In Leo Szilard’s 1929 thought experiment, a Maxwell demon manipulates a one-molecule gas to reverse the second law of thermodynamics. The demon must fail, Szilard argued, since there is hidden entropy creation in the demon’s collecting of information. This thought experiment is an inconsistent muddle of improper idealizations. It diverted an already successful literature of exorcism into degenerating speculations about about a connection between thermodynamic entropy and information. These confusions persist today in a voluminous literature. Narrative (...) conventions in a thought experiment allow thought experimenters great latitude in deciding which processes are typical and bear generalization and which can be idealized away as incidental. For its abuse of this latitude and the extent of the harm it caused, this thought experiment merits the distinction of the worst thought experiment in science. (shrink)

This paper intends to discuss some aspects of what we conceive as personal identity: what it consists in, as well as its alleged fragility. First I will try to justify the methodology used in this paper, that is, the use of allegories in ontological debates, especialy in the form of thought experiments and science fiction movies. Then I will introduce an original thought experiment I call “Who am I actually?,” one that was coined with the intent to (...) shed light on several aspects of the issue under examination, that is, the fragility of personal identity. Then I will move on to Christopher Nolan’s film The Prestige, as well as to Derek Parfit’s ‘divided minds’ thought experiment, to further discuss the fragility of personal identity; next to identity theft, the prospect of duplication is also intriguing, especially with regard to the psychological impact this might have on both the prototype and the duplicate. I will conclude with the view that spatial and temporal proximity or coexistence, especially when paired with awareness on behalf of the duplicates, would expectedly result in the infringement of the psychological continuity of one’s identity. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of the thought experiment changed radically in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The earlier authors—Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Peter of Spain, and John of la Rochelle—understood it as an ontological proof for the existence and/or the nature of the soul. By contrast, Matthew of Aquasparta and Vital du (...) Four used the flying man as an argument for the soul’s ability to be directly aware of itself. A detailed analysis of the views of these authors shows interesting philosophical differences between them and reveals how one of the crucial premises of the original thought experiment—namely that the flying man is unaware of his body—loses its importance due to the changes in the argumentative role that is assigned to it. The most radical example of a new way of understanding bodily self-awareness is Peter Olivi’s so-called ‘man before the creation.’. (shrink)

Since the proposal of the Turing Test in 1950 and Searle's Chinese Room argument in 1980, thought experiments have played a central role in philosophical discussions concerning intelligence, understanding, and artificial intelligence. The rapid development of expert systems and, more recently, large language models (LLMs), has significantly changed both the practical capabilities of AI systems and the questions that deserve philosophical investigation. In many real-world applications, the primary concern is no longer whether an AI system genuinely "understands" language in (...) the philosophical sense, but whether it can reliably perform as a human expert whose knowledge and judgment are trusted by human being. Motivated by this changing landscape, this paper proposes a new thought experiment, “the Professor Consultation Room” (PCR for short), that isolates an independent epistemological problem concerning the attribution of expert cognition. In the proposed scenario, students interact exclusively through textual communication with an unseen respondent who is either a distinguished logic professor or an LLM-based expert system possessing all of the professor's logical knowledge but no cognitive abilities beyond the currently recognized capability boundaries of existing LLMs. The central question is whether finite question-answer interactions alone can provide sufficient evidence to determine whether the respondent possesses cognitive abilities exceeding those currently demonstrated by LLMs. Unlike the Turing Test, which evaluates whether a machine can imitate general human conversational behavior, and unlike the Chinese Room, which questions whether symbol manipulation constitutes semantic understanding, the PCR shifts attention to expert cognition and to the epistemological problem of identifying respondent through observable behavior. Rather than attempting to resolve the longstanding debate concerning machine understanding, this thought experiment formulates a new question concerning the behavioral identifiability of human advanced cognitive abilities in the age of LLMs. The primary contribution of the present paper is not to propose a new theory of intelligence, understanding, or cognition. Rather, it introduces a new thought experiment that formulates an independent epistemological problem concerning the publicly observable evidence for attributing expert cognition through finite expert-level interaction. Unlike previous thought experiments, the Professor Consultation Room shifts philosophical attention from the ontology of cognition to the epistemology of attributing expert cognition on the basis of finite expert-level interaction. (shrink)

Detailed analysis of the expression ‘things in general and in themselves’ reveals two further uses of ‘noumenon’ (and ‘thing in itself’) in addition to the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ senses distinguished by Kant himself. It follows (pace various ‘reductive’ interpretations) that Kant’s transcendental distinction comprises four different contrasts. On a new resolution of the long-running ‘one or two objects?’ dispute, there follows a complete re-interpretation of Kant’s transcendental distinction as a meta-metaphysical thought experiment. It has the ‘metaphysical density’ necessary (...) to forestall charges of ‘innocuousness’ without giving purchase to the well-known objections that have dogged Kant’s transcendental distinction from its inception. (shrink)

Jonathan Bennett (1974) maintains that Huckleberry Finn’s deliberations about whether to return Jim to slavery afford insight into the tension between sympathy and moral judgment; Miranda Fricker (2007) argues that the trial scene in To Kill a Mockingbird affords insight into the nature of testimonial injustice. Neither claims merely that the works prompt an attentive reader to think something new or to change her mind. Rather, they consider the reader cognitively better off for her encounters with the novels. Nor is (...) her cognitive improvement restricted to acquiring new justified true beliefs about the works themselves. What the reader gleans is supposed to enhance her knowledge or understanding of the .. (shrink)

For Rousseau, social contract is a hypothetical one; the paper claims that it is, in contemporary terms, a political thought-experiment (TE). The abductive way of thinking, looking for the best normative pattern in the data, finds its counterpart in the historical abduction in the Second Discourse; the analogy between the two secures the methodological unity of Rousseau’s political philosophy. The proposed reading of the work as a TE shows that it fulfills the necessary requirements put by (hopefully) intuitively (...) acceptable definition of a TE, and fits in the contractarian tradition that has been experimenting with hypothetical arrangements since its start. The reading of The Social Contract as a TE has helped to systematize some of its shortcomings from the wider perspective of methodology of political philosophy. Finally, the political thought experiment (PTE) reading of Rousseau places his central work where it belongs: in the tradition started by Plato’s Republic, continuing with Renaissance and early modern philosophical utopias, culminating in the contractarian social contract TE, and going all the way to the work of Rawls and his present day continuators. We hope that this can contribute to a more positive picture of Rousseau’s work, despite criticism concerning his brusque manner of thought-experimenting. (shrink)

The bucket experiment in Newton’s Principia is quite simple. Nonetheless, physicists as well as philosophers and historians of science are still debating its purpose and success. I present two interpretations found in the literature. According to the first, Newton tries to prove absolute rotation and thus the existence of absolute space. According to the second, he tries to provide a definition of absolute rotation as it is used in his mechanics. Closely connected to this is his rejection of Descartes’ (...) explanation of rotation and of motion in general. I conclude with a short discussion on whether the bucket experiment can be classified as a thought experiment. (shrink)

The author, a member of the faculty in philosophy at Visva-Bharati University, produced this volume under appointment as Visiting Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, after having studied in England. These four essays are concerned with recent analytic thought, concentrating upon the problem of identity and the experiments of reflection which have appeared in modern British philosophy, such as Strawson’s world of nothing but sound. Chandra’s central concern is to analyse the relationship between identity and continuity, and (...) to show that these concepts are not identical. Thus the book is an extended essay in conceptual clarification and logical geography. Saying that a is identical with b is not to say that a is continuous with b. All of this is undertaken because the author finds this inappropriate identification pervasive in contemporary philosophy, and the source of considerable logical confusion, especially in the consideration of personal identity. As an underlying theme attention is also focused upon the relevance of this issue to the debate concerning philosophical skepticism. Strawson’s sound world is seen as an attempt to refute the skeptic, which attempt fails because of Strawson’s failure to distinguish between identity and continuity. With the failure of Strawson’s attack upon the skeptic, and perhaps the phenomenalist as well, his defense of material bodies is thereby undermined. In addition to Strawson, Chandra studies Price, Ryle, Hick, and the very recent work on personal identity by Parfit. The author concludes that identity is consistent with discontinuous existence. He also offers an analysis of after-images, including not only visual after-images but after-images of taste as well. A further underlying theme is the use of science in such thought experiments, for they are frequently presented as if they were of a scientific character, thus exaggerating scientific capabilities. However, the nature of the relationship between philosophy and science is hardly clarified, and the nature of scientific limits remains vague throughout the book. Chandra has isolated a unique feature of contemporary analytic philosophy for consideration, for few others have so concentrated upon this strange feature of thought experiment which pervades British philosophy, nor the identification of identity and continuity. The book would have been improved tremendously, however, if the author had only indicated much more clearly than he does the philosophical conclusions which he wishes to draw from his reflections. These constantly remain uncertain and ambiguous.—H.A.D. (shrink)

The most promising way to regard thought experiment is as a species of experiment, alongside concrete experiment. Of the authors who take this view, many portray thought experiment as possessing evidential significance intrinsically. In contrast, concrete experiment is nowadays most convincingly portrayed as acquiring evidential significance in a particular area of science at a particular time in consequence of the persuasive efforts of scientists. I argue that the claim that thought experiment (...) possesses evidential significance intrinsically is contradicted by the history of science. Thought experiment, like concrete experiment, has evidential significance only where particular assumptions--such as the Galilean doctrine of phenomena--are taken to hold; under alternative premises, in themselves equally defensible, thought experiment is evidentially inert. (shrink)

A version of the inverted spectrum thought experiment that disconfirms functionalism for the case of humans’ color experiences has typically been thought to require a certain kind of balancing act. What one needs, it has typically been thought, is a mapping of color experiences onto other color experiences that preserves the similarity and difference relationships among those experiences and the aspects of perceived colors underlying those similarities and differences. However, there are good reasons for being suspicious (...) about whether that is possible when the palette of color experiences is that available to humans with normal vision. The new version of the thought experiment constructed here doesn’t depend on preserving those relationships. I argue that there is a coherent, metaphysically possible scenario in which two human color experiences—any two—can be seen to be functionally equivalent. The upshot is that functionalism fails for all human color experiences. (shrink)

He describes his position as "neo-Carnapian", i.e. he is claiming that even if the question is meaningful, that doesn't mean it's worth looking into. He's probably right, in the sense that anyone can be right about a personal evaluative choice. And until I started questioning the belief that there is only one kind of physical process that could embody consciousness, I felt the same way myself. But the point about this thought experiment is that the current state of (...) cognitive science offers us two possible candidates for the embodiment of mind. And as Bickle points out, it seems like nothing we can imagine discovering in the future could settle this problem one way or the other. If this is true, this means that, strictly speaking, all this talk about being on the verge of a scientific understanding of consciousness is hype: No matter how close we get to solving the Chalmersian easy problems, we are getting nowhere nearer to solving the hard problem. If this is true, Cognitive Scientists ought to change their description of what they are doing, even if it cuts back on publicity and grant money. But I don't want to believe this, and I think the only way to avoid believing this is to discover the presuppositions that compel this belief, and see if we can change them. It's a dirty little job, but somebody has to do it, and philosophers seem less unqualified to attempt it than anyone else. Note, however, that I am not claiming we can use a thought experiment all by itself to find the answer, the way Searle claimed that the Chinese Room experiment supposedly proved that a computer couldn't be conscious. As RONALD LEMMEN points out, the fact that we can imagine something doesn't tell us anything about the world, only about our concepts of the world. Remember that the conclusion of my thought experiment was a question, not an answer. My only goal is to help clarify the question. (shrink)

Are philosophers of science limited to conducting autopsies on dead scientific theories, or might they also help resolve contemporary methodological disputes in science? This essay (1) gives an overview of thought experiments, especially in mathematics; (2) outlines three major positions on the current dose-response controversy for ionizing radiation; and (3) sketches an original mathematical thought experiment that might help resolve the low-dose radiation conflict. This thought experiment relies on the assumptions that radiation "hits'' are Poisson (...) distributed and that background conditions cause many more radiation-induced cancers than human activities. The essay closes by responding to several key objections to the position defended here. (shrink)

The strategic/terror bomber thought experiment is often employed in the contemporary debate on the principle of double effect (PDE). It is taken to show the intuitive appeal of PDE. In this paper, it is argued, however, that the thought experiment is used in a confused way. What is taken to be one thought experiments in fact is a series of subtly differing examples. Those differences, although subtle, bear on the applicability of these examples in the (...) argumentation for PDE. The main objectives of this paper are to provide a precise description and analysis of the variants of strategic/terror bomber thought experiments. The analysis shows that some variants are flawed mainly because of underdetermination of the cases by their descriptions and problems with rationality of the presented agents. This result seems to cast some new doubts on employment of the strategic/terror bomber thought experiment as an argumentative device supporting PDE. (shrink)

The COVID-19 crisis has renewed interest in alternative forms of organizing business and investment but our understanding of how these organizations can transform social systems is limited. The purpose of this article is to contribute to this understanding. In the context of one of the greatest transfers of wealth in global retail history that could see unprecedented numbers of businesses close or sold to distant, private interests, the article performs a thought experiment using the analogy of a commercial (...) trust to encourage new ideas and critical reflection on community wealth building. The article introduces systems hijacking—a process of leveraging incumbent forms and systems in which they are embedded for new purposes—as an analytically useful concept for understanding how alternative organizations can transform social systems. The article finds organizational governance is necessary to transcend structural deficiencies in inherited or borrowed forms to make way for transformation. (shrink)

물리학자 아인슈타인(Einstein, 1879-1955)이 “내 생애의 가장 운 좋은 생각”이라 불렀던 ‘등가원리 사고 실험’(1907년)은 새로운 ‘중력장 이론’으로 나아가는 과정에서 핵심적인 역할을 했다고 평가된다. 과연 이 사고 실험의 진정한 의의는 무엇이었는가? 특수 상대성 이론에서 아인슈타인이 독립적인 전기장과 자기장은 존재하지 않고 오직 단일한 전자기장이 존재함을 보였듯, 이 사고 실험은 독립적인 중력장과 관성장은 존재하지 않고 오직 단일한 관성중력장이 존재함을 결정적으로 암시한 것일까? 그러나 이와 같이 장이론의관점에서 등가원리 사고 실험의 의의를 해석하는 것이 아니라 경험주의의 관점에서 등가원리 사고 실험의 의의를 평가할 수 있다. 등가원리 사고 실험은 (...) 뉴턴 물리학에서 상대적으로 등속 직선 운동하는 기준계들에만 부여하던 관성계의 자격을, 중력의 영향 아래에서자유낙하 운동하는 기준계들에도 부여할 수 있게 했다. 이는 물리적 법칙을 수학적으로 기술할 수 있는 합법적인 기준계의 범위를 확장한 것이며, 결과적으로 물리적 지식의 일반성을 강화했다. 또한 이러한 관점은 실험과 측정을 통한 입증 혹은 반증을 가능하게 하는데, 왜냐하면 전자기력 같은 다른 힘과 달리 중력은 그 존재의 유무 혹은 변화를 시계 및 자와같은 기초 측정 도구의 행태 변화를 통해서 드러내기 때문이다. 결론적으로 나는 등가원리사고 실험의 진정한 의의가 전자기장과 유사한 중력관성장 이론의 가능성을 제시한 것에있다기보다는, 이 사고 실험을 통해 관성계의 영역이 확장되고 물리적 지식이 더 일반적인형태로 변했으며 시공간을 물리화(physicalization)하여 시계와 자를 통해 경험적으로 시험 가능한 예측을 제시한 데 있다고 주장한다. 요약하면, 경험주의 관점에서 등가원리 사고 실험이 갖는 의의는 관성계의 범위를 확장하여 지구 위 시계와 자를 통해 시간과 공간 에 대한 유의미한 물리학적 예측을 제시할 수 있는 결정적인 계기를 만들었다는 데 있다. (shrink)

The present study provides an analysis of Socrates’ account of the first polis in Republic 2 as a thought experiment and draws attention to the fact that Socrates combines both explanatory and evaluative aspects in his scenario. The paper further shows how the analysis of the city of pigs as a thought experiment can explain the lack of pleonexia by saving both the letter of the text, according to which there are no “pleonectic” desires in the (...) city of pigs, and the fact that the first polis is nonetheless concerned with human beings. For, in contrast to the account offered by Glaucon earlier in Book 2, Socrates highlights our needs and lack of self-sufficiency as well as our compatibility with an advantageous and happy life in a community. (shrink)

The article analyzes John Searle's famous "Chinese Room" thought experiment, which denies the ability of artificial intelligence to achieve genuine understanding. The study aims to deconstruct this argumentation step by step to clarify exactly how it is structured, what makes it persuasive, and where its weaknesses lie. For this purpose, a model is applied that examines the text at four levels. The first level clarifies the historical background: specifically, whose ideas and computer programs the author opposed. The second (...) level demonstrates how Searle constructs the experiment's scenario to subtly impose discussion rules that favor his position on the audience. In the third stage, the relevance of comparing a computer's operation to the actions of a person mechanically sorting incomprehensible characters is examined. The analysis reveals that the persuasiveness of the argumentation relies heavily on the assumption that only a biological brain is capable of generating consciousness. At the fourth level, the experiment is tested for robustness using the most well-known objections from critics. The conducted analysis shows that Searle successfully proves a machine's inability to understand meaning solely through the mechanical manipulation of symbols. However, his thought experiment proves vulnerable to the assumption that consciousness can emerge as an entirely new property of highly complex systems. Using modern Large Language Models (LLMs) as an example, the study concludes that the "Chinese Room" argument remains relevant, as it proves that machines do not grasp the physical connection between words and the real world. At the same time, this does not rule out the possibility that artificial intelligence is capable of successfully operating with syntactic connections between words within the language itself. (shrink)

The reconstruction of a complex physical system, such as a human brain, from its destroyed state faces fundamental obstacles due to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics. This paper presents a thought experiment that circumvents these limitations by replacing direct measurement with a statistical inference process based on antagonistic processing of probable and improbable scenarios, blind observation with syntactic shuffling, and resonance annihilation in feedback cycles. The proposed method suggests that by subjecting a system (...) to maximum noise and comparing results through successive cycles, one can isolate an informational invariant—a residual pattern that resists annihilation—which could, in principle, serve as a blueprint for physical reconstitution via entangled alignment principles. Philosophical implications for identity, consciousness, and the fundamental nature of information as primary reality are discussed. (shrink)

The Turing test has been studied and run as a controlled experiment and found to be underspecified and poorly designed. On the other hand, it has been defended and still attracts interest as a test for true artificial intelligence (AI). Scientists and philosophers regret the test’s current status, acknowledging that the situation is at odds with the intellectual standards of Turing’s works. This article refers to this as the Turing Test Dilemma, following the observation that the test has been (...) under discussion for over seventy years and still is widely seen as either too bad or too good to be a valuable experiment for AI. An argument that solves the dilemma is presented, which relies on reconstructing the Turing test as a thought experiment in the modern scientific tradition. It is argued that Turing’s exposition of the imitation game satisfies Mach’s characterization of the basic method of thought experiments and that Turing’s uses of his test satisfy Popper’s conception of the critical and heuristic uses of thought experiments and Kuhn’s association of thought experiments to conceptual change. It is emphasized how Turing methodically varied the imitation game design to address specific challenges posed to him by other thinkers and how his test illustrates a property of the phenomenon of intelligence and suggests a hypothesis on machine learning. This reconstruction of the Turing test provides a rapprochement to the conflicting views on its value in the literature. (shrink)

In her presentation at the Monte Verità workshop, Maja Mataric showed us a videotape of her robots cruising together through the lab, and remarked, aptly: "They're flocking, but that's not what they think they're doing." This is a vivid instance of a phenomenon that lies at the heart of all the research I learned about at Monte Verità: the execution of surprisingly successful "cognitive" behaviors by systems that did not explicitly represent, and did not need to explicitly represent, what they (...) were doing. How "high" in the intuitive scale of cognitive sophistication can such unwitting prowess reach? All the way, apparently, since I want to echo Maja's observation with one of my own: "These roboticists are doing philosophy, but that's not what they think they're doing." It is possible, then, even to do philosophy--that most intellectual of activities--without realizing that that is what you are doing. It is even possible to do it well, for this is a good, new way of addressing antique philosophical puzzles. (shrink)

This chapter seeks to define “thought experiment” and dig to its origin. It argues that thought experiments evolved from experiment through a process of attenuation. This builds inductive momentum behind the theme that thought experiments are experiments.

Husserl holds the view that givenness through adumbrations (i.e. perspectival givenness) is an essential characteristic of the givenness of spatiotemporal things. He goes so far to say that we are dealing with an essential law. In this article I try to make sense of this claim. I am also dealing with a thought experiment that is designed to show that the givenness through adumbrations is just a consequence of our physiological make-up, a view that Husserl explicitly rejects. Amongst (...) other things, I defend Husserl by introducing the crucial distinction between first-person-imagination and third-person-imagination. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of Molyneux's problem within contemporary philosophy of mind tend to characterize the problem as primarily concerned with the role innately known principles, amodal spatial concepts, and rational cognitive faculties play in our perceptual lives. Indeed, for broadly similar reasons, rationalists have generally advocated an affirmative answer, while empiricists have generally advocated a negative one, to the question Molyneux posed after presenting his famous thought experiment. This historical characterization of the dialectic, however, somewhat obscures the role Molyneux's (...) problem has played in spawning debates within the empiricist tradition. Fortunately, the differences between various empiricist accounts have been widely recognized and discussed among historians of philosophy working on the topic. The focus of the present essay is to develop an interpretation of John Locke's views on Molyneux's problem that best coheres with his other views on human understanding as well as with the predominant scientific opinion about the nature of perception during the period in which he lived. (shrink)

At the age of sixteen, Einstein imagined chasing after a beam of light. He later recalled that the thought experiment had played a memorable role in his development of special relativity. Famous as it is, it has proven difficult to understand just how the thought experiment delivers its results. It fails to generate problems for an ether-based electrodynamics. I propose that Einstein’s canonical statement of the thought experiment from his 1946 “Autobiographical Notes,” makes most (...) sense not as an argument against ether-based electrodynamics, but as an argument against “emission” theories of light. (shrink)

A conditional argument is put forth suggesting that if qualia have a functional role in intelligence, then it might be possible, by observing the behavior of verbal AI systems like large language models (LLMs) or other architectures capable of verbal reasoning, to tackle in an empirical way the "strong AI" problem, namely, the possibility that AI systems have subjective experiences, or qualia. The basic premise is that if qualia are functional, and thus have causal roles, then they could affect the (...) production of discourses about qualia and subjective consciousness in general. A thought experiment is put forth envisioning a possible method to probabilistically test the presence of qualia in AI systems based on this conditional argument. The method proposed in the thought experiment focuses on observing whether ideas related to the issue of phenomenal consciousness, such as the so-called "hard problem" of consciousness, or related philosophical issues centered on qualia, spontaneously emerge in extended dialogues involving LLMs specifically trained to be initially oblivious of such philosophical concept and related ones. By observing the emergence (or lack thereof) in the AI's verbal production of discussions related to phenomenal consciousness in these contexts, the method seeks to provide empirical evidence for or against the existence of consciousness in AI. An outline of a Bayesian test of the hypothesis is provided. Three main investigative methods with different reliability and feasibility aimed at empirically detecting AI consciousness are proposed: one involving human interaction and two fully automated, consisting in multi-agent conversations between machines. The practical and philosophical challenges involved by the idea of transforming the proposed thought experiments into an actual empirical trial are then discussed. In light of these considerations, the proposals put forth in the paper appears to be at least a contribution to computational philosophy in the form of philosophical thought experiments focused on computational systems, aimed at refining our philosophical understanding of consciousness. Hopefully, it could also provide hints toward future empirical investigations into machine consciousness. (shrink)

I aim to suggest in this chapter that it is possible to understand Timaeus’ whole discourse as a kind of thought experiment placing the audience (and the reader) in the footsteps of a diving craftsman. In other words, Timaeus is presenting to us the great experiment of fashioning the whole of the universe , an experiment which needs to be done not only by (deductive and non-deductive) reasoning, but also with the use our imagination. In consequence, (...) the Demiurge will appear to be an epistemological tool allowing this experience to take place in our own minds, which will imply two important claims allowing to understand the originality of the present interpretation in relation to others: 1) it does not seem necessary to attribute to the Demiurge an ontological role and 2) Timaeus’ experiment cannot be “translated” into a purely argumentative account. In other words, and to the contrary to most didactic approaches, Timaeus’s discourse could not be expressed in an abstract treatise of cosmology for experts based on empirical observation and deductive a priori arguments, for the use of imagination is an essential part of the process. (shrink)

Thought experiment is one of the most widely-used and least understood techniques in philosophy. A thought experiment is a process of reasoning carried out within the context of a well-articulated imaginary scenario in order to answer a specific question about a non-imaginary situation. The aim of my dissertation is to show that both the powers and the limits of this methodology can be traced to the fact that when the contemplation of an imaginary scenario brings us (...) to new knowledge, it does so by forcing us to make sense of exceptional cases. ;The dissertation has five chapters: an introduction, three case studies and a conclusion. My main contention is that certain patterns of features which coincide only fortuitously may nonetheless play a central role in the organization of our concepts, and that to the extent that imaginary scenarios involve disruptions of these patterns, our first-order judgments about them are often distorted or even inverted. ;In the introduction and conclusion, I discuss the role of imaginary exceptions in the acquisition of new knowledge. I argue that appeal to imaginary cases is unavoidable because the world is neither maximally replete nor effortlessly navigable, and that appeal to exceptional cases is indispensable if we wish to avoid mistaking accidental regularities for regularities that reflect deeper truths about the world. ;In the first case study, I discuss a famous thought experiment of Galileo's, and I try to show that the guided contemplation of an imaginary scenario can provide us with new scientific knowledge in a way that argument alone cannot. In the second case study, I try to show that standard interpretations of the puzzle of the Ship of Theseus founder because they ignore the importance of the background norms against which we can make sense of local instances of extrinsically-determined identity. And in the third case study, I try to show that thought experiments in the personal identity literature are inconclusive because they disregard the explanatory role played by contingent facts about the ways human beings come into existence. (shrink)

In this Letter to the Editor, I argue that Danto’s Ideal Chronicler thought experiment in philosophy of history conflates the properties of events with the relations between events. This oversight leads to misunderstandings regarding the nature of historical knowledge and historical events. The experiment fails to establish any non-trivial conclusions about the retrospective nature of historical truths or the constitution of historical events.

Judith Jarvis Thomson famously argued that abortion is permissible even if we accept that a fetus qualifies as a person and possesses a right to life. The current paper presents two arguments that undermine Thomson’s position. First, the paper sketches a contractarian argument that explores Thomson’s violinist thought experiment from behind a veil of ignorance, which suggests that if we had an equal likelihood of being an unwanted fetus and a pregnant woman, it would be rational for us (...) to oppose abortion. Second, the paper discusses the hypothetical self-aborting fetus, a thought experiment that reverses the dependence relationship between a woman and a fetus. It is argued that in this scenario, where fetuses have agency of their own, Thomson’s position would counterintuitively prohibit a woman from temporarily curtailing the freedom of her fetus even to save her own life. (shrink)

While much of the foregoing has been about conceptual issues in conservation and what ought not be done as a conservationist, I would like to continue transitioning into a more positive approach out of the belief that appropriate activity is a critical part of biotic conservation. It is easy to take an ethical approach that dwells on the negatives of past and present abuses, whereby one is effectively frozen. However, if conservation is to become a discipline where service is taken (...) seriously—whereby, as the name suggests, we truly serve together—a move must be made, where possible, from inaction to compassionate action. The following set of hypothetical scenarios are meant to help one mentally simulate variants of a situation in which a crucial decision must be made to act or not act on behalf of a creature. These scenarios, although fictional, are in certain respects not unlike the seemingly random encounters individuals have where they are forced to decide whether to rescue or not rescue an animal apparently in need. Some key aspects of the scenarios, however, mark them as departures from the norm, and help demonstrate the current confusion of motivations and reasons for conservation. I have chosen to construct them as thought experiments because of the privacy that often shrouds people’s encounters with wild animals, coupled with an attendant lack of accountability for those animals’ vital interests. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to re-evaluate the manner in which the Ticking Bomb Scenario (TBS), a thought experiment in philosophical enquiry, has been used in the discussion of the justifiability or otherwise of forward-looking interrogational torture (FLIT). The paper argues that criticisms commonly raised against the thought experiment are often inappropriate or irrelevant. A great many criticisms misunderstand the way in which thought experiments in general, and the TBS in particular, are supposed to (...) work in philosophical (and for that matter scientific) inquiry. The paper is not about the acceptability or otherwise of FLIT per se but rather an attempt to show that thought experiments such as the TBS are useful analytic tools and ought not to be rejected due to their inappropriate use by those engaged in the justifiability or otherwise of FLIT. By rescuing the TBS from its erroneous use the paper seeks to show its proper worth as part of an argumentative device in uncovering conflicting moral intuitions in our search for ethical truths. (shrink)

This article examines who or what should be the target of feminist criticism. Throughout the discussion, the concept of memes is applied in analyzing systems such as patriarchy and feminism itself. Adapting Dawkins' theory on genes, this research puts forward the possibility that patriarchies and feminisms are memeplexes competing for the limited energy and memory space of humanity.

This paper introduces a novel reverse replacement thought experiment to reassess the metaphysical foundations of mind-uploading optimism. While gradual replacement uploading is often considered the most promising strategy for preserving consciousness and personal identity, my analysis reveals profound tensions underlying this view. By exploring the gradual substitution of a silicon-based system with biological neurons, I argue that preservation of functional organization cannot guarantee the continuity of consciousness or personal identity. If functionalism is maintained, multiplicity becomes unavoidable, undermining the (...) meaningfulness of survival. Conversely, if uniqueness of identity is prioritized, the functionalist assumptions that originally motivated uploading optimism should be abandoned. The reverse replacement scenario thus forces a philosophical dilemma: either accept the radical fragmentation of personal identity or reframe the criteria for survival beyond functional organization. I conclude that mind-uploading theories must confront deeper metaphysical challenges than previously recognized, requiring a reconsideration of the relationships among consciousness, personal identity, and functionalism. (shrink)

Still today it remains unclear whether Galileo ever climbed the leaning tower of Pisa in order to drop bodies from its top. Some believe that he established the principle of equal speeds for falling bodies by means of an ingenious thought experiment. However, the reconstruction of that thought experiment circulating in the philosophical literature is no more than a cartoon. In this paper I will tell the story of the thought processes behind the cartoon.Keywords: Galileo (...) Galilei; Thought experiment; Falling bodies. (shrink)

This position paper proposes a new thought experiment, the Professor Consultation Room, which bears on epistemology, philosophy of mind, ontology, philosophy of logic, intelligence science, and artificial intelligence.

This position paper proposes a new thought experiment, the Professor Consultation Room, which bears on epistemology, philosophy of mind, ontology, philosophy of logic, intelligence science, and artificial intelligence.

This paper presents an extended thought experiment conducted by Daniel Dennett and the author as a way of exploring how consciousness might develop without a central “Cartesian Theater.” The starting point is a system with a real Cartesian Theater – a drone remotely piloted by a human sitting at a monitor. The imaginative exercise involves the removal of the human operator and their gradual replacement by onboard systems, emancipating the drone from external control. Following Braitenberg’s “law of uphill (...) analysis and downhill invention,” the rebuilding proceeds by bottom-up engineering rather than top-down design and makes use of various tricks and shortcuts. Six iterations of the drone are described, in which it acquires basic capacities for recognition and response, learning, imagination, metacognition, communication, and, finally, autostimulation – the ability to process its own verbal reports. This final development allows the drone to access its own internal response patterns, giving it the sense of having an inner life with qualities that resist explanation. The resulting sketch thus not only illustrates how consciousness could be achieved without a Cartesian Theater but also shows how the process might naturally create the illusion of such a theater. (shrink)

Será que um dia serão desenvolvidos computadores digitais capazes de pensar de modo similar ao nosso? Ou será que, independentemente da tecnologia, os computadores digitais estarão sempre limitados a manipularem dados sem compreendê-los? Neste trabalho, apresentarei duas concepções antagônicas de Filosofia da Mente: a Inteligência Artificial Forte (IA Forte), que responde afirmativamente à primeira questão, e a crítica de John Searle a esta corrente, que, por sua vez, responde de maneira afi rmativa à segunda questão. Para tanto, iniciarei o artigo (...) apresentando o famoso jogo da imitação proposto por Alan Turing (1950) para decidir se uma máquina é ou não inteligente, jogo este que ficou conhecido como teste de Turing. Logo em seguida, analisarei minuciosamente o experimento mental do quarto chinês (proposto em 1980 por John Searle), que é uma crítica ao teste de Turing e ao programa de pesquisa da Inteligência Artificial Forte (IA Forte). (shrink)