We very much welcome Enck and Condley’s (2025) introduction of agent-regret and their plea for the existential and moral importance of this concept as a distinct phenomenon from moral distress or c...

Moral realism as we know it has been primarily if not exclusively arguing for the objectivity of the moral properties of rightness and wrongness of action. This is understandable because the normative ethics, upon which moral realism as a metaethical theory reflects, has been dominated by consequentialism and deontology, both of which are primarily if not exclusively concerned about the rightness and wrongness of actions. In the last few decades, however, virtue ethics, which is primarily concerned with the goodness and (...) badness of human persons, has become a strong rival to consequentialism and deontology but has so far not received its deserved attention from metaethicists. In this paper, as a metaethical reflection on one of the most fundamental issues of virtue ethics as a normative theory, I shall develop an agent-focused moral realism, arguing for the objectivity of the moral properties of the goodness and badness of human persons. In the process, I shall also argue how such a moral realism can relatively easily respond to a number of representative criticisms that moral anti-realists have lodged to the action-focused moral realism. (shrink)

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a fast-growing technology that connects everyday devices to the Internet, enabling wireless, low-consumption and low-cost communication and data exchange. IoT has revolutionized the way devices interact with each other and the internet. The more devices become connected, the greater the risk of security breaches. There is currently a need for new approaches to algorithms that can detect malware regardless of the size of the network and that can adapt to dynamic changes in the network. (...) Through the use of a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm, this paper proposes a novel algorithm for malware detection in IoT devices. The proposed algorithm is not strongly dependent on the size of the IoT network due to the that its training is adapted using time differences if the IoT network size is small or Monte Carlo otherwise. To validate the proposed algorithm in an environment as close to reality as possible, we proposed a scenario based on a real IoT network, where we tested different malware propagation models. Different simulations varying the number of agents and nodes in the IoT network have been developed. The result of these simulations proves the efficiency and adaptability of the proposed algorithm in detecting malware, regardless of the malware propagation model. (shrink)

A growing number of philosophers now hold that agent causation is required for agency, or free will, or moral responsibility. To clarify what is at issue, this paper begins with a distinction between agent causation that is ontologically fundamental and agent causation that is reducible to or realized in causation by events or states. It is widely accepted that agency presents us with the latter; the view in question claims a need for the former. The paper then (...) examines a “disappearing agent” argument from Derk Pereboom that is aimed at showing that free will requires agent causation that is ontologically fundamental. It is argued that the argument fails. Further, it is argued that, contrary to Pereboom’s claim, the issue raised by his disappearing agent argument is distinct from the problem of present luck that libertarian theories of free will face. The paper concludes with an assessment of the prospects for success of a disappearing agent argument showing that agent causation that is ontologically fundamental is required for agency tout court. (shrink)

The current article is the first in a series of review articles addressing biosemiotic terminology. The biosemiotic glossary project is inclusive and designed to integrate views of a representative group of members within the biosemiotic community based on a standard survey and related publications. The methodology section describes the format of the survey conducted in November–December 2013 in preparation of the current review and targeted on the terms ‘agent’ and ‘agency’. Next, I summarize denotation, synonyms and antonyms, with special (...) emphasis on the denotation of these terms in current biosemiotic usage. The survey findings include ratings of nine citations defining or making use of the two terms. I provide a summary of respondents’ own definitions and suggested term usage. Further sections address etymology, connotations, and related terms in English and other languages. A section on the notions’ mainstream meaning vs. their meaning in biosemiotics is followed by attempt at synthesis and conclusions. Although there is currently no consensus in the biosemiotic community on what constitutes a semiotic agent, i.e., an agent in the context of semiosis, most respondents agree that core attributes of an agent include goal-directedness, self-governed activity, processing of semiosis and choice of action, with these features being vital for the functioning of the living system in question. I agree that these four features are constitutive of biosemiotic agents, and stipulate that biosemiotic agents fall within three major categories, namely 1) sub-organismic biosemiotic agents, 2) organismic biosemiotic agents and 3) super-organismic biosemiotic agents. (shrink)

The disappearing agent problem is an argument in the metaphysics of agency. Proponents of the agent-causal approach argue that the rival event-causal approach fails to account for the fact that an agent is active. This paper examines an analogy between this disappearing agent problem and the exclusion problem in the metaphysics of mind. I develop the analogy between these two problems and survey existing solutions. I suggest that some solutions that have received significant attention in response (...) to the exclusion problem have seen considerably less attention in response to the disappearing agent problem. For example, one solution to the exclusion problem is to reject the exclusion assumption. Analogously, one solution to the disappearing agent problem could be to deny the claim that the agent-causal approach and the event-causal approach are mutually exclusive. Similarly, proportionality theories of causation, a solution to the exclusion problem, can be transferred to the disappearing agent problem. After establishing the plausibility of the analogy between the two problems, I examine how this latter solution in particular can be transferred from the one problem to the other. (shrink)

Deontologists have long been upbraided for lacking an account of justified decision- making under risk and uncertainty. One response is to develop a deontological decision theory—a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an act’s being permissible given an agent’s imperfect information. In this article, I show that deontologists can make more use of regular decision theory than some might have thought, but that we must adapt decision theory to accommodate agent- centered options—permissions to favor or sacrifice our (...) own interests, when doing so is overall morally worse. Accommodating options requires more than just amend- ing the decision-theoretic ‘value function’. We must change the decision rule as well. (shrink)

Several philosophers claim that the phenomenology of one’s own agency conflicts with standard causal theories of action, couched in terms of causation by mental events or states. Others say that the phenomenology is prima facie incompatible with such a theory, even if in the end a reconciliation can be worked out. Here it is argued that the type of action theory in question is consistent with what can plausibly be said to be presented to us in our experience of our (...) agency. Several routes to a claim that there is nevertheless a prima facie incompatibility are examined, and all are found wanting. The phenomenology of agency, it is argued, is no threat to a standard causal theory of action. (shrink)

I argue for a novel understanding of the nature of agent-regret. On the standard picture, agent-regret involves regretting the result of one’s action and thus regretting one’s action. I argue that the standard picture is a flawed analysis of agent-regret. I offer several cases of agent-regret where the agent feels agent-regret but does not regret the result itself. I appeal to other cases where an agent’s attitude towards something depends upon whether or not (...) they are involved in that thing. I argue that the same applies to actions: sometimes an agent’s attitude towards a result differs from their attitude to their involvement in bringing about that result. Agent-regret is regret about my own action, but it need not involve regret about something in the world. I end by considering how this picture of agent-regret allows us to respond to a particular criticism of agent-regret. (shrink)

In this paper, we present an agent-based model for studying the impact of 'myside bias' on the argumentative dynamics in scientific communities. Recent insights in cognitive science suggest that scientific reasoning is influenced by `myside bias'. This bias manifests as a tendency to prioritize the search and generation of arguments that support one's views rather than arguments that undermine them. Additionally, individuals tend to apply more critical scrutiny to opposing stances than to their own. Although myside bias may pull (...) individual scientists away from the truth, its effects on communities of reasoners remain unclear. The aim of our model is two-fold: first, to study the argumentative dynamics generated by myside bias, and second, to explore which mechanisms may act as a mitigating factor against its pernicious effects. Our results indicate that biased communities are epistemically less successful than non-biased ones, and that they also tend to be less polarized than non-biased ones. Moreover, we find that two socio-epistemic mechanisms help communities to mitigate the effect of the bias: the presence of a common filter on weak arguments, which can be interpreted as shared beliefs, and an equal distribution of agents for each alternative at the beginning. (shrink)

In “Voluntary Acts and Responsible Agents,” Bernard Williams sketches what it means to be a mature agent. This mature agent tries to make sense of their own life, which is a life that is shared wit...

The rapid development of autonomous systems, some of which emulate animal abilities, raises a question about how to understand and compare their complexity. Taking an “agent” to be any system that can be well-explained by attributing goals and intentional states to it, in what sense should we understand some agents as more “complex” than others? There is a sizable literature about complexity in biology, notably in comparative psychology, where an animal’s complexity informs predictions about its abilities and guides experimental (...) design. In engineering and artificial intelligence, complexity is often assumed to be a sign of progress – we want to build more complex, capable machines. While the goals of researchers in these fields are different, they plausibly overlap in common conceptions of what a “more complex agent” entails. Existing work on “environmental complexity” and its relationship to “complex cognition” inquires into the origins of complexity, but not what it means to be a complex agent. Recognizing that complex behavior comes not just from complex cognition but from the interplay of body, environment, and cognition, we articulate an account of agent complexity in terms of Gibson’s (The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Classic), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1979) notion of affordances. We distinguish between cognitive and behavioral dimensions of affordances, and offer a framework for comparing agents based on the range of affordances they can exploit. Our approach ecologically grounds the sense in which some agents are more complex than others, while also clarifying why the answer to “which agent is more complex?” is sometimes indeterminate. It enables systematic comparison across diverse agent types, as we demonstrate through a detailed analysis of the nematode C. elegans and the hexapod robot RHex. We hope our account can advance discourse around the complexity of animals and guide the development of complex, agential machines. (shrink)

Enck and Condley (2025) put forward a robust and plausible account of agent-regret. The authors argue that agent-regret, originating from the work of Bernard Williams, highlights two problems with...

Enck and Condley (2025) draw welcome attention to clinician experiences of “agent-regret.” They define agent-regret broadly as a person’s regret over their “harmful but not wrongful actions,” that...

Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation.

I argue that agent-centered options to favor and sacrifice one’s own interests are grounded in a particular aspect of self-ownership. Because you own your interests, you are entitled to a say over how they are used. That is, whether those interests count for or against some action is, at least in part, to be determined by your choice. This is not the only plausible argument for agent-centered options. But it has some virtues that other arguments lack.

There is a well-established project in moral philosophy which seeks to demarcate deontological normative theories from consequentialist normative theories by defining deontology and deontological restrictions exclusively in terms of their agent-relativity. My aim in this paper is to explain why this project is mistaken and to defend both the possibility and the plausibility of agent-neutral deontological restrictions. I will argue that the common rationale underwriting the alleged agent-relativity of deontological restrictions is not, in fact, deontological at all. (...) If deontological restrictions (qua prohibitions on the performance of particular action-types by particular agents) are to be agent-relative restrictions in the sense that they are grounded in the idea that agents have a special responsibility not to violate them themselves – qua authors of their own actions – then these agent-relative restrictions are best understood as agent-relative consequentialist restrictions. Genuinely deontological restrictions, on the other hand, are agent-neutral restrictions in the sense that they apply to anyone and everyone and are grounded in the inviolable status of those victimised. (shrink)

I welcome Enck and Condley’s (2025) emphasis on agent-regret as distinct from both moral distress and compassion fatigue, especially since it highlights a set of agential concerns that go beyond wh...

Smart cities are an emerging technology that is receiving new ethical attention due to recent advancements in artificial intelligence. This paper provides an overview of smart city ethics while simultaneously performing novel theorization about the definition of smart cities and the complicated relationship between (smart) cities, ethics, and politics. We respond to these ethical issues by providing an innovative representation of the agent-deed-consequence (ADC) model in symbolic terms through deontic logic. The ADC model operationalizes human moral intuitions underpinning virtue (...) ethics, deontology, and utilitarianism. With the ADC model made symbolically representable, human moral intuitions can be built into the algorithms that govern autonomous vehicles, social robots in healthcare settings, and smart city projects. Once the paper has introduced the ADC model and its symbolic representation through deontic logic, it demonstrates the ADC model’s promise for algorithmic ethical decision-making in four dimensions of smart city ethics, using examples relating to public safety and waste management. We particularly emphasize ADC-enhanced ethical decision-making in (economic and social) sustainability by advancing an understanding of smart cities and human-AI teams (HAIT) as group agents. The ADC model has significant merit in algorithmic ethical decision-making, especially through its elucidation in deontic logic. Algorithmic ethical decision-making, if structured by the ADC model, successfully addresses a significant portion of the perennial questions in smart city ethics, and smart cities built with the ADC model may in fact be a significant step toward resolving important social dilemmas of our time. (shrink)

Agent-causal libertarianism is the view that agents-qua-agents, rather than being determined by external factors beyond their control, can choose for themselves, among various possibilities, how they will act. Numerous philosophers yoke their agent-causal libertarianism with an emergentist metaphysic, according to which nature is mereologically layered such that novel wholes emerge from, and causally influence, the parts constituting them. In this paper I present an emergentist model of agent causal libertarianism, according to which agents as emergent wholes of (...) higher-level parts such as reasons, desires and choices, arise out of and causally influence, their lower-level neural parts. I then compare and contrast this model with two other contemporary agent-causal emergentist models, one from Timothy O’Connor, the other from Juan Morales. After arguing that my model is preferable in several respects to these models, I consider a leading concern with all forms of emergentism, namely, outlining how it integrates with the doctrine of physicalism. (shrink)

The following is an interpretation of Aquinas’ agent intellect focusing on Summa Theologiae I, qq. 75-89, and proposing that the agent intellect is a metaphysical rather than a formal a priori of human understanding. A formal a priori is responsible for the intelligibility as content of the object of human understanding and is related to Kant’s epistemological views; whereas a metaphysical a priori is responsible for intelligibility as mode of being of this same object. We can find in (...) Aquinas’ text many indications that the agent intellect is not productive of the universal as content but is, rather, productive of the abstracted or intelligible mode of being of the universal nature. This is because for Aquinas the universal nature, which is the object of human understanding, is present in the things themselves but with a different mode of being. Chapter 1 is intended to establish the fact which requires for Aquinas an agent intellect, and provides two very important principles: one is that the object of human understanding (the universal nature) is present in the things themselves and, the other, that it is not in the things themselves with a mode of being which makes it available to the intellectual eye. These two principles lead us to the main point of Chapter 2, namely the distinction between the intelligible object and its intelligible mode of being. Now, because knowing is receptive of the intelligible object (Chapter 3), which is present in the things themselves (Chapter 1), the agent intellect is productive not of the object’s intelligible content, but of its abstracted or intelligible mode of being (Chapter 4). (shrink)

Scientists and engineers seek to understand how real-world systems work and could work better. Any modeling method devised for such purposes must simplify reality. Ideally, however, the modeling method should be flexible as well as logically rigorous; it should permit model simplifications to be appropriately tailored for the specific purpose at hand. Flexibility and logical rigor have been the two key goals motivating the development of Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), a completely agent-based modeling method characterized by seven specific (...) modeling principles. This perspective provides an overview of ACE, a brief history of its development, and its role within a broader spectrum of experiment-based modeling methods. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the agent/patient distinction against critics who argue that causal interactions are symmetrical. Specifically, I argue that there is a widespread type of causal interaction between distinct entities, resulting in a type of ontological asymmetry that provides principled grounds for distinguishing agents from patients. The type of interaction where the asymmetry is found is when one of the entities undergoes a change in kind, structure, powers, or intrinsic properties as a result of the interaction while (...) the other does not. Interactions of this type are widespread in molecular biology and chemistry. I focus specifically on (i) the actions of enzymes on substrates and (ii) water molecules breaking the bonds of polarized molecules. Finally, I respond to objections by laying out and to a limited extent defending three commitments of my account: emergent entities and powers, realism about chemical kinds or structures, and the assumption of the agent/patient distinction in functional attributions in biology. (shrink)

This essay will canvass recent philosophical accounts of human agency that deploy a notion of “self” (or “agent”) causation. Some of these accounts try to explicate this notion, whereas others only hint at its nature in contrast with the causality exhibited by impersonal physical systems. In these latter theories, the authors’ main argumentative burden is that the apparent fundamental differences between persona and impersonal causal activity strongly suggest mind-body dualism. I begin by noting two distinct, yet not commonly distinguished, (...) philosophical motivations for pursuing an agent-causal account of human agency. In the course of discussing the account developed by some philosophers in response to these consideration, I reconsider both the linkage of agent causation with mind-body dualism and its sharp cleavage from impersonal (or “event”) causation. (shrink)

Could it be true that even though we as a group ought to do something, you as an individual ought not to do your part? And under what conditions, in particular, could this happen? In this article, I discuss how a certain kind of case, introduced by David Copp, illustrates the possibility that you ought not to do your part even when you would be playing a crucial causal role in the group action. This is because you may have special (...) agent-relative reasons against participating that are not shared by the group as a whole. I defend the claim that these are indeed cases in which you ought not to do your part in what the group ought to do. I then argue that we can expect these cases to produce a troubling kind of rational conflict. (shrink)

Inspired by recent progress in multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (RL), in this work we examine the collective intelligent behaviour of theoretical universal agents by introducing a weighted mixture operation. Given a weighted set of agents, their weighted mixture is a new agent whose expected total reward in any environment is the corresponding weighted average of the original agents' expected total rewards in that environment. Thus, if RL agent intelligence is quantified in terms of performance across environments, the weighted (...) mixture's intelligence is the weighted average of the original agents' intelligences. This operation enables various interesting new theorems that shed light on the geometry of RL agent intelligence, namely: results about symmetries, convex agent-sets, and local extrema. We also show that any RL agent intelligence measure based on average performance across environments, subject to certain weak technical conditions, is identical (up to a constant factor) to performance within a single environment dependent on said intelligence measure. (shrink)

This article is a critical discussion of Derk Pereboom’s “disappearing agent objection” to event-causal libertarianism in his Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. This objection is an important plank in Pereboom’s argument for free will skepticism. It is intended to knock event-causal libertarianism, a leading pro-free-will view, out of contention. I explain why readers should not find the objection persuasive.

In ‘Moral Luck,’ Bernard Williams famously argued that “there is a particularly important species of regret, which I shall call ‘agent-regret,’ which a person can feel only towards his past actions.” Much subsequent commentary has focused on Williams’s claim that agent-regret is not necessarily restricted to voluntary actions, and questioned whether such an attitude could be rationally justified. This focus, however, obscures a more fundamental set of questions raised by Williams’s discussion: what is the role in our moral (...) psychology of evaluative attitudes that relate essentially to past exercises of our agency—occurrences which, by their very nature, cannot be repeated? On a standard conception, regret is directed principally towards actions that resulted from suboptimal deliberation. On this view, the main point of regret is to guide us away from similar poor decisions in the future. But Williams’s key insight in ‘Moral Luck,’ I argue, is that there is a mode of evaluation of one’s past actions and decisions that does not track considerations one could and should have been responsive to at the time, and is for this reason essentially retrospective. From this perspective, the full significance of regret cannot be captured in terms of a disposition to deliberate better in the future. Rather, the particular kind of painful of consciousness of the past embodied in regret amounts to a reflective, and essentially backward-looking, insight into the contingency and finitude of our own agency—that I am a particular person leading a particular life, and that the possibility of leading a different life is now gone forever. I end by making some speculative comments about the intractable question whether it is ultimately good or desirable to be disposed to regret one’s past mistakes. (shrink)

It is a matter of dispute whether we should acknowledge the existence of two distinct species of causation – event causation and agent causation – and, if we should, whether either species of causation is reducible to the other. In this paper, the prospects for such a reduction either way are considered, the conclusion being that a reduction of event causation to agent causation is the more promising option. Agent causation, in the sense understood here, is taken (...) to include but not to be restricted to the intentional causation of an event by a rational agent. But, it is argued, there are certain special features of intentional causation, understood as a sub-species of agent causation, which make the agent-causation approach to human agency a particularly promising one with which to tackle the problem of free will. (shrink)

When performing a skilled action—whether something impressive like a double somersault or something mundane like reaching for a glass of water—you exercise control over your bodily movements. Specifically, you guide their course. In what does that control consist? In this dissertation, I argue that it consists in attending to what you are doing. More specifically, in attending, agents harness their perceptual and perceptuomotor states directly and practically in service of their goals and, in doing so, settle the fine-grained manner in (...) which their bodies will move—details an intention alone leaves unsettled. This requires, among other things, that we reject views on which agents’ control is identical with their practical rationality. When all goes well, agents attentionally prioritize what is motivationally relevant to them to the exclusion of what would otherwise distract them from achieving their goals. However, sometimes agents attend distractedly—i.e., without prioritizing. As the aim of attention is to avoid distraction, this entails the possibility of defective attention. Defective attention, in turn, casts light on scenarios in which agents lose control over what they are doing, as when a skilled practitioner ‘chokes under pressure’. A complaint sometimes levelled against accounts, like mine, that claim to reduce agents’ control of their behaviour to that of causally efficacious mental states or events is that these accounts invariably deprive agents themselves of their rightful role in the generation of behaviour. This is the “Disappearing Agent Problem” for “reductive” or “event-causal” theories of action. I argue that, correctly understood, extant reductive theories do face a genuine Disappearing Agent Problem. However, it is a problem we solve by recognizing the role that conscious attention plays in making an action the agent’s own. Accordingly, I develop and defend an attentional account of action ownership. On this view, allocating conscious attention in service of your goals is sufficient for a kind of conscious perspective (“motivational perspective”), which, when active in controlling your behaviour, constitutes the behaviour as your own doing. As I explain, such perspective also contributes to explaining the subjective structure of your perceptual awareness of the world around you. (shrink)

Many find it plausible that acting freely requires a kind of sensitivity to reasons. Modalists define this sensitivity in terms of what S does in the relevant alternative possibilities. Agent modalists take S to be an agent, assessing their reasons-sensitivity by considering what the agent would have done in those possibilities. While intuitive, agent modalists struggle with Frankfurt cases. This has led some to a mechanism-based approach. Here, I raise two objections to this approach and defend (...) agent modalism. I argue that (1) the mechanism approach permits composite mechanisms, leading to an unattractive disjunction, and (2) excluding the agent undermines the original appeal of reasons-sensitivity. I defend agent modalism by arguing it can handle Frankfurt cases if it holds fixed the nonoccurrence of agent-altering events. This requirement also helps address rational blind spots. Thus, I aim to rehabilitate agent modalism as a viable account of reasons-sensitivity in free action. (shrink)

The question I raise is whether Mark Balaguer’s event-causal libertarianism can withstand the disappearing agent objection. The concern is that with the causal role of the events antecedent to a decision already given, nothing settles whether the decision occurs, and so the agent does not settle whether the decision occurs. Thus it would seem that in this view the agent will not have the control in making decisions required for moral responsibility. I examine whether Balaguer’s position has (...) the resources to answer this objection. (shrink)

In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate the deontic axiom that ought implies can, (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong (...) reason, and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving conflicting motives and motivational over-determination. In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote’s view. This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible. (shrink)

Common-sense morality includes various agent-centred constraints, including ones against killing unnecessarily and breaking a promise. However, it's not always clear whether, had an agent ϕ-ed, she would have violated a constraint. And sometimes the reason for this is not that we lack knowledge of the relevant facts, but that there is no fact about whether her ϕ-ing would have constituted a constraint-violation. What, then, is a constraint-accepting theory to say about whether it would have been permissible for her (...) to have ϕ-ed? In this paper, I canvass various possible approaches to answering this question and I argue that teleology offers the most plausible approach—teleology being the view that every act has its deontic status in virtue of how its outcome ranks, relative to those of its alternatives. So although, until recently, it had been thought that only deontological theories can accommodate constraints, it turns out that teleological theories not only can accommodate constraints, but can do so more plausibly than deontological theories can. (shrink)

This article addresses knowledge transfer dynamics in agent-based computational social science. The goal of the text is twofold. First, it describes the tensions arising from the convergence of different disciplinary traditions in the emergence of this new area of study and, second, it shows how these tensions are dealt with through the articulation of distinctive practices of knowledge production and transmission. To achieve this goal, three major instances of knowledge transfer dynamics in agent-based computational social science are analysed. (...) The first instance is the emergence of the research field. Relations of knowledge transfer and cross-fertilisation between agent-based computational social science and wider and more established disciplinary areas: complexity science, computational science and social science, are discussed. The second instance is the approach to scientific modelling in the field. It is shown how the practice of agent-based modelling is affected by the conflicting coexistence of shared methodological commitments transferred from both empirical and formal disciplines. Lastly, the third instance pertains internal practices of knowledge production and transmission. Through the discussion of these practices, the tensions arising from converging dissimilar disciplinary traditions in agent-based computational social science are highlighted. (shrink)

This paper develops a natural-language agent-based model of argumentation (ABMA). Its artificial deliberative agents (ADAs) are constructed with the help of so-called neural language models recently developed in AI and computational linguistics. ADAs are equipped with a minimalist belief system and may generate and submit novel contributions to a conversation. The natural-language ABMA allows us to simulate collective deliberation in English, i.e. with arguments, reasons, and claims themselves — rather than with their mathematical representations (as in symbolic models). This (...) paper uses the natural-language ABMA to test the robustness of symbolic reason-balancing models of argumentation (Mäs & Flache 2013; Singer et al. 2019): First of all, as long as ADAs remain passive, confirmation bias and homophily updating trigger polarization, which is consistent with results from symbolic models. However, once ADAs start to actively generate new contributions, the evolution of a conversation is dominated by properties of the agents as authors. This suggests that the creation of new arguments, reasons, and claims critically affects a conversation and is of pivotal importance for understanding the dynamics of collective deliberation. The paper closes by pointing out further fruitful applications of the model and challenges for future research. (shrink)

Personal relationships can change the deontic status of acts. Such change usually takes the form from optional to required. However, it also seems possible that relationships can change the deontic status from impermissible to optional or even required. In other words, agents can be required to do things for a friend that would be impermissible when done for a stranger. In this paper, I examine these controversial forms of deontic change. I argue that friendships can, in fact, make otherwise impermissible (...) acts permissible or even required, but only in certain cases. The question, then, is why friendships can play such a role, and why they can only do so in certain situations. I argue that the idea of deontological thresholds provides a unified explanation for both questions. This idea posits that otherwise impermissible actions become permissible or even required only in very specific situations, namely to avoid a moral catastrophe. I then argue that such deontological thresholds can be agent-relative and that friendships influence whether an agent-relative deontological threshold is reached. This explains why only friends, not strangers, can be permitted or required to perform certain otherwise impermissible actions. I contend that friendships play this role because of the fundamental knowledge by acquaintance that friends have of each other’s overall virtuous characters. (shrink)

It is a plausible and compelling theoretical assumption that epistemic rationality is just a matter of having doxastic attitudes that are the correct responses to one’s epistemic reasons, or that all requirements of epistemic rationality reduce to requirements on doxastic attitudes. According to this idea, all instances of epistemic rationality are instances of rational belief. Call this assumption, and any theory working under it, _belief-centered_. In what follows, I argue that we should not accept belief-centered theories of epistemic rationality. This (...) is an argument in three acts. In the first, I present counterexamples that problematize the belief-centered assumption: cases whose protagonists (i) fail to meet any plausible requirements on belief but (ii) nevertheless appear epistemically rational. In the second act, I consider alternative explanations of the counterexamples, friendly to the belief-centered theorist, and find them wanting. In the third and final act, I show that there are significant theoretical benefits to acknowledging a distinct agent-centered dimension of epistemic rationality and sketch a candidate agent-centered approach: a view that grounds an agent’s epistemic rationality in the possession of _good epistemic policies_. In the end, we see that a complete theory of epistemic rationality is as much of a theory of rational _agents_ as it is of rational _belief_. (shrink)

The causal theory of action is thought to be plagued by the problem of the disappearing agent. However, philosophers have reached no consensus on the nature of this problem, let alone on whether it is solvable. In this article, I interpret the problem as a phenomenological challenge: the causal theory of action employs an event-causal framework, with which certain aspects of the phenomenology of agency seem incompatible. I examine two areas in which the phenomenology appears to speak against an (...) event-causal framework: (1) the phenomenology of acting and (2) the phenomenology of making choices. Specifically, some philosophers have asserted that the phenomenology of acting involves content that action is caused by the agent themselves rather than by their mental states. Some philosophers have argued that the phenomenology of making choices involves content that the agent stands apart from their mental states in a way that allows them to reflect on, evaluate, or even manipulate their mental states. I argue that in neither case does the phenomenology pose a real challenge to the causal theory of action. (shrink)

The epistemology of computer simulations has become a mainstream topic in the philosophy of technology. Within this large area, significant differences hold between the various types of models and simulation technologies. Agent-based and multi-agent systems simulations introduce a specific constraint on the types of agents and systems modelled. We argue that such difference is crucial and that simulation for the artificial sciences requires the formulation of its own specific epistemological principles. We present a minimally committed epistemology which relies (...) on the methodological principles of the Philosophy of Information and requires weak assumptions on the usability of the simulation and the controllability of the model. We use these principles to provide a new definition of simulation for the context of interest. (shrink)

Agent-based models have played a prominent role in recent debates about the merits of democracy. In particular, the formal model of Lu Hong and Scott Page and the associated “diversity trumps ability” result has typically been seen to support the epistemic virtues of democracy over epistocracy (i.e., governance by experts). In this paper we first identify the modeling choices embodied in the original formal model and then critique the application of the Hong-Page results to philosophical debates on the relative (...) merits of democracy. In particular we argue that the “best-performing agents” in Hong-Page model should not be interpreted as experts. We next explore a closely related model in which best-performing agents are more plausibly seen as experts and show that the diversity trumps ability result fails to hold. However, with changes in other parameters (such as the deliberation dynamic) the diversity trumps ability result is restored. The sensitivity of this result to parameter choices illustrates the complexity of the link between formal modeling and more general philosophical claims; we use this debate as a platform for a more general discussion of when and how agent-based models can contribute to philosophical discussions. (shrink)

Many philosophers judge that typical agent-causal accounts of freedom improperly sacrifice the possibility of rational explanation of the action for the sake of securing control, while others judge that the reverse shortcoming plagues typical event causal accounts. (Of course, many philosophers make both these judgments.) After briefly rehearsing the reasons for these verdicts on the two traditional strategies, we undertake an extended examination of Randolph Clarke's recent attempt to meet the challenge by proposing an original, "integrated agent-causal" account (...) of human free action. We argue that Clarke's account fails. In a final section, we sketch a more promising route to integration. (shrink)

Back in 1982, when I started studying with Samuel Scheffler, a major subject of debate was whether – and, if so, exactly why and how – the existence of agent-relative reasons for action justifies making fundamental changes to consequentialist moral theory. How dramatically the tables have turned in the years since! Now the question tends to be whether – and, if so, exactly why and how – agent-neutral reasons for action can have a significant role to play in (...) contractualist moral theory. In the first half of this paper, I offer some arguments for thinking that agent-neutral reasons do exist and that they are more basic than reasons of other sorts. In the second half of the paper, I offer some arguments for thinking that such reasons, being more basic, must have a central role to play in contractualist moral theory. (shrink)

The agent-relative/agent-neutral distintion is widely and rightly regarded as a philosophically important one. Unfortunately, the distinction is often drawn in different and mutually incompatible ways. The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction has historically been drawn three main ways: the ‘principle-based distinction’, the ‘reason-statement-based distinction’ and the ‘perspective-based distinction’. Each of these approaches has its own distinctive vices (Sections 1-3). However, a slightly modified version of the historically influential principle-based approach seems to avoid most if not all of these vices (...) (Section 4). The distinction so understood differs from numerous other distinctions with which it might easily be confused (Section 5). Finally, the distinction so drawn is important to normative theorizing for a variety of reasons (Section 6). (shrink)

In this paper, we first propose a simple formal language to specify types of agents in terms of necessary conditions for their announcements. Based on this language, types of agents are treated as ‘first-class citizens’ and studied extensively in various dynamic epistemic frameworks which are suitable for reasoning about knowledge and agent types via announcements and questions. To demonstrate our approach, we discuss various versions of Smullyan’s Knights and Knaves puzzles, including the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever (HLPE) proposed by (...) Boolos (in Harv Rev Philos 6:62–65, 1996). In particular, we formalize HLPE and verify a classic solution to it. Moreover, we propose a spectrum of new puzzles based on HLPE by considering subjective (knowledge-based) agent types and relaxing the implicit epistemic assumptions in the original puzzle. The new puzzles are harder than the previously proposed ones in the literature, in the sense that they require deeper epistemic reasoning. Surprisingly, we also show that a version of HLPE in which the agents do not know the others’ types does not have a solution at all. Our formalism paves the way for studying these new puzzles using automatic model checking techniques. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the evolution of knowledge in multi-agent conformant planning over transition systems. We propose a dynamic epistemic logical framework with modalities of distributed knowledge to handle the epistemic reasoning in such scenarios, and we reduce a problem of multi-agent conformant planning to a model checking problem. We prove that multi-agent conformant planning is Pspace-complete on the size of the dynamic epistemic model.

In a digital communication environment, information security is mandatory. Three essential parameters used in the design process of a steganography algorithm are Payload, security, and fidelity. However, several methods are implemented in information hiding, such as Least Significant Bit (LBS), Discrete Wavelet Transform, Masking, and Discrete Cosine Transform. The paper aims to investigate novel steganography techniques based on agent technology. It proposes a Framework of Steganography based on agent for secret communication using LSB. The most common image steganography (...) databases are explored for training and testing. The methodology in this work is based on the statistical properties of the developed agent software using Matlab. The experiment design is based on six statistical feature measures, including Histogram, Mean, Standard deviation, Entropy, Variance and Energy. For steganography, an Ensemble classifier is used to test two scenarios: embedding a single language message and inserting bilingual messages. ROC Curve represents the evaluation metrics. The result shows that the designed agent-based system with 50% training/testing sample set and 0.2 Payload can pick out the best cover image for the provided hidden message size to avoid visual artifact. (shrink)