This paper shall give a review of some recently published and some older books, which were published as second or third edition, on Information Ethics and Internet related topics: - Brennan, Linda L. & Victoria E. Johnson : Social, Ethical, and Policy Implications of Information Technology. Hershey, PA: Information Science Publishing, 2004. – 304 pages, paperback, $59.95 - Capurro, Rafael: Ethik im Netz. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 2003. 278 pages, paperback, €26.00 - Cavalier, Robert J. : The impact of the (...) Internet on our moral lives. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005. – 249 pages, paperback, $26.95 - Johnson, Deborah G.: Computer Ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, third edition, 2001. – 240 pages, paperback, $40.67 - Kuhlen, Rainer: Informationsethik. Umgang mit Wissen und Informationen in elektronischen Räumen. Konstanz: UVK , 2004. – 444 pages, paperback, €24.95 - Nyíri, Kristóf: Vernetztes Wissen. Philosophie im Zeitalter des Internets. Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2004. – 179 pages, paperback, €19.95 - Spinello, Richard A.: Case Studies in Information Technology Ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, second edition, 2003. – 252 pages, paperback, $54.67 - Spinello, Richard A. & Herman T. Tavani : Readings in Cyberethics. Sudbury, NJ: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, second edition, 2004. – 697 pages, paperback, $54.95 - Tavani, Herman T.: Ethics & Technology. Ethical Issues in an Age of Information and Communication Technology. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2004. 344 pages, paperback, $53.95. (shrink)

This essay critically examines some classic philosophical and legal theories of privacy, organized into four categories: the nonintrusion, seclusion, limitation, and control theories of privacy. Although each theory includes one or more important insights regarding the concept of privacy, I argue that each falls short of providing an adequate account of privacy. I then examine and defend a theory of privacy that incorporates elements of the classic theories into one unified theory: the Restricted Access/Limited Control (RALC) theory of privacy. Using (...) an example involving data-mining technology on the Internet, I show how RALC can help us to frame an online privacy policy that is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to address a wide range of privacy concerns that arise in connection with computers and information technology. (shrink)

Are trust relationships involving humans and artificial agents possible? This controversial question has become a hotly debated topic in the emerging field of machine ethics. Employing a model of trust advanced by Buechner and Tavani :39–51, 2011), I argue that the “short answer” to this question is yes. However, I also argue that a more complete and nuanced answer will require us to articulate the various levels of trust that are also possible in environments comprising both human agents and (...) AAs. In defending this view, I show how James Moor’s model for distinguishing four levels of ethical agents in the context of machine ethics :18–21, 2006) can help us to develop a framework that differentiates four levels of trust. Via a series of hypothetical scenarios, I illustrate each level of trust involved in HA–AA relationships. Finally, I argue that these levels of trust reflect three key factors or variables: the level of autonomy of the individual AAs involved, the degree of risk/vulnerability on the part of the HAs who place their trust in the AAs, and the kind of interactions that occur between the HAs and AAs in the trust environments. (shrink)

The present study examines certain challenges that KDD (Knowledge Discovery in Databases) in general and data mining in particular pose for normative privacy and public policy. In an earlier work (see Tavani, 1999), I argued that certain applications of data-mining technology involving the manipulation of personal data raise special privacy concerns. Whereas the main purpose of the earlier essay was to show what those specific privacy concerns are and to describe how exactly those concerns have been introduced by the (...) use of certain KDD and data-mining techniques, the present study questions whether the use of those techniques necessarily violates the privacy of individuals. This question is considered vis-à-vis a recent theory of privacy advanced by James Moor (1997). The implications of that privacy theory for a data-mining policy are also considered. (shrink)

This paper examines the question whether, and to what extent, John Locke’s classic theory of property can be applied to the current debate involving intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the information commons. Organized into four main sections, Section 1 includes a brief exposition of Locke’s arguments for the just appropriation of physical objects and tangible property. In Section 2, I consider some challenges involved in extending Locke’s labor theory of property to the debate about IPRs and digital information. In Section (...) 3, it is argued that even if the labor analogy breaks down, we should not necessarily infer that Locke’s theory has no relevance for the contemporary debate involving IPRs and the information commons. Alternatively, I argue that much of what Locke has to say about the kinds of considerations that ought to be accorded to the physical commons when appropriating objects from it – especially his proviso requiring that “enough and as good” be left for others – can also be applied to appropriations involving the information commons. Based on my reading of Locke’s proviso, I further argue that Locke would presume in favor of the information commons when competing interests (involving the rights of individual appropriators and the preservation of the commons) are at stake. In this sense, I believe that Locke offers us an adjudicative principle for evaluating the claims advanced by rival interests in the contemporary debate about IPRs and the information commons. In Section 4, I apply Locke’s proviso in my analysis of two recent copyright laws: the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). I then argue that both laws violate the spirit of Locke’s proviso because they unfairly restrict the access that ordinary individuals have previously had to resources that comprise the information commons. Noting that Locke would not altogether reject copyright protection for IPRs, I conclude that Locke’s classic property theory provides a useful mechanism for adjudicating between claims about how best to ensure that individuals will be able to continue to access information in digitized form, while at the same time also allowing for that information to enjoy some form of legal protection. (shrink)

Privacy concerns involving data mining are examined in terms of four questions: What exactly is data mining? How does data mining raise concerns for personal privacy? How do privacy concerns raised by data mining differ from those concerns introduced by traditional information-retrieval techniques in computer databases? How do privacy concerns raised by mining personal data from the Internet differ from those concerns introduced by mining such data from data warehouses? It is argued that the practice of using data-mining techniques, whether (...) on the Internet or in data warehouses, to gain information about persons raises privacy concerns that go beyond concerns introduced in traditional information-retrieval techniques in computer databases and are not covered by present data-protection guidelines and privacy laws. (shrink)

This essay examines issues involving personal privacy and informed consent that arise at the intersection of information and communication technology and population genomics research. I begin by briefly examining the ethical, legal, and social implications program requirements that were established to guide researchers working on the Human Genome Project. Next I consider a case illustration involving deCODE Genetics, a privately owned genetics company in Iceland, which raises some ethical concerns that are not clearly addressed in the current ELSI guidelines. The (...) deCODE case also illustrates some ways in which an ICT technique known as data mining has both aided and posed special challenges for researchers working in the field of population genomics. On the one hand, data-mining tools have greatly assisted researchers in mapping the human genome and in identifying certain “disease genes” common in specific populations. On the other hand, this technology has significantly threatened the privacy of research subjects participating in population genomics studies, who may, unwittingly, contribute to the construction of new groups that put those subjects at risk for discrimination and stigmatization. In the final section of this paper I examine some ways in which the use of data mining in the context of population genomics research poses a critical challenge for the principle of informed consent, which traditionally has played a central role in protecting the privacy interests of research subjects participating in epidemiological studies. (shrink)

During the past decade, a fairly extensive literature on the digital divide has emerged. Many reports and studies have provided statistical data (Digital Divide Network, 2002; NTIA, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000) pertaining to sociological aspects of ‘the divide,’ while some studies have examined policy issues involving universal service (Camp and Tsong, 2001) and universal access (Brewer and Chuter, 2002). Other studies have suggested ways in which the digital divide could be better understood if it were ‘reconceptualized’ in terms of an (...) alternative metaphor, e.g. a ‘divide’ having to do with literacy (Warschauer, 2002), power (Moss, 2002), content (Carvin, 2000), or the (information) environment (Floridi, 2001). However, with the exception of Johnson (2001) and Koehler (2002), authors have tended not to question ‐ at least not directly ‐ whether the digital divide is, at bottom, an ethical issue. Many authors seem to assume that because disparities involving access to computing technology exist, issues underlying the digital divide are necessarily moral in nature. Many further assume that because this particular ‘divide’ has to do with something that is digital or technological in nature, it is best understood as a computer ethical issue. The present study, which examines both assumptions, considers four questions: (1) What exactly is the digital divide? (2) Is this ‘divide’ ultimately an ethical issue? (3) Assuming that the answer to (2) is ‘yes,’ is the digital divide necessarily an issue for computer ethics? (4) If the answer to (3) is ‘yes,’ what can/should computer professionals do bridge the digital divide? (shrink)

This paper is intended as a tribute to the late James Moor. An esteemed Dartmouth professor, who published in many areas of philosophy, including logic, Moor is perhaps best remembered today for his pioneering work in the field of computer ethics. His seminal (and award-winning) article, “What Is Computer Ethics?” (_Metaphilosophy_, 1985) was highly influential both in defining and shaping the then nascent field of computer ethics. Many other computer-ethics-related papers followed over the next quarter century, in which Moor examined (...) a range of topics – from moral responsibility to autonomy to privacy in the context of computing and emerging technologies, including nanotechnology and AI. And while the insights and frameworks put forth in many of his published works have received the acclaim they deserve, Moor’s contribution to the privacy literature remains, in my view, underappreciated. In trying to show why his privacy theory deserves much more attention than received to date, I also briefly describe the evolution of Moor’s position on privacy – from his earlier publications on that topic to a comprehensive and systematic privacy framework. I then suggest that a further exploration of his privacy theory would benefit researchers working in technology ethics in general, and AI ethics in particular. Finally, I encourage privacy scholars to take a closer look at Moor’s privacy framework to see whether they might be able to tease out and disclose some potential insights and features that may still be embedded in that robust theory of privacy. (shrink)

This essay examines some ethical aspects of stalkingincidents in cyberspace. Particular attention is focused on the Amy Boyer/Liam Youens case of cyberstalking, which has raised a number of controversial ethical questions. We limit our analysis to three issues involving this particular case. First, we suggest that the privacy of stalking victims is threatened because of the unrestricted access to on-linepersonal information, including on-line public records, currently available to stalkers. Second, we consider issues involving moral responsibility and legal liability for Internet (...) service providers (ISPs) when stalking crimesoccur in their `space' on the Internet. Finally, we examine issues of moral responsibility for ordinary Internet users to determine whether they are obligated to inform persons whom they discover to be the targets of cyberstalkers. (shrink)

A review of Cecilia Sjöholm’s Doing Aesthetics with Arendt: How to See Things (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, 219 pp. ISBN 978-0-231-17308-7).

Organized into three main parts, this paper examines some challenges for the informed-consent process in medical research where DNA databanks are employed. In Part 1, we briefly describe the principle of informed consent and show why it is ethically important. Part 2 focuses on some specific challenges that that arise for the traditional informed-consent process in population-wide genetics/genomics research, especially where data-mining techniques are used. In the third and final section, we defend a model of consent based on the notion (...) of a "charitable trust," which we believe can help to preserve the integrity of the consent process in the context of medical and genetic research involving DNA databanks. (shrink)

The article is an investigation into theatricality from various standpoints in order to focus on different views on theatricality considered as partially emancipated from theatre and to verify if and to what extent each of them can apply to installation artworks as environments and intermedial devices. Ultimately the article propounds the idea of a paradoxical anti-theatrical theatricality of installation art, grasped in its very connection to site-specificity, critically engaging Martin Heidegger’s insights regarding the «Gestell» and the «work-being» of the work (...) of art, as a general theoretical basis through which a particular focus of ‘specificity’ of installation is endorsed. (shrink)

Included in the 2005 cyberethics bibliography update is an annotated list of more than fifty recent books; each has a publisher's date of 2002 or later. This list expands upon the books identified and annotated in cyberethics bibliography included in the June 2003 issue of ACM Computers and Society Magazine. For information about selected books published between 1998 and 2002, see the June 1999, June 2000, June 2001, and June 2002 issues of Computers and Society; and for a comprehensive list (...) of books and articles published before 1997, see my Computing, Ethics, and Social Responsibility: A Bibliography. (shrink)

Included in the 2001 annual bibliography update is a select list of recent books and articles, each with a publisher's date of either 2000 or 2001. For an annotated list of selected books and articles published between 1998 and 2000, see the June 1999 and June 2000 issues of Computers and Society; and for a comprehensive list of books and articles published before 1997, see my Computing, ethics, and social responsiblity: a bibliography.

The present essay includes an overview of key milestones in the development of computer ethics as a field of applied ethics. It also describes the ongoing debate about the proper scope of CE, as a subfield both in applied ethics and computer science. Following a brief description of the cluster of ethical issues that CE scholars and practitioners have generally considered to be the standard or "mainstream" issues comprising the field thus far, the essay speculates about the future direction of (...) CE and describes some theoretical and practical questions that will likely arise. (shrink)

Starting from a specific critique of the traditional «metaphysical mistake» (to take apart being and appearing), Hannah Arendt points out the necessity to support a radical “phenomenalism”, which can be able to become politically relevant through 'spectacularity'. Far from the task of replacing an unknown being or substance, in Arendt's view all appearances are phenomena enhancing a singular exhibition on the 'world stage' in order to communicate an opinion or to perform deeds. Along this path, the encounter with Merleau-Ponty’s thought (...) occurs at several levels. Specifically, the thesis of the ‘spectacular’ character of the world reveals itself in Arendt’s political theory as intimately linked to the thesis of an aesthetic and, at the same time ontological basis of experience, where opinion 'opens' to determined 'portions' of being. Such features of Arendt's political theory join it to Merleau-Ponty's theory of vision as “conditioned thought ” (by the world), “which advents” as “instituted” in a singular proper-body (Eye and Mind). According to Arendt, thought itself has to be considered not only as invisible (The Life of the Mind), but as a visible “doxa”, showing specific “aspects of world”, also revealed as specific positions to take and to defend in public. The paper suggests that the theoretical encounter of the two philosophers is a valuable asset in the context of contemporary political “publicity”. (shrink)

Provides a short synopsis for books that cover topics such as evolution, psychoanalysis, artificial intelligence, ethics, and psychopathology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).