In this paper, we examine the scientific, legal, and ethical foundations for inclusion of transgender women athletes in competitive sport, drawing on IOC principles and relevant Court of Arbitration for Sport decisions. We argue that the inclusion of trans athletes in competition commensurate with their legal gender is the most consistent position with these principles of fair and equitable sport. Biological restrictions, such as endogenous testosterone limits, are not consistent with IOC and CAS principles. We explore the implications for recognizing (...) that endogenous testosterone values are a ‘natural physical trait’ and that excluding legally recognized women for high endogenous testosterone values constitutes discrimination on the basis of a natural physical trait. We suggest that the justificatory burden for such prima facie discrimination is unlikely to be met. Thus, in place of a limit on endogenous testosterone for women, we argue that ‘legally recognized gender’ is most fully in line with IOC and CAS principles. (shrink)

This chapter explores how what is dismissed as “trans activism” is often public philosophy. It considers how so‐called “public philosophy” on trans issues often does a substantially worse job of living up to the name. The chapter discusses how the dichotomy between “trans activism” and “public philosophy” provides a pretext for marginalizing trans voices. To draw on Black feminist philosophical thought, lived experience is a criterion for knowledge of the needs of marginalized people. Like other marginalized communities, trans communities have (...) encountered many areas in which hermeneutical liberation is needed. Public philosophy as trans activism is often systemically and systematically ignored or willfully misinterpreted as being biased and motivated by self‐interest, whereas anti‐trans (public) philosophy is seen as asking the important questions. (shrink)

In this chapter, Veronica Ivy argues against a “punitive model of assertoric behavior,” according to which speakers generally assert properly only because hearers have the ability to punish speakers in some sense when they assert improperly. Ivy argues against this by showing that we assert truthfully even when there are no punitive disincentives for lying, and we feel badly for asserting falsely even when there are no punitive consequences. In this way, Ivy claims that speakers tend to experience an internal (...) duty of honesty and truthfulness and this is what drives assertoric practices. Given this, Ivy maintains that speakers should adopt a default attitude of trust toward assertions, including those that are anonymous. This trust is defeasible: if speakers have strong positive reasons to doubt the assertion, then these reasons serve as defeaters. However, Ivy argues that anonymity itself is not a defeater and, thus, doubting anonymous assertions is the exception, not the rule. (shrink)

It’s relatively easy to say that the debates about whether trans and intersex women athletes deserve full and equal inclusion in women’s sport is a contentious contemporary issue. I’ve already argued for the legal, ethical, and scientific basis for full and equal inclusion of trans and intersex women in women’s sport. In this paper, I want to analyze what I take to be a representative selection of recent arguments against full and equal inclusion of trans and intersex women in women’s (...) sport. In short, these arguments tend to be based on mere assumption, unsupported “common sense,” straw arguments, fallacious question begging, and a number of hypotheticals and unsupported counterfactuals rather than established fact. Essentially, they’re based on a lot of “ifs.”. (shrink)