This article is a reply to Karori Mbugua’s article titled “The Problem of Hell Revisited: Towards a Gentler Theology of Hell” (Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya, New Series, Vol.3 No.2, December 2011, pp.93-103). The present article does not in any way seek to argue for or against the existence of eternal damnation. Instead, it advances the view that while Mbugua raises important philosophical issues around the question of eternal damnation, those questions deserve (...) a more incisive treatment than Mbugua accorded them. The article further argues that as with all other matters touching on the way things are rather than the way they ought to be, the answer to the question as to whether or not eternal damnation exists cannot be determined by our opinions - its existence or nonexistence is an objective fact. Consequently, philosophers cannot revise the fact to their liking; what they can do is to accept or reject the doctrine of eternal damnation altogether on rational grounds, but with no assurance that the objective fact is on their chosen side. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss William Lane Craig’s response to problems faced by Molinists who hold that an eternal hell exists and that most people who fail to accept Christ during their earthly lives end up there. Craig suggests that it is plausible to suppose that most people who fail to accept Christ suffer from transworld damnation, and that the fact that they do ensures that it is fair that they end up in hell regardless of whether they hear (...) the Gospel message. I argue that whether this suggestion-which I call ‘Craig’s contentious suggestion’-is true depends on how transworld damnation is understood. I present four interpretations of transworld damnation, and argue that on three of the interpretations Craig’s suggestion is clearly unacceptable, but that it may be acceptable on the fourth. (shrink)

The fourteenth-century Florentine Dominican Remigio dei Girolami has traditionally been regarded as an extreme anti-individualist. As evidence for his extremism, commentators typically point to objection eleven of his 1302 treatise De bono communi, which appears to argue that the superiority of the common good over individual good requires that a citizen be willing to be damned to hell in preference to his commune's damnation. I believe, however, not only that this traditional interpretation has been influenced by historiographical cirumstances, but (...) also that the argument of the crucial objection eleven has been misunderstood. When read correctly, taking into consideration Remigio's use of both Aristotelian and Biblical political languages, both the passage and the treatise as a whole are seen to be more interesting and more complex than can be dismissed with the phrase ‘extreme anti-individualism. (shrink)

Scott Hill has recently published a response to the ‘Master Argument against Universalism,’ defended at length in James Dominic Rooney’s (Not a Hope in Hell, Routledge, 2025). Hill relies on his own summaries or interpretations of that argument which involve fundamental misconceptions about it and the reasons given in the book for affirming its premises. Further, he ignores the responses or qualifications made in the book to objections that resemble those made by Hill. For this reason, the article focuses on (...) reviewing the Master Argument. In addition, I will pose further potential objections in the spirit of Hill’s criticisms and show the way that these objections entail a denial of the assumption (made in the book) that classical theism is true. Since the argument was only intended to show that universalism requires denying classical theism, I show that the objections fall prey to the dilemma posed, and that the Master Argument is sound, if classical theism is true. While Hill is nonchalant about denying classical theism, as are many others, I conclude by laying out the dialectical costs of affirming universalism and denying classical theism, especially for those interested in maintaining a ‘patristic universalism.’. (shrink)

Jerry L. Walls aims to demonstrate in his book Hell: The Logic of Damnation that some traditional views of hell are still defensible and can be believed with intellectual and moral integrity. Focusing on the issues from the standpoint of philosophical theology, Walls explores the doctrine of hell in relation to both the divine nature and human nature. He argues, with respect to the divine nature, that some traditional versions of the doctrine are compatible not only with God's omnipotence (...) and omniscience, but also with a strong account of His perfect goodness. The concept of divine goodness receives special attention since the doctrine of hell is most often rejected on moral grounds. (shrink)

I argue that the idea of a freely embraced eternal destiny in hell is deeply incoherent and implies, quite apart from its incoherence, that we are free both to sin with impunity and to defeat God's justice forever.

The Calvinist view that man is predestined to be among the elect or the damned has profoundly influenced not only our views of criminals and deviants, but also the theoretical basis of correctional methods and psychotherapeutic techniques. In this provocative and original volume, Mordechai Rotenberg examines the impact of Protestant doctrine on Western theories of deviance. He explores the inherent contradiction between Protestant ethics, with its view of human nature as predestinated, and the "people-changing" sciences.Rotenberg presents empirical studies that show (...) how people's tendency to label themselves and others as deviant can be predicted on the basis of their exposure to Western socialization. He contrasts alienating individuals, the result of competitiveness and exaggerated independence fostered by socialization in Protestant societies, to the reciprocal individualism of Hassidic, Japanese, and other non-Western cultures. Examining the Protestant "bias" of Western behavioral sciences, Rotenberg examines modern theories of deviance and proposes alternative models. He compares traditional past-oriented insight therapy, grounded in Calvinist methods of introspection, self-torment, and conversion, with Hassidic notions of redemption and salvation."Rotenberg provides important historical and sociological insights into the intellectual origins of modern theories of deviance. His argument that Western behavioral science retains a Calvinist view of humanity will force most scholars to examine anew the assumptions and foundations of their own theories."--Gerald N. Grob, Rutgers University"A highly original work, which should be of great interest to anyone concerned with relevant behavior. It shows how macro-definitions in a society tend to lead people to think about themselves and their ills in certain ways--and thus to deviate in certain ways."--Richard A. Cloward, co-author, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare. (shrink)

This article offers a detailed analysis of the penalties imposed on Cn. Calpurnius Piso pater in AD 20 after he had been posthumously convicted of maiestas . Piso was accused of leaving his province without permission and then returning to try to retake it after the death of Germanicus in AD 19. He was also believed by many to be implicated in the death of Germanicus. The details of his case have been revealed by a new inscription from Spain, the (...) Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone patre, which was first published in 1996. Part of this long and well-preserved inscription records the post-mortem sanctions against memory imposed by the senate and Tiberius on Piso after his suicide. The verdicts for his family members and accomplices are also included. The decree was posted on bronze in the major cities of the Empire and in the winter quarters of all the legions. The article argues for the following conclusions. The decree should be taken at face value and its punishments considered harsh for a member of the Roman office-holding élite. It was widely published throughout the Empire after there had been extravagant mourning for Germanicus. Consequently, it seems that post-mortem disgrace did not necessarily involve the family as a whole. Indeed, sanctions against memory appear to be consciously designed to preserve the Roman élite family, its assets, and social position by removing its erring member. Such sanctions reveal both a tension and an accommodation between remembering and forgetting, between the family and the community, between history and memory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Universal Salvation, Damnation, and the Task of TheologySimon Francis Gaine O.P.The science of theology is rightly concerned with questions of the ultimate salvation and damnation of intellectual creatures, both angelic and human.1 Here I shall touch on the orthodoxy and theological correctness of two opposed views, which are current in Christian theology today, about the ultimate fate of human beings in the order God has created. One (...) is universalism, the idea that all human beings definitely will or may be finally united with God in heaven.2 According to stronger or weaker versions of universalism, hell will or may be empty. The other is sometimes known as "infernalism," by which I mean the view that there will be some human beings forever separated from God, even if we do not know who they will be. According to infernalism, thus defined, hell will definitely not be empty.Hans Urs von Balthasar is among those theologians who is counted as a universalist. However, he distanced himself from the idea that universal salvation is something we can believe by faith or know for certain. Balthasar supposed that an empty hell is something we can instead hope for, and so [End Page 879] embraced a weaker version of universalism.3 Three short works by him have been gathered in English translation under the title Dare We Hope "That All Men Be Saved"?4 Among them is Balthasar's main defense of his position, Was dürfen wir hoffen?, which was first published in German in 1986.5 Though he acknowledges that we do not know for definite that universal salvation will take place, he treats it as something really possible. However, for "infernalists," as Balthasar dubs them, though we can certainly hope that any given individual will be admitted to heaven, we cannot hope for the salvation of the human race as a whole, because we are bound to believe that some will be lost, even though we may not know who they will be. This is because, on the infernalist account, the actual inhabitation of hell has been divinely revealed, such that universalism is outside the bounds of Christian orthodoxy, and so can hardly be true. From the first reactions to Balthasar's proposal, even before the publication of Was dürfen wir hoffen?, the revelation that some will be forever in hell has been presented as a refutation of Balthasar's hope, intimating that his universalism is heretical.6 Some critics have suggested that, while Balthasar was not setting out to oppose Church teaching, it is not possible to "accede to Balthasar's way of conceiving the possibility of eternal salvation and remain orthodox."7It seems to me, however, that both infernalism and a hope for universal salvation arguably lie within the current bounds of Catholic orthodoxy. I do not mean to say that both are correct. Evidently they cannot both be true. Either it is possible that hell will in fact be empty or it is not. Nevertheless, it seems to me that both views can be recognized as falling within the current bounds of orthodoxy. Consider how the claims of the classic Thomist and Molinist positions on the relationship between divine grace and human freedom cannot both be true in all their details, yet each falls within the [End Page 880] bounds of current Catholic orthodoxy and neither position can licitly call the other heretical, without prejudice to a future magisterial determination of the question.8 I suggest that, likewise, infernalism and universalism as understood by Balthasar both fall within the bounds of current Catholic orthodoxy, even if both cannot be correct. However, while the Catholic orthodoxy of infernalism, having been held within Catholicism over the centuries, is surely uncontested, that of universalism is strongly contested, especially on the alleged ground that infernalist teaching is revealed doctrine.Though universalism is certainly not a modern invention, it has become increasingly prominent in modern times. Since the Second Vatican Council, it has been embraced by a number of Catholic theologians.9 The extent of its contemporary support gives reason to ask whether it has become more or less positively recognized by the magisterium as an arguable theological... (shrink)

Traditionally, Christians have hold the two following beliefs: the belief that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good on the one hand and the belief that God has actualized a possible world in which some people freely reject Christ and are damned eternally, while others freely accept Him and are saved on the other. The combination of these two beliefs seems to result in a contradiction. This serious and well-known problem is called the soteriological problem of evil. In this article (...) the author, on the basis of William Lane Craig's Molinist theory, argues that there is no contradiction between these beliefs and that, therefore, there is no soteriological problem of evil, unless one adds two premises. The theory of middle knowledge shows that there is no good reason to accept the second of these. Therefore, there is no contradiction between belief in a perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent God and the eternal damnation of some people in this world. This Molinist account is defended against some philosophical and theological objections that have been raised against it. Finally, the author tries to show that, although Craig's concept of transworld damnation is helpful to offer a defense of the compatibility of the two traditional Christian beliefs mentioned above, it does not help us to offer a theodicy of post-mortem evil. (shrink)

Traditionally, Christians have hold the two following beliefs: the belief that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good on the one hand and the belief that God has actualized a possible world in which some people freely reject Christ and are damned eternally, while others freely accept Him and are saved on the other. The combination of these two beliefs seems to result in a contradiction. This serious and well-known problem is called the soteriological problem of evil. In this article (...) the author, on the basis of William Lane Craig's Molinist theory, argues that there is no contradiction between these beliefs and that, therefore, there is no soteriological problem of evil, unless one adds two premises. The theory of middle knowledge shows that there is no good reason to accept the second of these. Therefore, there is no contradiction between belief in a perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent God and the eternal damnation of some people in this world. This Molinist account is defended against some philosophical and theological objections that have been raised against it. Finally, the author tries to show that, although Craig's concept of transworld damnation is helpful to offer a defense of the compatibility of the two traditional Christian beliefs mentioned above, it does not help us to offer a theodicy of post-mortem evil.ZusammenfassungIn der christlichen Tradition finden wir die folgenden beiden Überzeugungen: einerseits, dass Gott allwissend, allmächtig und vollkommen gut ist und anderseits, dass er eine mögliche Welt aktualisiert hat, in der einige Menschen Christus freiwillig ablehnen und ewig verloren gehen, während andere ihn freiwillig annehmen und gerettet werden. Es hat den Anschein, dass die Kombination dieser beiden Überzeugungen in einen Widerspruch mündet. Aufgrund der Molinistischen Theorie William Lane Craigs sucht Verfasser zu erweisen, dass diese beiden Überzeugungen sich nicht widersprechen – es sei denn, dass zwei fragwürdige Prämissen hinzugefügt würden. Die Theorie der scientia media zeigt, dass es keine guten Gründe gibt, um die zweite dieser Prämissen zu akzeptieren. Es besteht also kein Widerspruch zwischen der Überzeugung, dass Gott allwissend, allmächtig und vollkommen gut ist, und der Überzeugung, dass einige Menschen ewig verloren gehen. Diese Molinistische Theorie wird gegenüber einigen philosophischen und theologischen Einsprüchen verteidigt. Schliesslich versucht der Verfasser nachzuweisen, dass, obwohl Craigs Konzept der transworld damnation für eine Verteidigung des christlichen Glaubens gebraucht werden kann, es nicht gebraucht werden kann für eine Theodizee hinsichtlich postmortalem Übel. (shrink)

Leibniz consistently denies that unbaptized infants are condemned to hell in virtue of original sin. He is less than forthcoming, however, about where they go when they die. Scholars are divided on this issue. Some think that, according to Leibniz, they go to limbo, while others think that he is committed to the view that they go to heaven. The aim of this paper is to show that this scholarly attention is misguided and that Leibniz does not defend a position (...) regarding the fate of unbaptized infants. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has demonstrated Molina’s rejection of transworld damnation, claiming instead that there is at least one feasible world where any individual is freely saved, lost, or does not exist. This article argues that one can subscribe to Molina’s doctrine of individual predestination while maintaining, with William Lane Craig, that no actual person who fails to hear the gospel and is lost would have been saved in some feasible world where s/he heard the gospel. As part of the divine (...) deliberation, God could narrow down the spectrum of feasible worlds to a lower-order spectrum by factoring out worlds which, among other conditions, contain anyone who does not fall into either of two types. The first type comprises persons saved in at least one world where they receive only general revelation at the moment of salvation, lost in at least one world where they receive only general revelation, and lost in every world where they receive special revelation without first appropriating salvation through general revelation. The second type comprises persons saved in at least one world where they receive special revelation without first appropriating salvation through general revelation and lost in at least one comparable world. (shrink)

Objections to the orthodox doctrine of an eternal hell often rely on arguments that it cannot be a person’s own fault that she ends up in hell. The paper summarizes and addresses three significant arguments which aim to show that it could not be any individual’s fault that they end up in hell. I respond to these objections by showing that those who affirm a classical picture of sin have Moorean reasons to reject these objections. That classical perspective holds that (...) all (serious) sin involves choosing eternal destiny apart from God and that no sin could possibly be caused by God. Consequently, it is necessary for ending up in hell that someone commit a serious sin, and it is sufficient for ending up damned that one persists forever in sin. Since the objections conflict with Moorean commitments central to the classical perspective, those who hold to such a classical perspective on sin would have good reason to reject all these arguments, which involve assumptions that would entail that such a perspective is false. (shrink)

The recent literature on Leibniz’s views on salvation and damnation has focused on whether Leibniz was a lifelong believer in the doctrine of eternal damnation, or whether he came to accept universalism, the doctrine that everyone will be saved. Neglected, however, has been Leibniz’s complex and surprising justification of damnation. In this paper, I examine Leibniz’s attempt to answer the ‘complaint of the damned’: the damned’s complaint that God has treated them unjustly by creating them such that (...) damnation was inevitable. I argue that Leibniz’s ‘psychology of damnation’ is the centerpiece of his response to the complaint of the damned. I further show that the psychology of damnation is not only of theological interest, but also provides an account of the moral psychology of evil in general, and helps solve a puzzle that arises from Leibniz’s naturalized theory of punishment – the puzzle of how vice can be naturally ‘self-punishing.’. (shrink)

In “Omnibenevolence and Eternal Damnation”, I consider whether it is consistent to hold both that God is omnibenevolent and that he infinitely punishes human beings for the commission of finite transgressions. In exploring this problem, I discuss the utilitarian and retributive notions of punishment and justice, the possible mitigating effect of forewarning, and differing conceptions of the nature of the relationship of God to human beings. My conclusion is that it is inconsistant to hold both of these beliefs.

In this essay, I contend that feminist theories of citizenship in the U.S. context must go beyond simply acknowledging the importance of race and grapple explicitly with the legacies of slavery. To sketch this case, I draw upon W.E.B. Du Bois's “The Damnation of Women,” which explores the significance for all Americans of African American women's sexual, economic, and political lives under slavery and in its aftermath.

: In this essay, I contend that feminist theories of citizenship in the U.S. context must go beyond simply acknowledging the importance of race and grapple explicitly with the legacies of slavery. To sketch this case, I draw upon W.E.B. Du Bois's "The Damnation of Women," which explores the significance for all Americans of African American women's sexual, economic, and political lives under slavery and in its aftermath.

Logic-based therapy (LBT) is an approach to philosophical practice that involves finding philosophical ideas that can serve as “antidotes” to clients’ emotional problems. I examine philosophical arguments from an ancient Chinese text, namely the Zhuangzi, and from four Buddhist texts, namely the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta, and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. The Bodhicaryāvatāra contains several antidotes to the fallacy known within LBT as “Damnation of Others.” Arguments from the Zhuangzi, the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta, and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā may be helpful antidotes to the (...) fallacy of Awfulizing about death. (shrink)

I believe that Craig's arguments for the possibility of (DT) are important for two reasons: first, because the line he takes, though unsuccessful in my opinion, is the most plausible (or least implausible) line available; and second, because he sets forth with startling clarity some of the propositions that someone who takes this line must be willing to accept. But in the end, I shall argue, he not only fails to establish that (DT) is possible; he also fails in the (...) lesser task of trying to undermine my own argument that (DT) is impossible. Although Craig nowhere gives formal shape it, his argument for the possibility of (DT) seems to run something like this: He first insists that certain propositions other than (DT) are possible in the broadly logical sense, and he then tries to deduce the possibility of (DT) from these other possibilities; that is, he casts about for some proposition p - perhaps a conjunction of several propositions - that will enable him to argue as follows: (1) p entails (DT). (2) p is possible in the broadly logical sense. (3) Therefore, (DT) is also possible in the broadly logical sense. And, of course, the challenge he faces in defending such an argument is this: If, for some p, he.. (shrink)

Combining time travel with certain kinds of supertask, this paper proposes a novel model for Hell. Temporally-closed spacetimes allow otherwise impossible opportunities for material kinds of damnation and reveal surprising limitations on metaphysical objections to Hell. Prima facie, eternal damnation requires either infinite amounts of time or time for the damned to speed-up arbitrarily. However, spatiotemporally finite ‘time travel’ universes can host unending personal torment for infinitely many physical beings, while keeping fixed finite limits on rates of temporal (...) passage. Such ‘Hilbert's Inferno’ spacetimes suggest neither materialism nor the finitude of time and space need forbid Hell. A material Hell can be spatiotemporally finite yet eternal for its inhabitants. Hilbert's Inferno also sheds light on Hell's location and accessibility, and shows that some spacetimes are intrinsically better suited to punishment than reward. (shrink)

This entry explores two features of John Locke’s (1632-1704) theological commitments: the existence and nature of God; and, the nature of punishment in the afterlife. Locke argues for a cogitative and immaterial God. Locke also denies eternal damnation, or eternal punishment and torment in the afterlife. The goal of this entry is to not only showcase Locke’s often overlooked discussion of eternal damnation, but also to show how this discussion, and Locke’s treatment of God, link up with his (...) groundbreaking and influential discussion of persons and their persistence conditions. (shrink)

This paper explores the issue of Leibniz's commitment to the doctrines of eternal punishment and universal salvation. I argue against the dominant view that Leibniz was committed to eternal punishment, but rather than defending the minority position that Leibniz believed in universal salvation, I suggest that the evidence for his adherence to each is indicative of the way in which he regards religious doctrine as instrumentally valuable. My hypothesis is that Leibniz thought that the appropriateness of advocating eternal damnation, (...) universal salvation or any other eschatological position was a function of the role that it would play in engendering the virtue of true piety in a given audience. (shrink)

Increasingly, theists have come to see their relationship with God as anological to an exemplary human relationship. Seeing it this way would be difficult, supposing a traditional theological determinist view of providence in which God elects some to salvation in heaven and others to eternal damnation. But, as Derk Pereboom explains in this esssay, if one accepts universal salvation and denies divine retribution, both libertarianism and theological determinism accommodate a good relationship with God. Each of these positions can secure (...) trust in God by a developmental account for why God permits evil, and by a sufficiently strong notion of divine providence can be used to respond to the problem of evil. The challenge that valuable love for God is ruled out by theological determinism can be answered by reflecting on what sorts of loving responses we ordinarily cherish. (shrink)

Christian universalism, or the theory of universal salvation, is increasingly popular among religious thinkers. A small group of scholars has put forward the contentious claim that Kierkegaard was a universalist, despite that he refers in places to the idea of eternal damnation as essential to Christianity. This paper examines the evidence both for and against the view that Kierkegaard was a universalist and concludes that despite Kierkegaard’s occasional references to the importance of the idea of eternal damnation to (...) Christianity, there is reason to believe that Kierkegaard may have been a universalist, both in terms of the substance of his thought, including two unequivocal statements in his journals that he believed everyone would eventually be saved and in terms of his rhetorical style which prioritizes the effect his writings would have on the reader over the literal truth of the views they present. (shrink)

The “Confessio philosophi” is an early dialogue in which Leibniz engages with what he takes to be the central task of theodicy: to uphold the justice of God. It evinces his commitment to the claim that ours is the best possible world, and offers an account of how such a world could include damnation. Various answers to the question why God is justified in permitting sin are suggested in the dialogue. These are addressed in this chapter, which also highlights (...) a threat to God’s justice raised by the doctrine of eternal damnation which is given surprisingly little attention. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the place of the “Confessio philosophi” in Leibniz’s lifelong theodicy project. (shrink)

Leibniz in his early philosophical career, mentions and adheres to the different forms of God’s knowledge such as, free, natural, and middle knowledge (God’s understanding). And surprisingly, Leibniz is consistent with these forms of God’s knowledge in his mature philosophical years. It is with surprise that many Leibnizian scholars do not implement these forms of God’s knowledge when Leibniz speaks of the Trinity, the problem of evil, the possibility and impossibility of the damnation of the innocent, phenomena, and Leibniz’s (...) correspondence with Arnauld. It is essential to take into consideration Leibniz theological position since fundamentally Leibniz's philosophical assertion stems from and is grounded in his theology. For this reason, when discussing Leibniz's philosophical system, one must incorporate his theological perspective. Thus, when Leibniz speaks of God’s foreknowledge, one should decipher what form of knowledge is Leibniz speaking of and how precisely these types of God’s knowledge is incorporated into his system. For this reason, I argue that Leibniz uses, as a background, his understanding of these forms of knowledge, and by noticing this background, it will show how Leibniz departs from Spinoza’s necessitarianism regarding God’s intellect. (shrink)

The Protestant ethic — a moral code stressing hard work, rigorous self-discipline, and the organization of one's life in the service of God — was made famous by sociologist and political economist Max Weber. In this brilliant study (his best-known and most controversial), he opposes the Marxist concept of dialectical materialism and its view that change takes place through "the struggle of opposites." Instead, he relates the rise of a capitalist economy to the Puritan determination to work out anxiety over (...) salvation or damnation by performing good deeds — an effort that ultimately discouraged belief in predestination and encouraged capitalism. Weber's classic study has long been required reading in college and advanced high school social studies classrooms. (shrink)

This article focuses on addressing Marilyn McCord Adams’ ‘Problem of Hell' - the argument that eternal damnation is incompatible with divine goodness and omnipotence. While Adams proposes universalism as the solution, this raises concerns about preserving human freedom and moral responsibility. Drawing on insights from Thomas Hopko, Richard Swinburne, Jacques Maritain, and Alexander Pruss, I develop the ‘Presence-Union’ model of hell that reconciles eternal separation from God with divine goodness. This model demonstrates how the unveiled presence of divine love, (...) combined with a miraculous restoration of natural felicity and the distinction between formal and real union with God, provides a coherent alternative to both traditional views of hell and universalism, and maintains both divine mercy and the gravity of human moral choice. (shrink)

_A stunning reexamination of one of the essential tenets of Christian belief from one of the most provocative and admired writers on religion today__ “A scathing, vigorous, eloquent attack on those who hold that that there is such a thing as eternal damnation.”—Karen Kilby, _Commonweal___ “[A] provocative, informative treatise.... [Hart’s] resounding challenge to orthodox Christian views on hell and his defense of God’s ultimate goodness will prove convincing and inspiring to the open-minded.”—_Publishers Weekly_ (starred review)_ The great fourth-century church (...) father Basil of Caesarea once observed that, in his time, most Christians believed that hell was not everlasting, and that all would eventually attain salvation. But today, this view is no longer prevalent within Christian communities. In this momentous book, David Bentley Hart makes the case that nearly two millennia of dogmatic tradition have misled readers on the crucial matter of universal salvation. On the basis of the earliest Christian writings, theological tradition, scripture, and logic, Hart argues that if God is the good creator of all, he is the savior of all, without fail. And if he is not the savior of all, the Kingdom is only a dream, and creation something considerably worse than a nightmare. But it is not so. There is no such thing as eternal damnation; all will be saved. With great rhetorical power, wit, and emotional range, Hart offers a new perspective on one of Christianity’s most important themes. (shrink)

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of C. S. Lewis’s death, a special annotated edition of his Christian classic, The Screwtape Letters, with notes and excerpts from his other works that help illuminate this diabolical masterpiece. Since its publication in 1942, The Screwtape Letters has sold millions of copies worldwide and is recognized as a milestone in the history of popular theology. A masterpiece of satire, it offers a sly and ironic portrayal of human life and foibles from the (...) vantage point of Screwtape, a highly placed assistant to “Our Father Below.” At once wildly comic, deadly serious, and strikingly original, The Screwtape Letters comprises the correspondence of the worldly-wise devil Screwtape and his nephew Wormwood, a novice demon in charge of securing the damnation of an ordinary young man. For the first time, The Screwtape Letters will be presented in full-text accompanied by helpful annotations in a striking two-color format. These annotations will give fans a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the popular book, providing background information, explanations of terms, historical significance, and excerpts from Lewis’s other works that more fully explain the ideas in this volume. For both expert Lewis fans and casual readers, The Screwtape Letters: Annotated Edition will be a beautiful and insightful guide to a beloved classic. (shrink)

The Discourse on Metaphysics is one of Leibniz's fundamental works. Written around January 1686, it is the most accomplished systematic expression of Leibniz's philosophy in the 1680s, the period in which Leibniz's philosophy reached maturity. Leibniz's goal in the Discourse is to give a metaphysics for Christianity; that is, to provide the answers that he believes Christians should give to the basic metaphysical questions. Why does the world exist? What is the world like? What kinds of things exist? And what (...) is the place of human beings in the world? To this purpose Leibniz discusses some of the most traditional topics of metaphysics, such as the nature of God, the purpose of God in creating the world, the nature of substance, the possibility of miracles, the nature of our knowledge, free will, and the justice behind salvation and damnation. This volume provides a new translation of the Discourse, complete with a critical introduction and a comprehensive philosophical commentary. (shrink)