An increasing number of complex and important decisions are now being made with the aid of opaque algorithms. This has led to calls from both theorists and legislators for the implementation of a right to an explanation for algorithmic decisions. In this paper, we argue that, in most cases and for most kinds of explanations, there is no such right. After differentiating a number of different things that might be meant by a ‘right to an explanation,’ we (...) argue that, for the most plausible and popular versions (a right to an explanation for a specific bureaucratic decision, a right to an explanation grounded in public reason considerations, or a right to a higher-level explanation of an entire system of automated decision-making), such a right is either superfluous, impossible to obtain, or not the best way to secure the relevant normative goods. We also argue that proponents of a right to an explanation carve off certain kinds of automated decisions as requiring more justification than others in similar areas of social (and natural) science policy, a demarcation we argue is unjustified. While there will be some cases where an explanation is the only thing that can secure an important normative good (e.g. when an explanation is the only thing that would catch an unjustified individual decision), we argue these cases are too rare and scattered to ground something as weighty as a right to an explanation. (shrink)

In this article I present a characterization of the right to mental integrity (RMI), expanding and refining the definition proposed by Ienca and Andorno’s (Life Science Society Policy 13 5, 2017) and clarifying how the scope of this right should be shaped in cases of cognitive extension (EXT). In doing so, I will first critically survey the different formulations of the RMI presented in the literature. I will then argue that the RMI protects from i) nonconsensual interferences that (...) ii) bypass reasoning and iii) produce mental harm. Contrary to other definitions proposed in the literature, my formulation disentangles the RMI from the right to cognitive liberty (RCL) (Lavazza in Frontiers Neuroscience 12 82, 2018), the right to mental privacy (RMP) (Lavazza and Giorgi in Neuroethics 16 (1): 1-13, 2023), and the right to psychological continuity (RPC) (Zohny et al. in Neuroethics 16: 20, 2023), thus enabling a fine-grained assessment of their simultaneous or individual violation. Finally, I analyse how the extended mind thesis (EXT) reshapes the scope of the RMI, proposing a layered protection of extended mental integrity, which grants stronger protection to the organism-bound cognitive system and self in case of manipulative influences of the mind-extending device. To conclude, I present a variety of neurorights violations and mental harms inflicted to organism-bound and cognitively extended agents. (shrink)

Stories shape not only how we understand the world but also how we live in it. The way a narrative presents the unfolding of events or sketches the layers of a person’s character can have monumental consequences for the people involved in them. Yet across historical periods and global spaces, entire peoples, cultures, and communities—as well as the individuals within them—have been robbed of their stories through erasure, vilification, and distortion. At the heart of this book lies the question: If (...) people are unknown in deep and unjust ways because their stories have been stolen, don’t they have the right to be known? Drawing on a framework from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which affirms the right to know for victims of gross violations or injustices, this book makes a novel and urgent case for its counterpart: the right to be known. Both rights, it is argued, can be understood within a framework of epistemic reparations. The ultimate goal is to shed light on the normative demands these reparations generate, as well as some of the concrete steps that can be taken to fulfill them, so that each of us might get to work right now in the ongoing process of addressing the epistemic wrongs of those who have been relegated to the margins of the unknown. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the right to privacy that is inspired by classic control views on this right and recent developments in moral psychology. The core idea is that the right to privacy is the right that others not make personal information about us flow unless this flow is an expression of and does not conflict with our deep self. The nature of the deep self will be spelled out in terms of stable intrinsic (...) desires. The paper argues that this view has advantages over alternative accounts of the right to privacy, that it is extensionally adequate in interesting test cases, that there is a good reason to think that the right to privacy, thus understood, can be justified, and that this view helps identify what kind of information is protected by the right to privacy. (shrink)

Natural right and the historical approach -- Natural right and the distinction between facts and values -- The origin of the idea of natural right -- Classic natural right -- Modern natural right : Hobbes ; Locke -- The crisis of modern natural right : Rousseau ; Burke.

Investigates a complex structure of morality, the demands such morality places on individuals, and the behavioral consequences of the system of right and wrong.

The foundation of the Kantian theory of right is the one innate right to freedom. Here, I offer a comprehensive philosophical comparison between Kantian rightful freedom and the conception of freedom as negative liberty or non-interference, a hugely influential view in terms of which Kantian rightful freedom is often understood. This fruitful comparison clarifies the fundamental differences between the two views, emphasizing the resources the Kantian approach offers for contributing to contemporary debates on freedom as a distinctive rights-based (...) republican view. This Kantian perspective also offers a useful lens for critiquing negative-liberty-based views, revealing a dilemma they face. (shrink)

We speak of the right to know with relative ease. You have the right to know the results of a medical test or to be informed about the collection and use of personal data. But what exactly is the right to know, and who should we trust to safeguard it? This book provides the first comprehensive examination of the right to know and other epistemic rights: rights to goods such as information, knowledge and truth. These rights (...) play a prominent role in our information-centric society and yet they often go unnoticed, disregarded and unprotected. As such, those who control what we know, or think we know, exert an influence on our lives that is often as dangerous as it is imperceptible. Beginning with a rigorous but accessible philosophical account of epistemic rights, Lani Watson examines the harms caused by epistemic rights violations, drawing on case studies across medical, political and legal contexts. She investigates who has the right to what information, who is responsible for the quality and circulation of information and what epistemic duties we have towards each other. This book is essential reading for philosophers, legal theorists and anyone concerned with the protection and promotion of information, knowledge and truth.. (shrink)

The right to die refers to the claim (based on autonomy) that individuals should be entitled to choose to end their lives under specific clinical conditions such as imminent death, terminal illness, and when they are suffering physically or psychologically. The right to die in the clinical setting entails the direct or indirect assistance of a physician or healthcare professional to guarantee death is effective and painless (in contrast to suicide that may be unsuccessful and inflict severe pain).

Recently, there has been some discussion about the relationship between Kant's conception of right (the sphere of juridical rights and duties) and his moral theory (with the Categorical Imperative as its fundamental norm). In section 1, I briefly survey some recent contributions to this debate and distinguish between two different questions. First, does Kant's moral theory (as developed in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason ) imply , or validate, a Kantian conception of right (as developed (...) in the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals , the Doctrine of Right)? In other words, is the Categorical Imperative sufficient to show that the fundamental principles of right are normatively valid? Second, does Kant's conception of right presuppose his moral theory? In other words, is the Categorical Imperative necessary to show that the basic principles of right are normatively valid? In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with defending a negative answer to the first of these questions. In section 2, I will discuss Paul Guyer's attempt to vindicate a positive answer to the same question. In section 3, reasons will be given why any attempt to derive Kant's conception of right from the Categorical Imperative must fail because of the analytic connection between right and coercion. (shrink)

This paper challenges the widely accepted view that right governs action, and only actions, while ethics governs maxims. It argues that principles of right not only apply to actions but also impose constraints on maxims. However, while ethics provides us with a principle for adopting maxims, right formulates only a negative principle —it merely specifies which maxims are contrary to right. This interpretation not only offers an exegetical advantage over readings that consider right as concerning (...) only actions but also presents Kant’s moral philosophy as a more coherent theory, in which the notion that moral laws should govern maxims is central. If right, according to Kant, is to be understood as part of a moral theory that establishes duties and obligations through principles of pure reason, then right, as a system of normative principles, must be able to impose constraints on the subjective principles on which we act. (shrink)

A number of international organizations have claimed that children have a right to be loved, but there is a worry that this claim may just be an empty rhetoric. In this paper, I seek to show that there could be such a right by providing a justification for this right in terms of human rights, by demonstrating that love can be an appropriate object of a duty, and by proposing that biological parents should normally be made the (...) primary bearers of this duty, while all other able persons in appropriate circumstances have the associate duties to help biological parents discharge their duties. I also consider some policy implications of this right. (shrink)

This chapter rereads Kant’s property theory in light of his anti-imperialist remarks in the discussion of hospitality and cosmopolitan right. These remarks suggest that stateless groups have claims to political independence, and to possession of their land, that can impose binding duties on others in a state of nature. How does Kant’s acknowledgment of the rights of stateless peoples affect his property argument? What is the relation of the provisional claims made in the state of nature to the conclusive (...) property rights imposed in a civil condition? This chapter argues that Kant’s discussion of colonialism provides important insight into what provisional property rights are like. Provisional rights are not radically indeterminate: they have moral content, and make normative demands on others in the state of nature. Still, provisional rights are not natural property rights: instead, they are _temporary_ claims that can be legitimately altered in the future by a rightful public authority. (shrink)

ABSTRACTRevisiting the trend of identifying populism with extreme right parties, in this paper we aim to problematize such associations within the context of today’s Europe. Drawing on examples from relevant parties in France and the Netherlands, and applying a discourse-theoretical methodology, we test the hypothesis that such parties are better categorized primarily as nationalist and only secondarily – and reluctantly – as ‘populist’. Our hypothesis follows the remarks of scholars who have stressed that the central theme in the discourse (...) of such parties is not the staging of an antagonism between a ‘people’ and an ‘elite’, but rather the opposition of an ethnic community with its alleged dangerous ‘others’. In this context, we propose a discursive methodology able to differentiate between ‘populist’ and ‘nationalist’ discourses by locating the core signifiers in each discourse in relation to peripheral ones, as well as by clarifying the nature of the axial antagonisms put forth. (shrink)

Kant limits cosmopolitan right to a universal right of hospitality, condemning European imperial practices towards indigenous peoples, while allowing a right to visit foreign countries for the purpose of offering to engage in commerce. I argue that attempts by contemporary theorists such as Jeremy Waldron to expand and update Kant’s juridical category of cosmopolitan right would blunt or erase Kant’s own anti-colonial doctrine. Waldron’s use of Kant’s category of cosmopolitan right to criticize contemporary identity politics (...) relies on premises that upset Kant’s balanced right to hospitality. An over-extensive right to visit can invoke “Kantian” principles that Kant himself could not have consistently held, without weakening his condemnation of European settlement. I construct an alternative spirit of cosmopolitan right more favorable to the contemporary claims of indigenous peoples. Kant’s analysis suggests there are circumstances when indigenous peoples may choose whether to engage in extensive cultural interaction, and reasonably refuse the risks of subjecting their claims to debate in democratic politics in a unitary public. Cosmopolitan right accorded respect to peoples; any “domestic” adaptation of cosmopolitan right should respect indigenous peoples as peoples, absent a serious public explanation by a democratic state for why it has now become appropriate to treat indigenous peoples merely as individual citizens. (shrink)

Can we have objective knowledge of right and wrong, of how we should live and what there is reason to do? Can it be anything but luck when our moral beliefs are true? Kieran Setiya confronts these questions in their most compelling and articulate forms, and argues that if there is objective ethical knowledge, human nature is its source.

Social media data hold considerable potential for predicting health-related conditions. Recent studies suggest that machine-learning models may accurately predict depression and other mental health-related conditions based on Instagram photos and Tweets. In this article, it is argued that individuals should have a sui generis right not to be subjected to AI profiling based on publicly available data without their explicit informed consent. The article (1) develops three basic arguments for a right to protection of personal data trading on (...) the notions of social control and stigmatization, (2) argues that a number of features of AI profiling make individuals more exposed to social control and stigmatization than other types of data processing (the exceptionalism of AI profiling), (3) considers a series of other reasons for and against protecting individuals against AI profiling based on publicly available data, and finally (4) argues that the EU General Data Protection Regulation does not ensure that individuals have a right not to be AI profiled based on publicly available data. (shrink)

The concepts of right action and virtuous motivation are clearly connected, in that we expect people with virtuous motives to at least often act rightly. Two well-known views explain this connection by defining one of the concepts in terms of the other. Instrumentalists about virtue identify virtuous motives as those that lead to right acts; virtue-ethicists identify right acts as those that are or would be done from virtuous motives. This paper outlines a rival explanation, based on (...) the “higher-level” account of virtue defended in the author’s Virtue, Vice, and Value and by earlier philosophers such as Rashdall, Moore, and Ross. On this account rightness and virtue go together because each is defined by a (different) relation to some other, more basic moral concept. Their frequent coincidence is therefore like a correlation between A and B based not on either’s causing the other but on their being joint effects of a single common cause C. (shrink)

Something Aristotle calls ‘right logos’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘logos’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the Laws—in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian phronēsis, like his and Plato’s technē and epistēmē, is a matter of grasping explanatory accounts: in this (...) case, accounts that identify the right action and say why it is right. Arguably, Aristotelian rationality is a matter of being able to grasp accounts in general. (shrink)

Introduction: the foundation of justice -- Practical reason and justifying reasons: on the foundation of morality -- Moral autonomy and the autonomy of morality : toward a theory of normativity after Kant -- Ethics and morality -- The justification of justice: Rawls's political liberalism and Habermas's discourse theory in dialogue -- Political liberty: integrating five conceptions of autonomy -- A critical theory of multicultural toleration -- The rule of reasons: three models of deliberative democracy -- Social justice, justification, and power (...) -- The basic right to justification: toward a constructivist conception of human rights -- Constructions of transnational justice: comparing John Rawls's the law of peoples and Otfried Höffe's democracy in an age of globalisation -- Justice, morality, and power in the global context -- Toward a critical theory of transnational justice. (shrink)

The right to health refers to everyone enjoying the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. This right is not new in that it was already mentioned as a fundamental right in the constitution of the WHO in 1946. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights also mentioned health as part of the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 25). The right to health was again recognized as a human right in (...) the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (shrink)

I argue in favour of the central claim of virtue-ethical accounts of right action: that right action is virtuous action. First, I disambiguate this claim and argue for a specific interpretation of it. Second, I provide reasons to prefer target-centred over both agent-centred and motive-centred accounts of virtuous action. Third, I argue that an action is right if, only if, and because it is overall virtuous. Finally, I respond to important arguments to the contrary.

There is an ongoing debate in medicine about whether patients have a ‘right not to know’ pertinent medical information, such as diagnoses of life-altering diseases. While this debate has employed various ethical concepts, probably the most widely-used by both defenders and detractors of the right is autonomy. Whereas defenders of the right not to know typically employ a ‘liberty’ conception of autonomy, according to which to be autonomous involves doing what one wants to do, opponents of the (...) right not to know often employ a ‘duty’ understanding, viewing autonomy as involving an obligation to be self-governing. The central contribution of this paper is in showing that neither view of autonomy can reasonably be said to support the extreme stances on the right not to know that they are sometimes taken to. That is, neither can a liberty view properly defend a right not to know without limits, nor can a duty view form the basis of an absolute rejection of the right not to know. While there is still theoretical distance between these two approaches, we conclude that the views are considerably closer on this issue than they first appear, opening the way for a possible compromise. (shrink)

It appears at least intuitively appropriate to claim that we owe it to victims to punish those who have wronged them. It also seems plausible to state that we owe it to society to punish those who have violated its norms. However, do we also owe punishment to perpetrators themselves? In other words, do those who commit crimes have a moral right to be punished? This work examines the sustainability of the right to be punished from the standpoint (...) of the two main theories of rights—the will and the interest conceptions. The right to be punished is shown to be largely indefensible on both accounts: on the will theory, the right to be punished conflicts with autonomy, and it can neither be claimed nor waived by a perpetrator; on the interest theory, a perpetrator’s interest in punishment, inasmuch as it exists, is not sufficient to ground a duty on the part of the state. (shrink)

In this classic work, Leo Strauss examines the problem of natural right and argues that there is a firm foundation in reality for the distinction between right and wrong in ethics and politics. On the centenary of Strauss's birth, and the fiftieth anniversary of the Walgreen Lectures which spawned the work, _Natural Right and History_ remains as controversial and essential as ever. "Strauss... makes a significant contribution towards an understanding of the intellectual crisis in which we find (...) ourselves... [and] brings to his task an admirable scholarship and a brilliant, incisive mind."—John H. Hallowell, _American Political Science Review_ Leo Strauss was the Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus in Political Science at the University of Chicago. (shrink)

The ‘right to be known’ has traditionally been interpreted from a human-centric and individualistic perspective unsuitable for resolving the environmental crises of our epoch. Given the political need to raise collective awareness about the interconnectedness of the human and more-than-human worlds, we establish a dialogue between Indigenous and Western philosophies about the rights of more-than-human entities to be known and cared for. We consider a Western Australian Indigenous community’s advocacy on behalf of ‘Martuwarra’, a non-anthropocentric socio-environmental structure that encompasses (...) the cultural ecosystem of a river (the ‘Fitzroy River’ in colonial nomenclature) and the Indigenous groups with ontologies and First Laws belonging to that ecosystem. For the First Peoples of Martuwarra, their cultural ecosystem is a custodial group agent that is the victim of an epistemic injustice. The advocacy on behalf of Martuwarra, we suggest, is an act of Indigenous truth-telling that establishes the custodial group agent’s right to be known and which seeks to entrench restorative norms of justice as part of a moral revolution. We address contractualist and other objections to our proposal and discuss the benefits of theorising the rights of custodial group agents. (shrink)

In Experiment, Right or Wrong, Allan Franklin continues his investigation of the history and philosophy of experiment presented in his previous book, The Neglect of Experiment. Using a combination of case studies and philosophical readings of those studies, Franklin again addresses two important questions: (1) What role does and should experiment play in the choice between competing theories and in the confirmation or refutation of theories and hypotheses? (2) How do we come to believe reasonably in experimental results? Experiment, (...) Right or Wrong makes a significant contribution to an important area in contemporary history and philosophy of science. Philosophers and historians of science, physicists, and advanced students in these areas will find much of interest in this engaging study. (shrink)

The practice of unrestricted universal suffrage is unjust. Citizens have a right that any political power held over them should be exercised by competent people in a competent way. Universal suffrage violates this right. To satisfy this right, universal suffrage in most cases must be replaced by a moderate epistocracy, in which suffrage is restricted to citizens of sufficient political competence. Epistocracy itself seems to fall foul of the qualified acceptability requirement, that political power must be distributed (...) in ways against which there are no qualified objections. However, it is less intrinsically unjust than democracy with universal suffrage, and probably produces more just outcomes. Thus epistocracy is more just than democracy, even if not perfectly just. (shrink)

If people have stringent moral rights, then the doctrine of double effect is false or unimportant, at least when it comes to making acts permissible or wrong. There are strong and weak versions of the doctrine of double effect. The strong version asserts that an act is morally right if and only if the agent does not intentionally infringe a moral norm and the act brings about a desirable result (perhaps the best state of affairs available to the agent (...) or a promotion of the common good). The weak version asserts that, other things being equal, it is deontically worse to intentionally infringe a norm than to foreseeably do so. A person’s intention or mere foresight might still be relevant to his or her blameworthiness or virtue, but this is a separate issue. (shrink)

This paper provides an answer to the question why birth parents have a moral right to keep and raise their biological babies. I start with a critical discussion of the parent-centred model of justifying parents’ rights, recently proposed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift. Their account successfully defends a fundamental moral right to parent in general but, because it does not provide an account of how individuals acquire the right to parent a particular baby, it is insufficient (...) for addressing the question whether and why there is a right to parent one’s biological child. Such a right is important because, in its absence, fairness towards adequate prospective parents who are involuntarily childless would demand a ‘babies redistribution’; moreover, in societies with entrenched histories of injustice there may be reasons of fairness for shuffling babies amongst all recent parents. I supplement the Brighouse-Swift account of fundamental parental rights by an account of how adequate parents acquire the right to parent their biological babies. I advance two arguments to this conclusion: by the time of birth, the birth parents will have already shouldered various burdens in order to bring children into existence, and are likely to have formed an intimate relationship with the future baby. Denying birth parents who would make at least adequate parents the right to keep their baby would be unfair to them and would destroy already formed parent-baby relationships which, I assume, are intrinsically valuable. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHow should we conceive of a right to reproduce? And, morally speaking, what might be said to justify such a right? These are just two questions of interest that are raised by the technologies of assisted reproduction. This paper analyses the possible legitimate grounds for a right to reproduce within the two main theories of rights; interest theory and choice theory.

ABSTRACTThe jus ad bellum criterion of right intention is a central guiding principle of just war theory. It asserts that a country’s resort to war is just only if that country resorts to war for the right reasons. However, there is significant confusion, and little consensus, about how to specify the CRI. We seek to clear up this confusion by evaluating several distinct ways of understanding the criterion. On one understanding, a state’s resort to war is just only (...) if it plans to adhere to the principles of just war while achieving its just cause. We argue that the first understanding makes the CRI superfluous, because it can be subsumed under the probability of success criterion. On a second understanding, a resort to war is just only if a state’s motives, which explain its resort to war, are of the right kind. We argue that this second understanding of the CRI makes it a significant further obstacle to justifying war. However, this second understanding faces a possible infinite regress problem, wh... (shrink)

In this commentaryI evaluate the claim made byKeenan, Nelson, OÕConnor, and Pascual-Leone (2001) that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity, self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere. This reasoning is based on the assumption that self-recognition represents a valid operationalization of self-awareness; I present two views that challenge this rationale. Keenan et al. also support their claim with published evidence relating brain activityand self-awareness; I closelyexamine their analysis of one specific review (...) of literature and conclude that it appears to be biased. Finally, recent research suggests that inner speech (which is associated with left hemispheric activity) is linked to self-awareness—an observation that further casts doubt on the existence of a right hemispheric self-awareness. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. (shrink)

This paper draws upon Hannah Arendt's idea of the 'right to have rights' to critique the current protection gap faced by refugees today. While refugees are protected from refoulement once they make it to the jurisdiction or territory of a state, they face an ever-increasing array of non-entrée policies designed to stymie access to state territory. Without being able to enter a state capable of securing their claims to safety and dignity, refugees cannot achieve the rights which ought to (...) be afforded to them under international law. Drawing upon both legal theory and political philosophy, this paper argues that refugees today, just as the stateless in Arendt’s time, must be afforded the ‘right to have rights’, understood as a right to enter state territory. (shrink)

New dimensions in different ethical scenarios following genetic information require new medical-ethical Action Guides for physician-patient interaction. This paper discusses the ambiguity in moral choice between a “right not to know” and “a duty to know”, regarding parental decisionmaking pro or contra selective abortion following prenatal screening for autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease (Potter III) and related public policy issues.

While Rawls’s theory has often been used to critique inherited wealth inequalities, this paper explores an underexamined possibility: a Rawlsian justification of inheritance. I argue that the right to bequeath can be justified when regulated by the Difference Principle. According to this principle, bequests can be permissible if they function as an incentive that maximally benefits the least advantaged. To meet this condition, I propose a specific inheritance tax design – sensitive to the disincentive effects of receiving large inheritances (...) and the incentive scope of bequeathing – with progressive rates based both on the amount received and the number of transfers. (shrink)

Is there a right or wrong way to play a game? Many think not. Some have argued that, when we insist that players obey the rules of a game, we give too much weight to the author’s intent. Others have argued that such obedience to the rules violates the true purpose of games, which is fostering free and creative play. Both of these responses, I argue, misunderstand the nature of games and their rules. The rules do not tell us (...) how to interpret a game; they merely tell us what the game is. And the point of the rules is not always to foster free and creative play. The point can be, instead, to communicate a sculpted form of activity. And in games, as with any form of communication, we need some shared norms to ground communicative stability. Games have what has been called a “prescriptive ontology.” A game is something more than simply a piece of material. It is some material as approached in a certain specified way. These prescriptions help to fix a common object of attention. Games share this prescriptive ontology with more traditional kinds of works. Novels are more than just a set of words on a page; they are those words read in a certain order. Games are more than just some software or cardboard bits; they are those bits interacted with according to certain rules. Part of a game’s essential nature is the prescriptions for how we are to play it. What’s more, we investigate the prescriptive ontology of games, we will uncover at least distinct prescriptive categories of games. Party games prescribe that we encounter the game once; heavy strategy games prescribe we encounter the game many times; and community evolution games prescribe that we encounter the game while embedded in an ongoing community of play. (shrink)

Both of Spinoza’s major political works make frequent use of the concept of right (jus). However, his understanding of right–both natural right and political right–is not moralistic. That is, to have (a) right is not an intrinsic moral status, such that others have a moral obligation either to provide some benefit or to avoid interference with the rightsholder. For Spinoza, if someone lacks the actual power to take some action or secure some benefit, they also (...) lack the right to take that action or obtain that benefit. The same point applies to political authorities: when a political authority lacks the power to enact some law, it is simply false that they have the right to enact that law. Spinoza holds that in our political thinking, we must confront the actual distribution of power in the world, not "a Fantasy, possible only in a Utopia, or in the golden age of the Poets" (TP1.1). This entry examines three components of Spinoza’s view of right: his doctrine of natural right; his account of how people transfer their natural right to a central authority to form a civil order; and his notion of being sui juris, in command of one’s own right. (shrink)

The emerging international biomedical law tends to recognise the right not to know one’s genetic status. However, the basis and conditions for the exercise of this right remain unclear in domestic laws. In addition to this, such a right has been criticised at the theoretical level as being in contradiction with patient’s autonomy, with doctors’ duty to inform patients, and with solidarity with family members. This happens especially when non-disclosure poses a risk of serious harm to the (...) patient’s relatives who, without that vital information, could be deprived of preventive or therapeutic measures. This paper argues, firstly, that individuals may have a legitimate interest in not knowing their genetic make up to avoid serious psychological consequences; secondly, that this interest, far from being contrary to autonomy, may constitute an enhancement of autonomy; thirdly, that the right not to know cannot be presumed, but must be “activated” by the individual’s explicit choice, and fourthly, that this is not an absolute right, in the sense that it may be restricted when disclosure to the patient is necessary in order to avoid a risk of serious harm to third persons. (shrink)

In the seventeenth century, John Locke, while laying the foundations of the liberal system, was the first to theorise the right of rebellion. Within his framework, revolt against an oppressive regime was considered a collective right. However, as recent attempts at revolution under authoritarian regimes have demonstrated, the exercise of this right can prove challenging in the context of digital technologies. Compared to Locke’s era, there are notable developments concerning the motivations, principal actors, and methods of citizen (...) uprisings. Digital technologies have played a significant role not only in facilitating revolts but also in enabling authoritarian restorations. This has underscored the urgency of safeguarding the right to rebellion by updating counterpowers against authoritarian tendencies to address the challenges of the digital age. (shrink)

Compulsory (health) service contracts have recently received considerable attention in the normative literature. The service contracts are considered and offered as a permissible and liberal alternative to emigration restrictions if individuals relinquish their right to exit via contract in exchange for the state‐funded tertiary education. To that end, the recent normative literature on the service programmes has particularly focused on discussing the circumstances or conditions in which the contracts should be signed, so that they are morally binding on the (...) part of the skilled workers. However, little attention is devoted to the relevance of the right to exit for the debate on compulsory service programmes. In this paper, I argue that even if the service contracts are voluntary, and thus the would‐be medical students voluntarily relinquish their right to exit, the reasons behind the right should be taken into account for the contracts to be morally valid. A clear understanding of the right to exit is a must in order not to breach its basic components and for the service contracts to be morally binding. To that end, I provide two accounts of the reasons to value the right to exit by presenting Patti Lenard's discussion of the right to exit and by reconstructing James Griffin's account of human rights. I conclude by offering brief ethical considerations for compulsory health service programmes grounded in the reasons to value the right to exit. (shrink)

This article offers a justification for the continued use of jury trials. I shall critically examine the ability of juries to render just verdicts, judicial impartiality, and judicial transparency. My contention is that the judicial system that best satisfies these values is most preferable. Of course, these three values are not the only factors relevant for consideration. Empirical evidence demonstrates that juries foster both democratic participation and public legitimation of legal decisions regarding the most serious cases. Nevertheless, juries are costly (...) and, therefore, economically less efficient than competing modes of trial. I do not argue that all human beings possess an inalienable legal right to be tried by a jury. However, it is my hope that this analysis will make clear what we might gain or lose when we propose jury reforms. (shrink)

Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars see this as evidence that that Mengzi endorsed a right of popular rebellion. I argue that the text of the Mengzi reveals a more mixed view, and does so in two respects. First, it suggests that the people are sometimes permitted to participate in a rebellion but not permitted to decide for themselves when rebellion is warranted. Second, it gives appropriate moral weight not to the people’s (...) judgments about the justifiability of rebelling, but rather to certain affections and behaviors that closely track their life satisfaction. I contend that in both respects the permissions Mengzi grants the people fall short of a proper right of rebellion. I conclude that the more historical account of Mengzi’s “just revolt theory” suggests an intriguing division of justificatory labor, and note some of the advantages of this account. (shrink)

This book explores how traditional theories of economic justice, both from the libertarian right and the egalitarian left, have failed to appreciate the objection against exploitative behavior that would be possible through the exercise of property rights. This failure also underlies the recent plea for a so-called unconditional basic income.

Under no circumstances should the absurd "right to roam‟ be incorporated into the legislation of this country. In reality, it is clearly a mere licence to trespass. Armed with the appropriate economic and philosophical arguments, we should eventually be able to offer an effective counter-attack with a movement for the "right to own‟ privately every last one of the state-controlled commons, heaths, hills, mountains, downs, woodlands, rivers, beaches, and footpaths. As a result, there will be no imposition on (...) legitimate landowners and more access to better resources for ramblers. (shrink)

A critical discussion of Christine Swanton's target-centred account of right action.

Sketched out against the backdrop of the far-right’s response to the Anthropocenic COVID-19 pandemic, this essay analyses Schild & Vrienden’s [Shield & Friends’] memetic activism. Part of the global far right, Schild & Vrienden (or S&V) positions itself as a Belgian Flemish alt-right youth movement out to culturally – or metapolitically – alter society (Pano 2018; Maly 2019). Digital meme-making is one of S&V’s most notorious metapolitical strategies. Arguing that digital memes that are spread and reworked by (...) social media users have ‘making live and letting die’-powers (Lykke 2019) and are thus an important part of the far right and the alt-right’s investment in a dehumanising bio-/necropolitics, this chapter investigates S&V’s memetic activism before, during, and after the pandemic. This is done to gain a better understanding of their white supremacist and anti-LGBTQIA politics. The research presented in this essay furthermore contributes to memetic theory, Queer Death Studies (Radomska et al. 2019, 2020; MacCormack et al. 2021), and critical theory by zooming in on the affective hauntings of the ‘Kongo’ memetic assemblage, alt-right memes’ microspectropolitics, and memes’ queer(ing) potential via the posthumanising post-representational perspectives of Baradian (2007, 2010) agential realism and Deleuzoguattarian (2005) micropolitics. (shrink)