Los procesos migratorios suponen repensar las relaciones, tránsitos y vivencias de las comunidades receptoras. En este sentido, el análisis de los escenarios de convivencia urbana implica redescubrir las historias viejas y nuevas de la inmigración, de la construcción del barrio, de la conformación de sus actores colectivos y de los espacios urbanos comunes. En el análisis de los escenarios de convivencia más conflictivos, encontramos giros discursivos que buscan responsabilizar a la inmigración reciente de problemáticas estructurales que se viven como irremediables. (...) Otros discursos, tendientes a la indiferencia respecto a la convivencia, muestran un potencial conflicto que vuelve inestables estas posturas. El escenario de convivencia social parece construirse desde acciones que buscan la implicación e interrelación entre los actores, desde el conocimiento y reconocimiento de las diferencias y con acento en los derechos comunes. (shrink)

Durante cinco días, mañana y tarde, más de sesenta especialistas en filosofía, psicología, psiquiatría, medicina y en otras disciplinas, como el arte, la arquitectura, la literatura, etc. —provenientes de diversas geografías de Catalunya, España, Europa y América Latina— compartieron sus reflexiones en el Congreso Internacional Hermenéutica de la locura y la salud en el mundo global: homenaje a Michel Foucault, celebrado entre el 18 y el 22 de noviembre de 2024 y organizado por la Cátedra Internacional en Hermenéutica y Estética (...) Críticas —HERCRITIA—. Este evento fue planeado también en conmemoración del cuadragésimo aniversario de la muerte de Foucault, y tuvo lugar en el Campus Sanitari de Sant Joan de Deu en Sant Boi de Llobregat, institución y ciudad perteneciente a Barcelona, cuya historia está íntimamente ligada a la investigación y el trabajo clínico más avanzado dentro del marco de la salud mental que irradia desde el contexto catalán y español. Las ponencias y debates que allí tuvieron lugar, y que son las que dan origen a este libro que hoy presentamos a ustedes: Tras el efecto Michel Foucault; Hermenéutica actual de la locura y la salud mental, dan testimonio de una preocupación compartida: pensar de nuevo, y pensar en común, las condiciones contemporáneas de la salud, en especial de la salud mental, en un diálogo fecundo que dio lugar una vez más a eso que el filósofo italiano, Gianni Vattimo, llamó en su momento «Hermenéutica de La Latinidad» como subtítulo de la Cátedra HERCRITIA: una comunidad de exploración e intervención social crítica y sensible, articulada por afinidades filosóficas, políticas y culturales. Las distintas contribuciones de este libro no sólo retoman, desde perspectivas diversas, la pregunta por la locura, la salud mental, el poder y la subjetividad, sino que abren nuevas vetas y cauces interpretativos que ponen en juego genealogías filosóficas, análisis contemporáneos y experiencias situadas. Este libro busca, por tanto, ser más que un homenaje: aspira a ser una plataforma crítica desde donde repensar lo que nos está ocurriendo, tanto en los saberes como en los cuerpos y las instituciones. (shrink)

How do we know which institutions provide good care? Some scholars argue that the best way to think about care institutions is to model them upon the family or the market. This paper argues, on the contrary, that when we make explicit some background conditions of good family care, we can apply what we know to better institutionalized caring. After considering elements of bad and good care, from an institutional perspective, the paper argues that good care in an institutional context (...) has three central foci: the purpose of care, a recognition of power relations, and the need for pluralistic, particular tailoring of care to meet individuals? needs. These elements further require political space within institutions to address such concerns. (shrink)

This study emphasizes the original yet undeveloped elements of Nietzsche's theories and examines the temporal structure underlying the basic concepts of his thought.

Chris Ealham's book reveals a fascinating dialogue between a prominent individual figure (José Peirats, 1908–1989) and the anonymous masses in the history of Spanish anarcho-syndicalism, and vice versa. Peirats would hardly be known without Spanish anarcho-syndicalism, while Spanish anarcho-syndicalism would have been less relevant if José Peirats had not been included in its ranks. -/- What is remarkable is that, despite Ealham's honest confession of his sympathy for some of the working-class movements in general and for anarcho-syndicalism in particular (3), (...) his research is highly critical of both anarcho-syndicalism and Peirats's numerous personal and ideological errors and contradictions. We need not go far to find examples: in his book, Ealham makes no effort to conceal that Peirats can be described at times using adjectives such as homophobic, sexist (or rather, antifeminist), anti-intellectual, antinationalist, and anticommunist (226). Nevertheless, his negative elements paled in comparison with his achievements. -/- Peirats was born in La Vall d'Uixó (Castellón); he was a brick-maker, anarchist militant, and later a noted writer and historian. The moral influence [End Page 188] coming from his mother and maternal uncles was decisive in the young Peirats's character and training. His informal education, together with his move to Barcelona, awakened his early militancy. In spite of having to work very hard from a young age, he was lucky enough to be educated later at the Ateneo Obrero Racionalista in Sants (a neighborhood in the southern part of Barcelona). There, he started having contact with the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), joining the union when he was just fourteen years old. During Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (1927–1930) Peirats was devoted to avoiding—sometimes fighting back against—State repression of syndicalists. He also continued doing manual work while cultivating his intellectual training and techniques as a working-class writer. -/- With the coming of the Second Republic (1931), the general attitude within the CNT was that nothing revolutionary would be achieved by collaborating with professional or parliamentary politics: "radicals like Peirats gave no quarter to the new regime. After the enforced interregnum of the dictatorship, they were primed and ready for direct action" (47). Nonetheless, the CNT was not united on this issue and the disputes over ideological tactics came swiftly. At this point, Ealham pinpoints a three-fold division within the CNT: one revolutionary, one syndicalist, and another anarcho-syndicalist (55–56). The divisions and differences would become even more marked when the CNT took part in the Frente Popular with four anarchist ministers (Federica Montseny, Joan Peiró, Juan García Oliver, and Juan López Sánchez): "the anarchist leaders opted simply to ignore what remained of the old state and accept a policy of 'democratic collaboration' with the other anti-fascist forces on behalf of unity in the fight against authoritarianism" (90). Peirats vehemently opposed this strategy that placed the CNT inside a republican state, and from this time on, including during the Spanish Civil War "conferences, meetings, and plenums were organized like witch-hunts" (104). -/- After Franco's triumph, Peirats did not follow in Montseny's or Germinal Esgleas's footsteps—that is, he opted against a diplomatic passport or any special safe conduct, but joined the multitudes of Republican soldiers and civilians who escaped in their retirada (retreat) towards France (119). In fact, after going through a French internment camp, he asked himself whether the best option was to return to Franco's Spain or try his luck abroad. Without any hint of cowardice, he knew that in Spain he could only expect his death... (shrink)

We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative (...) strengths, and varying vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect. (shrink)

Much space is devoted by Broadhead to the discussion of this strophe and its ‘various difficulties’. The discussion centres on two main issues: 1. ‘If the Chorus say ; that implies there has already been some call he might have heard & But to Darius there has been no appeal at all; nor surely could the previous invocation have been described in these excessive epithets.’ So Headlam,3 who then proceeded, in the light of Luc. Necyom.

No discussion of the informed consent process would be adequate without attention to dilemmas and challenges arising in research in foreign countries, particularly in the less developed countries. In an era of the human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, for example, much attention to research issues concerning devastating health conditions in developed and less developed countries has occurred with renewed vigor.

Knowing the Latin binomial name for a species opens up a world of knowledge, but there is another way of knowing that does not involve names.

Where is the disconnect between what we consider beautiful, and how we actually shape our surroundings? Is there something about humans coming together as civilizations that results in the destruction of beauty and biodiversity? This essay examines the world through the history of forests – and it raises more questions than it answers – but the questions are of vital importance.

Thomas Reid’s positive account of justice as a natural virtue must be extracted from his polemic on Hume’s theory that justice is an artificial virtue. For Hume, the conceptual analysis of justice is in terms of agreement and hence, it is absurd to suppose that any act is unjust prior to Humean agreement. Hume maintains that no man is obliged to obey the rules of justice unless others agree to do likewise; by implication, there can be no injustices in the (...) state of nature. Reid categorically denies this, and presents sharp criticism of Hume’s account. To refute Hume’s account, Reid must show that there is a conceptual priority of the notion of justice—prior to any convention or artifice of society. In other words, he must show that we have a conception of justice which is not dependent on the conventions of society. Reid, I will show, is successful in showing this. His success in showing that justice is a natural virtue depends not only on his conceptual analysis, but on his arguments from human nature as well. The argument of Reid’s that is the central focus of this paper rests upon the following claim: “As soon as men have any rational conception of a favour and an injury, they must have the conception of justice and perceive its obligation.”. (shrink)

Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and-authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible (...) that our memories are also experienced as originating in past experiences of those events? I call this the puzzle of alethic memory. I argue that alethism can be reconciled with the claim that memories are experienced as originating in past experiences of those events—what I call the experience of first-handedness—if we conceive of the phenomenology of remembering in metacognitive terms. According to the metacognitive approach that I favor, the phenomenology of remembering is partly explained by what memory represents and partly explained by the existence of a metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations. I argue that accounting for the feeling of first-handedness in terms of the metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations allows us to solve the puzzle of alethic memory. (shrink)

The 12 chapters cover 6 questions: I. What is the relationship between memory and imagination? II. Do memory traces have content? III. What is the nature of mnemonic confabulation? IV. What is the function of episodic memory? V. Do non-human animals have episodic memory? VI. Does episodic memory give us knowledge of the past?

This paper offers a critical overview of the evolving debate on the accuracy conditions of episodic memory. We argue that the positive proposals articulated in the context of this literature are actually attempts to answer related but ultimately different types of questions. After presenting our overview of the debate, we discuss four lessons that can be drawn from it. While we do not put forward a substantive account of the accuracy conditions of remembering, we believe that these lessons contribute to (...) advancing the debate by providing the grounds for more nuanced and rigorous engagement among philosophers interested in the accuracy conditions of episodic memory. (shrink)

The viability of a naïve realist theory of memory was a lively debate for philosophers of mind in the first half of the twentieth century. More recently, though, naïve realism has been largely abandoned as a non-starter in the memory literature, with representationalism being the standard view held by philosophers of memory. But rather than being carefully argued, the dismissal of naïve realism is an assumption that sits at the back of much recent theorizing in the philosophy of memory. In (...) this paper, we identify three reasons why philosophers of memory have felt compelled to outright reject naïve realism. We argue that none of those reasons are successful. Thus, far from being a non-starter, we argue that naïve realism is a theoretical perspective that needs to be given serious consideration in current philosophy of memory debates. (shrink)

The current dispute between causalists and simulationists in philosophy of memory has led to opposing attempts to characterize the relationship between memory and imagination. In a recent overview of this debate, Perrin and Michaelian have suggested that the dispute over the continuity between memory and imagination boils down to the question of whether a causal connection to a past event is necessary for remembering. By developing an argument based on an analogy to perception, I argue that this dispute should instead (...) be viewed as a dispute about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining. The focus on attitudes, rather than on causal connections, suggests a new way of conceiving of the relationship between memory and imagination that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of memory. (shrink)

The questions of whether episodic memory is a propositional attitude, and of whether it has propositional content, are central to discussions about how memory represents the world, what mental states should count as memories, and what kind of beings are capable of remembering. Despite its importance to such topics, these questions have not been addressed explicitly in the recent literature in philosophy of memory. In one of the very few pieces dealing with the topic, Fernández (2006) provides a positive answer (...) to the initial questions by arguing that the propositional attitude view of memory, as I will call it, provides a simple account of how memory possesses truth-conditions. A similar suggestion is made by Byrne (2010) when he proposes that perception and episodic memory have the same kind of content, differing only in degree. Against the propositional attitude view, I will argue that episodic memory does not have propositional content, and therefore, that it is not a propositional attitude. My project here is, therefore, mainly critical. I will show that, if empirical work is to inform our philosophical theories of memory in any way, we have good reasons to deny, or at least to be skeptical, of the prospects of the propositional attitude view of episodic memory. (shrink)

The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role in the development of memory research in the last couple decades. Despite its growing importance in psychology, philosophers have only begun to develop an interest in philosophical questions pertaining to the relationship between memory and mental time travel. Thus, this paper proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memory and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start (...) by discussing some of the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental time travel. I call the resulting view of memory the mental time travel view. I then proceed to consider important philosophical questions pertaining to memory and develop them in the context of the mental time travel view. I conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory and research on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional philosophical questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before. (shrink)

O que é o lembrar? Quando podemos dizer que um sujeito lembra um evento do passado? Essas são duas questões centrais na filosofia da memória, uma área que vem experimentando uma rápida expansão nos últimos anos. Por quase meio século, a teoria causal da memória, inicialmente proposta por Martin e Deutscher, dominou o debate sobre como devemos responder às duas questões iniciais. Mais recentemente, no entanto, a teoria causal se tornou alvo de duras críticas, o que motivou os filósofos da (...) memória a desenvolverem duas novas teorias sobre o lembrar: a teoria simulacionista e a teoria funcionalista. Neste artigo, exploramos essas teorias em mais detalhes com o objetivo de tornar mais claro quais são seus comprometimentos, assim como suas vantagens e desvantagens. (shrink)

Quasi-set theory $\cal Q$ allows us to cope with certain collections of objects where the usual notion of identity is not applicable, in the sense that $x = x$ is not a formula, if $x$ is an arbitrary term. $\cal Q$ was partially motivated by the problem of non-individuality in quantum mechanics. In this paper I discuss the range of explanatory power of $\cal Q$ for quantum phenomena which demand some notion of indistinguishability among quantum objects. My main focus is (...) on the double-slit experiment, a major physical phenomenon which was never modeled from a quasi-set-theoretic point of view. The double-slit experiment strongly motivates the concept of degrees of indistinguishability within a field-theoretic approach, and that notion is simply missing in $\cal Q$. Nevertheless, other physical situations may eventually demand a revision on quasi-set theory axioms, if someone intends to use it in the quantum realm for the purpose of a clear discussion about non-individuality. I use this opportunity to suggest another way to cope with identity in quantum theories. (shrink)

La filosofía de la memoria ha crecido rápida y significativamente en la última década. En este comentario, nos basamos en observaciones críticas que hemos articulado individualmente en trabajos previos para sugerir que la investigación futura en el área se beneficiaría de (i) hacer más explícitas las diferencias entre los proyectos teóricos, revelando diversas suposiciones y compromisos metodológicos, y de (ii) identificar dónde los desacuerdos a este nivel han sido erróneamente tomados como disputas unívocas y de primer orden sobre “la naturaleza (...) del recuerdo”. Ampliar la perspectiva en esta etapa de la filosofía de la memoria nos dará una idea más clara de dónde estamos, cuánto hemos avanzado y hacia dónde deberíamos dirigirnos. (shrink)