This book represents an outstanding contribution to the field of somatic psychology. It focuses on the relationship between body and emotions, and on the linkages between mindfulness-based emotion studies and neuroscience. The author discusses the awakening of somatic intelligence as a journey through pain and trauma management, the moral dimensions of somatic passions, and the art and practice of embodied mindfulness. Issues such as the emotions and the body in relation to Buddhist contemplative practice, against the (...) background of the most recent findings of current neuroscience, are expanded in the book. A broad review of the Darwinian-Jamesian heritage on emotion studies is a unique contribution to the tradition of the somatogenic strands of emotions, and provides a contrasting focus to the ideogenic emotions in Sigmund Freud. This work provides an invaluable resource for students of psychology and philosophy, psychotherapists and meditation teachers, students, and for anyone with an interest in the field of somatic psychology. (shrink)

This work begins with a brief review – from the _physical education_ movement that began in ancient Greece and is deeply rooted in 19th century Europe, to the _somatics_ movement alive today. The review captures primary historical and conceptual references, relevant to the therapeutic-embodied exploratory work. Then, G. Stanghellini’s mental health care model [ 2 ] is reviewed. This model is considered within reflexive self-awareness and spoken dialogue: the main vehicles in relation with alterity and its consequences in the realm (...) of psychotherapeutic encounter and intervention. This will highlight the individual’s bodily movement and inter-corporeal ‘proto-dialogue’ as a prior realm of therapeutic intervention. Next, a brief consideration of E. Strauss work [ 31 ] is presented. This paper’s hypothesis is that bodily qualitative dynamics highlighted by phenomenology are essential for an effective mental health therapeutic intervention. A ‘seed’ of a framework is proposed in this paper; this seed assesses some phenomenological assets of a positive conception of mental health, for which self-awareness education is key to develop skills such as _kinaesthetic intelligence_ and _attunement_ and to educate healthy persons who can promote edifying social relations and environments. (shrink)

The Protagoras is the touchstone of Socrates’ moral intellectualist stance. The position in a nutshell stipulates that the proper reevaluation of a desire is enough to neutralize it.[1] The implication of this position is that akrasia or weakness of will is not the result of desire (or fear for that matter) overpowering reason but is due to ignorance. -/- Socrates’ eliminativist position on weakness of will, however, flies in the face of the common-sense experience regarding akratic action and thus Aristotle (...) was at pains to render Socrates’ account of moral incontinence intelligible. The key improvement Aristotle makes to Socrates’s model is to underscore that the conditioning of the akratic’s body plays a critical role in determining the power of one’s appetites and, accordingly, the capacity of one to resist the temptations these appetites present for rational evaluation. As Aristotle puts it, “For the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e., on less than most people.” (1151a 3-4). Aristotle presents what I shall call a somatic paradigm (i.e. the drunkard analogy) in order to tackle the problem of akrasia and it is this somatic solution that marks a significant improvement over Socrates’s intellectualist or informational model or so the tradition tells us. -/- In this paper, I wish to push back on the above Aristotelian explanation. I argue that when one fully examines Socrates’ account of weakness of will that Aristotle’s solution is less effective than is traditionally thought. In fact, Socrates can bring Aristotle’s model into his own; just as Aristotle absorbs what is right about Socrates’s model, namely, that akratic action utilizes reason but to a limited degree, Socrates in Meno (77C-78A) develops his own somatic model of weakness of will that connects to the intellectualist paradigm of the Protagoras. To achieve this rapprochement between the two models, I zero in on the description provided by Socrates of those individuals who desire bad things knowing they are bad as “ill-starred” or “bad spirited” (κακοδαίμων ). The “bad-spirited” is the coward and, in contrast to Aristotle’s drunkard, becomes fearful quickly from little danger. This additional somatic component, when connected to Socrates’s position on akrasia in Protagoras adds a new twist to Socrates’s model in the following way: while no one wishes to be ill-starred such that more harm than good will befall one, one may become so as a result of the bad choices one knowingly makes. -/- -/- [1] “After him came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this subject, but even he was not successful. For he used to make the virtues into sciences, and this is impossible. For the sciences all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that all the virtues, according to him arise in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in making the virtues into sciences he is doing away with the nonrational part of the soul and is thereby doing away with passion and character…” (Aristotle, Magna Moralia 1.1. 1182 a15-26). (shrink)

This paper argues that contemporary AI intensifies a long process of somatic alienation, the externalization of human capacities, organ by organ, to tools, by increasingly targeting judgment and cognitive capacities rather than mere effort. The claim is conditional: under prevailing ownership, deployment, and incentive regimes, many AI systems can push practices beyond supportive relief toward domination; yet with alternate designs and governance, relief can be non-alienating. To distinguish these trajectories, the paper proposes a practical two-out-of-three audit. A technology is (...) provisionally alienating when at least two hold. (i) Opacity, where users cannot predict or contest outputs. (ii) Irreversibility, where skills or infrastructure atrophy such that re-entry is costly. (iii) Displaced ends, where optimization objectives shift from users to institutional or commercial reasoning. Applying this audit across cases, such as in navigation, writing, coding, or diagnosis, reveals movement along a four-mode progression. The pattern runs from augmentation to delegation to integration and, in some deployments, to domination of human ends. The paper makes three original contributions. (1) A four-mode model that unifies physical and cognitive externalization without teleology. (2) A two-out-of-three audit that operationalizes alienation with observable indicators for researchers, designers, and regulators. (3) Design norms that preserve evaluative agency, maintain reversibility, and enforce legibility, for example, user user-settable goals, rationale exposure, and skill retention protocols. Philosophically, I synthesize Anders, Stiegler, Arendt, and Gehlen to clarify when “relief” becomes rule in the historical trajectory. (shrink)

The most recent tool for acting on the world, the exosomatization of cognitive activities, is often considered an autonomous and objective replacement of knowledge construction. We show the intrinsic limits of the mechanistic myths in AI, from classical to Deep Learning techniques, and its relation to the human construction of sense. Human activities in a changing ecosystem – in their somatic and sensible dimensionalities proper to any living experiences – are at the core of our analysis. By this, we (...) stress the key role of the knowing subject, far away from any allegedly objective big collections of data. The production of organized structures of physics, biology and in societal analysis will be compared and distinguished by trying to set on more robust grounds the constructive as well as the disruptive roles of entropic, negentropic, anti-entropic dynamics that are different concepts in different domains, to be handled with care: the use of machine learning and optimization methods as tools and models to analyse and manage human activities in view of their scientific and political ideology of technoscientific governance. They suppose that which they try to produce is objective, that is, standardized and controllable behaviours. In this dialogue we stress a mirror symmetry between the lack of theoretical interpretation of scientific data and the lack of democracy in this fiction of neutrality. Moreover, bad analogies constitute an obstacle to grasp the anteriority of biological and ecological constraints which enable and limit all artificial products of human intelligence. We will thus stress biological specificity, the role of normativity and constraints in evolution, of labour in structuring the human historical construction of sense by common activities. (shrink)

This study explores the cognitive and corporeal aspects of choreography as a means of expressing the human subconscious. Recent interdisciplinary research, including studies of somatic intelligence and mirror neurons, suggests that dance can influence human cognitive abilities through psychosomatics. Mirror neurons allow for kinesthetic empathy, enabling dance observers to experience movements, emotions, and experiences as their own. The authors argue that dance, which engages multiple aspects of a person, is a crucial tool for educating the younger generation and (...) should be included in compulsory education programs, rather than just as extracurricular activities. (shrink)

Michel Foucault's early works criticize the development of modern democratic institutions as creating a surveillance society, which functions to control bodies by making them feel watched and monitored full time. His later works attempt to recover private space by exploring subversive techniques of the body and language. Following Foucault, pragmatists like Richard Shusterman and Richard Rorty have also developed very rich approaches to this project, extending it deeper into the literary and somatic dimensions of self-stylizing. Yet, for a debate (...) centered on the re-creation of the vision of the self, these discussions have yet to fully engage—even while they set the conditions for this engagement with—issues of posthuman technologies, such as AI, robotics, and genetic engineering. These certainly will constitute the primary engine of public institutional surveillance in the years to come. With this surveillance, the two spheres of private self-fashioning and public institutions will continue to evolve in relation to one another. As they do so, democratic society will change considerably. Perhaps Rorty's own normative and linguistic ideal of conversational maintenance may provide something of a democratic limit case on any future posthuman self-fashioning. (shrink)

In recent decades, there has been a remarkable amount of controversy within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology (among others) about how we ought to understand the cognitive and the bodily aspects of human emotions. Although numerous philosophers and psychologists have accepted a conception of emotions as cognitive phenomena, which are elicited and differentiated according to what information they take in about the person-environment relationship, others have identified emotions as bodily feelings. Yet we should not assume that the distinctly (...) class='Hi'>somatic element in our experience of such emotions as fear, awe, and grief is unrelated to the potentially truth-revealing function of affective experience. Nor does affective cognition need to prove its epistemic worth by being measured against the standard of some _other_ mode of rationality—such as dispassionate judgment. (shrink)

This book distils thirty years of creative practice into a rigorous inquiry that bridges artmaking, somatic intelligence, and systems thinking. Rooted in the author’s concept of Embodied Matter Exploration (EME), it positions creativity as cultural metabolism, where material, memory, and body co-compose meaning. Each chapter unfolds around an artwork as theory, method, and intervention. Resisting fragmentation, the book integrates autoethnography, semiotics, and living systems thinking. Academic literature is treated as a dialogical companion. By participating in meaning making and (...) interpretation, readers gain new perceptions of self, nature, and society, and develop critical reflections to challenge pressing issues such as social injustice, environmental sustainability, and technology’s shaping impacts. A thought-provoking read for those interested in systems theory, anthropology, health psychology, neuroscience, and ecology, this practice-led and autoethnographic work opens new paths to possibility studies and creative research. (shrink)

[This Masters Thesis stands primarily as a reference point in the development of culture and technology. Completed at the University of Oregon in 2012, when ideas of "Strong AI" (now AGI) had fallen into broad disrepute and most researchers predicted a timeline of centuries or never for AI to reach capacities it then reached in fifteen years, this work's predictions regarding the trajectory to come are in retrospect singularly prescient.] -/- "This study examines the role of the strong artificial (...) class='Hi'>intelligence concept as an organizing principle in AI research. Strong AI, defined as artificial systems capable of performing any intellectual task that humans can, has become controversial following the field's unfulfilled promises of the 1960s-70s. Many researchers now avoid the term entirely. This work argues that abandoning the strong AI vision may be counterproductive for the field's development. -/- Through analysis of five major paradigms—the problem-solving paradigm, supercomputing, connectionism and mathematical modeling, data-driven AI (DDAI), and nouvelle AI—this thesis evaluates contemporary approaches to artificial intelligence. Each is analyzed for its contributions and limitations regarding strong AI. Based on current trajectories, the author anticipates that, considering exponential growth in computational resources and recent algorithmic advances, strong AI may emerge within decades rather than centuries, assuming scientific progress continues. -/- Examining IBM Watson's recent Jeopardy victory through statistical analysis rather than symbolic reasoning, the author anticipates that data-driven approaches will become increasingly dominant, suggesting that "statistical pattern analysis... may be at the core of cognition." Given recent successes and breakthroughs in cognitive sciences, the author recontextualizes statistical processes as potentially fundamental to intelligence mechanisms rather than merely computational tools. Connectionist architectures are evaluated not separately but conjoined to data-driven approaches, understood as most likely fusing towards large-scale parallel distributed processing capable of emergent intelligence rather than the symbolic reasoning, rule-based approaches that have dominated the field thus far. Given the limitations demonstrated by logic-based systems like Shakey and the General Problem Solver, this analysis suggests that intelligence will emerge from massive networks of simple processing units rather than from programmed logical rules. This bottom-up emergence through what the author calls "feedback and recursion" in dynamical systems appears to be more promising than top-down symbolic manipulation. This combination of such distributed statistical learning with increasingly digitized information is expected to enable capabilities previously thought impossible without explicit programming. -/- Drawing on Hofstadter's (2001) assertion that "analogy is the core of cognition," this analysis also predicts that pattern recognition and analogical reasoning will prove essential for artificial general intelligence. Systems will need to recognize patterns in one context and apply them in novel situations: capabilities the author expects to emerge from distributed statistical learning rather than explicit rules. -/- Regarding embodiment, the thesis cites Brooks' (1991) argument that high-level behaviors will be "very simple" for systems that have mastered sensorimotor fundamentals. The author links physicality with social processing, considering the two as fundamentally interconnected through somatic-emotional embodiment. While acknowledging Moravec's Paradox – that tasks easy for humans are difficult for computers and vice versa – the analysis notes that social processing capabilities appear as necessary for language acquisition and other fundamentally social aspects of human knowledge. Systems lacking these capabilities would "at best behave with extreme autism." The author concludes that some form of social interaction across developmental trajectories – whether in actual physical embodiment or simulated social environments – is likely necessary for Strong AI. Building on social intelligence, this thesis positions Strong AI not so much as a solitary development “within the machine” as an emergence occurring as a relationship with and within humankind. The author notes that technology has enhanced human capabilities "since the first paintings appeared on caves,” and anticipates increasing human-machine integration with AI functioning as a cognitive partner, whether through UI interactions or, eventually, through direct neural interfaces. -/- Considering Moore's Law and current supercomputing trajectories, the analysis suggests computational resources may become sufficient for brain-scale neural simulations within two decades, while emphasizing that "raw computational power alone will not suffice" without corresponding algorithmic advances. The thesis proposes that strong AI will likely require modular integration of multiple capabilities: logical reasoning, distributed processing or neural architectures at scale, pattern analysis with analogical representation, and embodied socioemotional processing. -/- Following Moravec (1988), the author anticipates that top-down and bottom-up approaches will eventually converge, with "fully intelligent machines" resulting when "the metaphorical golden spike is driven uniting the two efforts." The work concludes that the strong AI vision provides essential value as an organizing principle uniting these efforts, facilitating synthesis between disparate research areas. The author suggests that the current milieu’s dismissal of strong AI as impossible may underestimate convergent progress across multiple domains. While acknowledging technical challenges and timeline uncertainties, the thesis presents a compelling case for taking seriously the possibility that artificial general intelligence may emerge within current researchers' professional lifetimes." Published January 2012. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.33546.99520. (shrink)

Social intelligences and goal-directed behaviors of mate selection show conservation throughout phylogeny, from unicellular to multicellular life. Some microbes co-evolved somatic ornaments and weapons, behavioral courtship and dominance routines, and decision-making logics that facilitate mate choice, rival deterrence, and monogamy, gating spread of inferior genes from promiscuous unions. Such “cognitive cell” adaptations help microbes direct niche evolution for improved survival.

Attempts to engineer a generally intelligent artificial agent have yet to meet with success, largely due to the (intercontext) frame problem. Given that humans are able to solve this problem on a daily basis, one strategy for making progress in AI is to look for disanalogies between humans and computers that might account for the difference. It has become popular to appeal to the emotions as the means by which the frame problem is solved in human agents. The purpose of (...) this paper is to evaluate the tenability of this proposal, with a primary focus on Dylan Evans’ search hypothesis and Antonio Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. I will argue that while the emotions plausibly help solve the intracontext frame problem, they do not function to solve or help solve the intercontext frame problem, as they are themselves subject to contextual variability. (shrink)

These photographs in Figs. 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 were taken in the waters of Gordon’s Bay, part of the sandstone rock cliff formations where land and ocean meet on the lands of the Bidjigal and Gadigal clans in Sydney, Australia. I began swimming in these waters in 1993 as part of an end-of-week ritual, while building my earth house. They have continued to feel cleansing, a place of somatic return, dissolution, and reformation. Selections from H2+O2 (a body of photographic (...) artworks) open this chapter. The works signal the soma and practice of breathing with life. I swim daily and have done for 40 years. I love being in and moving through water. Being immersed is like returning to an expansive, wordless home, where I metabolise experience and reflect in ways that escape language. Swimming brings me into contact with my breathing body; it amplifies a sense of vastness and vulnerability that connects and dissipates in a moment. Over time, this practice has cultivated a kind of mind-in-life: attuned, fluid, and somatically intelligent. (shrink)

Suppose that we develop a medically safe and affordable means of enhancing human intelligence. For concreteness, we shall assume that the technology is genetic engineering (either somatic or germ line), although the argument we will present does not depend on the technological implementation. For simplicity, we shall speak of enhancing “intelligence” or “cognitive capacity,” but we do not presuppose that intelligence is best conceived of as a unitary attribute. Our considerations could be applied to specific cognitive (...) abilities such as verbal fluency, memory, abstract reasoning, social intelligence, spatial cognition, numerical ability, or musical talent. It will emerge that the form of argument that we use can be applied much more generally to help assess other kinds of enhancement technologies as well as other kinds of reform. However, to give a detailed illustration of how the argument form works, we will focus on the prospect of cognitive enhancement. (shrink)

Most approaches to animal ethics ground the moral standing of nonhumans in some appeal to their capacities for intelligent autonomy or mental sentience. _Corporal Compassion _emphasizes the phenomenal and somatic commonality of living beings; a philosophy of body that seeks to displace any notion of anthropomorphic empathy in viewing the moral experiences of nonhuman living beings. Ralph R. Acampora employs phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism and deconstruction to connect and contest analytic treatments of animal rights and liberation theory. In doing so, (...) he focuses on issues of being and value, and posits a felt nexus of bodily being, termed symphysis, to devise an interspecies ethos. Acampora uses this broad-based bioethic to engage in dialogue with other strains of environmental ethics and ecophilosophy. _Corporal Compassion_ examines the practical applications of the somatic ethos in contexts such as laboratory experimentation and zoological exhibition, and challenges practitioners to go beyond recent reforms and look to a future beyond exploitation or total noninterference--a posthumanist culture that advocates caring in a participatory approach. (shrink)

Roberto Marchesini presents a timely proposal within post-human philosophy in order to overcome the centuries-long separation between human beings, non-human animals and technology. This book highlights the inspiring nature of the relationship with non-human beings - what Marchesini calls "Epiphany" - and how its enhancement can open new existential dimensions. Technology is also reinterpreted, no longer as a performative tool, but as a virus that infiltrates the human dimension and changes its predicates. Technopoietic events are not just the product of (...) human intelligence, but they arise from an epiphany (a becoming alterity), thus positioning technology well within the ontological and somatic dimension of human beings. This book lays the foundations for a new and non-anthropocentric Humanism, which is able to recognize the essential role that non-human alterities have had throughout our history. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Enneagram, when encountered within visionary states arising from contemplative practice, dreaming, and somatic discipline, should no longer be treated as a static two-dimensional diagram but as a dynamic vortex-structure that discloses transformation in process. Drawing on Gurdjieff’s Fourth Way teachings, the phenomenology of the Yoga of the Inner Light, and experiential work with phosphene-based luminosity, I propose that the Enneagram becomes intelligible only when it is embodied, kinetic, and temporally extended. In such states, the (...) practitioner does not stand outside the symbol as interpreter; rather, the symbol becomes an inhabited field in which consciousness recognizes itself as structured by lawful movement. This transition corresponds to the integrative phases of the Yoga of the Inner Light, where sacred geometry ceases to function as object and is revealed as architecture of awareness. The paper further situates this visionary transformation at the intersection of two traditions: medieval metaphysics of light, which conceives luminosity as the ontological principle through which world arises, and the Fourth Way grammar of lawful processes encoded in the Enneagram. When these converge, the Enneagram emerges not as personality typology but as an ontological engine mediating between primordial light and manifest reality. The vortex-Enneagram therefore functions less as symbol than as operative cosmology, inducting the practitioner into a mode of participatory knowledge in which perception, movement, and being are ordered by the same lawfulness. (shrink)

Human leadership and followership take many forms, shaped by the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts of our groups and societies. Underlying this complexity, we argue, are key elements of human social psychology regarding social comparison and the resolution of coordination and collective action problems. The Multi-Capital Leadership (MCL) theory posits that leader emergence and effectiveness depend on perceptions of individuals’ abilities to provide benefits or impose costs in solving challenges of group living, through the deployment of different forms of (...) capital: material, social, somatic (e.g., physical formidability, height, immune functionality), and neural (e.g., knowledge, intelligence, personality, supernatural abilities). We integrate this framework with a review of leadership across human societies, including in non-state and non-industrial contexts, and with novel comparative analyses of ethnographic data. This synthesis highlights how context-specific demands for coordination and collective action, and the accuracy of social comparison, shape the structure and dynamics of leadership and followership across cultures. (shrink)

There is no corporal philosophy at the level of other philosophical subdisciplines. A research line has begun whose ultimate goal is to determine whether a somatic philosophy can be built. From a pragmatist and biopolitical approach, the present study investigated why it has not been possible to develop grounded somatic philosophy. As an answer, the “idealist–dualist episteme” is described, which encompasses invariants in the history of idealist philosophy at the ontological, gnoseological, ethical–political, and pedagogical levels. These constants reflect (...) somatophobia, as well as an ontological and gnoseological disregard of the body, which has led to the irrelevance of the body and corporeality in philosophy until the arrival of the “bodily turn”. The critique of this prevailing idealism and dualism will enable a review of current approaches based on these positions, such as embodiment, enactivism, embodied cognition, or embodied artificial intelligence. It opens up a new philosophical line with a universalis scope that is open to the eclectic construction of a pragmatic corporal philosophy that takes into account Chinese, Japanese, or African philosophies. (shrink)

The design of collaborative robotics, such as driver-assisted operations, engineer a potential automation of decision-making predicated on unobtrusive data gathering of human users. This form of ‘somatic surveillance’ increasingly relies on behavioural biometrics and sensory algorithms to verify the physiology of bodies in cabin interiors. Such processes secure cyber-physical space, but also register user capabilities for control that yield data as insured risk. In this technical re-formation of human–machine interactions for control and communication ‘a dissonance of attribution’ :7684, 2019. (...) https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1805770115) is created between perceptions of phenomena, materials and decision-making. This reconfigures relations not only between humans and machines, objects and subjects, but possibly disrupts attributive functions in the social system of Law. What it requires is shifting a legal accountability for action from a sovereignty of the human to a new materialist account based on a ‘cognitive assemblage’ between physiological data, computation and algorithmic sensing. This paper investigates the function of law as a guidance system to acknowledge this account of sensory and algorithmic computation as autonomous ‘sensing agents’ that may be accountable in situations of risk. This assemblage of robotic computation and sensory determination requires a clearer legal differentiation across the current static terminologies of person, property, liability and rights that maintain strict separations of object from subject. To neglect this, we argue, law will solely impute attributions of error to humans despite evidence of operation via mutual control. (shrink)

This article challenges some common modern conceptions of Plotinus’ ethics and suggests a more positive view on the basis of an ancient paradigm of self-relatedness that runs from Plato through Aristotle to Plotinus with different emphases in each, but that is often misunderstood. Following Stern-Gillet’s rejection of some modern views that Plotinus’ ethics is egoistical, impractical, and world renouncing, we argue that while self-directedness is primary in the ancient tradition, there flows from this an intrinsic correlation between self-directedness and care (...) for others. Negative views of Plotinus' ethics do not take account of Plotinus’ understanding of energeia or activity which pre-includes praxis and transforms external action into focused energeia. In other words, self-relatedness in the context of divine inspiration, as in Socrates’ second speech in Plato’s Phaedrus, is for Plotinus a psycho-somatic activity, but rooted in the psyche and in principle intelligible, genuinely capable of unifying intelligible and sensible in a form that can be really attentive to both practical and contemplative concerns simultaneously. From this perspective, Plotinus’ ethics includes not only care of the self and others, but also, we maintain, broader ecological and cosmic concerns. (shrink)

The debate over halting artificial intelligence (AI) development stems from fears of malicious exploitation and potential emergence of destructive autonomous AI. While acknowledging the former concern, this paper argues the latter is exaggerated. True AI autonomy requires education inherently tied to ethics, making fully autonomous AI potentially safer than current semi-intelligent, enslaved versions. The paper introduces “non-originary anthropomorphism”—mistakenly viewing AI as resembling an individual human rather than humanity's collective culture. This error leads to overestimating AI's potential for malevolence. Unlike (...) humans, AI lacks bodily desires driving aggression or domination. Additionally, AI's evolution cultivates knowledge-seeking behaviors that make human collaboration valuable. Three key arguments support benevolent autonomous AI: ethics being pragmatically inseparable from learning; absence of somatic roots for malevolence; and pragmatic value humans provide as diverse data sources. Rather than halting AI development, accelerating creation of fully autonomous, ethical AI while preventing monopolistic control through diverse ecosystems represents the optimal approach. (shrink)

We understand the workings of the human body as a series of interdependent physiological relationships: muscle interacts with bone as the heart responds to hormones secreted by the brain, all the way down to the inner workings of every cell. To make an organism function, no one component can work alone. In light of this, why is it that the accepted understanding that the physical phenomenon of the mind is attributed only to the brain? In The Embodied Mind, internationally renowned (...) psychiatrist Dr. Thomas R. Verny sets out to redefine our concept of the mind and consciousness. He brilliantly compiles new research that points to the mind's ties to every part of the body. The Embodied Mind collects disparate findings in physiology, genetics, and quantum physics in order to illustrate the mounting evidence that somatic cells, not just neural cells, store memory, inform genetic coding, and adapt to environmental changes-all behaviors that contribute to the mind and consciousness. Cellular memory, Verny shows, is not just an abstraction, but a well-documented scientific fact that will shift our understanding of memory. Verny describes single-celled organisms with no brains demonstrating memory, and points to the remarkable case of a French man who, despite having a brain just a fraction of the typical size, leads a normal life with a family and a job. The Embodied Mind shows how intelligence and consciousness-traits traditionally attributed to the brain alone-also permeate our entire being. Bodily cells and tissues use the same molecular mechanisms for memory as our brain, making our mind more fluid and adaptable than we could have ever imaged. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophical Perspectives on Galen of Pergamum. Four Case-Studies on Human Nature and the Relation between Body and Soul by Robert VinkesteijnJulien DevinantVINKESTEIJN, Robert. Philosophical Perspectives on Galen of Pergamum. Four Case-Studies on Human Nature and the Relation between Body and Soul. Leiden: Brill, 2022. viii + 357 pp. Cloth, $155.00Vinkesteijn's book, stemming from his 2020 dissertation at Utrecht University, explores Galen's views on (human) nature and the soul. (...) Opting to sidestep the debate on the unity of Galen's thought, he offers a series of close readings of some of Galen's most philosophical writings, radiating from the short treatise The Capacities of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body (QAM), which encapsulates the questions he investigates throughout the book. Although many of the texts and themes examined have been extensively discussed in previous scholarship, its strength lies in its steadfast and coherent defense of a long-favored interpretation of Galen as "somatizing the soul."Case Study 1 revisits QAM, which has sparked considerable debate in Galenic studies. It defends the idea, recently criticized, that despite Galen's agnostic statements about the substance of the soul elsewhere, he supports here the physicalist and more speculative thesis that the whole soul is indeed identical to the specific mixture of elemental qualities in the homoeomerous parts of the main psychic organs. Vinkesteijn maintains that this thesis aligns with Galen's general physiology, and that Galen's analysis of the soul as a formal aspect in a hylomorphic whole represents not an exegetical stance on Aristotelian positions but his own viewpoint, applicable to both the nonrational and rational parts. The study then rightly emphasizes Galen's conviction that our actions and affections can and should be modified by habituation. It argues that there is no basis for assuming that the identity thesis leads to a radically deterministic ethic. Indeed, it showcases the possibility of a second formation of our bodily mixture, with Galen attributing to the rational part of the soul a godlike potential for change and improvement of the soul's virtues—although it concedes the unlikelihood of such personal enhancement, as it hinges on rare natural predispositions.Case Study 2 focuses on Galen's definition of nature and his elemental theory; it focuses on the first book of Galen's Commentary on Hippocrates's On the Nature of Man (HNH) and examines the notable absence of the soul as an explanatory factor in an account of human nature. It argues that Galen articulates a concept of nature as a primary hylomorphic substance, shared by all beings subject to generation and decay and determining their secondary properties. The study then [End Page 557] examines Galen's use of his allegedly Hippocratic/Platonic method of division to dissect nature into its constantly interacting elemental powers of heating, cooling, moistening, and drying. Vinkesteijn then underscores the complexities in delineating mixtures from nature as an intelligent creator, challenging the dichotomy between a transcendent and an immanent formation of natural beings and pinpointing the difficulty in differentiating between the causality of nature and that of the soul in humans.Case Study 3 explores Galen's engagement with Plato's Timaeus, focusing on the soul–body relationship. It drives home the argument of the first study and aims to show how the fragments of Galen's lost Commentary on the Timaeus offer a somatizing interpretation of the soul. Extensively drawing on the disputed but recently reassessed Larrain fragments, it convincingly argues that they align with passages from Galen's attested works. Vinkesteijn highlights Galen's creative reading of the Timaeus, tailored to mirror his own doctrines. Beyond incorporating Aristotelian notions into his analysis, Galen is depicted as ingeniously reinterpreting the Platonic soul–body distinction. Notably, Vinkesteijn shows how Galen takes the river metaphor literally, as an indication of moisture abundance, and applies it beyond its original context of generation. This approach enables Galen to reinterpret Plato's ideas through the prism of elemental qualities and emphasize the association of the soul with lightlike or dry and hot substances, bridging the gap between the Platonic concept of the soul and Galen's physiological understanding of human nature.Case... (shrink)

The World Health Organization, in its last review of its International Classification of Diseases, established a new classification for chronic pain. Among the principal categories, of particular interest is chronic primary pain as a new type of diagnosis in those cases in which the etiology of the disease is not clear, being termed as chronic primary visceral pain when it is situated in the thorax, abdomen, or pelvis. Due to the novelty of the term, the objective of the systematic review (...) was to examine the psychopathological and neuropsychological disorders associated with chronic primary visceral pain. We carried out a search of the scientific literature following the PRISMA directives using the Pubmed, Medline, PsycInfo and Scopus databases. A total of 33 articles were selected after applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The analysis of the studies showed that most persons with chronic primary visceral pain suffer from at least one psychological disorder; the most prevalent being anxiety, depressive or somatoform disorders. The most frequent psychopathological symptoms are anxiety, depression and somatization. Similarly, the findings are insufficient to determine the existence of deficits in the domains of executive functioning, memory and intelligence. However, the existence of attention biases does seem to be clear. This review supposes a starting point for conceptualizing chronic primary visceral pain. It is necessary to continue further research so as to obtain a better understanding of this pathology and the disorders associated. (shrink)

This chapter intends to highlight, by means of discourse and content analysis, the dialogic exchanges between certain scientists, who were beginning to emerge as notable thinkers in their respective fields, in order to better understand the thinking by which they progressed. The breathless power of these dialogues would make it clear to even diehard supporters of AI in education as to why human intelligence has little to do with machinic capacities other than being able to program and use them (...) as glorified computing machines or speedy search engines. It is my submission that toying with AI ideas as though they were somehow approximations of conscious intelligence or are potential replacement for general human intelligence severely detracts from the growth of young minds as critical and creative thinkers independent of the contagion of AI-related discourse. The work and purpose of the two kinds of capacities—sentient intelligence and AI—are qualitatively different, belonging to two different ontological orders. A compilation of court cases is not a legal argument, a literature review is not a novel, a set of affordances or efficiencies is not the physics problem, an extensive collection of rhythms and meters is not poetry, and so on. One could give countless examples that show why the current hyper buzz around AI is hype, even motivated hype, and nothing else, that, if taken seriously, might lead to the not-yet-mature becoming even more deprived and deluded. When the hype begins to fade, the folks who will be left holding the simulacra will surely be those who had taken the frenzy to be toward something real, while the actual existential issues lay in the psycho-somatic and eco-organic rather than in the informational and the algorithmic. (shrink)

This article will explore the representation of certain mental and somatic phenomena in Beckett’s trilogy of novels Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable, exploring how his understanding of schizophrenia and psychosis informs his representation of the relationship between mind and body. It will also examine recent phenomenological and philosophical accounts of schizophrenia (Louis Sass, Josef Parnas, Shaun Gallagher) that see the condition as a disorder of selfhood and concentrate in it on the disruption to ipseity, a fundamental and pre-reflective (...) awareness of self that leads to a loss of ‘grip’ (in the term of Merleau-Ponty) on concepts and percepts. Beckett’s writing might, it is argued, make such disruptions more tangible and intelligible. The article will also consider John Campbell’s argument that immunity of the first person to error—Sydney Shoemaker’s foundational philosophical idea that we cannot misspeak the first person pronoun—is revoked in states of psychosis, and relate such states to the moments in Beckett’s writing where this immunity is challenged, and quasi-psychotic experiences represented. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Talking Cures, the Clinic, and the Value of the IneffableDaniel Berthold (bio)KeywordsMadness, disease, the normal, the abnormal, the ineffable, Hegel, Kierkegaard, LacanI am most grateful to my readers, James Phillips and Louis Sass, who have led me to several new insights by suggesting ways of complicating my reading of a Lacanian approach to Hegel's and Kierkegaard's conceptions of madness. I am a Kierkegaard and Hegel scholar, with very little (...) pretense to expertise about Lacan and regrettably even less about the theory and practice of psychiatry. In submitting my essay to Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Philosophy, I was hoping to entice a community of practitioners and theoreticians I have great respect for to consider the musings of a philosopher on topics which engage them as thinkers and actors in their professions. I could not possibly have hoped for more intelligent and provocative replies than I have been given by my two respondents.Phillips' framing of his response in terms of the distinction between the "madness of the philosophers" and the "madness of the clinic" is very helpful. It is a distinction that is indeed central to the question of the possibility of dialogue between philosophers and clinicians—so central, in fact, that it is generous of Phillips not to reproach me for failing to mention it. On the one hand, the challenge for philosophers is to show that their descriptions are not merely metaphoric and that their preoccupation with the dark side of human experience connects in some way with the reality of disease, so that there is some way for clinicians to translate their language into the language of psychiatry. Otherwise, philosophers will have only poetic or literary interest for the psychiatrist or psychologist.On the other hand, the challenge for clinicians is the extent to which they are open to moving beyond a reduction of "mental illness" to a purely biological conception of disease. One needn't go so far—nor should we—as Thomas Szasz or Michel Foucault in seeing "mental disease" as itself merely a metaphor. But granting the evidence of underlying organic disorder, symptoms nevertheless display themselves as mental and behavioral states (what Hegel calls "shapes of consciousness") that, as Hegel argued, are paralleled in "normal" experience, so that the distinction between disease and normality (and hence illness and metaphor) is often elusive. Madness "has the healthy consciousness for its presupposition," Hegel writes, because the healthy mind is still grappling with the same sorts of contradictions and feelings of alienation, the same "infinite pain" which characterizes insanity. Madness is not the absolute "other" of rationality, but an echo of it (1978, 3:382, 408).Hegel himself accepted the medicalization of madness that began to occur in the late eighteenth [End Page 325] century, and rejected the metaphysical and theological categories of what was called "romantic medicine." But he also cautioned against the narrowness of the "somatic" school which he felt lacked sufficient explanatory value if not connected to a "speculative" (i.e., philosophic) framework (see Berthold-Bond 1995, ch. 2).It might even be argued that every person seeking therapy is first of all suffering from "philosophic" madness, at least in the sense that initially she does not understand her own suffering as "disease," but experiences her torment in the vocabulary of the philosopher. Thus the philosopher's descriptions are the closest to the subject's own self-understanding, and while the therapist must seek to rephrase these descriptions into the vocabulary of the clinic (just as Hegel, for example, translated his own philosophic description of the madness of his friend Hölderlin in the Phenomenology as the "lost soul" whose "light dies away within it" into the medical category of Wahnsinn—mania or frenzy, which today we would call schizophrenia—in the classificatory scheme of mental disorder he gives in the Encyclopaedia; 1977, 400; 1978, 408)—there is a real question about which vocabulary is a metaphor for the other.The second main point Phillips addresses, which is taken up in different ways by Sass as well, has to do with the relation between speech and silence in madness. Phillips finds that Kierkegaard offers a more complex and subtle view than... (shrink)

Within a physicalist-mechanistic worldview, in which we cannot be more than intelligent, self-reproducing biomachines or biobots, fundamentals of a new approach to the science of human self-explanation are outlined. Some a priori logical necessities, or determinants, of any biobot’s control system design are recognized. Evolution had to satisfy them, but neuroscience and cognitive science so far do not clearly see these basics. It is concluded that the old part of the brain still contains the genetically fixed drives, responses, and the (...) physiological control. Here is the seat of an ancient somatic self that is not intelligent but is still the active center of our life. The neocortex has evolved to serve the somatic self with intelligence by individually building a virtual model of the external material and social world. This model is used by the somatic self to “pre-play” intended actions and responses to see whether they would satisfy its needs. This schema of global brain function provides the neurological foundation for the ego-id dichotomy in analytic psychology, as well as some critique of it. Following the groundbreaking experiments by Benjamin Libet and John-Dylan Haynes et al. , consciousness is taken as a “theater” that presents what the neural networks already have worked out, and freedom of the will is limited. The explosive growth of culture and civilization began when neocortical power exceeded a certain threshold. This can be taken as a quasi-mutation that projected us into a supra-biological space of existence that is new to natural history. It is not clear whether this event will lead to a positive future for humanity or to doom. Functional religion is seen as a neurosystemic attempt to bring back the earlier natural state. Thus, it can be valuable when cleared of mythological ballast. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient GreeceMindy FenskeBodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece by Debra Hawhee. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004. Pp. xiv + 226. $40.00, hardcover.In Bodily Arts, Debra Hawhee constructs an often compelling, always interesting case for the conceptual and material linkages between the ancient arts of rhetoric and athletics. In so doing, Hawhee also highlights the integral role of the musical (...) arts to rhetorical and athletic training. Throughout the book, Hawhee weaves together close readings of multiple texts (poetry, oratory, sculpture, painting, architecture) in order to illuminate the intricate “network of overlapping practices” that connect the bodies of rhetoric, athletes, and musicians in Ancient Greece. To this reader, the central strengths of the study are methodological as well as conceptual. In terms of method, Hawhee carefully and with studied finesse integrates close readings of visual, spatial, and verbal texts and practices. In the wrong hands, this type of endeavor can easily appear as the worst kind of pastiche. Not so in this case where Hawhee manages the textual interpretation with deft expertise. Conceptually, the central premise that rhetoric was a practice that was fully embodied and, most importantly, that embodiment was not in a hierarchical relation to reason, rationality, and the mind is provocative. Hawhee argues that the relations of mind-body in Ancient Greek culture were understood as a complex interlocking system that, when trained through physical practices emphasizing rhythm, repetition, and response (to/with an encounter), resulted in the possible transformation of the very nature of the self. [End Page 197]In the process of constructing the argument for the connections between rhetorical and athletic training and performance, Bodily Arts moves through three phases. The Introduction and first three chapters lay the theoretical groundwork for the second phase: the introduction of the concept of phusiopoieses in Chapter 4. Chapters 5–7 then discuss the actual rhetorical and athletic spaces, practices, and bodies of and in phusiopoiesis.The introduction opens with description of a first-century BC bronze statue of an “Antikythera Youth” (3). Hawhee uses the mystery surrounding the identity of the figure (deciphered largely through interpretations of the actions implied by the stature of the statue) to articulate the connections between the body of the rhetor and the body of the athlete as well as to introduce the importance of the body to Greek values of hexis (comportment) and aretē (virtuosity). The Introduction also presents three critical relations that serve both as conceptual departure points as well as hail the multiple audiences of the book: relations of body and mind, learning and performing, and classical studies and rhetorical studies. Hawhee’s perspective is quite straightforwardly that rhetoric is an art that required physical training and physical performance.Chapter 1, “Contesting Virtuosity: Agonism and the Production of Aretē,” connects the values of agon and aretē and argues that the “very logic for linking rhetoric and athletics” lies at the heart of this relation (22). Hawhee argues that agon and aretē are less about ends (victory and virtue) and more centrally concerned with embodied processes. Agon, through Hawhee’s reading of Hesiod’s Work and Days, is articulated as a mode of encounter that produces a particular, and possibly transformative, response. Aretē is the bodily performance of virtuosity. Central to this performance, according to Hawhee’s interpretation of the Olympic ethos through Pindar’s poetry, is the activity of questing. Aretē is demonstrated rather than simply won or attained. Following these definitions of agon and aretē, the chapter moves to illustrating the shared language of rhetoric and athletics in terms of these values. Hawhee argues that this shared vocabulary confirms that sophistic rhetoric was understood and practiced as an embodied and agonistic art “fused and infused” with athletics (43).In Chapter 2, “Sophistic Mētis : An Intelligence of the Body,” Hawhee describes mētis as cunning and somatic becoming that “infuses the arts of rhetoric and athletics with a kind of bodily intelligence... not an explicit set of precepts but rather a tacit style of movement running through most kinds of actions, including thought” (47). Moreover, the movement of mētis [End Page 198] is corporeal. It... (shrink)

Both Nietzsche and Lawrence have been identified as important fore- runners and progenitors in the development of an ecocentric, “posthumanist” worldview. Nietzsche suggested, and Lawrence developed, the notion of an anti-mechanistic “gay science”. Both writers rejected the Christian denigration of nature, the Romantic notion of a “return to nature” and the instrumentalisation of nature by industrial rationality in favour of a conception of the good life founded in the body and an almost utopian “ascent to nature”. However, since the ascent (...) to nature required an overcoming of existing humanity, both Nietzsche and Lawrence faced the task of articulating a conception of the Over-man – or post-human, as contemporary theory would put it – that is not merely a figure of authoritarian brutality. Deep ecologist Del Ivan Janik has claimed that Lawrence “saw man as part of an organic universe, living best by acknowledging its wonder and rejecting the temptation to force his will upon it. In this sense he stands at the beginning of the modern posthumanist tradition and of the literature of environmental consciousness.” 1 Accurate as this assessment is, however, the struggle with questions of power, gender, sexuality and religion that early posthu- manism involved has tended to be airbrushed out of the dark green reading of Lawrence. And Lawrence's personal spiritual and intellectual struggle was also a creative conflict with Nietzsche. A useful point of departure is Anna Bramwell's comment in Ecology in the Twentieth Century on the somewhat surprising ubiquity of Nietzsche in ecophilosophical works, as it might be applied with equal force to Lawrence: Nietzsche ... is frequently described as an important figure. Why should this be? In reality, he does not conform at all to the model ecologist ... Yet Nietzsche still hovers, worrying but relevant. I will get on to the worries in due course; for the moment, a few words on the relevance of Nietzsche might be in order. For one thing, Nietzsche was not much interested in nature per se; unlike Lawrence, he never concerned himself with either natural beauty or the threat posed to it by late 19th century industrialisation. This may be due in part to his actual environment, which was largely congenial, as Robert Solomon reminds us: From snatches of prose, one might well conclude that Nietzsche wants nothing more fervently than the life of Conan the Barbarian, a role for which he, in particular, was notoriously ill-suited. "Live dan- gerously" he tells us, from the posher resorts in Southern Europe. It seems reasonable to suggest that if Nietzsche was more fascinated by the Provencal art of the troubadours than by the resistable rise of the capi- talist machine economy, his convalescent exile by the Med, away from the industrial heartlands of Northern Europe, may be partly responsible. His chief concern is the overcoming of the Christian and moral misreading of nature – especially human nature – and the corresponding articulation of what HM Robinson calls a “somatic conception of the good life” to replace it. However, Nietzsche only calls for such a conception, rather than fully elaborating it – let alone living it – so he has “little to say about how human intelligence could be so immanent in our physical being as to make our articulation of our physical will to power something expressive of a properly human nature and not of brute strength.” 4 In short, the problem is how to distinguish the ideal, noble Overman from the mere thug. We should not expect to find the close and often reverent attention to the non-human world as such that is an attractive and central feature of Lawrence's writing; Nietzsche's interest is lively but essentially abstract. (shrink)

The notions of psychological deficiency of intellectual one stand out against understanding the changes or some psychic loss as irreparable — what is suggested by the term ”defekt” (adopted from German psychiatry), which is generally accept- ed in Poland. Intellectual deficiency refers only to a certain decrease of mental efficiency or to some definite functions; it may fluctuate, grow deeper or restore. The proofs of deficiency have been sought by means of many investigations con- cerning the measurement of intelligence, (...) the appreciation of the processes in thinking, the memory, etc.In Chapter I the author presents different approaches to the measurement of intellectual deficiency, starting with the tests of Binet’s Intelligence Scalę up to the investigations based on standardized intelligence scales of Wechsler.The second chapter (based minly on American scientific literaturę) offers the proofs of intellectual deficiency in schizophrenia according to its clinical form, its development, etc., showing, at the same tirne, the controversial conclusions to which different authors have come. The author of the present article suggests that the above differences are mainly the result of of the lack of investigations based on strictly homogeneous groups. On the other hand the intellectual deficiency coming out in the test proves an enormous differentiation in schizophrenia — not only within the group which finally is heteronomic, but also in the achievements of the same patient. Hence, we may speak about the individual pattern of responses cha- racteristic of schizophrenia.Chapter III discusses the author’s own examinations of two groups of schi- zophrenics, 24 persons each. Their schizophrenia have taken the form of paranoia. without any serious somatic disease. The process of their illness has not started before they were 18 years old. The two groups consisted of 8 women and 16 men (all of them were the country people). The similar criteria have been accepted in the examination of these groups, except a few ones, the aim of which was to differ- entiate the chronically ill patients from those whose illness was not chronical. The ”chronical” group was represented by the patients whose disease lasted from 5 to 15 years, and, who, having been in the hospital for the period of 2 years without any intermission, revealed at least 3 remissions. The other group w^as represented by the patients whose disease lasted not morę than 4 years, and the number of remissions was not higher than 4. It can be stated, therefore, that the criteria of dividing the patients into 2 groups could be defined as the period of duration of the disease and the stability of schizophrenic defect.The members of the ”chronical” group were put through the process of rehabili- tation which lasted 3 years. It aimed to activate the patients as well as to prepare them to morę organized work, and finally to take certain effects of social, occupa- tional and clinical rehabilitation (cfj Z. Płużek, 1972). Fig. 1 presents the derno- graphic structure of the examined groups. The intelligence has been measured by means of Wechsler-Bellevue test, which was employed twice, before and after the process of rehabilitation of the ”chronical” group. The representatives of the other group were tested once only, shortly before they left hospital, that is in the time of remission. All the patients were examined in the same hospital.Chapter IV offers an analysis of the research results in which the results of the two examinations of the ”chronical” group were compared with each other; on the other hand there is a comparison of the results of the two groups. Fig. 2 presents average results together with standard deviations as well as the changes (in percentage) in ”chronical” group (column 3) and the ranges for the particular tests (columns 4 and 6).As the Polish version of Wechsler Scale has not been standardized yet. There are some deviations from Wechsler’s assumptions. Some additional differences may appear as the examined patients are country people. In order to receive morę reliable comparisons the author ąuotes the examinations of the inhabitants of one village representative of the some region in which the members of the two groups had previously lived. The results of this research (Wechsler-Bellevue Test) were presented in column 5, fig. 4 and compared to the results reoeived during the examination of the two groups.Chapter V shows the conclusions resulting from the preceding analyses which are reduced to the statement that the intellectual capacity of the patients of the ”chronical” group is lower than the capacity of the members of the second group and is much lower than average intelligence. Intellectual deficiency refers mainly to motor efficiency, decrease of the speed of working, ability of learning new habits, visual motor coordination. The differences in verbal capability between the two groups chiefly depends on the social conditions. A long period of staying in hospital deepens the the process of isolation and passiveness of a patient, and, finally, causes the decrease of intellectual abilities. The aetive process of rehabilita- tion leads to a certain improvement of intellectual achievements, but not in the case of all the patients. The appreciation of the intellectual standard and the obser- vations of dynamie ąuality of the changes are significant in the process of rehabili- tation, but they do not determine its effects (as it was presented in the work of Z. Płużek, 1972). The intellectual deficiency in schizophrenia does not represent a real mental defect; it is a kind of weakening one intellectual functions, Avhich is connected with nonintellectual factors. (shrink)

This chapter proceeds along the lines of a dialogue between two participants in the following manner:A:I do not wish to characterize an unknown variable as this or that. That would be prejudicial to the inquiry. But the artificial thing is a false prophet by definition, because the very dictionary meaning of artificial is fake or inauthentic. So I am not saying anything about it for the moment. Rather, I want to unearth the conditions that make us speak of such a (...) thing in the first place. Each concept is the consequence of a prevailing set of conditions and circumstances.I:These conditions and circumstances, are they accidental?A:Nothing is accidental in this world. They appear to us as such because we are enabled to see only a part of the reality. The connections and links are occluded.I:If we accept that for the moment, what are the conditions that have given rise to the discourse of intelligence?A:Ideas of racial superiority, colonialism, militarism, these are some of the early precursors, the pudenda origo so to speak, to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche.I:Lowly origins, eh?A:Most glorified notions have dubious genealogy. It’s almost a rule. Like we mentioned earlier, Marx used to say that all ruling ideas come from the ruling classes. And the ruling classes … we know where they come from.I:Self-serving, in other words.A:Quite so.I:Coming back to the problem of generating an alternative ground for observing this attribute called intelligence, you suggested that we link two forms of energy, the spinal and the cerebral, or the somatic and the mento-emotional, to create a force field that is more holistic than intelligence. (shrink)

Cognitively-oriented theories have dominated the recent history of the study of emotion. However, critics of this perspective suggest the role of the body in the experience of emotion is largely ignored by cognitive theorists. As an alternative to the cognitive perspective, critics are increasingly pointing to William James’ theory, which emphasized somatic aspects of emotions. This emerging emphasis on the embodiment of emotions is shared by those in the field of AI attempting to model human emotions. Behavior-based agents in (...) AI are attempts to model the role the body might play in the experiencing of emotions. Progress in creating such behavior-based models that function in their environments has been slow, suggesting some potential problems with Jamesian alternatives to cognitive perspectives of emotions. Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of embodiment are suggested as alternatives to James’ and as means for addressing the shortcomings of the cognitive perspective. (shrink)

Since the discovery of the double helix structure of DNA, a cascade of research has made gene therapy a reality. In recent decades, the therapeutic applications of gene therapy have impacted individuals across the world. While gene therapy has merit, its promises are tempered by ethical considerations that warrant a thorough appraisal. In this chapter, I detail the implications of somatic gene therapy at the nexus of three fundamental themes, including (1) the intersection of health, disease, and the human (...) condition; (2) global disparities and associated issues of access and uptake; and (3) the emphasis of and sensitivity to genetics. My goal is to elucidate the ethical considerations of gene therapy while adding context to their uniqueness, probability, and scope, and reframing them in the context of different ethical frameworks or principles. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to share a balanced perspective of the morally salient considerations of gene therapy. The sound deployment of gene therapy further requires that multimodal safeguards are implemented and adhered to across stakeholder groups. (shrink)

This article examines how emerging technologies – particularly artificial intelligence – disrupt the moral and institutional foundations of contemporary military practice. While strategic documents from the United States, NATO, and other major actors anticipate profound institutional transformation driven by AI, their treatment of ethics largely confines itself to legal compliance and technical safeguards, leaving the ethical role of military leadership in managing disruptive change underexamined. Drawing on Seumas Miller’s distinction between social institutions that are merely instrumental to collective goods (...) and those whose defining ends are constitutive of such goods, the article argues that the military belongs to the latter category. Because the military’s core function – defending the sovereignty of a polity – is itself morally significant, technological disruption of its organizational structures simultaneously constitutes ethical disruption. The article thus reconceives change management during periods of technological transition as calling for a specific kind of military prudence, a practical wisdom exercised within and through the institution’s role-mediated ethical practices. By analyzing three concrete modes of techno-moral disruption, the article shows how AI may reshape ethical standards, redistribute professional knowledge, and alter organizational ethos, and why navigating these transformations responsibly is a central task of military virtue. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the (...) neural correlates of emotion wrong, it isn't able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren't emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology. (shrink)

Originating in the work of Ernst Haeckel and Wilhelm Preyer, and advanced by a Prussian embryologist, Wilhelm Roux, the idea of struggle for existence between body parts helped to establish a framework, in which population cell dynamics rather than a predefined harmony guides adaptive changes in an organism. Intended to provide a causal-mechanical view of functional adjustments in body parts, this framework was also embraced later by early pioneers of immunology to address the question of vaccine effectiveness and pathogen resistance. (...) As an extension of these early efforts, Elie Metchnikoff established an evolutionary vision of immunity, development, pathology, and senescence, in which phagocyte-driven selection and struggle promote adaptive changes in an organism. Despite its promising start, the idea of somatic evolution lost its appeal at the turn of the twentieth century giving way to a vision, in which an organism operates as a genetically uniform, harmonious entity. (shrink)

This paper argues that the DSM diagnostic category 'major depression' is so permissive that it fails to distinguish the phenomenology of depression from a general 'feeling of being ill' that is associated with a range of somatic illnesses. We start by emphasizing that altered bodily experience is a conspicuous and commonplace symptom of depression. We add that the experience of somatic illness is not exclusively bodily; it can involve more pervasive experiential changes that are not dissimilar to those (...) associated with depression. Then we consider some recent work on inflammation and depression, which suggests that the experience of depression and the 'feeling of being ill' are, in some cases at least, much the same . However, we add that the phenomenology of depression is heterogeneous and that many cases involve additional or different symptoms. We conclude that 'major depression' is a placeholder for a range of different experiences, which are almost certainly aetiologically diverse too. (shrink)

Contemplative traditions recognize two inner perceptual pathways: the Yoga of Inner Light and the Yoga of Inner Sound. This paper systematically recovers a third and previously neglected path: the Yoga of the Inner Body, which unfolds through refined interoceptive perception of subtle, endogenous somatic signs. This path progresses from discrete internal sensations (Level 1: Sensation) to coherent longitudinal currents (Level 2: Flow), and culminates in a unified, non-conceptual vibratory field permeating the body (Level 3: Field). Through phenomenological analysis, these (...) experiences are clearly distinguished from medical pathology (such as essential tremor or autonomic arousal) and from mystical mythology (such as literalist interpretations of Kundalini). A neurobiological account is proposed using interoceptive processing within a Predictive Coding framework: the Yoga of the Inner Body arises when sustained meditative attention reduces top-down cognitive filtering, allowing the physiological ground state of the autonomic system to enter conscious perception. Cross-cultural convergence, reflected in terms such as Spanda (Kashmir Shaivism), Wajd (Sufism), and Zifa Gong (Taoism), validates this phenomenon as a universal human capacity. The systematization of this path establishes embodiment not as a cognitive burden, but as a direct epistemology of presence, leading to the emergence of a new field: somatic consciousness studies. (shrink)