The Problem of Biological Individuality is the problem of how to count organisms. Whilst counting organisms may seem easy, the biological world is full of difficult cases such as colonial siphonophores and aspen tree groves. One of the main solutions to the Problem of Biological Individuality is the Physiological Approach. Drawing on an argument made by Eric Olson in the personal identity debate, I argue that the Physiological Approach faces a metaphysical problem - the ‘Foetus Problem’. This paper illustrates (...) how metaphysics can contribute to debates about organisms in the philosophy of biology. (shrink)

Critique of J.J. Thomson's well-known defense of abortion. Tries to show that Thomson is wrong that abortion is a violation of the fetus's right to life because there is an important difference between the way the fetus is dependent on the pregnant woman and the way the patient is dependent on the violinist.

Ectogenesis, or the use of an artificial womb to allow a foetus to develop, will likely become a reality within a few decades, and could significantly affect the abortion debate. We first examine the implications for Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, which argues for a woman’s right to withdraw life support from the foetus and so terminate her pregnancy, even if the foetus is granted full moral status. We show that on Thomson’s reasoning, there is no right (...) to the death of the foetus, and abortion is not permissible if ectogenesis is available, provided it is safe and inexpensive. This raises the question of whether there are persuasive reasons for the right to the death of the foetus that could be exercised in the context of ectogenesis. Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis have examined several arguments for this right, doubting that it exists, while Joona Räsänen has recently criticized their reasoning. We respond to Räsänen’s analysis, concluding that his arguments are unsuccessful, and that there is no right to the death of the foetus in these circumstances. (shrink)

We examine pregnant women's experiences with routinised obstetric ultrasound as entailed in their antenatal care during planned pregnancies. This paper highlights the ambiguity of ultrasound technology in the constitution of maternal–foetal connections. Our analysis focusses on Australian women's experiences of the ontological, aesthetic and epistemological ambiguities afforded by ultrasound. We argue that these ambiguities offer possibilities for connecting to the foetus in ways that maintain a kind of unknowability; they afford an openness and ethical responsiveness irrespective of the future (...) of the foetus. This suggests that elucidating women's experience has implications for theorising ethics across maternal–foetal relations and, more specifically, for the ‘moral pioneering’ (Rapp, 2000) that reproductive technologies can demand of women. Moral pioneering cannot be reduced to moments or processes of decision-making; it must allow for greater recognition of the affective commitments entailed in and incited by ultrasound. Furthermore, focussing on experiences of the ambiguity of ultrasound allows for understanding the ways in which affectivity circulates across domains commonly understood as medical or social, public or private. In doing so, it contributes to undermining a series of tensions that currently shape feminist analysis of obstetric ultrasound, often at the expense of the experience of women. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that, despite appearances, the success of Don Marquis's well-known future-like-ours argument against abortion does not turn, in an important way, on the metaphysics of identity. I argue that this is false. The success of Marquis's argument turns on precisely two issues: first, whether it is prima facie seriously wrong to deprive something of a future like ours; second, whether, in a counterfactual circumstance in which an abortion does not occur, the foetus is (...) numerically identical with something that, later on, experiences a life like ours. Since the former claim is plausible (albeit disputable), the success of Marquis's argument does turn on the metaphysics of identity in an important way. Before defending a positive argument for this position, I consider what I take to be the most promising way of challenging it. This involves a recent objection to Marquis by Tim Burkhardt (2021). Burkhardt claims that his objection floats free of the metaphysics of identity. I argue that it fails to do so, and that in fact it fails outright. I end by considering the relationship between my arguments and the question of what matters in survival. (shrink)

At some point in the future – perhaps within the next few decades – it will be possible for foetuses to develop completely outside the womb. Ectogenesis, as this technology is called, raises substantial issues for the abortion debate. One such issue is that it will become possible for a woman to have an abortion, in the sense of having the foetus removed from her body, but for the foetus to be kept alive. We argue that while there (...) is a right to an abortion, there are reasons to doubt that there is a right to the death of the foetus. Our strategy in this essay is to consider and reject three arguments in favour of this latter right. The first claims that women have a right not to be biological mothers, the second that women have a right to genetic privacy, and the third that a foetus is one's property. Furthermore, we argue that it follows from rejecting the third claim that genetic parents also lack a right to the destruction of cryopreserved embryos used for in vitro fertilization. The conclusion that a woman possesses no right to the death of the foetus builds upon the claims that other pro-choice advocates, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson, have made. (shrink)

Under Chinese law, the juridical status of the embryo and the foetus is unclear, mainly because the existing legislation can be subject to diverse interpretations due to its ambiguous language. Lack of clarity with the law has led to different understandings amongst Chinese legal scholars. However, although there has been no consensus, there has been a clear tendency to deprive embryos and foetuses of legal status or personhood, thereby excluding them from entitlement to fundamental rights, an understanding reinforced by (...) the Confucian view of the beginning of life. It is expected that in the near future the Chinese courts will face issues involving embryos and foetuses more often, such as disputes over in vitro embryos. The lack of legal precedent could result in contradictory resolutions, therefore, the law should clarify the legal status of embryos and foetuses and accord to prenatal life special respect and treatment. (shrink)

The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the fetus is a person, whether the fetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate “requires a different strategy.” Hence his “future of value” strategy, which is summarized as follows: (1) A normal fetus has a future of value. (2) Depriving a normal fetus of a future of value imposes a misfortune on it. (...) (3) Imposing a misfortune on a normal fetus is prima facie wrong. (4) Therefore, depriving a normal fetus of a future of value is prima facie wrong. (5) Killing a normal fetus deprives it of a future of value. (6) Therefore, killing a normal fetus is prima facie wrong. In this paper, I argue that Marquis’s strategy is not different since it involves the concept of person—a concept deeply rooted in the traditional approach. Specifically, I argue that futures are valuable insofar as they are not only dominated by goods of consciousness, but are experienced by psychologically continuous persons. Moreover, I argue that his strategy is not sound since premise (1) is false. Specifically, I argue that a normal fetus, at least during the first trimester, is not a person. Thus, during that stage of development it is not capable of experiencing its future as a psychologically continuous person and, hence, it does not have a future of value. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although a preference for sons is reportedly a universal phenomenon, in some Asian societies daughters are considered financial and cultural liabilities. Increasing availability of ultrasonography and amniocentesis has led to widespread gender screening and selective abortion of normal female foetuses in many countries, including India. Feminists have taken widely divergent positions on the morality of this practice. Feminists from India have strongly opposed it, considering it as a further disenfranchisement of females in their patriarchal society, and have agitated successfully (...) for legislative prohibitions. Libertarian feminists on the other hand, primarily from the United States, have argued that any prohibition of the use of this technology is a curtailment of a woman's reproductive choices and a violation of her right to make autonomous decisions regarding procreation. Using India as an illustrative case, this paper argues that in the context of what prevails in some societies, an ethical argument that hinges on the principle of autonomy as understood in the West can be problematic. Furthermore, a liberal theoretical assumption that it is always better to have more rather than fewer choices may not hold up well against the realities of life for such women. Although feminists have little disagreement concerning substantive matters, it is in the area of strategy that differences of opinion have arisen, their moral reasoning and responses shaped by the culture, ethnicity, class and race to which they belong. A view that a single ‘orthodox’ feminism of any variety can embody the aspiration of all women reverts to the problematic issues in the evolution of the rationalistic, individualistic, ‘male’ ethics against which women have consistently raised objections. (shrink)

This article examines two first-hand encounters with the foetus to reflect on the familial, photographic and political dimensions of 3D and 4D foetal portraits. It examines the photographic status of foetal portraits as intimates of the family album while acknowledging their public meaning in reproductive politics. The article aims to situate 3D and 4D foetal portraits within photographic history, theory and practice by examining how these camera-less images align with photographic vision.

Typical persons are rational, can use language, are intentional systems, require certain kinds of treatment from others, are agents of responsible behaviour, and have some special kind of self-consciousness. Problems arise when any of these strands are missing. This chapter considers normal and abnormal infants and fetuses. It shows the importance of the treatment they should receive. It comments on the potentiality and future interests of the organism, things that they are not aware of. The normal and healthy infant or (...) foetus could be described as a person. Meanwhile, _in vitro_ fertilization (IVF) techniques introduce the problem regarding the obligations and reasons for action towards the frozen zygote. (shrink)

Husserl investigated the topic of childhood in a small number of research manuscripts, produced around the 1930s. This essay first presents its rationale for addressing the issue – which was essentially to examine more closely the phenomenon of Einfühlung in the context of his inquiry into intersubjectivity – and illustrates the method of Rückfrage that guided his research. It then offers a reading of Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions of childhood and the related conceptual distinctions, organizing them under the following headings: a. (...) second childhood (das wirkliche Kind); b. Urkindheit, or primal childhood which, in turn is subdivided into: b1. first childhood outside the womb and b2. intrauterine life; c. procreation or generation (Zeugung), from the UrIch to the VorIch. Throughout this reverse reconstruction, a particular focus is given to the importance of the notion of Paarung (coupling or pairing) at all levels of the ego's constitution. The self-constitution of the ego (Ich) always implies a relationship – which differs as a function of the child's specific stage of development – with all that is alien to the ego (Ichfremdes), right back to the unattainable, yet constitutive alterity of birth. (shrink)

A tumour bigger than a fist in its right horn when dissected, removed white matter, tenacious, similar to soap, diffusing something bloody with pungent odour but without any stench of decay. When this matter was dissolved in water a hairy ball appeared bristling with small bony spikes protruding here and there. The hair having been removed and the bones which adhered to nothing having been unfolded, this ball appeared to be a baby hare, fairly large.

The role of the soul in generation was a subject for controversy, rooted in Aristotle’s definition of anima. The classic questions concerning the soul in generation, which we find in Fernel, his contemporaries and successors, arise from this definition of anima. Put briefly, they are: is the seed animate, or is it an instrument of an “external efficient” as Cremonini called it? If the latter, is this external cause the parents, God, Nature, the heavens? Is the anima (as form) the (...) same thing as species? And, related to this, how are the faculties or actions of a complex living creature such as a man, composed of parts of different forms or species, integrated into a functioning whole?These questions are discussed by Fernel in his Medicina and by others. The de principio effectivo semini insito of Joannes Bronzerius asks “what makes semen fertile?” Archangelo Piccolomini’s Anatomicae Praelectiones is much broader. Scaliger’s discusses the soul in generation in his Exotericarum Exercitationum (1557). What is clear, in this all too brief and sketchy survey of Renaissance ideas of the soul in generation, is that Aristotle’s De generatione animalium is probably the most important single authority for the Renaissance debate. (shrink)

Pregnancy and motherhood bring enormous change to one’s life. As a student of philosophy, I have struggled to find a place for myself, as a new mother, in academic life. Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness examines human consciousness -- it places human experience as the starting point of philosophical inquiry. This approaches the sort of place I think human experience should rest in philosophy. If I am to claim that motherhood is academically significant, surely, this examination must begin with an (...) examination of human experience. This paper tries to root my experience of pregnancy as something that I think is academically interesting. It was through writing this paper that I found myself hopeful that my becoming a mother was not the end of my academic career, but rather presents an interesting and important new path in my philosophical journey. (shrink)

The unborn healthy foetus is looked upon as a blessing by one and all. A plethora of thoughts arise in the brains of expectant parents. But what goes on in the brain of the yet unborn still remains a mystery. 'Foetal mind' is a reflection of functions of its organs of sense, an instrument of knowledge that may even be reduced to machine to demonstrate the effect of sense organs and brain contact. Testimony to this fact are the various (...) waveform patterns obtained non-invasively from the foetal Middle Cerebral Artery (MCA) by using Colour Doppler Ultrasound. Our study, conducted for evaluating the foetal MCA in a rural obstetric population in Maharashtra, India, explains how the MCA - a major artery supplying foetal brain, can give abundant information about foetal heart and foetal stress. When only the foetal heart is stressed by the presence of arrhythmias or ectopic beats, these changes are manifest in the foetal MCA velocity waveform pattern as seen on Colour Doppler study. When the entire foetus is under stress, as in cases of intra uterine growth retardation (IUGR), changes again manifest in the foetal MCA velocity waveform pattern and are designated as the foetal Brain Sparing Effect. Thus scientific evaluation of foetal MCA waveform can objectively demonstrate that the overtly non-communicating foetal brain indeed remains an internal organ of sense and a vital instrument of knowledge to clarify the various effects of sense organs and brain contact. Although the brain parenchyma or cerebral metabolism has not been studied here, cerebral vessels serve as a window to cerebral metabolism, as auto regulatory function of brain leads to changes in haemodynamics of cerebral vessels. Also, like other vessels, MCA mirrors foetal distress and IUGR; but unlike other vessels, e.g. the umbilical or uterine artery, which show these changes in the form of reduction or even reversal of diastolic flow, MCA shows an increase in diastolic component due to brain sparing effect. The unique connection between physical changes in the foetal heart, brain and mental operations are thus critically clarified to some extent, and this helps untangle and comprehend the lattice of mental operations. Although this preliminary study has its limitations, it still carries forward the present corpus of knowledge on the strength of its evidential and critical enquiry and helps unravel the concept of foetal consciousness. (shrink)

According to the expressivist argument the choice to use biotechnologies to prevent the birth of individuals with specific disabilities is an expression of disvalue for existing people with this disability. The argument has stirred a lively debate and has recently received renewed attention. This article starts with presenting the expressivist argument and its core elements. It then goes on to present and examine the counter-arguments before it addresses some aspects that have gained surprisingly little attention. The analysis demonstrates that the (...) expressivist argument has a wide range of underpinnings and that counter-arguments tend to focus on only a few of these. It also reveals an important aspect that appears to have been ignored, i.e., that people do not select foetuses based on chromosomes or other biological traits, but based on characteristics of living persons with specific disabilities. This makes it more difficult to undermine the claim that negative selection of foetuses expresses a disvaluing of persons with such disabilities. It leaves the expressivist argument with a strong bite still. (shrink)

The case of Vo v. France represents the latest phase of the European Court of Human Rights’ thinking on the scope of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to life) in relation to foetal life where a foetus had been lost owing to a medical accident. The Court by a majority decided that, “even assuming” Article 2 applied to the instant case (albeit to the life of the pregnant woman rather than that of the (...) foetus), it had not been violated. While the facts in Vo were extreme and exceptional, the Court will shortly hear the case of D v. Ireland concerning access to abortion for foetal anomaly, an application made under Articles 3, 8, 10 and 14 of the European Convention. If the case of D were declared admissible, the Court would then have to consider whether a denial of access to abortion for foetal anomaly constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3, or an interference with a pregnant woman’s right to respect for private life under Article 8 (and if so, how the doctrine of the margin of appreciation applies). The Grand Chamber precedent of Vo displays ambivalence about whether Article 2 should apply to foetal life, and its resort to the “even assuming” formula spared Member States the difficulty of having to justify their various abortion regimes, by reference to this Article. It remains to be seen whether in a case like D that is directly concerned with abortion, the Court will take a more definite stance on the correct balance to be struck between the State’s interest in protecting foetal life and the Convention rights of pregnant women. (shrink)

This article discusses section 156 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which prohibits the use of eggs from aborted female foetuses for the purposes of reproduction. I argue that the pre-legislative debates focus only on the biological relationship between the aborted foetus and any ensuing child and foreclose the possibility of useful discussion about the potential merits of such technology. Kristeva's theory of abjection has been used in order to elucidate the strength of feeling about the (...) use of eggs from the expelled foetus. I suggest that the ‘yuk’ factor stems from the potential for the blurring of the boundaries between life and death. In addition, I suggest that the stress placed on the biological link means that the foetus is ascribed special properties not given to live donors. Woman's very crucial role in reproductive technologies is therefore erased. The article argues that there are very good reasons why the debate on the subject should remain open. At present women donors have to undergo highly intrusive procedures in order to give eggs and the process is not without its health risks. The use of eggs from aborted foetuses certainly raises important consent issues but these could be addressed by placing women at the centre of the decision making process, starting with the recognition that it is women and not foetuses who have the remit and responsibility for giving consent for the use of their genetic material. Moreover, there should be an acknowledgement that women are perfectly capable of making informed decisions about donation and of considering the potential implications of participating in egg donation. (shrink)

The prolepsis in Denis Villeneuve's Arrival emphasises the cyclical nature of the film's narrative and anchors human reproduction as a central theme. Pregnancy, the pregnant body, and the physical, experiential nature of birth, commonly heavily gendered in film, are misleading focal points in the narrative. The presence of the unborn as a subtext in the film problematises Iris Marion Young's notion of pregnant embodiment as a subjective lived-body experience. The viewer is encouraged to empathise with the complexity of birth, life, (...) and death as part of Louise's lived-body experience, but is finally confronted with the uncertainty of maternity, pregnancy and the unborn. When Barbara Duden calls the unborn foetus a “not-yet”, she describes the process by which the foetus achieves a legal status, and the precarious nature of ascribing life or personhood. The prolepsis, which punctuates the main narrative, emphasises the reversibility and irreversibility of life that does “not-yet” exist. Import... (shrink)

IntroductionRights-ethicists intensely debate what properties of an individual are necessary and sufficient in order for that individual to have moral rights. At the heart of this important debate is the issue of whether individuals such as human foetuses, infants, and unconscious adults have moral rights, and if so, what these rights are. This paper focuses on the moral status of unconscious adults, as well as human foetuses, which are potential agents in the sense that they follow a “normal” path of (...) development towards agency. Using Michael Tooley’s (Tooley 1983) and Jeff McMahan’s (McMahan 2002) influential discussions on this topic as a point of departure, this paper defends two claims. (1) Possession of the capacity for autonomous agency that is temporarily “blocked” by sleep or coma is sufficient in order for an individual to have intrinsic worth and thus, moral rights. (2) If possession of the blocked capacity for autonomous agency is sufficient in order for an individual to hav. (shrink)

CATEGORY: Philosophy play; historical fiction; comedy; social criticism. STORYLINE: Katherine, a slightly neurotic American lawyer, has tried very hard to find personal happiness in the form of friends and lovers. But she has not succeeded, and is therefore very unhappy. So she travels to London, hoping that Christianus — a well-known satisfactionist — may be able to help her. TOPICS: In the course of the play, Katherine and Christianus converse about many philosophical issues: the modern American military presence in Iraq; (...) the meaning of life; the ethics of abortion; assessing WHO death statistics; the potential personhood of foetuses; ancient Egyptian moustaches and beards; defining criteria for progress in human society; objectivity and subjectivity; Chicago futures trading developments; the virtues of cryonics technology; a U.S. Supreme Court case; important and unimportant knowledge; and spiritualist dualism vs. scientific materialism . NOTES: This work features elaborate footnotes and comments by the author, to enhance the reader's experience of the play and its philosophizing characters. (shrink)

A popular tactic for defending abortion rights is appealing to self-ownership: since I own my body, a foetus has the right to occupy it only if I allow it. One cannot be forced to bring a pregnancy to term because that would violate one's self-ownership. The same logic applies to speech: we have freedom of speech because we produce speech using the bodies that we own. To curtail that speech violates our self-ownership, or in a phrase: my body, my (...) speech. (shrink)

In debates over abortion, the foetus and the woman have been continually positioned as antagonists. Given the stakes involved in such debates about personal integrity, individual responsibility, life and death, it is no wonder that many radical feminist authors have concentrated on refocusing the attention on women and away from the disembodied foetus. Such writers have worked hard to decode and deconstruct the public foetus in our midst and have mobilized interpretative tools such as cultural criticism to (...) contextualize the production and consumption of foetal images. Barbara Duden's book, The Public Foetus, is an important and interesting contribution to this effort, which is still taken up by authors writing in this field. Duden's strategy is to seek to remind us (and in particular those who are involved in reproductive medicine) that pregnancy is concentrated in the embedded pregnant woman rather than the disembodied ‘public foetus’ and she attempts to retrieve the embodied woman as the site of pregnancy through what Michaels has termed a ‘fetal disappearing act’. While this may create as many problems for women as it resolves, I would argue that, while the ‘public foetus’ continues to loom large in the politics of abortion and women's positions in relation to the new reproductive technologies remain contested, Duden's work remains important in the continuing debate about how women's reproductive freedom can be continually re-negotiated and re-established. (shrink)

Regulatory approach to the right to abortion in Europe is diverse and basically related to the issue of when the right to life begins and how this question is reflected in national legislation. Such an approach and diversity is tolerated by the European Court of Human Rights, but only if some specific standards and criteria formulated in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights are reflected in national legislation. Research of the Lithuanian legal acts conducted in the light (...) of the jurisprudence of the Court shows that they are not in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the solutions are therefore suggested. The aim of the article is to systematically analyse the Lithuanian legal acts regulating issues of abortion and to identify the existing problems and provide suggestions as to how to solve those problems with the help of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in abortion cases. Analysis of the Lithuanian legal acts reveals that the existing legal regulation and practice is confusing and ambiguous. Abortion questions are regulated in Lithuania by means of secondary legislation, namely by order of the Health Minister which is more than 15 years old, and the classification of diseases dangerous to woman’s health and life is based on international classification that is invalid. The order is not in reconciled with the Lithuanian criminal law. Some other ambiguities and problems are identified in the article. Abortion on a woman’s request in Lithuania is possible by the end of the 12 week of pregnancy and during the entire pregnancy, if it causes danger to woman’s health and life. The Lithuanian legislator requires that both conditions – danger to woman’s health and life – are met in order to terminate pregnancy what is unnecessary and sometimes even confusing. The author suggests providing two separate bases for abortion – danger to woman’s life or health. Foetus problems – if a foetus is irreversibly damaged or suffering from an incurable life-threatening disease, it is not a separate basis for abortion in Lithuania, however those abnormalities of the foetus are related to the health and life of a pregnant woman. In the opinion of the author, looking into the practice of the other EU countries, it is better to provide a separate ground for abortion because of abnormalities of the foetus. The basic problem in Lithuania that is similar in Poland and in Ireland is that there is no clear procedure in case a pregnant woman is not satisfied with the decision of the medical commission regarding the question of her abortion or if the opinion of members of the commission is diverse – no time guidance or appeal institution is provided. (shrink)

Twinning the aborted foetus and death row prisoner as subjects in extremis, this article attempts to reconcile my own experiences and place them within a broader ethical framework. I argue that there is substantial moral ambiguity in whom we choose to privilege for survival or destroy that undermines a definitive pro-life or pro-choice position, as those concepts are commonly understood. My primary argument is that there are always exceptions to rules, to cases, to experiences that need to be acknowledged (...) and considered alongside the power relations that come with the right to define and decide who lives and dies. This is an interrogation of my own moral parameters, written throughout pregnancy with children who went on to live, and an examination of my own bias and fear of causing or experiencing suffering that informed my previous abortion. Technological intervention is troubling the concepts of what constitutes ‘living’ and ‘dying’ – to what counts as ‘life’. Technologies that keep the moribund infant alive are creating a liminal space where subjects hang in between life and death so that our concept of both may need to be redefined to include ‘a living death’, akin to a life spent on Death Row. (shrink)

Deals with the problem of the acquisition and distribution of organs for transplantation and allows the application of the foregoing theoretical discussion of saving lives and relevant/irrelevant utilities. As an aid to dealing with categories that are of current concern to the medical community, Ch. 11 starts with a summary of the recommendations of the US Task Force on Organ Transplantation on acquisition and distribution of organs, and discusses and criticizes the total‐brain‐death criterion for death. The next section of the (...) chapter discusses the role of informed consent of the original organ owner and his family in relation to the State in the task of acquiring organs, as well as the moral possibility of sale, trading, and taking of organs. The last section of the chapter considers the morality of more controversial proposals for acquiring organs: ‘donation’ from foetuses, donation from live donors where there is significant risk to the donor, and (the most radical) killing some persons for the sake of acquiring organs for others. (shrink)

The conclusions of the previous chapters are applied to the abortion question. Four kinds of interests are distinguished: functional, biotic, conscious, and reflective interests. It is argued that beings are morally considerable only when they have at least conscious interests. Because consciousness only arises in human foetuses quite late in gestation (around 28-weeks), people do not come into existence (in the morally relevant sense) until at least that time. Thus, given the harm of coming into existence, it is wrong not (...) to abort a foetus in the earliest stages of gestation. The ‘pro-death’ argument is then defended against two famous arguments that abortion is wrong — Richard Hare's ‘golden rule’ argument and Don Marquis' ‘future-like-ours’ argument. (shrink)

Some creatures are pretty obviously deciders, others obviously not; and there are indeterminate cases. This chapter considers some examples that are in various ways not straightforward. Discussing them helps to clarify the key notions involved in the basic package, especially those of ‘decision making’, ‘control’, and the ‘integration’ of basic-package capacities; and to sharpen the contrasts between deciders and other behaving systems. It also prepares the ground for the conclusion that the idea of the basic package raises no serious philosophical (...) problems. Examples discussed include protozoa; bees; the human embryo, foetus, and neonate; the artificial giant; some machines described by Block; and the ‘machine-table robot’. (shrink)

The clinical autopsy of foetuses, stillborn babies, or neonates and the examination of the placenta help to inform the mother’s decision-making and her medical care for subsequent pregnancies. Indeed, these post-mortem examinations can identify unexpected congenital malformations or the cause of repeated miscarriage or stillbirth. However, the use of clinical pathology for diagnostic purposes in the context of family planning for bereaved parents with an unfulfilled desire to have a child, and IVF couples has received little attention to date. This (...) article applies Beauchamp and Childress’ bioethical framework to identify, assess and systematically discuss ethical issues associated with the use of clinical foetal autopsy in reproductive healthcare within the German legal context. In the format of a clinical ethics consultation, the article examines the current policy on perinatal post-mortem examinations in Germany, and asks whether the clinical foetal autopsy for reproductive health purposes should be part of standard clinical examinations offered to bereaved parents. The conclusion of our research recommends clinical foetal autopsy as ethically acceptable, provided that the necessary resources are available. This recommendation is based on the ethical obligation towards the mother as the patient, which is grounded in the bioethical principles of autonomy and beneficence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Lee claims that foetuses and adult humans are phases of the same identical substance, and thus have the same moral status because: first, foetuses and adults are the same physical organism, and second, the development from foetus to adult is quantitative and thus not a change of substance. Versus the first argument, I contend that the fact that foetuses and adults are the same physical organism implies only that they are the same thing but not the same substance, (...) much as living adults and their corpses are the same thing (same body) but not the same substance. Against Lee's second argument, I contend that Lee confuses the nature of a process with the nature of its result. A process of quantitative change can produce a change in substance. Lee also fails to show that foetuses are rational and thus have all the essential properties of adults, as required for them to be the same substance. Against the pro‐choice argument from asymmetric value (that only the fact that a human has become conscious of its life and begun to count on its continuing can explain human life's asymmetric moral value, i.e. that it is vastly worse to kill a human than not to produce one), Lee claims that foetus's lives are asymmetrically valuable to them before consciousness. This leads to counterintuitive outcomes, and it confuses the goodness of life (a symmetric value that cannot account for why it is worse to kill a human than not produce one) with asymmetric value. (shrink)

A central question in contemporary ethics and political philosophy concerns which entities have moral status. In this article, I provide a detailed analysis of the view that moral status comes in degrees. I argue that degrees of moral status can be specified along two dimensions: (i) the weight of the reason to protect an entity’s morally significant rights and interests; and/or (ii) the rights and interests that are considered morally significant. And I explore some of the complexities that arise when (...) we link degrees of moral status to the weight of reasons to protect bundles and/or the content and size of these bundles, in particular regarding the attribution of moral status to nonparadigmatic entities (e.g. people with severe cognitive disabilities, children, embryos and foetuses, robots, non-human animals, ecosystems, and rivers). (shrink)

Elselijn Kingma argues that, in cases of mammalian placental pregnancy, the foster (roughly, the post-implantation embryo/foetus) is part of the gravida (the pregnant organism). But she does not consider the possibility of proper overlap. I show that this generates a number of serious problems for her argument and trace the oversight to a quite general issue within the literature on biological individuality. Doing so provides an opportunity to pull apart and clarify the relations between some importantly distinct questions concerning (...) organismality and organismic parthood, and to identify the implications that this has for those who want to draw on this literature when making metaphysical or mereological arguments. (shrink)

The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no moral status to (...) any of these beings, assigning it only to groups to which they belong, while individualists such as welfarists grant an equal moral status to humans and many animals, and Kantians accord no moral status either to animals or severely mentally incapacitated humans. I argue that an underexplored, modal-relational perspective does a better job of accounting for degrees of moral status. According to modal-relationalism, something has moral status insofar as it capable of having a certain causal or intensional connection with another being. I articulate a novel instance of modal-relationalism grounded in salient sub-Saharan moral views, roughly according to which the greater a being's capacity to be part of a communal relationship with us, the greater its moral status. I then demonstrate that this new, African-based theory entails and plausibly explains the above judgments, among others, in a unified way. (shrink)