Particularism—bending rules to help one’s friends and relations—is a morally ambiguous form of corruption that, unlike bribery, might be justified by virtues of loyalty and care. To test whether they involve distinct moral vulnerabilities, we developed a 16-item Particularism vs. Bribery Tolerance Scale (PBTS) using lay input from Chinese populations, Rasch modeling, and Bayesian structural equation modeling (BSEM). Two pilot studies (N = 91; N = 114) in Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland generated topic-matched scenarios of either particularism or (...) bribery. In Study 1 (N = 499), eight pairs of scenarios were selected based on topic coverage, Rasch fit indices, and similar item functioning between Hong Kong and mainland Chinese participants. In Study 2 (N = 991), BSEM analyses supported the scale’s two-factor structure, partial scalar invariance across regions, and convergent and discriminant validity. Critically, when controlling for shared variance, particularism tolerance was uniquely associated with moral excuse-making (high Moral Disengagement and low Rule Orientation) and not with virtues. In contrast, bribery tolerance was negatively related to caring virtues (Reciprocal Filial Piety and Warm virtues) and positively related to Authoritarian Filial Piety. The PBTS provides a psychometrically sound tool for investigating distinct moral motivations associated with bribery vs. particularism. (shrink)

The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists find them unconvincing. Last, we present some purported counterexamples that have been raised against Uniqueness (...) and discuss some possible reasons why proponents of Uniqueness might find these similarly unconvincing. (shrink)

Human reproductive cloning aims to produce duplicates, i.e., people who are phenotypically and genetically identical to those already in existence. This might appear to actually threaten human dignity, because it calls into question our much-vaunted, precious uniqueness. This is precisely what this book sets out to explore: Whether, in what sense, and to what extent human reproductive cloning can threaten human uniqueness and dignity, particularly by either promoting or violating certain human rights or moral rights.

The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivation (...) for this strong epistemic claim and to defend it from several recent objections in the literature. In particular I look at objections to the Uniqueness Thesis coming from considerations of rational disagreement (can’t reasonable people disagree?), the breadth of doxastic attitudes(can’t what is justified by the evidence encompass more than one doxastic attitude?), borderline cases and caution (can’t it be rational to be cautious and suspend judgment even when the evidence slightly supports belief?), vagueness (doesn’t the vagueness of justification spell trouble for the Uniqueness Thesis?), and degrees of belief (doesn’t a finegrained doxastic picture present additional problems for the Uniqueness Thesis?). (shrink)

We prove a uniqueness theorem showing that, subject to certain natural constraints, all 'no collapse' interpretations of quantum mechanics can be uniquely characterized and reduced to the choice of a particular preferred observable as determine (definite, sharp). We show how certain versions of the modal interpretation, Bohm's 'causal' interpretation, Bohr's complementarity interpretation, and the orthodox (Dirac-von Neumann) interpretation without the projection postulate can be recovered from the theorem. Bohr's complementarity and Einstein's realism appear as two quite different proposals for selecting (...) the preferred determinate observable--either settled pragmatically by what we choose to observe, or fixed once and for all, as the Einsteinian realist would require, in which case the preferred observable is a 'beable' in Bell's sense, as in Bohm's interpretation (where the preferred observable is position in configuration space). (shrink)

A comparison is given between two conditions used to define logical constants: Belnap's uniqueness and Hacking's deducibility of identicals. It is shown that, in spite of some surface similarities, there is a deep difference between them. On the one hand, deducibility of identicals turns out to be a weaker and less demanding condition than uniqueness. On the other hand, deducibility of identicals is shown to be more faithful to the inferentialist perspective, permitting definition of genuinely proof-theoretical concepts. This kind of (...) analysis is driven by exploiting the Curry–Howard correspondence. In particular, deducibility of identicals is shown to correspond to the computational property of eta expansion, which is essential in the characterization of propositional identity. (shrink)

In this essay, I present a straightforward counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis, which holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence.

Deference principles are principles that describe when, and to what extent, it’s rational to defer to others. Recently, some authors have used such principles to argue for Evidential Uniqueness, the claim that for every batch of evidence, there’s a unique doxastic state that it’s permissible for subjects with that total evidence to have. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to assess these deference-based arguments for Evidential Uniqueness. I’ll show that these arguments only work given a particular (...) kind of deference principle, and I’ll argue that there are reasons to reject these kinds of principles. The second aim of this paper is to spell out what a plausible generalized deference principle looks like. I’ll start by offering a principled rationale for taking deference to constrain rational belief. Then I’ll flesh out the kind of deference principle suggested by this rationale. Finally, I’ll show that this principle is both more plausible and more general than the principles used in the deference-based arguments for Evidential Uniqueness. (shrink)

The concept of ‘population thinking’ was introduced by Ernst Mayr in the mid-twentieth century and it has since become one of the most pervasive notions in the philosophy of biology. Despite its influence, however, the term has been widely misunderstood, even by those who have done the most to champion it. Population thinking today is often confused with population-level thinking (i.e., the idea of treating populations as units of analysis), which, ironically, is the opposite of what Mayr intended to convey (...) when he coined the term. For Mayr, population thinking was a way of emphasizing the variation among individuals in a population, as well as the importance of recognizing their differences and uniqueness. In this paper, I recover the original meaning of ‘population thinking’ and elucidate its central role in evolutionary theory. I also demonstrate its surprising relevance to many other areas of contemporary biology. In particular, I show how the recent introduction of novel methodologies in molecular biology has led to a number of unexpected discoveries that are best understood through the lens of population thinking. Finally, I examine the historical origins and philosophical foundations of population thinking, and I show how it lies at the heart of what makes biology different from physics. (shrink)

Engel (Grazer Philos Stud 77: 45–59, 2008) has insisted that a number of notable strategies for rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion are put forward on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. A central aim of this paper will be to establish the contrast point: I argue that one very familiar strategy for defending the knowledge norm of assertion—viz., that it is claimed to do better in various respects than its competitors (e.g. the justification and the truth norms)—relies (...) on a presupposition that is shown to be ultimately under-motivated. That presupposition is the uniqueness thesis—that there is a unique epistemic rule for assertion, and that such a rule will govern assertions uniformly. In particular, the strategy I shall take here will be to challenge the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm in a way that at the same time counts against Williamson’s (Knowledge and its limits, 2000) own rationale for the uniqueness thesis. However, rather than to challenge the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm via the familiar style of ‘expert opinion’ and, more generally, ‘second-hand knowledge’ cases (e.g. Lackey in Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge, 2008), a strategy that has recently been called into question by Benton (Philos Phenomenol Res, 2014), I’ll instead advance a very different line of argument against the sufficiency thesis, one which turns on a phenomenon I call epistemic hypocrisy. (shrink)

Wentzel van Huyssteen's book Alone in the World? provides a thoughtful and nuanced account of human evolution from a theological perspective. Not only does his work provide what is perhaps the only sustained theological reflection specifically on human evolution, but his working through of many of the issues, particularly on the image of God literature in theology, has few parallels. Despite this, I focus on what I consider to be several weaknesses of the text, including areas of theological method, theological (...) interpretation, and the central topic of human uniqueness. Addressing these weaknesses will, I propose, improve van Huyssteen's argument and lead in new and fruitful directions. (shrink)

According to the standard view of particularity, an entity is a particular just in case it necessarily has a unique spatial location at any time of its existence. That the basic entities of the world we speak about in common sense and science are particular entities in this sense is the thesis of “foundational particularism,” a theoretical intuition that has guided Western ontological research from its beginnings to the present day. The main aim of this paper is to review (...) the notion of particularity and its role in ontology. I proceed in four steps. First, I offer a brief reconstruction of the tasks of ontology as “theory of categorial inference in L”. An ontological theory states which (combinations of) entity types or categories make true L-sentences true; the features of the stipulated categories explain why L-speakers are entitled to draw certain material inferences from the classificatory expressions of L. Second, I draw attention to the fact that since Aristotle this theoretical program typically has been implemented with peculiar restrictions prescribing certain combinations of category features, e.g., the combination of particularity, concreteness, individuality, and subjecthood. I briefly sketch how these restrictions of the “substance paradigm” or “myth of substance” are reinforced by the standard readings of predicate-logical constants, viz. the existential quantifier and the identity sign. Third, I argue that in the context of the substance paradigm foundational particularism is incoherent. I discuss the current standard conceptions of particulars as developed in the debate about individuation (bare particulars, nude particulars, tropes) and show that their main difficulties derive from the traditional restriction that particulars are so also logical subjects and/or individuals. Fourth, to show that the traditional linkages of category features are not conceptual necessities, I sketch the outlines of an ontology (General Process Theory) based on non-particular individuals. For ontologists in computer science working with description logic this monocategoreal ontology based on more or less generic ‘dynamics’ may hold special interest. As General Process Theory documents, ontologists may well abandon the notion of particularity: in common sense and science we do reason about items that have a unique spatial location at any time, but the uniqueness of their location can be taken to be a contingent affair. (shrink)

This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent distributional aspects of the world, which no theory (...) of reasons should purport to settle. Appeals to default reasons cannot therefore uniquely support particularism. But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter. Since generalism is not a non-starter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. Here I propose to clarify the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects. In closing, I outline the sort of generalism that I think is motivated by my discussion, and then articulate some worries this view raises about the theoretical usefulness of the label ‘default reason’. -/- [Note: The outline of moral generalism provided in this paper is superseded by those in "Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation" and "A Theory of Hedged Moral Principles".]. (shrink)

The exploration of the mechanisms of cultural heredity has often been regarded as the key to explicating human uniqueness. Particularly early imitative learning, which is explained as a kind of simulation that rests on the infant’s identification with other persons as intentional agents, has been stressed as the foundation of cumulative cultural transmission. But the question of what are the objects of this mechanism has not been given much attention. Although this is a pivotal point, it still remains obscure. I (...) will characterize the notion of action-types and show why they are the genuine objects of cultural heredity. However, this answer is in conflict with the concept of imitation, and the problem arises that, if imitation is conceptualized as simulation and explained in terms of the cognition of infants, the objects of cultural transmission seemingly cannot be passed on by imitation. In order to solve this problem, I propose reconsidering the concept of imitation and to conceptualize imitation as a cooperative activity of infants and adults. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to critically assess Markus Seidel’s perspective on reasonable disagreement, particularly focusing on his notion of “meta-evidence.” Seidel posits two primary assertions: first, he contends that his explanation of disagreement is compatible with the uniqueness thesis (UT), in contrast to Kuhn’s interpretation, which he claims is not; second, he asserts that he has formulated an absolutist framework for explaining reasonable disagreement that excludes the influence of social factors. In response to the first assertion, we argue (...) that Seidel’s claim is unjustified, as it relies on an unsubstantiated differentiation between weighing values (as proposed by Kuhn) and the assessment of meta-evidence (as suggested by Seidel), thus creating an unnecessary dichotomy. Discarding this distinction reveals that both Seidel’s and Kuhn’s accounts of reasonable disagreement are equally compatible with UT. Furthermore, in our critique of the absolutism claim, we address it on two levels. At a minimal level, we show that Seidel’s absolutist framework is insufficient. At a maximal level, by highlighting the constructive role of social factors, we contend that his explanation is not absolutist but rather embodies a relativist stance. (shrink)

According to Ernst Gombrich, cartoons provide us the chance to “study the use of symbols in a circumscribed context [and] find out what role the image may play in the household of our mind” (Gombrich 1973, 190). This paper looks at some underexplored implications and outcomes of Ernst Gombrich’s conceptual schemata when such a schemata is applied to cartoons. While we might easily avoid defamatory reference when picking out a subject in writing or speech, cartoon depictions, especially those unaccompanied by (...) speech bubbles or captions, often rely on a visual symbolism typified by the warping of some features the removal of others, and the manifestation of some visual trope or other, more easily lend themselves to defamatory reference. While harms to the referent are many in cases of defamatory cartoons, this paper focuses on the harms to the viewers of such cartoons by the depicter’s message and mode of representation, unique to the cartoon form. I will focus on the harms of misinformation of the viewer by the visual schemata (Gombrich 1960) present in certain cartoons, and the way this misinformative visual schemata (Ibid) may also restrict the possibility of conceptual revisions in its viewership. Harms of this kind come out uniquely in cartoons via norms of cartooning (as a particularly stylized and symbolic mode of visual representation) and the norms of interaction employed in the act of viewing a cartoon. As we’ll see in our case study of the infamous Jyllands Posten cartoons of Muhammad the Prophet, even in cases where a cartoon representation bears no visual similarity to its referent, viewers can easily and reliably pick out the referent by calling to mind, in our focal case, the defamatory stereotypes, stock figures and icons inextricably linked with the referent. I argue that the damage to viewers of these sorts of depictions lies not in the fact that the viewer manages to pick out the intended referent of the depiction but what tools they use to pick out the referent and how such tools of reference (mis)inform their understanding of the referent they’ve picked out. (shrink)

Both Emmanuel Levinas and Edouard Glissant explored the possibility of a form of relationality in which one opens oneself to the Other without being totally dissolved in the Other. But whereas Levinas located such a possibility in the ethical relation with the unique Other who disturbs my self-sufficiency, for Glissant it took place in what, particularly in his early work, he often identified as a primarily aesthetic relation with the exotic. In that early work Glissant drew heavily on Victor (...) Segalen’s account of the shock of the exotic as he attempted to explore the loss of diversity and difference, but in his later work, under the name creolization, he shifted his primary focus increasingly to the encounter between cultures, albeit while still drawing on some of the terms he had developed through his engagement with Segalen. In addition to demonstrating some of the parallels between Levinas and Glissant’s efforts to investigate a largely neglected form of relationality, this paper also explores the efforts both Segalen and Glissant made to free the the term “exotic” from some of its problematic connotations. (shrink)

This speculative paper develops a novel, interdisciplinary framework for the "Why am I me?" problem. It proposes that a unique phenomenal first-person perspective (PFPP) is not generated de novo by the brain, but is a primitive property that accompanies a single, continuous physical history: a spacetime worldline. Neural processes, particularly those of the hindbrain responsible for timing, prediction, and global coordination, function to stabilize and amplify this already fixed perspective, while cortical networks furnish the variable contents of perception, memory, (...) and thought. The account argues that biological uniqueness is merely statistical and cannot ground the guaranteed exclusivity of first-person ownership. This exclusivity, it is suggested, is more plausibly anchored in the non-overlapping structure of relativistic spacetime itself. The proposal is explicitly conceptual and metaphysically speculative but is framed to yield testable empirical predictions. The loss and recovery of sentience should correlate more strongly with deep coordination systems than with cortical activity, and disruptions of hindbrain timing should specifically impair subjective unity, agency, and self-location. Failure of these predictions would falsify the view's core neural claims. (shrink)

We prove that in IST, Nelson's internal set theory, the Uniqueness and Collection principles, hold for all (including external) formulas. A corollary of the Collection theorem shows that in IST there are no definable mappings of a set X onto a set Y of greater (not equal) cardinality unless both sets are finite and #(Y) ≤ n #(X) for some standard n. Proofs are based on a rather general technique which may be applied to other nonstandard structures. In particular we (...) prove that in a nonstandard model of PA, Peano arithmetic, every hyperinteger uniquely definable by a formula of the PA language extended by the predicate of standardness, can be defined also by a pure PA formula. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Unique Response to Death:Day of the Dead Fiestas and Communal Articulations of ResistanceDenise Meda-LambruIntroductionPhilosophers such as Octavio Paz and Emilio Uranga theorize death grounded in Mexican circumstances to show an intimate relational dynamic with life. In their view, death is embedded in the everydayness of the living. Carlos A. Sánchez, in "Death and the Colonial Difference," explains that the Mexican idea of death reveals much about the (...) life and the situatedness of those who subscribe to the relational dynamic between life and death. Death is linked to the living, especially for those who are situated in inferiorized positions. In the accounts promoted by Paz and by Uranga, the historical and social conditions of lived experience provide the context for how death is conceived, and, subsequently, treated. They advance Mexican conceptions of death and provide interesting perspectives into how some colonized peoples are resisting narrow narratives of death. This is to say that their approaches do not grant the dominant assumption that death is merely a biological event or a life event ceasing the life of the individual. In this essay, I examine their critiques of dominant assumptions of death to elaborate on conceptions of death contextualized within historical and social entanglements, namely, a Mexican analysis of death. In particular, I utilize Paz's work on Day of the Dead fiestas to study communal practices and theorize the ritual dimensions of the life and death relationship. Through an examination of a Mexican approach to death, I contend that rituals of death help locate the non-dominant social logics that engender resistant activity and cultivate a distinct interconnected communal relation.To develop this position, I clarify the historical and social distinctions between Mexican and Anglo-American approaches to death and analyze literature promoting a Mexican view of death. Ultimately, I share a similar view [End Page 31] with Paz, Uranga, and Sánchez who charge that there is a unique Mexican idea of death. However, to be clear, my interest in their work does not assume they represent the Mexican view of death (Brandes, Skulls to the Living). Rather, I am interested in exploring how their discussions of death, from a particular socio-historical situation, reveal ways in which colonized peoples refuse dichotomous narratives of death. Sánchez's work, in particular, provides valuable insights into the Mexican relation with death, particularly the role of coloniality/modernity with temporality. Lastly, as I return to Paz's own discussion of death, I refer to the sensibilities and practices relevant to the resistant dimensions of a Mexican relationship with death. An analysis of Paz's focus on fiestas offers a focus distinct from Sánchez in that it pays significant attention to the ritual dimensions of death and helps illustrate the resistant responses to hegemonic social norms. Thus, paying attention to communal practices, this essay emphasizes the relationship between death rituals and deviant activity to dominant modes of being.What Is Death? Examining the DistinctionsScholars have noted a distinction between the logics involved in European and Anglo-American approaches to death and those of Mexican people. Emilio Uranga asserts that "[f]or the North American (el norteamericano), death is a reality that must be hidden, a phenomenon that is silenced and masked as much as possible so that it will not disturb, with its impertinence, the flow of a life that unfolds in radical dedication to [self]-realization and work" (qtd. in Sánchez 180). Paz shares a similar view of this concealment. He writes that "the word death is not pronounced in New York, in Paris, in London, because it burns the lips" ("Day of the Dead" 57). Paz describes death for the Euro-Anglo as one that is treated as a stinging topic to be avoided. In both Uranga's view and Paz's view, the Euro-Anglo phenomenon of death is not socially discussed or regarded as part of the daily lived realities of the subject. If we take their accounts as at least generally accurate, then for Anglos, death is something that is to be treated as separate from life.1In distinction, however, the Mexican attitude toward death is described as... (shrink)

Where are we to look for the unique hues? Out in the world? In the eye? In more central processing? 1. There are difficulties looking for the structure of the unique hues in simple combinations of cone-response functions like ( L − M ) and ( S − ( L + M )): such functions may fit pretty well the early physiological processing, but they don’t correspond to the structure of unique hues. It may seem more promising (...) to look to, e.g., Hurvich & Jameson’s ‘chromatic response functions’; but these report on psychophysical behaviour, not on underlying physiology. So ‘opponent processing’ isn’t any particular help on the unique hues—and even physiology in general seems not to have come up with any good correlate or explanation. 2. Wright ( Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2: 1–17, 2011 ) looks in a different place: to (a) magnitude of total visual response that a stimulus light provokes, the maxima and minima of which, he thinks, give us the boundaries of the main hue categories (Wright connects these with Thornton’s ‘prime’ and ‘antiprime’ colours in an illuminant: Journal of the Optical Society of America 61 ( 1971 ): 1155–1163); and (b) the ratio of chromatic to achromatic response, the maxima and minima of which, he suggests, give us the focal points of the unique hues. The suggestions are extremely interesting; but the desired correspondences have some counterexamples; and where they hold, one could wonder how much they depend upon the particular choice of functions to measure (a) and (b); and one could hope for more of an explanatory linkage between the sets of items in question. 3. Could the unique hues come from, so to speak, the external world? White and black can easily be defined as particular kinds of reflectance. What of the standard four unique hues? Variation in kinds of sunlight and skylight coincides well with variation along a line from unique yellow to unique blue (cf. Shepard 1992, Mollon 2006 ). If we wanted something to calibrate our standards for unique yellow and blue as the lens of the eye changes with age, and despite interpersonal cone differences, this would be a good basis—and there are several ways this can be extended to surface colours. But is there any essential connection between these things: is there any rationale why the light of the sun and the sky should be counted as unique hued? An answer may be: because in our environment, these illuminants are as close to white (or the natural illuminant colour) as you can get—to see things tinged with sunlight or skylight should be to see them minimally tinged with any alien colour. Whereas other hues in an illuminant would be treated as tinging with a more alien colour the thing seen. (shrink)

This book presents a novel metaphysics of concrete entities. The author uses the theory developed to address three major topics in the metaphysics of concreta: fundamentality, persistence over time, and phenomenal consciousness. The book provides a new theory of what "bundles" particular property instances, or tropes, into material property bearers. The theory is based on two new ideas. The first is that the primitive nature of one sui generis monadic property called markedness bears on the bundling of other properties' tropes. (...) The second idea is that the geometric and topological features of a given markedness trope help to determine which tropes it bundles. The author argues that this new markedness bundle theory determines all property co-instantiation at the levels of both type and token, positioning markedness tropes as the fundamental concreta. The theory also explains bundling across time, yielding an advantageous account of material persistence. Finally, markedness tropes operate as de facto panprotopsychist property instances: fundamental non-consciousness tropes that uniquely explain where and why consciousness properties are exemplified. The book solidifies the case for markedness through sustained critical analysis of competing theories of fundamentality and persistence, focusing in part on their inability to account for unending mereological and plural structures. Concrete Particulars will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

In this study, the authors utilize mountain pass lemma, variational methods, regularization technique, and the Lyapunov function method to derive the unique existence of the positive classical stationary solution of a single-species ecosystem. Particularly, the geometric characteristic of saddle point in the mountain pass lemma guarantees that the equilibrium point is the ground state stationary solution of the ecosystem. Based on the obtained uniqueness result, the authors use the Lyapunov function method to derive the globally exponential stability criterion, which (...) illuminates that under some suitable conditions, a certain internal competition is conducive to the global stability of the population, and a certain amount of family planning is conducive to the overall stability of the population. Most notably, the regularity technique of weak stationary solution employed in this study can also be applied to some existing literature related with time-delays reaction-diffusion systems for the purpose of regularization of weak solutions. Finally, an illuminative numerical example shows the effectiveness of the proposed methods. (shrink)

The paper addresses the epistemological and theoretical assumptions that underpin the concept of Work and Organizational Psychology as idiographic, situated, and transformative social science. Positioning the connection between uniqueness and generalization inside the debate around organization studies as applied approaches, the contribution highlights the ontological, gnoseological, and methodological implications at stake. The use of practical instead of scientific rationality is explored, through the perspective of a hermeneutic lens, underlining the main features connected to the adoption of an epistemology of practice. (...) Specifically, the contribution depicts the configuration of the applied research as a relational practice, embedded in the unfolding process of generating knowledge dealing with concrete social contexts and particular social objects. The discussion of a case study regarding a field research project allows one to point out challenges and constraints connected to the enactment of the research process as a social accomplishment. (shrink)

This volume collects critical essays that provide a broader understanding of the magazine Weird Tales and its authors, artists, readers, and editorial practices, as well as the larger impact that the periodical had on popular culture and genre fiction. In particular, these essays explain why Weird Tales deserved its subtitle “The Unique Magazine” and why works by some of its authors have endured.

Among the tricky questions posed by artistic creation, some relate in particular to the capacity of human beings to reproduce things and to the right they have (or grant themselves) to act in this way. This activity, when aimed for example at identical reproduction, is called “copy” by art critics, historians, and those who take an interest in the aesthetics of objects. I will not attempt to discuss the subtleties involved in the use of different terms to describe the activity (...) of the reproduction of works of art; when an artist “imitates,” is that copying? To what extent is the new work admissible? To what category do users and connoisseurs assign it? These and other questions will be answered in the wider context of my examination of the relationship between the unique and the multiple in African societies. The problems of an original's copy or replica are not viewed in the same light in all parts of the world, not only because of the dictum “truth on our side of the border, error on theirs” but above all because the status of the plastic work is not the same and its existence and validity are not governed by the same laws and customs. However, in all societies that create, the “copy” poses problems which Africa cannot elude and which arise there in a manner at once similar and different from that of contemporary Western societies. (shrink)

Perdurantism has been considered a theory revisionary of common-sense. In particular, it revises some common-sensical truth-value attributions to ordinary sentences. Facing this situation, perdurantists that are willing to save the appearances adopt some kind of reconciliatory strategy. In this article, we examine one specific puzzle that detects a contrast in the truth-value attributions between perdurantism and common-sense, the Puzzle from Uniqueness, and we investigate whether the reconciliatory strategies based on the method of paraphrase succeed to solve it. First, we argue (...) that the classical solutions available in the literature, the quantifiers-restriction strategy and the sortal-restriction strategy, fail. Second, we formulate a new solution to the Puzzle from Uniqueness that, in turn, relies on a novel account of the expression “being apt to”. (shrink)

Referent Tracking (RT) advocates the use of instance unique identifiers to refer to the entities comprising the subject matter of patient health records. RT promises many benefits to those who use health record data to improve patient care. To further the adoption of the paradigm we provide an illustration of how data from an EHR application needs to be decomposed in order to make it accord with the tenets of RT. We describe the ontological principles on which this decomposition (...) is based in order to allow integration efforts to be applied in similar ways to other EHR applications. We find that an ordinary statement from an EHR contains a surprising amount of “hidden” data that are only revealed by its decomposition according to these principles. (shrink)

Both and agree that there are universals—that qualities are universals. To say that the quality white is a universal is to say, in part, that one and the same thing is connected in some way to both Plato and Socrates and accounts for the truth of the sentences "Plato is white" and "Socrates is white." To put it another way, the term "white" in both sentences refers to the same entity. What arguments are there for such a view? Russell elegantly (...) put forth the classic argument in "On the Relations of Universals to Particulars." To deny universals is to assert that the quality attributed to Socrates is not one and the same with the quality attributed to Plato. The quality "in" each is numerically distinct and, furthermore, no one thing accounts for these distinct qualities being of the same kind. [I mention this latter point since one might, on a version of, hold that there are particular qualities as well as universal qualities. The former account for the whiteness of particular patches; the latter for such particular whitenesses being just that.] One must then hold that such particular qualities are related in some way, since they are the entities in virtue of which we truly assert that both things are white. One must then specify such a relation. The obvious point is that such a relation will either be taken as a universal or a particular instance. If a particular then the original problem recurs when we introduce a third white patch or a pair of black patches. If admitted as a universal then the view finally accepts universals, albeit relational ones. No other alternative can answer the original question—to account for Socrates and Plato having the same color. That is, no alternative acknowledging only individuals—that denies the two patches are connected, in some way, to one and the same entity—can prevent the recurrence of exactly the same kind of question we started out with. Let us consider the case of particulars. One may argue that just as universals account for the sameness of quality, something must account for the difference of two patches which, conceivably, have all their nonrelational qualities in common. This something, the ground of numerical difference, is considered to be a substratum which stands in a unique relation or connection with universals to form or constitute facts and the things we started out with, Plato and Socrates. These ordinary things are thought of as composed of a substratum and universals connected together. Facts about such things may be composed of the substratum and one universal. The facts are about the things since the same substratum is a constituent of both sorts of entities. Such substrata account for the difference of the two patches; for there being two and not one thing. These substrata, in turn, are held to be simply different. At this point one may balk. If substrata are held to be simply different, why bother with them at all? Why not hold that Socrates and Plato are composites, not classes, of universals, and that they are different composites of the same universals? They just simply differ. If substrata can simply differ, why may not composites of universals simply differ? The proponent of substrata must retort that since Plato and Socrates are composite entities they cannot simply differ but must be held to differ in a constituent. Only simple entities can simply differ. Let me call this assertion the axiom of difference. The first point to note is that it is a necessary assumption in the argument to establish the need for substrata in an adequate ontology. We must then inquire why some accept, implicitly or explicitly, such an axiom. (shrink)

Philosophers of perception often claim that usual perceptual experiences not only present particulars but also phenomenally present them as particulars. Nevertheless, despite the initial plausibility of this thesis, it is not clear what exactly it means to say that particularity is phenomenally presented. The paper aims to provide a deeper analysis of the claim that perceptual experiences phenomenally present objects as particulars. In doing so, I distinguish two theses regarding phenomenally presented particularity: Generic Particularity and Specific Particularity. (...) According to the first thesis, vision phenomenally presents particularity of objects, understood as a general characteristic that may be shared by many entities. The second thesis states that vision phenomenally presents particularity of objects, understood as an individual characteristic unique to each particular. I argue that, relying on knowledge concerning the functioning of perceptual mechanisms, vision does not phenomenally present generic particularity but it has certain abilities for presenting specific particularity. (shrink)

The existence and uniqueness of a maximum point for a continuous real—valued function on a metric space are investigated constructively. In particular, it is shown, in the spirit of reverse mathematics, that a natural unique existence theorem is equivalent to the fan theorem.

In political economy, the seminal contribution of the Baron–Ferejohn bargaining model constitutes an important milestone for the study of legislative policy making. In this paper, we analyze a particular equilibrium characteristic of this model, equilibrium uniqueness. The Baron–Ferejohn model yields a class of payoff-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibria in which players’ equilibrium strategies are not uniquely determined. We first provide a formal proof of the multiplicity of equilibrium strategies. This also enables us to establish some important properties of SSPE. (...) We then introduce veto players into the original Baron–Ferejohn model. We state the conditions under which the new model has a unique SSPE not only in terms of payoffs but also in terms of players’ equilibrium strategies. (shrink)

Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory ‘Russellian’ just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in ‘On Denoting’. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of ‘On Denoting’ are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two (...) claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that ‘The F is G’ entails ‘There is at most one F’; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. I outline an argument against this claim, and I argue that by holding on to uniqueness contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for. (shrink)

Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory ‘Russellian’ just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in ‘On Denoting’. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of ‘On Denoting’ are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two (...) claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that ‘The F is G’ entails ‘There is at most one F’; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. I outline an argument against this claim, and I argue that by holding on to uniqueness contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for. (shrink)

This essay explores recent developments surrounding the Fourth Industrial Revolution, particularly as they relate to the challenge of technological unemployment. In an age of advanced robotics and artificial intelligence (Al), so warns the philosopher-historian Yuval Noah Harari, ordinary people may become unemployable, unable to contribute to society, and therefore be declared a “useless class.” In contrast to such a dystopian view, futurists like Ray Kurzweil and Nick Bostrom envision a digital utopia, while more realistic optimists emphasize that Al will ultimately (...) create more jobs than it destroys. As an alternative to these perspectives, this essay proposes a Judeo- Christian approach that, independently of traditional frameworks of paid work, affirms the unique value and dignity of all human beings by highlighting the theological significance of human creativity, the balance between work and play, love as an overarching framework for life, and the role of human beings as ethical decision-makers. (shrink)

Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory 'Russellian' just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in 'On Denoting'. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of 'On Denoting' are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two (...) claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that 'The F is G' entails 'There is at most one F'; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. I outline an argument against this claim, and I argue that by holding on to uniqueness contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for. (shrink)

Although parenting research typically focuses on one target child, parents’ emotion-related parenting behaviours are predicted by the broader family context. The number of children in the home impacts parents’ emotional resources and may be particularly relevant to mothers’ beliefs about acceptable emotional displays from their young children. Participants included 226 Portuguese mothers of a 2- to 6-year-old target child (M = 3.89 years) with between 1 and 4 children. Mothers reported on their family makeup, tolerance of their child’s dominant and (...) submissive negative emotion displays, parenting stress and mindful parenting. Covarying maternal age, family income and target child age, regressions revealed that mothers with more children were less likely to endorse beliefs that it was acceptable for their young child to display dominant negative emotions. Mothers were also more tolerant of displays of dominant negative emotions for younger children than older children within this early childhood period. These effects remained even after accounting for mothers’ parenting stress and mindfulness. Results are interpreted using social information processing, emotion socialisation and transactional stress and coping perspectives. (shrink)

Generalist moral theories speak in terms of all people at all places and times, while Aristotle argues that this broad brush can omit details of a specific situation that may be important to an understanding of good or bad choice within that situation. Generalist rules, e.g. Always tell the truth, miss what can be complicated and important at a particular place and time. Further, the development of generalist theories through history has produced sets of principles that often disagree with one (...) another. How important consequences of one’s actions are, relative to the intentions guiding those actions, is one example. The conflict between those two produces unending arguments, both missing particularism’s value of seeing and judging the unique aspects of a specific situation. (shrink)

Fundamental concrete particulars are needed to explain facts about non-fundamental concrete particulars. However, the former can only play this explanatory role if they are properly discernible from the latter. Extant theories of how to discern fundamental concreta primarily concern mereological structure. Those according to which fundamental concreta can bear, but not be, proper parts are motivated by the possibilities that all concreta bear proper parts and that some properties of wholes are not fixed by the properties of their (...) proper parts. In response, theorists who hold that the fundamental concrete particulars can be proper parts may appeal to the possibility that every concrete particular is a proper part—that there is no mereologically maximal whole world, as well as to the intuition that fundamental concreta are qualitatively homogeneous “blocks” from which non-fundamental concreta are built. After motivating the plausibility of gunk and junk, the present essay proposes a constraint on fundamental concrete particulars based on topology instead of mereology: the fundamental concrete particulars must be appropriately connected. This constraint has the unique advantage of consistency with each of gunk, emergence, junk, and the building block intuition. (shrink)

Transcription and replication of genes in mammalian cells always requires a promoter or replication origin, respectively, but the ability of enhancers to stimulate these regulatory elements and the interactions that mediate this stimulation are developmentally acquired. The primary function of enhancers is to prevent repression, which appears to result from particular components of chromatin structure. Factors responsible for this repression are present in the maternal nucleus of oocytes and its descendant, the maternal pronucleus of mouse 1‐cell embryos and in mouse (...) 2‐cell embryos, but are absent in the paternal pronucleus. Thus, enhancers are not needed to achieve efficient transcription and replication in paternal pronuclei. However, enhancers, even in the presence of their specific activation protein, are inactive prior to formation of a 2‐cell embryo, suggesting that a coactivator essential for enhancer function is not available until zygotic gene expression begins. Furthermore, enhancer stimulation of transcription appears to be mediated through a promoter transcription factor, but this interaction can change as cells undergo differentiation, switching from a TATA‐box independent to a TATA‐box dependent mode. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a particular emphasis placed on conducting randomized controlled trials (RCTs) that compare the relative efficacy of psychosocial and pharmacological interventions. This article addresses relevant ethical considerations in the conduct of these treatment trials, with a focus on RCTs with children. Ethical concerns, including therapeutic misconception, treatment preference, therapeutic equipoise, structure of treatments, and balancing risks versus benefits, are introduced through a clinical scenario and discussed as they relate to psychotherapy versus medication RCTs. In each (...) case, suggestions are made for researchers seeking to minimize the impact of these ethical concerns on research participants. (shrink)

1. Philosophy of Science. The term “philosophy of science” is used here to refer to the study of the approaches and methodologies of the sciences. By “approach” is understood the totality of the presuppositions of a given science : more precisely, both philosophical and scientific presuppositions—that is, categories, postulates, and premises as conditions—and “existential” presuppositions. By “methodology” is understood the intellectual-emotional structure of a given science—that is, its categories, postulates, and premises as characteristics, as well as its concepts, methods, and (...) techniques. Further, I advocate understanding a given science through a study of its approach and of its methodology. Finally, I submit that the best understanding of either of the two is impossible without the study of the other. More specifically, I advocate the consideration of a particular science as a given, and the interpretation of its intellectual structure or methodology ; and then the study of its presuppositions or underlying approach. (shrink)

This chapter argues for — or calls attention to — the existence of another class or category of particulars. The characterization of category is perhaps best, that is, most persuasively, approached by referring to a certain subclass of the already acknowledged category of events. Particular members of this sub-class include, for example, particular smiles, blushes, grimaces, sneezes, gestures. Each such event is a unique individual particular, with its own spatio-temporal position, a particular instance of its appropriate sortal.

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of supervisor support on the relationship between the need to be unique and the innovative behavior. People not only strive to belong to a group but also want to be unique from others and feel exceptional. Individuals’ innovative behavior is one of the things that makes them feel different from other people. Because developing a new idea, supporting this idea, putting this idea into practice, and the positive (...) achievements of this idea distinguish people who exhibit innovative behavior from others. It depends on the behavior of supervisors whether people who break away from typical practices and procedures to feel unique and special continue to act in innovative ways. In this context, it is vitally essential for supervisors to support people who display innovative behavior. The research was conducted on employees working in the education sector in Mersin. We employed the confirmatory factor analysis to examine the fitness of the model and moderation was tested. As hypothesized, the need to be unique had a significant and positive effect on innovative behavior. This finding is consistent with existing literature and thus advance knowledge on need to be unique and innovative behavior, particular in education sector. Nonetheless, it has been determined that supervisor support doesn’t have a moderator role on the relationship between the need to be unique and innovative behavior. Although there are some researches in the literature on consumer experiences about the need to be unique and innovative behavior, but literature on education section is sparse and still long way to go to evaluate its’ reflections on the workplace. (shrink)

COVID-19 presents a variety of ethical challenges in a set of arenas, arenas not always considered in past pandemics. These challenges include issues related to autonomy, distributive ethics, and the establishment of policies of equity and justice. Methods are a literature review based on regular editing of an online textbook during the COVID-19 outbreak and a literature review using key ethical terms. Patients are confronted with new issues related to autonomy. Providers need to expand their concepts of ethical issues to (...) include decisions based on proportionality and public health ethics. The public health sector needs to assess the beneficence of alternative modes of disease control. The research community needs to redefine the concept of informed consent in emergent conditions. All elements of the medical spectrum—physicians, scientists, and the community-at-large including the pharmaceutical industry—need to consider the multifaceted methods for preventing future pandemics. This will require giving particular emphasis to public health funding and ending the documented discrimination that exists in the provision of proven therapies. The developing world is especially at risk for most of the ethical issues, especially those related to equity and justice. The ethical issues associated with the COVID-19 outbreak are not unique but provide a diverse set of issues that apply to patients, providers, social groups, and investigators. The further study of such issues can help with preventing future outbreaks. (shrink)

Using an ethnographic case study, this research examines three competing hypotheses of how a community acts. The study attempts to reconstruct the events that led various actors in the community to seek the formation of an industrial base as an alternative economic source for the community. The roles of unique events, specific persons and particular strategies in the formation of the industrial base are examined. It was found that unique events play a very important role in the community's (...) concern over economic alternatives to agriculture and their success in securing such alternatives. These events were also important to key individuals within the community, placing them in positions to act in the industrial base formation. Strategies of community action used in the industrial base formation and since that time were found to be consistent with the “centralized weak-tie network” hypothesis of action or ganization. This type of community action organization seems to be very effective at the community level but tends to be very exclusionary of the community population as a whole. (shrink)

In the midst of the ongoing debate over the uniqueness of Christ and of Christianity, Stanislas Breton’s work Unicité et monothéisme offers new categories of reflection which may come to bridge the fundamental theological differences between pluralist and inclusivist perspectives. While his notions of méontology and of the Cross as the symbol of self-effacement create a radical openness to the distinctive truth of other religious traditions, this openness is itself firmly grounded within Christian self-understanding. Breton also reminds us that the (...) ultimate Christian basis for salvation lies not so much in assent to particular doctrines, but in the act of total self-givenness to others, in particular to “the least of these my brethren” (Matt. 25). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 122.3 (2001) 447-451 [Access article in PDF] Elizabeth Baynham. Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. xiv + 237 pp. Cloth, $39.50. This is a well-organized book that is abreast of recent scholarship and contributes to our understanding of Q. Curtius Rufus and his History of Alexander as a work of literature. Baynham tells us (...) that her primary objective is an analysis of Curtius' historical methods and arrangements of his material and an evaluation of his chief themes. Her introductory chapter sketches the influence of Curtius' History in the Middle Ages and Renaissance and gives a brief synopsis of scholarship in the field. A chapter entitled "Roman Curtius" attempts to place the author and his work into the broader framework of Roman literature, with a particular focus on his language and themes and the influences that shaped these. A lengthy chapter on sources and historical methods reviews Curtius' place within the tradition of ancient historians of Alexander the Great. The three most original chapters explore the motifs of fortuna and regnum in Curtius' portrait of [End Page 447] Alexander. The book concludes with an appendix surveying the debate over the date of Curtius' History of Alexander. Baynham considers at length the current "consensus" view that the work was written under Claudius but ultimately decides that a date under Vespasian is "most likely." The index, unfortunately, is too brief to be very helpful: following up on Baynham's discussion of the idea of regnum in Curtius, the reader must look up eighteen undifferentiated references to libertas. The absence of an index of passages discussed is a serious omission, which detracts significantly from the book's usefulness.Despite Baynham's assertion of the "apathy" and "hostility" of twentieth-century Curtian study (5), Curtius Rufus (as she points out elsewhere) has not lacked for attention in recent decades. J. E. Atkinson's A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni (Amsterdam 1980, 1994) is supplemented by his survey of scholarship on Curtius (ANRW 2.34.4 [1997]: 3447-83). For those without Latin, there is a Penguin translation by John Yardley. At the other end of the scale, there is Jean Therasse, Quintus Curtius Rufus Index Verborum (1976). Some of this work is admittedly excessive and unproductive. The Loeb edition by J. C. Rolfe (1946), for example, is still available and offers a better translation than Yardley. More significantly, it is not clear how much is gained by lengthy commentaries on passages of Curtius, particularly in the face of A. B. Bosworth's Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander (1980, 1995) and P. A. Brunt's Loeb edition of Arrian (1976, 1983), which offers such extensive notes that it might well be called a commentary. Of necessity, historical commentators on Arrian and Curtius traverse much of the same ground. Moreover, all this attention to Curtius as a historian has not--perhaps cannot--reverse the commonsense judgment that Arrian is the better and more reliable source.In a sense, the attention of historians has diminished our understanding of Curtius' History of Alexander. Rather than approaching the work as a whole, they ransack Curtius for isolated statements and anecdotes to bolster their own view of particular incidents in Alexander's career. This is poor methodology and poor history. It would be a signal achievement of Baynham's book if it could direct more attention to Curtius by literary scholars. It is in this area that interesting work on Curtius has been done in the last two decades: for example, Werner Rutz's "Zur Erzahlungskunst des Q. Curtius Rufus," ANRW 32.4 (1986): 2329-57, Francesca Minissale's Curzio Rufo: Un romaziere della storia (1983), and H. Currie's "Quintus Curtius Rufus: The Historian as Novelist?" Groningen Colloquia on the Novel 3 (1990): 63-77.Curtius' History of Alexander is a text that might lend itself well to the approaches of genre study and narrative technique. It is disappointing that Baynham does not do more in this direction... (shrink)

Wilkins & Wakefield's intriguing model of language evolution is deficient in evidence of human uniqueness in metaphorical matching, amodal representation, reference, conceptual structure, hierarchical organization, linguistic comprehension, sign use, laterality, and handedness. Primates show communicative reference, laterality, and handedness, and apes in particular show hierarchical organization, conceptual structure, cross-modal abilities, sign use, and displaced reference.