Augustine

Heidegger AI Textual Research Investigations: Augustine (GA 83) / By Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Copyright©2026 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-ND. Imprint 1.0. 2026. WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) digital. 1-162 pages. -/- Warning. Warning: this is an AI Working Zone. Warning. Perhaps an impending danger of unexpected, unknown texts. This is an AI investigation into Martin Heidegger’s texts. Daniel Fidel Ferrer as the “Prompt Artist”. AI conducted by ©Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2026. Maestro. I could consider myself the (...) Maestro suggeritore. Heidegger on HEIDEGGER’S 1930/31 SEMINAR ON AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONES XI (DE TEMPORE). TABLE OF CONTENTS. I. Introduction II. Historical and Philosophical Context III. Augustine, Confessiones XI, and Heidegger’s Turn to Christian Sources IV. Heidegger’s Method in the 1930/31 Seminar V. The Aristotelian Background (Phys. IV) VI. Augustine’s Question: Quid est tempus? VII. Heidegger’s First Analytic Movement (GANG I): The Phenomenology of Measured Time VIII. The Breakthrough of Chapters 17–20: Memoria, Expectatio, Contuitus IX. The Second Analytic Movement (GANG II): Time as the Measure of Motion X. Distentio Animi: The Inner Constitution of Temporality XI. Extentio, Intentio, and the Structure of the Human Psyche XII. Heidegger’s Final Interpretation: Time as the Structure of Existential Selfhood XIII. The Confessional Mode: Why Augustine’s Form Matters XIV. Critical Evaluation: Strengths, Limitations, Philosophical Implications XV. Conclusion: From Augustine to Heidegger's Later Thought. Auch muss auf Heidegger zurückgegangen werden! (shrink)

Augustine is commonly interpreted as endorsing an extramission theory of perception in De quantitate animae. A close examination of the text shows, instead, that he is committed to its rejection. I end with some remarks about what it takes for an account of perception to be an extramission theory and with a review of the strength of evidence for attributing the extramission the- ory to Augustine on the basis of his other works.

In Book 2 of De Libero Arbitrio (Lib. Arb.), Augustine devises a proof of God’s existence and also seems to identify God with truth. In this paper, I reconstruct two distinct proofs: (1) Augustine’s proof of God’s existence and (2) his argument for the identification of God with truth. While scholars have long recognized that Augustine offers a proof of God’s existence in Lib. Arb. 2.14–39, the fact that he has two dialectical aims in this section of the dialogue has (...) been overlooked in the secondary literature. An upshot of disentangling these dialectical aims is that the two proofs turn out to be doctrinally neutral, resting not on any specifically Christian tenets, but rather on Augustine’s commitment to the existence of the intelligible Forms. (shrink)

This article focuses on the unresolved scholarly question of how Confessiones, book 10 should be interpreted, proposing a new explanation as to how and why the second half of book 10 is critically important to this text. Emphasizing important relations between the introductory chapters and the second half of book 10, the article revisits Augustine’s treatment of ambitio saeculi, interpreted as a state of will, with which author Augustine continues to struggle, even during his act of confessing publicly (i.e., in (...) composing the book 10 text for publication). As a corruption of the motive behind his act of public confession, ambitio saeculi threatens to undermine the moral integrity of this same act. After Augustine recognizes that he cannot solve this moral flaw, he despairs and considers abandoning his human audience, and so, the very publication of his text. However, he is made newly capable of remaining, as confessant, before his readership, through a new, deeper conversion. This conversion to a new humility is given in and through the confessant’s participation in the eucharistic sacrament, which provides a hopeful resolution to his ambitio saeculi. (shrink)

Why is God hidden? How might God be pointed out? In this timely study, Chad Engelland provides an original and compelling account of why God the creator is naturally hidden and how God can be intended. Drawing on phenomenology, philosophy of language, and medieval thought, he explores these questions, arguing that if the God in question is the ultimate source of all things, then hiddenness is necessary. Only a creature, rather than the creator, can appear directly in experience. Nonetheless, God (...) the creator can be named as the ultimate source of all through a deferred ostension, which is a way of establishing the reference to a hidden cause through some manifest effect. Moreover, the deferred ostension can be clarified not only through the phenomenology of absent authors, which is a special case of the problem of other minds, but also via the fulfillment of desire in giving thanks for all. (shrink)

Augustine’s doctrine of predestination has often been considered to be at odds both with his understanding of divine love and with his pastoral sensibilities. This has been concluded primarily on the basis of Augustine’s later works on grace and predestination, most notably De praedestinatione sanctorum (praed. sanct.) and De dono perseuerentiae (perseu.). Less attention has been paid to Augustine’s use of the doctrine of predestination in his preaching, however. This article explores the relationship between predestination and Augustine’s pastoral practice through (...) attention to his preaching of predestination in the In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (Io. eu. tr.). The article begins with a brief summary of Augustine’s teachings on predestination in praed. sanct. and perseu., and then turns to an examination of Augustine’s pastoral uses of predestination in several homilies of his Io. eu. tr. This examination reveals a variety of pastoral ends for which Augustine employed predestination, including inspiring humility, love for one’s enemies, perseverance in faith, and consolation for sinners. This pastoral side of predestination may provide a lens through which to see Augustine’s later treatises on predestination in a more nuanced and complicated light, since it is from this pastoral history that Augustine later writes on predestination. (shrink)

The late ancient Christian author Augustine of Hippo is often cited in historical litanies of important philosophers of time. While some of these citations are tokenistic, they attest to his ongoing relevance for philosophy of time as a subfield. The majority of authoritative treatments of Augustine treat him as a subjectivist about time, usually meaning he makes time a product of the soul. The relevant passages in Augustine do not proffer much support for a strictly subjectivist reading. Instead, the cosmological (...) and eschatological dimensions of Augustine's philosophy of time render it either an objective account or—if such a thing is possible—an account that transcends the subjective-objective dichotomy. (shrink)

Throughout his writings, Augustine compares the union of Christ’s human and divine natures to a marriage. For Augustine, the divine Word is the bridegroom not only of the church but also of the human flesh that he joins to himself in the Incarnation. There has been only modest commentary on Augustine’s use of this metaphor and almost no inquiry into its sources. This paper demonstrates the Latin Christian roots of this nuptial metaphor for the Incarnation and brings to light the (...) importance of Augustine’s nuptial Christology to his ecclesiology. The paper concludes by clarifying Augustine’s understanding of the relationship between the Word-flesh and Christ-church nuptial unions. (shrink)

The article explores how the divine command “Tolle lege” in Confessiones 8.12, coupled integrally with Augustine’s response, resolves multiple dilemmas or problems central to the narrative of the work, in philosophical, psychological and theological modes. An initial contention is that the question of the soul’s ability to move itself is more fundamental to the crisis of Book 8 than is the dividedness of the post-lapsarian will, and that the climactic moment in 8.12 brings the surprising, urgently needed solution. A second (...) claim is that too little attention has been paid to the apparent redundancy of the divine command: Augustine has “taken and read” before. Here, too, extraordinary supernatural therapy is provided in the cooperative nexus of God’s call and Augustine’s response. Key to the analysis of these two textual features is the monumental import, morally and metaphysically, of the human act of obedience to God, on its own terms and in contradistinction with other kinds of moral action. Finally, the claim is advanced, abundantly justified by the text yet far under-appreciated, that the divine command is actually, and intentionally, iterative, bespeaking the boundless gratuitousness of God’s mercy and a pedagogy of literary-spiritual growth in Christ. (shrink)

Approximately fifteen hundred years after Augustine’s death, his understanding of human bodies continues to interest historians, philosophers, scholars of Christianity, and popular journalists. From college classrooms to international scholarly forums, contemporary students of Augustine’s thought discuss the proposal that Augustine considered concupiscentia (sexual lust) and its deployment central to the formation and organization of the self. This proposal ignores Augustine’s commitment to the doctrine of the bodily resurrection; I argue that it was not his sexual experience and its resolution that (...) was decisive in his understanding of the body’s participation in his commitment to “becoming Christ.” It was, rather, the practice of belief, “walking,” together with fellow members of the body of Christ, that affirms present human bodies. Augustine taught that the Christian walk will be completed when resurrected bodies will be relieved of their vulnerability and morbidity and united to “Life itself.” “I want the whole to be healed,” the old Augustine said in a sermon, “because I am the whole.”. (shrink)

This paper elucidates Augustine’s ontology and phenomenology of numbers in his De musica and develops it into a theory of mathematical hermeneutics through Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method. For Augustine, the science of music is an investigation into the numbers of musical rhythm and harmony, whose ‘numerical soundness’—i.e., their equality and order—name the fundamental mathematical principles informing the beauty of music, as well as all that is beautiful and true. Crucially, I argue that, for Augustine, this numerical soundness is primarily (...) discerned through the intuitive delight of our aesthetic sensibility (sensuales numeri). The function of the calculating reason (iudicales numeri), on the other hand, is reflective upon this sensibility: evaluating its pleasures to help us press on towards a more undistracted and universal delight. The telos of liberal education, unveiled by faith, is the state of flawless delight in the ineffable beauty of God, which coincides with a perfect love for God and neighbors. Using Gadamer’s concepts of taste and tact, I develop this into an Augustinian phenomenology of mathematical taste, which is always directed towards a tactfulness of love. I conclude by proposing that this hermeneutical account of truth can help bridge the modern phenomenological gap that was introduced between the human and the mathematical sciences. (shrink)

Augustine believed that humans are called to be both slaves and friends of God. John 15:15, Jesus tells his disciples that they are no longer his slaves, but are instead his friends, thus posed a significant interpretive problem for him. This paper surveys Augustine’s thirteen discussions of the passage, presenting several themes Augustine developed and interpretive strategies he tried out over two decades of interpreting the passage. His favorite strategy was reading the passage proleptically. The disciples were not yet friends (...) of God at the time of Jesus’s speaking but could look forward to a certain future when they will be friends of God. But this strategy couldn’t solve the problem: Jesus treats slavery to and friendship with God as substitutes, not compossible. One theme was to associate slavery with fear. Augustine invoked this in his most extensive treatment of John 15:15, arguing that there are two species of slavery to God, each corresponding to a kind of fear. One fear, and thus one slavery, is compatible with friendship. The other is not. The paper concludes by identifying some further problems Augustine’s approach raised. (shrink)

In this article I call attention to a twofold pattern of ranking pagans that is epiphenomenal to the structure of books 1–10 of Augustine’s City of God, and evident when we attend to Augustine’s assessment of intellectual claims by certain pagans in combination with his moral evaluation of them. On the one hand, Augustine begins with those who have the most serious errors and progresses through representatives who come closer to the truth, arriving finally at the Platonists (and Porphyry in (...) particular), who have the most correct knowledge and are “closest to us [Christians].” On the other hand, as Augustine progresses through pagans who have increasing relevant knowledge, the heat of his criticisms also increases, such that Porphyry ends up as having the most relevant knowledge and as the worst pagan. This twofold structural pattern in books 1–10 itself has not been noticed and is of interest in its own right. It is also another way to notice and explore the classic tension within Augustine between his simultaneous appreciation for and rejection of a rival intellectual heritage. (shrink)

Confessions 13.11.12, which describes the Christian Trinity in terms of “to be, to know, and to will” and “being, mind, and life,” is a difficult passage to interpret. At the same time, it has important implications: for making sense of an assertion about Platonism in Book 7, for assessing Augustine’s originality or lack thereof in philosophical theology, and for correctly placing him in the wider history of metaphysics. As we will see, this rich passage is only fully intelligible as an (...) engagement with Plotinus (fl. 250) that is mediated by Marius Victorinus’ metaphysics. This fact about Confessions 13.11.12 has ramifications, both particular and general. It permits us to understand what this particular passage intends to say about the Trinity – an important implication because the meaning of some of the basic terms and the relation between Augustine’s paronymous trios are not what they appear to be. Equally crucially, this feature of Confessions 13 gives us access to the reasoning behind Augustine’s claims; for Victorinus provides arguments grounded in classical metaphysics to support his trinitarianism, whereas Augustine only repeats Victorinus’ conclusions. Furthermore, it reveals that Augustine’s highly influential writings about the Trinity are not as original as is typically assumed, and it illustrates a general truth: Augustine’s common designation as “Platonist” would be more precise if it were revised to “Victorine Neoplatonist.” Again, it indicates that Augustine was exposed to a wider range of philosophical concepts and distinctions than is often supposed. Victorinus wrote in Latin but was fluent in Greek; he was in touch with Greek philosophical texts and sprinkled his text with technical terms from Greek philosophy. For example, Victorinus utilizes Aristotelian concepts that are not contained in the Categories, the only text by Aristotle that Augustine knew. So Augustine, who was not bilingual, could access this content via Victorinus. Lastly, the presence of Marius Victorinus’ thought in Confessions 13.11.12 improves our knowledge of his role in the later history of western metaphysics. Victorinus is often assumed to have had no significant influence on medieval philosophy, because his Against Arius ceased to be copied in full by the time of Alcuin (fl. 780). (That was because Jerome rightly characterized the text as inaccessible except to those with advanced training in philosophy.) However, Augustine’s sway over subsequent western thought renders his direct source, Victorinus, influential as well. (shrink)

In “Salvator Mundi: Via Crucis,” Denise Levertov encounters Christ as he bears “Incarnation’s heaviest weight.” In these fleeting moments, she writes, Christ finds himself “out of his depth,” enduring the “sickened desire... to simply cease, to not be.” The poet’s meditation on these moments offers a useful lens for reconsidering Augustinian hope. In view of Christ’s suffering as the incarnated divine promise, how does Augustine interpret the meaning of St. Paul’s “one hope” (Eph. 4:4) and St. Peter’s “living hope” (1 (...) Pet. 1:3)? While other hopes unfold under the shadow of death, the life that is “hidden with Christ in God” (Col. 3:3) draws its hope out of the depths to which Christ has descended. This results in a new way of keeping time in God’s promise: a way that for Augustine disrupts and exceeds, without abandoning, life in the saeculum. (shrink)

This paper—the text of a lecture given at Oxford in 2022—explores possible answers to a question frequently posed as I worked on the book Augustine the African: was Augustine Black? I begin by exploring the evidence for Augustine’s appearance in literal terms, through textual traces or visual images, and briefly discussing the Amazigh heritage of his mother. I then look at the examples and metaphors in his preaching for further hints. The question broadens out to become one about the founding (...) presumptions of the discipline of history, and the context of the early modern invention of the category of blackness. The epistemological claims of blackness and whiteness in this context are briefly explored, along with their convoluted equivalencies with the categories of African and Roman. Finally, I look to the Ghanaian philosopher Wiredu to provide an African take on Eurocentric “universals.”. (shrink)

Augustine’s theology of divine forgiveness has received surprisingly little sustained attention. This is unfortunate, not least because his approach offers a thought-provoking contrast to the way forgiveness is typically conceived in our own day. We commonly understand forgiveness in therapeutic terms, as overcoming resentment or anger. For Augustine, God’s forgiveness is “metaphysical”—an other-oriented action that changes the moral and spiritual status of those who are forgiven. God forgives preveniently, to free sinners from their sin, so that they can be who (...) they were meant to be. Forgiveness, therefore, is a divine attempt to restore sinners to the good. Yet although God acts out of love, Augustine did not consider forgiveness incompatible with paternalistic anger or punishment. This essay draws on Augustine’s theologies of baptism and the cross to explore these ideas, and their implications for the relationship between human and divine agency in giving and receiving forgiveness. It concludes by raising some questions about how Christians should think about human forgiveness in light of Augustine’s account of God’s transformative love. (shrink)