Particularism

In Why Teaching Art Is Teaching Ethics. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 9-20 (2023)
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Abstract

Generalist moral theories speak in terms of all people at all places and times, while Aristotle argues that this broad brush can omit details of a specific situation that may be important to an understanding of good or bad choice within that situation. Generalist rules, e.g. Always tell the truth, miss what can be complicated and important at a particular place and time. Further, the development of generalist theories through history has produced sets of principles that often disagree with one another. How important consequences of one’s actions are, relative to the intentions guiding those actions, is one example. The conflict between those two produces unending arguments, both missing particularism’s value of seeing and judging the unique aspects of a specific situation.

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