does not presuppose an account of the good; the other, which I argue is central to the flourishing of a community of practice, does. It presupposes that account of the good which is implicit in the end or telos of the practice concerned. (shrink)

Purpose. The article deals with the problem of mutual perception of individuals, which implies the analysis of the anthropological prerequisites for the study of interpersonal communication. The work emphasizes the need to identify the gnoseological lacuna of the possibility and relevance of knowing someone else’s "I". As well as the need to point out implicit metaphysical attitudes, universal for many worldviews, which are implicitly included in the theory of personal communication. Theoretical basis. The author proceeds from the (...) logical consequences of the evolutionary premise in anthropology. He compares the psychophysical goals of the interpersonal communication task with its ideological theory, monitors the impossibility of the realizing the communication level declared in the consciousness. As an opposite evolutionary premise, the author cites the postulates of the "philosophy of dialogue" by F. Rosenzweig, F. Ebner, M. Buber, and others. The correlation of these philosophical positions reveals the inconsistency of materialistic reduction in anthropology. Originality. The author identifies four levels of communication: background, obstacle, function and dialogue. He represents the rationale for the fact that the first three levels do not need the existence of an individual "I". The first three levels leave the existential "I" unnecessary and therefore unclaimed. The philosophy of dialogue with the Other raises an equally important question about the conditions for the possibility of a metaphysical continuum in ontology, and in turn, suggests the acceptance of a philosophical premise about God as the space of subjectivity in the "I-You" dialogue. Conclusions. Philosophical understanding of the communication of two existential "I" demanded in communication is possible only within the framework of religious discourse. The phenomenal consciousness can enter into communication with a specific other phenomenal consciousness only when there is a metaphysical space between them, allowing for the possibility of communication of such a level. The materialistic conditioning by the human evolutionary needs in all its conceivable forms produces a reduction of the communicative inquiry, which makes the mutual perception of the two "I" impossible. In this psychophysiological anthropological model, there is no space for the possibility of a dialogue of individuals. (shrink)

Digital communication between a patient and their clinician offers the potential for improved patient care, particularly for young people with long term conditions who are at risk of service disengagement. However, its use raises a number of ethical questions which have not been explored in empirical studies. The objective of this study was to examine, from the patient and clinician perspective, the ethical implications of the use of digital clinical communication in the context of young people living with (...) long-term conditions. A total of 129 semi-structured interviews, 59 with young people and 70 with healthcare professionals, from 20 United Kingdom -based specialist clinics were conducted as part of the LYNC study. Transcripts from five sites were read by a core team to identify explicit and implicit ethical issues and develop descriptive ethical codes. Our subsequent thematic analysis was developed iteratively with reference to professional and ethical norms. Clinician participants saw digital clinical communication as potentially increasing patient empowerment and autonomy; improving trust between patient and healthcare professional; and reducing harm because of rapid access to clinical advice. However, they also described ethical challenges, including: difficulty with defining and maintaining boundaries of confidentiality; uncertainty regarding the level of consent required; and blurring of the limits of a clinician’s duty of care when unlimited access is possible. Paradoxically, the use of digital clinical communication can create dependence rather than promote autonomy in some patients. Patient participants varied in their understanding of, and concern about, confidentiality in the context of digital communication. An overarching theme emerging from the data was a shifting of the boundaries of the patient-clinician relationship and the professional duty of care in the context of use of clinical digital communication. The ethical implications of clinical digital communication are complex and go beyond concerns about confidentiality and consent. Any development of this form of communication should consider its impact on the patient-clinician-relationship, and include appropriate safeguards to ensure that professional ethical obligations are adhered to. (shrink)

The species problem is the longstanding puzzle regarding the nature of species. This paper aims to describe how biologists experience little communication breakdown when they have different conceptions of species. For this purpose, I analyze two debates on species and speciation between Guy Bush and Jerry Coyne & H. Allen Orr. Although they have radically different ideas on species, they experience little communication difficulty. I will argue that this is because they implicitly agreed on the referent of the (...) group of organisms being addressed and possible causal factors of the speciation process. This analysis confirms a leading account in the general philosophy of science on the way in which scientists avoid the incommensurability threat. (shrink)

The concept of epistemic injustice provides a theoretical framework for considering the ethical issues arising in interpersonal communication. This article proposes the concept of implicational injustice as a novel type of epistemic injustice. An implicature is a message that a speaker does not explicitly state, but that is implicitly communicated by an utterance. Since the speaker does not explicitly state the implicature, it may be overlooked by the hearer. This oversight of implicature is likely to occur when the hearer (...) prematurely terminates the search for relevance or when there is informational inequality between speaker and hearer. If premature termination or information inequality is caused by the hearer’s prejudice against the speaker or by the undue ignorance of the speaker, the oversight of implicature is deemed an implicational injustice. This article offers several examples of the oversight of implicature and implicational injustice in doctor-patient communication in which patients’ attempts to convey psychosocial messages to their physicians are often overlooked. Implicational injustice can be considered as a novel subtype of epistemic injustice that differs from other subtypes, such as silencing, testimonial injustice, and interpretative injustice. Implicational injustice prevents the sufferer’s full participation in epistemic collaboration and can inflict secondary harm, such as negative effects on clinical decision making. (shrink)

The main aim of the thesis is to give a semantic account of implicit content – the kind of content that plays a crucial role in implicit communication. Implicit communication is a species of communication in which a speaker communicates certain contents that go over and above the contents retrievable from the linguistic meaning of the words used. The focus of the thesis is a certain kind of implicit communication involving locations (when (...) sentences such as “It is raining” are used to communicate that it is raining at a certain location) and judges (when sentences such as “Avocado is tasty” are used to communicate that avocado is tasty for a certain person, called “the judge”). The way the topic of implicit content is approached is via the notion, widespread in contemporary philosophy of language, of “unarticulated constituents”. The thesis contains an investigation of this notion, with the specific aim of disentangling the many senses it has been used and of providing a general definition of the notion. A direct product of this investigation is a partitioning of the logical space; three positions are then selected, which correspond to the main contenders in the current debate involving unarticulated constituents: truth-conditional semantics, truth-conditional pragmatics and relativism. The biggest part of the thesis is dedicated to investigating certain arguments that have surfaced in the debate between these positions, with the ultimate goal of proposing a relativist account of implicit content. The particular version of relativism offered consists in the combination of the claim that locations and judges are part of the circumstances of evaluation, rather than the content of utterances, with “the variadic functions approach” to certain natural language expressions. Also, several arguments against a truth-conditional semantic approach to predicates of personal taste are provided. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated potential in enhancing various aspects of healthcare, including health provider–patient communication. However, some have raised the concern that such communication may adopt implicit communication norms that deviate from what patients want or need from talking with their healthcare provider. This paper explores the possibility of using LLMs to enable patients to choose their preferred communication style when discussing their medical cases. By providing a proof-of-concept demonstration using ChatGPT-4, we suggest (...) LLMs can emulate different healthcare provider–patient communication approaches (building on Emanuel and Emanuel’s four models: paternalistic, informative, interpretive and deliberative). This allows patients to engage in a communication style that aligns with their individual needs and preferences. We also highlight potential risks associated with using LLMs in healthcare communication, such as reinforcing patients’ biases and the persuasive capabilities of LLMs that may lead to unintended manipulation. (shrink)

Future automated vehicles of different sizes will share the same space with other road users, e. g., pedestrians. For a safe interaction, successful communication needs to be ensured, in particular, with vulnerable road users, such as pedestrians. Two possible communication means exist for AVs: vehicle kinematics for implicit communication and external human-machine interfaces for explicit communication. However, the exact interplay is not sufficiently studied yet for pedestrians' interactions with AVs. Additionally, very few other studies focused (...) on the interplay of vehicle kinematics and eHMI for pedestrians' interaction with differently sized AVs, although the precise coordination is decisive to support the communication with pedestrians. Therefore, this study focused on how the interplay of vehicle kinematics and eHMI affects pedestrians' willingness to cross, trust and perceived safety for the interaction with two differently sized AVs. In this experimental online study, the participants interacted with the AVs in a shared space. Both AVs were equipped with a 360° LED light-band eHMI attached to the outer vehicle body. Three eHMI statuses were displayed. The vehicle kinematics were varied at two levels. Moreover, “non-matching” conditions were included for both AVs in which the dynamic eHMI falsely communicated a yielding intent although the vehicle did not yield. Overall, results showed that pedestrians' willingness to cross was significantly higher for the smaller AV compared to the larger AV. Regarding the interplay of vehicle kinematics and eHMI, results indicated that a dynamic eHMI increased pedestrians' perceived safety when the vehicle yielded. When the vehicle did not yield, pedestrians' perceived safety still increased for the dynamic eHMI compared to the static eHMI and no eHMI. The findings of this study demonstrated possible negative effects of eHMIs when they did not match the vehicle kinematics. Further implications for a holistic communication strategy for differently sized AVs will be discussed. (shrink)

The following article proposes an empirical study to explore communication strategies in the Cosa Nostra. Psychological studies on the characteristics of the language within the criminal organization are undoubtedly recent, but crucial to thoroughly understand the characteristics of implicit and explicit communication it adopts in the various contexts it works, as well as the power and value they assume. The data we have obtained from some videos concerning interviews and police interrogations to men of honor have been (...) analyzed through a method that refers to the grounds of qualitative research in clinical psychology, the Grounded Theory by Glaser and Strauss. The analysis we have carried out and its relevant data show us a world of the Mafia where the care for linguistic choices, for both form and contents, is characterized as a crucial activity, even when words are replaced by silence or gestures. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of rhetoric and rhetorical strategies that are implicit in the standalone sustainability reporting of the top 24 companies of the Fortune 500 Global. We adopt Bormann’s :396–407, 1972) SCT framework to study the rhetorical situation and how corporate sustainability reporting messages can be communicated to the audience. The SCT concepts in the sustainability reporting’s communication are subject to different types of legitimacy strategies that are used by corporations as (...) a validity and legitimacy claim in the reports. A content analysis has been conducted and structural coding schemes have been developed based on the literature. The schemes are applied to the SCT model which recognizes the symbolic convergent processes of fantasy among communicators in a Society. The study reveals that most of the sample companies communicate fantasy type and rhetorical vision in their corporate sustainability reporting. However, the disclosure or messages are different across locations and other taxonomies of the SCT framework. This study contributes to the current CSR literature about how symbolic or fantasy understandings can be interpreted by the users. It also discusses the persuasion styles that are adopted by the companies for communication purposes. This study is the theoretical extension of the SCT. Researchers may be interested in further investigating other online communication paths, such as human rights reports and director’s reports. (shrink)

“Implicit bias” is a term of art referring to relatively unconscious and relatively automatic features of prejudiced judgment and social behavior. While psychologists in the field of “implicit social cognition” study “implicit attitudes” toward consumer products, self-esteem, food, alcohol, political values, and more, the most striking and well-known research has focused on implicit attitudes toward members of socially stigmatized groups, such as African-Americans, women, and the LGBTQ community.[1] For example, imagine Frank, who explicitly believes that women (...) and men are equally suited for careers outside the home. Despite his explicitly egalitarian belief, Frank might nevertheless implicitly associate women with the home, and this implicit association might lead him to behave in any number of biased ways, from trusting feedback from female co-workers less to hiring equally qualified men over women. Psychological research on implicit bias is relatively recent (§1), but a host of metaphysical (§2), epistemological (§3), and ethical questions (§4) about implicit bias are pressing.[2]. (shrink)

Recent discussions of animal communication and the evolution of language have advocated adopting a ‘pragmatics-first’ approach, according to which “a more productive framework” for primate communication research should be “pragmatics, the field of linguistics that examines the role of context in shaping the meaning of linguistic utterances”. After distinguishing two different conceptions of pragmatics that advocates of the pragmatics-first approach have implicitly relied on, I argue that neither conception adequately serves the purposes of pragmatics-first approaches to the origins (...) of human linguistic communication. My main aim in this paper is to motivate–and begin to articulate–an intermediary conception whose scope is narrower than Carnapian pragmatics but broader than Gricean pragmatics. To do so, I first spell out what I take to be the key insight offered by proponents of the Gricean approach concerning the emergence of linguistic communication, namely, its being communication ‘from a psychological point of view’. I then develop this insight using key elements from the anti-Gricean ‘biosemantic’ account of linguistic communication due to Ruth Millikan, Philosophical Perspectives 9, Ridgeview Publishing, Atascedero CA, 1995, Millikan R Varieties of Meaning. Mass.: The MIT Press, Cambridge, Millikan, Beyond concepts: unicepts, language, and natural information, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 2017, and elsewhere). I argue that the intermediary pragmatics-first approach that I propose, which draws on both Gricean and Millikanian resources, would be better equipped to serve the purposes of those who search for potential precursors of human linguistic communication in animal communication. (shrink)

Patient-centred communication is widely regarded as a best practice in contemporary medical care, both in terms of maximising health outcomes and respecting persons. However, not all patients communicate in ways that are easily understood by clinicians and other healthcare professionals. This is especially so for patients with non-speaking intellectual disabilities. We argue that assumptions about intellectual disability—including those in diagnostic criteria, providers’ implicit attitudes and master narratives of disability—negatively affect communicative approaches towards intellectually disabled patients. Non-speaking intellectually disabled (...) patients may also be taken to lack decision-making capacity and resultingly, may be given very little role in determining their care. But, given evidence of the heterogeneous communicative practices available to non-speaking patients, efforts should be made to extend patient-centred communication to them. We offer four suggestions for doing so: (1) treating those with non-speaking intellectual disabilities as potential communicators; (2) lengthening appointment times to develop relationships necessary for communication; (3) disentangling capacity from communication in concept and in practice; and (4) recognising the bidirectional connection between supported decision-making and patient-centred communication. (shrink)

Discussion of political and legal citizenship requires attention to social solidarity. Current approaches to citizenship, however, tend to proceed on abstract bases, neglecting this sociological dimension. This is partly because a tacit understanding of what constitutes a `society' has been developed through implicit reliance on the idea of `nation'. Issues of social belonging are addressed more directly in communitarian and multiculturalist discourses. Too often, however, different modes of solidarity and participation are confused. Scale is often neglected. The model of (...) `nation' again prefigures the ways in which membership and difference are constructed. The present paper suggests the value of maintaining a distinction among relational networks, cultural or legal categories, and discursive publics. The first constitute community in a sense quite different from either of the second and third. Categories, however, are increasingly prominent in largescale social life. But the idea of the public is crucial to conceptualizing democratic participation. (shrink)

In this, the second of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory. ‘Linguistic competence’ for Chomsky means the mastery of an abstract system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus. The model by which communication is understood on this account contains three implicit assumptions, here called ‘monologism’, ‘a priorism’, and ‘elementarism’. The author offers an outline of a (...) theory of communicative competence that is based on the negations of these assumptions. In opposing the first two assumptions he introduces distinctions, respectively, between semantic universals which process experiences and those that make such processing possible, and between semantic universals which precede all socialization and those that are linked to the conditions of potential socialization. Against elementarism, he argues that the semantic content of all possible natural languages does not consist of combinations of a finite number of meaning components. Differences in systems of classification preclude this, and such differences can be seen to infect all respects of intercultural comparison. Using the notion of ‘performative utterance’, the author elucidates the role of dialogue‐constitutive universals as part of the formal apparatus required of a”; speaker's capacity to communicate. He then notes what would be required of a general semantics based on a theory of communicative competence; and finally points out how this theory might be used for social analysis. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that when we trust the results of scientific research, that trust is inevitably directed at least in part at collective bodies rather than at single researchers, and that accordingly, reasonable assessments of epistemic trustworthiness in science must attend to these collective bodies. In order to support this claim, I start by invoking the collaborative nature of most of today’s scientific research. I argue that the trustworthiness of a collaborative research group does not supervene (...) on the trustworthiness of its individual members and point out some specific problems for the assessment of epistemic trustworthiness that arise from the specific nature of today’s collaborative research. Next, I argue that the social diffusion of trustworthiness goes even further; we always also need an assessment of the trustworthiness of the respective research community as a whole. Communities, I claim, play an essential role in the epistemic quality management of science. To see why this role is indispensible, we have to appreciate the full complexity of determining what is desirable in a method of inquiry. The relevant features of a method include three different dimensions: the reliability of positive results, the reliability of negative results, and the method’s power. Every methodological choice involves a trade-off between these three dimensions. The right balance between them (the “distribution of inductive risks”, or DIR) depends on value judgments about the costs of false results and the benefits of correct ones. Conventional methodological standards of research communities impose constraints on admissible DIR and thereby harmonize the implicit value judgments. Trusting that the research community has set the limitations on DIR in a suitable way is thus always part of placing our trust in a scientific result. (shrink)

The chapter discusses the mechanisms involved in intrapersonal and interpersonal communication and learning values, beliefs, and biases and their implicit and explicit interactions with an individual’s thinking. Thinking is one type of conscious intrapersonal communication where a message sender and message receiver are the same person. It is a self-confirming process. However, endless internal repetitions of thinking often are distorted as facts without the thinker’s awareness as a result of the neurobiology of automaticity. Intrapersonal communication and (...) ethnocentrism, internalized privilege/oppression, types of thinking, types of interpersonal styles, and the formation of automatic thought patterns are discussed. The chapter explores the powerful role of a provider’s intrapersonal communication on her perception, worldview, interpersonal communication, and her ability to view the client’s worldview. Concrete strategies and personal stories are inserted immediately after concepts for readers to process concepts through both intellectually (conceptually) and affectively (emotionally). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.1 (2005) 27-29 [Access article in PDF] Community, Consciousness, and Dynamic Self-Understanding Marya Schechtman Keywords consciousness, unconscious, self-understanding, embedded consciousness, personal identity I would like to thank both of my commentators for their generous and insightful comments. After an extremely clear and accurate summary of my position, Grant Gillett suggests that it should be supplemented with a recognition that the self-understanding I describe is rooted (...) in culture and social practice. I agree wholeheartedly with the need for such a supplement. In this paper, I try to switch from the emphasis on contents of consciousness found in traditional developments of the Lockean insight to an emphasis on the fact of reflective self-consciousness, which I think better captures what seems right in Locke's view. My suggestion is that we take up Locke's claim that the essential feature of personhood is awareness of oneself as a self, and understand this self-awareness in terms of an implicit demand for intelligibility in one's conscious experience. Considering oneself as a self requires that one view one's current state not as a free-standing moment that might or might not be related in appropriate ways to the states of a freestanding past or future self, but rather as part of an unfolding life story. This involves, among other things, an acknowledgment of our obligation to questions such as: "Why do I feel this way?" or "Why am I doing this?" Being a self involves holding oneself accountable for what one is doing and feeling. In this case the accountability is to oneself.The possibility of being accountable to oneself obviously depends, however, on a cultural context in which there is such a thing as accountability to others. It is only against a backdrop where others may call for an explanation of one's behavior or speech—and where not all explanations count as legitimate—that one can demand intelligibility from oneself. Children must be socialized into personhood by learning the right questions to ask about how their lives hang together, and what kinds of answers count as answers to those questions. Person, in Locke's sense, is a normative and forensic term, and is therefore inherently bound up with public standards. My point here is the somewhat limited claim that the attitude toward our own lives and experience, which is self-constituting, giving us a sense of ourselves as persisting beings, will involve this kind of accountability to oneself. I agree, however, that the tools for achieving this sort of attitude come in with mother's milk and early socialization. A fuller development of my claim thus [End Page 27] requires much more discussion of the role of culture and society in self-constitution. I begin such a discussion in my Constitution of Selves (1996), and hope to take it up in more detail in future work.Markus Heinimaa (2005) wonders if I have gone far enough in rejecting traditional approaches to the problem of personal identity. Although I say that the perceiver-self is not a homunculus, I do talk about it as if it is an entity, and about the unconscious as if it is a place inside this entity where psychological states can hide. Heinimaa's suggestion is that both the perceiver self and the unconscious are unnecessary complications, and that I can achieve my goal without them. Locke's insight can be better (or at least as well) captured, he suggests, with a kinetic view of the person as a process of self-understanding. These challenges are well taken. Although I cannot fully answer them here, perhaps I can clarify my position somewhat, and in so doing motivate some of my assumptions.I begin with my assumption of unconscious mental states and processes. My discussion starts from the idea that there are considerations pulling us toward the claim that the person must be identified with consciousness, and also considerations pulling us toward the view that the person must be more than conscious experience. The first set of considerations is laid out in some detail in... (shrink)

The emergence of human communication systems is typically investigated via 2 approaches with complementary strengths and weaknesses: naturalistic studies and computer simulations. This study was conducted with a method that combines these approaches. Pairs of participants played video games requiring communication. Members of a pair were physically separated but exchanged graphic signals through a medium that prevented the use of standard symbols (e.g., letters). Communication systems emerged and developed rapidly during the games, integrating the use of explicit (...) signs with information implicitly available to players and silent behavior‐coordinating procedures. The systems that emerged suggest 3 conclusions: (a) signs originate from different mappings; (b) sign systems develop parsimoniously; (c) sign forms are perceptually distinct, easy to produce, and tolerant to variations. (shrink)

Research on the evolution of language is often framed in terms of sharp discontinuities in syntax and semantics between animal communication systems and human language as we know them. According to the so-called “pragmatics-first” approach to the evolution of language, when trying to understand the origins of human language in animal communication, we should be focusing on potential pragmatic continuities. However, some proponents of this approach (e.g. Seyfarth and Cheney Animal Behavior 124: 339–346, 2017) find important pragmatic continuities, (...) whereas others (e.g. Origgi and Sperber 2000) find sharp discontinuities. I begin (in Section 1) by arguing that this divergence is due to the fact that the proponents implicitly rely, respectively, on two different views of pragmatics, corresponding to different conceptions of what is involved in context-dependence – one “Carnapian”, the other “Gricean”. I argue that neither conception is fit to serve the purposes of pragmatics-first approaches to the evolution of language. In Section 2, I examine a recent formal “semantic-pragmatic” analysis of monkey calls, due to Philippe Schlenker et al. (in, e.g., Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (6): 439–501, 2014, Trends in Cognitive Science 20 (12): 894–904, 2016a, Theoretical Linguistics 42 (1–2): 1–90, 2016b), which appears to improve on the Carnapian and Gricean conceptions. However, I argue that the appearances are misleading and that the S-P analysis is no better suited than Carnapian analyses for the purposes of those seeking to establish human-nonhuman pragmatic continuities. Understanding why this is so will point the way toward my preferred, genuinely intermediate conception of pragmatics (as defended in Bar-On Biology & Philosophy 36 (6): 1–25, 2021), which – I argue in Section 3 – is better fit for these purposes. Drawing on recent discussions of chimpanzee communication, I briefly indicate which aspects of extant primate call communication – both gestural and vocal – could potentially count as pragmatic according to this conception. (shrink)

A consensus has emerged among many normative theorists of cultural pluralism that dialogue is the key to securing just relations among ethnic or cultural groups. However, few normative theorists have explored the conditions or incentives that enable inter-group dialogue versus those that encourage inter-group conflict. To address this problem, I use Habermas’s distinction between communicative and strategic action, since many models of inter-group dialogue implicitly rely upon communicative action, while many accounts of inter-group conflict rest upon strategic action. Drawing on (...) explanatory accounts of inter-group conflict, I outline five strategic logics of group conflict, what I call the resource, political, information, positional, and security logics. I then argue that these strategic logics cannot be overcome by three motivations commonly thought to support communicative action: moral-cognitive consistency, the normative characteristics of modernity, and publicity constraints. At this point, I turn to an empirical case, the reception of African-American concerns within the Jewish public sphere prior to the Second World War, in order to suggest that, although strategic incentives might hinder inter-group dialogue, they may also encourage it. In conclusion, I provide three recommendations for how theorists might utilize strategic incentives in order to recognize which actors, policies, or institutions can encourage inter-group dialogue. (shrink)

In this paper I will be implicitly defending the following thesis: An individual X obtains knowledge of scientific claim p in virtue of being a member of a community A that regards claim p as knowledge. The thesis states is that a claim p only becomes scientific knowledge once it's been through a process of validation by a scientific community. This is meant to be contrasted with the claim that individuals first obtain scientific knowledge perception or inference, and then transmit (...) it to their colleagues, without the community playing any epistemological role. The strategy that I will follow is the following. In the first section I will consider the claim “that collaboration plays a causal role in advancing scientists' epistemic goals, and that its growing popularity is a consequence of its effectiveness in aiding communities of scientists to realize their epistemic goals”. I will conclude that the claim is rather weak in the sense that it only justifies certain sections of scientific practice and does not establish that in principle scientific knowledge is produced in the manner described above. An attempt to strengthen the thesis will be made through the presentation of evidence that all through history in what is widely recognised as scientific activity the scientist is never alone, even if they are the single author of a scientific work. I will draw on certain insights from Latour's study in the making of scientific knowledge to support the thesis that the individual scientist is necessarily surrounded by allies. This attempt will consist of two parts, the first being what the exploration of what I term the intra-laboratory aspect of scientific activity, and the second being the public forum aspect. I will conclude that the latter aspect is the aspect which supports the claim that the production of scientific knowledge is in principle social, that is that the appropriate unit of epistemological analysis of the production of scientific knowledge is the scientific community rather than the individual scientist. Finally, I will promote the thesis that community agreement is constitutive of knowledge, presenting and arguing for the communitarian account of scientific knowledge. I will briefly argue against an individualistic conception of knowledge acquisition, based on the model of the solitary Cartesian thinker and the notion that knowing something involves being in a certain mental state, and then briefly talk about belief as the property of plural subjects before I move on to present the communitarian model of knowledge acquisition. (shrink)

Our claim in this paper is that a theory of “pretense” (in all its crucial uses in human society and cognition) can be built only if it is grounded on the general theory of “behavioral implicit communication” (BIC), which is not to be confused with non-verbal communication (with distinct notions being frequently conflated, such as “signs” vs. “messages”, or goal as “intention” vs. goal as “function”). Pretense presupposes some BIC-based human interaction, where a normal, practical behavior is (...) used for signifying something, based on a sign that is not a conventional one. In light of BIC interaction theory, one can exploit this sign or message in a deceptive way in order to induce the other to believe that he/she is performing a given behavior or has a given mental state. (shrink)

Background: In cancer care, many clinical contexts still lack a good-quality patient–health professional communication about diagnosis and prognosis. Information transmission enables patients to make informed choices about their own healthcare. Nevertheless, disclosure is still an ethically challenging clinical problem in cancer care. High-quality care can be achieved by understanding the perspectives of others. The perspective of patients, their caregivers, physicians and nurses have seldom been simultaneously studied. Objective: To investigate the phenomenon of diagnosis and prognosis-related communication as experienced (...) by patients, their caregivers, and both their attending nurses and physicians, to enlighten meanings attached to communication by the four parties. Methods: A qualitative study using interpretative phenomenological analysis was performed. Participants and research context: Purposive sampling of six patients, six caregivers, seven nurses and five physicians was performed in two oncological hospitals in Italy. Ethical considerations: Local Ethics Committee approved the study. It was guided by the ethical principles of voluntary enrolment, anonymity, privacy and confidentiality. Results: Three main themes were identified: (a) the infinite range of possibilities in knowing and willing to know, (b) communication with the patient as a conflicting situation and (c) the bind of implicit and explicit meaning of communication. Conclusion: The interplay of meanings attached by patients, their caregivers, and their attending oncologist and nurse to communication about diagnosis and prognosis revealed complexities and ambiguities not yet settled. Physicians still need to solve the ethical tensions in their caring relationship with patients to really allow them ‘to choose with dignity and being aware of it’. Nurses need to develop awareness about their role in diagnosis and prognosis-related communication. This cognizance is essential not just to assure consistency of communication within the multi-disciplinary team but mostly because it allows and enables the moral agent to take its own responsibilities and be accountable for them. (shrink)

Community Engagement (CE) has been presented by bio-ethicists and scientists as a straightforward and unequivocal good which can minimize the risks of exploitation and ensure a fair distribution of research benefits in developing countries. By means of ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in Kenya between 2007 and 2009 we explored how CE is understood and enacted in paediatric vaccine trials conducted by the Kenyan Medical Research Institute and the US Centers for Disease Control (KEMRI/CDC). In this paper we focus on the role (...) of paid volunteers who act as an interface between villagers KEMRI/CDC. Village Reporters’ (VRs) position of being both with the community and with KEMRI/CDC is advantageous for the conduct of trials. However it is also problematic in terms of exercising trust, balancing allegiances and representing community views. VRs role is shaped by ambiguities related to their employment status and their dual accountability to researchers and their villages. VRs are understandably careful to stress their commitment to self-less community service since it augments their respectability at community level and opens up opportunities for financial gain and self-development. Simultaneously VRs association with KEMRI/CDC and proximity to trial participants requires them to negotiate implicit and explicit expectations for material and medical assistance in a cultural setting in which much importance is placed on sharing and mutuality. To ensure continuity of productive interactions between VRs, and similar community intermediaries, and researchers, open discussion is needed about the problematic aspects of relational ethics, issues concerning undue influence, power relations and negotiating expectations. (shrink)

For some time, the role of culture in language education within schools, universities and professional communication has received increasing attention. This article identifies two aporias in the discourse of intercultural communication : first, that it contains an unstated movement towards a universal consciousness; second, that its claims to truth are grounded in an implicit appeal to a transcendental moral signified.These features constitute IC discourse as ‘totality’, or as ‘metaphysics of presence’.The article draws on the work of Levinas (...) ; and Derrida to propose more considered ethical grounds for intercultural praxis. Contra a Hegelian impetus towards universal consciousness,we posit an irreducible distance and separation between the self and other. In so doing, not only are we able to supersede the field’s implicit appeal to the transcendental as a source of truth but also to counter perceptibly ‘exorbitant’ claims and actions of the intercultural other. In this vein, the article proposes a discourse ethics of responsibility by which it still becomes possible for a critical intercultural praxis to make value judgements and to take potentially transformative action vis-à-vis cultural acts that challenge the limits of intercultural tolerance and hospitality. (shrink)

Professor Nicholas (Nick) Barber’s learned and intelligent book on The Principles of Constitutionalism is best understood as an exercise in Aristotelian naturalism and moral and constitutional realism, of a sort much more characteristic of the classical law than of modern positivism. In view of the book’s implicitly classical approach, it would have benefited, at a number of key junctures, from drawing upon the rich and enduring tradition of the ius commune. Barber often speaks in the register of the classical law, (...) perhaps without knowing it. Doing so more often, and more explicitly, would have improved an already impressive work. (shrink)

Metaphors are considered as instruments crucial for persuasion. However, while their emotive, communicative and persuasive effects are the focus of different studies and discussions, the core of their persuasive function, namely their argumentative dimension, is almost neglected. This paper addresses the problem of explaining how metaphors can communicate arguments, and how it is possible to reconstruct and justify them. To this purpose, a distinction is drawn between the arguments that are communicated metaphorically and reconstructed “top down,” namely based on relevance (...) considerations, and the ones that are triggered implicitly by the use of a metaphorical expression. In both cases, metaphorical arguments are reconstructed through different patterns of argument, called argumentation schemes (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008). However, while the purpose of a metaphorical sequence of discourse (called metaphorical move) can guide and justify the reconstruction of the argument that can sufficiently support the intended conclusion in a persuasive move, a more complex analysis is needed for analyzing the inferences that a metaphorical move can trigger. These inferences are claimed to represent part of the connotation of the metaphorical expression and can be captured through its most frequent collocations, determinable using some tools of the corpus linguistics. (shrink)

The scientific community takes for granted a view of science that may be called standard empiricism. This holds that the basic intellectual aim of science is truth, nothing being presupposed about the truth, the basic method being to assess theories with respect to evidence. A basic tenet of the view is that science must not accept any thesis about the world as a part of scientific knowledge independent of evidence, let alone in violation of evidence. But physics only accepts unified (...) theories, and persistently rejects infinitely many ad hoc rivals that fit the phenomena even better. In persistently rejecting these infinitely many empirically more successful rival theories, physics thereby makes a substantial assumption about the universe – it is such that all ad hoc theories are false – an assumption that is accepted implicitly independently of evidence, even in a sense against the evidence. That contradicts standard empiricism. The scientific community needs to adopt a new conception of science that represents the assumption of physics as a hierarchy of assumptions, thus facilitating the improvement of the assumption that is made, as science proceeds. (shrink)

In this paper, I illustrate how children’s mentalizing abilities interface with both implicit and explicit aspects of communication. I use two examples to make this point. First, I argue that some understanding that other people have mental states which can be affected by communication is present already in infancy. I show that this early sensitivity to intentionality is responsible for early communicative successes. Second, I suggest that mindreading is involved in learning the meaning of evidentials and other (...) mental terms. I present some cross‐linguistic evidence for the acquisition of evidential morphemes and relate those findings to young children’s ability to reason about beliefs, evidence and information. (shrink)

Numerous societal issues, from climate change to pandemics, require public engagement with scientific research. Such engagement reveals challenges that can arise when experts communicate with laypeople. One of the most common frameworks for framing these communicative interactions is the deficit model of science communication, which holds that laypeople lack scientific knowledge and/or positive attitudes towards science, and that imparting knowledge will fill knowledge gaps, lead to desirable attitude/behavior changes, and increase trust in science. §1 introduces the deficit model in (...) more detail and shows that adhering to this model often fails to achieve its aims, which motivates the main question of this chapter: how can Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thinking collectives address the persistent problem of deficit approaches in science communication? I suggest that it can do so by exposing the deficit model’s implicit assumption of an expert-lay divide. Accordingly, §2 lays out Fleck’s theory and §3 contrasts it with contemporary debates about science communication. Following this descriptive work, §4 draws on Fleck’s ideas to make four concrete suggestions for further questioning the expert-lay divide. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explain the transition from implicit CSR to explicit CSR that has taken place in Scandinavia over the last two decades. Matten and Moon’s distinction between implicit and explicit CSR is the point of departure for the analysis, which is based on case studies of two Norwegian companies: HÅG and Hydro. On the basis of these case studies, we identify two forces that are pushing the transition from implicit to explicit CSR (...) in Scandinavia: Organizational expressiveness and Re-legitimizing. Both of these measures are adjustments to the globalization of the economy, altering the competitive situation even in highly institutionalized, Scandinavian economies. HÅG, a midsized Norwegian manufacturer of office chairs, made CSR and environmental values an integral part of their expressive strategy in the early 1990s. Hydro, a big Norwegian aluminium producer, made CSR an explicit issue around the turn of the millennium, in an attempt to re-legitimize their business operations in a new market situation where plants in local communities in Norway were shut down and relocated to less regulated regimes in low-cost regions abroad. (shrink)

The concept of complexity has become very important in theoretical biology. It is a many faceted concept and too new and ill defined to have a universally accepted meaning. This review examines the development of this concept from the point of view of its usefulness as a criteria for the study of living systems to see what it has to offer as a new approach. In particular, one definition of complexity has been put forth which has the necessary precision and (...) rigor to be considered as a useful categorization of systems, especially as it pertains to those we call living. This definition, due to Robert Rosen, has been developed in a number of works and involves some deep new concepts about the way we view systems. In particular, it focuses on the way we view the world and actually practice science through the use of the modelling relation. This mathematical object models the process by which we assign meaning to the world we perceive. By using the modelling relation, it is possible to identify the subjective nature of our practices and deal with this issue explicitly. By so doing, it becomes clear that our notion of complexity and especially its most popular manifestations, is in large part a product of the historical processes which lead to the present state of scientific epistemology. In particular, it is a reaction to the reductionist/mechanistic view of nature which can be termed the Newtonian Paradigm. This approach to epistemology has dominated for so long that its use as a model has become implicit in most of what we do in and out of science. The alternative to this approach is examined and related to the special definition of complexity given by Rosen. Some historical examples are used to emphasize the dependence of our view of what is complex in a popular sense on the ever changing state of our knowledge. The role of some popular concepts such as chaotic dynamics are examined in this context. The fields of artificial life and related areas are also viewed from the perspective of this rigorous view of complexity and found lacking. The notion that in some way life exists at the edge of chaos is examined from the perspective of the second law of thermodynamics given by Schneider and Kay. Finally, the causal elements in complex systems are explored in relation to complexity. Rosen has shown that a clear difference in causal relations exists between complex and simple systems and that this difference leads to a uniquely useful definition of what we mean by living. Rosen makes it very clear that the class of systems which are complex is a much larger class than those which we call living. For that reason, the focus of this review will be on complexity as a stepping stone towards the deeper question of what makes a system alive. (shrink)

When we communicate with others, we usually know when we are expected to contribute to an evolving dialogue, such as during a debate, or when it is suitable to generate predictable responses, for example, at a marriage ceremony. However, in cross-cultural communication situations, communicating partners may have different assumptions in this respect. In particular, when a western communicator expects a dialogical development, a Russian participant may expect the same communication situation to progress as a sequence of predictable (...) class='Hi'>communication acts. This clash of implicit expectations often results in communication failure, without either party realizing that implementing incompatible approaches to information sharing is the reason for this failure. In this article, I introduce the terms ‘dialogical engagement’ and ‘monological sequencing’ whilst exploring cross-cultural communication problems between Russia and the West. I use these terms to describe mechanisms that characterize both cultures’ preferred communication patterns and which, when inadvertently deployed, cause collisions between Russian and western communicating partners. By uncovering these differences, I intend to progress beyond merely acknowledging cross-cultural communication problems between the two worlds. Besides, as in the Russian cultural setting, more communication situations are implicitly expected to develop as monological sequences than similar situations in the West, understanding this particular distinction may prevent practitioners in numerous fields from making the mistake of expecting cross-cultural communication situations to develop in line with their implicit assumptions. (shrink)