Since the 1970s Barry Stroud has been one of the most original contributors to the philosophical study of human knowledge. This volume presents the best of Stroud's essays in this area. Throughout, he seeks to clearly identify the question that philosophical theories of knowledge are meant to answer, and the role scepticism plays in making sense of that question. In these seminal essays, he suggests that people pursuing epistemology need to concern themselves with whether philosophical scepticism is (...) true or false. Stroud's discussion of these fundamental questions is essential reading for anyone whose work touches on the subject of human knowledge. (shrink)

Some have argued that knowledge, or human knowledge, requires some sort of reflection, usually on the reasonableness of one's beliefs. It is argued that there is no such requirement, either for knowledge in general, or even for human knowledge. Reflection is not always an epistemically good thing; when it is epistemically valuable, what is valuable about it is already explained by a reliability requirement on knowledge. Knowledge does not require reflection of any (...) sort. (shrink)

Contemporary debates in epistemology devote much attention to the nature of knowledge, but neglect the question of its sources. This book focuses on the latter, especially on the question of innateness. Carruthers' aim is to transform and reinvigorate contemporary empiricism, while also providing an introduction to a range of issues in the theory of knowledge. He gives a lively presentation and assessment of the claims of classical empiricism, particularly its denial of substantive a priori knowledge and of (...) innate knowledge. He argues that we would be right to reject the substantive a priori but not innateness, and then presents a novel account of the main motivation behind empiricism, which leaves contemporary empiricists free to accept innate knowledge and concepts. Carruthers closes with a discussion of scepticism, arguing that acceptance of innate concepts may lead to a decisive resolution of the problem in favor of realism. (shrink)

From the ancient Greeks to the formative voices of contemporary analytic philosophy, this collection of readings deftly blends the foremost classical sources with important comtemporary philosophical thinkers to present a wide-ranging and in-depth examination of the major theories of knowledge.

Three recent interpreters of tacit knowledge, Harald Grimen, Harry Collins, and John McDowell, either deny it is appropriate to attribute knowledge of any sort to animals or ignore the relevance of the tacit knowledge of animals to human knowledge. In this article, we seek to show that in Michael Polanyi’s understanding, tacit knowledge in animals underlies and supports human explicit knowledge. For Polanyi, tacit knowledge arises in increasingly complex forms in evolutionary (...) history, and explicit knowledge emerges from it. Both forms of knowledge are personal achievements that can be true or false; animal behavior is not simply deterministic. Polanyi’s view on non-human tacit knowledge thus explains features of human knowledge that those denying or ignoring non-human knowledge leave unexplained. (shrink)

Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx. There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and (...) his response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. This edition of Berkeley's two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes, and an index. (shrink)

Stephen Grimm finds me inclined to bifurcate epistemic assessment into higher and lower orders while showing awareness of this only in recent writings. Two untoward consequences allegedly follow: (a) my rejection of Virtue Reliabilism, and (b) my knowledge-based account of the value attaching to our knowledge on the higher level. By contrast, Grimm considers Virtue Reliabilism a perfectly adequate account of knowledge, while the higher epistemic state he believes to be, rather, understanding, which he takes to be (...) quite distinct from knowledge. Once knowledge and understanding are seen to be distinct, finally, this will help us to avoid the two untoward consequences. I am grateful for these interesting points, and would like to respond briefly in what follows. (shrink)

Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx. There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and (...) his response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. This edition of Berkeley's two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes and an index. (shrink)

Russell's classic examination of the relation between individual experience and the general body of scientific knowledge. It is a rigorous examination of the problems of an empiricist epistemology.

The appropriate methodology for psychological research depends on whether one is studying mental algorithms or their implementation. Mental algorithms are abstract specifications of the steps taken by procedures that run in the mind. Implementational issues concern the speed and reliability of these procedures. The algorithmic level can be explored only by studying across-task variation. This contrasts with psychology's dominant methodology of looking for within-task generalities, which is appropriate only for studying implementational issues.The implementation-algorithm distinction is related to a number of (...) other “levels” considered in cognitive science. Its realization in Anderson's ACT theory of cognition is discussed. Research at the algorithmic level is more promising because it is hard to make further fundamental scientific progress at the implementational level with the methodologies available. Protocol data, which are appropriate only for algorithm-level theories, provide a richer source than data at the implementational level. Research at the algorithmic level will also yield more insight into fundamental properties of human knowledge because it is the level at which significant learning transitions are defined.The best way to study the algorithmic level is to look for differential learning outcomes in pedagogical experiments that manipulate instructional experience. This provides control and prediction in realistically complex learning situations. The intelligent tutoring paradigm provides a particularly fruitful way to implement such experiments.The implications of this analysis for the issue of modularity of mind, the status of language, research on human/computer interaction, and connectionist models are also examined. (shrink)

In Michael Williams' “What's So Special About Human knowledge?” he argues that the kind of knowledge characteristic of adult humans is distinctive in that it involves epistemic responsibility. In particular, when an adult human has knowledge, they have a certain kind of epistemic authority, and that to attribute knowledge to them is to grant them a certain kind of authority over the subject matter. I argue that, while it is true that when we attribute (...) knowledge to adult humans, we typically also attribute to them the relevant kind of epistemic authority, this need not be because adult humans have a distinctive kind of knowledge. Rather, it may be because adult humans are distinctive kinds of beings - beings that can have epistemic authority over the subject matter about which they know. The only thing that need be special about human knowledge is that it's had by human knowers. (shrink)

Finnish philosopher Eino Kaila wrote a classic statement of logical empiricism. Having experienced the foundational debates of the Vienna Circle in 1929, Kaila was a keen follower of the further developments of the Circle. His synoptic presentation and analysis of the basic themes, or "theses," of the movement was based on his lectures as professor of theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki. The work appeared as a book in Finnish in 1939 and a Swedish translation by Georg Henrik von (...) Wright followed immediately. Earlier, a translation of his philosophical essays from the original German, entitled Reality and Experience, appeared in 1979. However, this is the first translation of Kaila's major epistemological work, which remains a source for re-evaluations of Logical Empiricism. (shrink)

These articles and speeches by the Nobel Prize-winning physicist date from 1934 to 1958. Rather than expositions on quantum physics, the papers are philosophical in nature, exploring the relevance of atomic physics to many areas of human endeavor. Includes an essay in which Bohr and Einstein discuss quantum and_wave equation theories. 1961 edition.

Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx. -/- There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, (...) and his response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. -/- This edition of Berkeley's two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes and an index. (shrink)

This quoted passage makes a negative claim – a claim about what we are not doing when we characterize an episode or state as that of knowing – and it also makes a positive claim – a claim about what we are doing when we characterize an episode or state as that of knowing. Although McDowell has not endorsed the negative claim, he has repeatedly and explicitly endorsed the positive claim, i.e., that “in characterizing an episode or a state as (...) that of knowing… we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.” This is what I will henceforth call “the positive Sellarsian claim”. (shrink)

Hume thinks that scepticism is “a malady, which can never be radically cur’d.” By this he means that scepticism is theoretically unassailable. Thus.

An introduction for students in the hard and social sciences, this brief book examines the nature and limits of human knowledge. Topics include how humans process information, how they cannot have certain knowledge, the limits to all human systems of definition including science, and the considerations of these limits.

This chapter offers an account of human knowledge and belief as constitutively social. Social factors affect epistemology in at least two ways. They bear on an important sort of belief, and also on a corresponding sort of epistemic competence. This concerns both a kind of value that knowledge has, and also how the pragmatic can properly encroach on epistemology.

Stroud is one of the most important and influential epistemologists working on issues related to the challenge of skepticism. This book collects fourteen of his essays written between 1968 and 1999. The papers have all been previously published or delivered at conferences.

Open peer commentary on the article “What Can the Global Observer Know?” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: My comments are aimed at certain difficulties and ambivalent statements in Gasparyan’s paper that are necessary to clarify before any productive discussion can start. Particularly, the underlying problem of her research should be made more explicit and internal differentiation of various research contexts should be more precise.

First published in 1948, this provocative work contributed significantly to an explosive intellectual discourse that continues to this day.

In Adventure in Human Knowledges and Beliefs, readers are adjudicators who “measure” the acceptability of knowledges and beliefs. Andrew Ralls Woodward leads readers through an adventure which includes the philosophy of science, religious studies, and theology.

Epistemology or the Theory of Knowledge has become one of the most complicated and esoteric areas of philosophy. This paper attempts to defend a form of foundationalism in epistemology which does not require the reader to be familiar with the philosophical literature; so, it should be of interest to psychologists concerned with the nature and character of human knowledge as well as, of course, to philosophers. The heart of the foundationalism defended here is the thesis that a (...) belief is epistemically reliable unless it has been shown to be suspect. (shrink)

Or a Treatise on Language. ... oironff inclination for na : this is one of the most s s language exposes'*! ... cs- •al, enables me to gratify my unenviable propensity. , Among the results is a Treatise on the Philosophy of / Human Knowledge.

It is acknowledged that Francisco Suarez had an excellent knowledge of the Medieval Scholastic tradition. In this project, I focus on one topic, human knowledge of material singulars, to determine Suarez's debt to and freedom from the Scholastic tradition. The representative thinkers of the Medieval tradition that I consider are Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. ;In the first two Chapters, I consider the accounts of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham on the (...) issue of knowledge of singulars. I show that both Scotus and Ockham try to distance themselves from the analysis of indirect knowledge of material singulars presented by Aquinas. Although Scotus retains the notion that the universal nature is the first object of the intellect, his stress on the autonomy of the intellect in its relation to sense cognition paved the way for Ockham. Notably, Ockham rejects any account of knowledge that requires intermediary representational species, and consequently adopts a position that stresses the intellect's ability to know singulars directly via intuitive cognition. ;In the final two Chapters, I discuss in detail Suarez's account of knowledge of material singulars. I show that Suarez accepts Ockham's basic arguments for the priority of knowledge of the singular but at the same time retains the necessity of intelligible species. His account of the relationship between sense cognition and intellectual cognition owes some debt to Scotus, but Suarez accents the theme of the autonomy of the intellect to an extremely high degree. Furthermore, he rejects Ockham's account of intuitive cognition, positing instead a theory of cognition that requires representational species at every step in the cognitive process, both sensory and intellectual. Consequently, Suarez presents us with a highly nuanced and extremely consistent account of knowledge that leaves no explanatory "gaps.". (shrink)

This chapter discusses the two varieties of human knowledge: the animal and the reflective. Animal knowledge does not require that the knower have an epistemic perspective on his belief, a perspective from which he endorses the source of that belief, from which he can see that source as reliably truth conducive. Reflective knowledge does by contrast require such a perspective.