The Trobriand Islanders about whom this study-is concerned, have been studied intensively by Professor Bronislaw Malinowski, who has published his results in several monographs. This essay is based entirely on his writings. It does not add any material to what Professor Malinowski has presented. It tries, rather, to formulate what is not explicitly stated;— the logical and ethical implications of the customary behavior of the Trobrianders. If at times I venture to disagree with Professor Malinowski's own deductions, it is only (...) because, in presenting the material with such a wealth of pertinent detail and emotional association, he has made it possible for his readers to draw conclusions as valid as his own. (shrink)

A major disagreement between different views about the foundations of quantum mechanics concerns whether for a theory to be intelligible as a fundamental physical theory it must involve a ‘primitive ontology’ (PO), i.e. variables describing the distribution of matter in four-dimensional space–time. In this article, we illustrate the value of having a PO. We do so by focusing on the role that the PO plays for extracting predictions from a given theory and discuss valid and invalid derivations of (...) predictions. To this end, we investigate a number of examples based on toy models built from the elements of familiar interpretations of quantum theory. (shrink)

The paper seeks to make progress from stating primitive ontology theories of quantum physics – notably Bohmian mechanics, the GRW matter density theory and the GRW flash theory – to assessing these theories. Four criteria are set out: internal coherence; empirical adequacy; relationship to other theories; explanatory value. The paper argues that the stock objections against these theories do not withstand scrutiny. Its focus then is on their explanatory value: they pursue different strategies to ground the textbook (...) formalism of quantum mechanics, and they develop different explanations of quantum non-locality. In conclusion, it is argued that Bohmian mechanics offers a better prospect for making quantum non-locality intelligible than the GRW matter density theory and the GRW flash theory. (shrink)

We give a new and elementary construction of primitive positive decomposition of higher arity relations into binary relations on finite domains. Such decompositions come up in applications to constraint satisfaction problems, clone theory and relational databases. The construction exploits functional completeness of 2-input functions in many-valued logic by interpreting relations as graphs of partially defined multivalued ‘functions’. The ‘functions’ are then composed from ordinary functions in the usual sense. The construction is computationally effective and relies on well-developed methods of (...) functional decomposition, but reduces relations only to ternary relations. An additional construction then decomposes ternary into binary relations, also effectively, by converting certain disjunctions into existential quantifications. The result gives a uniform proof of Peirce’s reduction thesis on finite domains, and shows that the graph of any Sheffer function composes all relations there. (shrink)

Rational agents seem more confident in any possible event than in an impossible event. But if rational credences are real-valued, then there are some possible events that are assigned 0 credence nonetheless. How do we differentiate these events from impossible events then when we order events? de Finetti (1975), Hájek (2012) and Easwaran (2014) suggest that when ordering events, conditional credences and subset relations are as relevant as unconditional credences. I present a counterexample to all their proposals in this paper. (...) While their proposals order possible and impossible events correctly, they deliver the wrong verdict for disjoint possible events assigned equal positive credence. (shrink)

Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu (...) quoque. Dasgupta and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma. (shrink)

This paper draws on the 'Fitting Attitudes' analysis of value to argue that we should take the concept of fittingness (rather than value) as our normative primitive. I will argue that the fittingness framework enhances the clarity and expressive power of our normative theorising. Along the way, we will see how the fittingness framework illuminates our understanding of various moral theories, and why it casts doubt on the Global Consequentialist idea that acts and (say) eye colours are (...) normatively on a par. We will see why even consequentialists, in taking rightness to be in some sense determined by goodness, should not think that rightness is conceptually reducible to goodness. Finally, I will use the fittingness framework to explicate the distinction between consequentialist and deontological theories, with particular attention to the contentious case of Rule Consequentialism. (shrink)

In this influential work, first published in English in 1963, Durkheim and Mauss claim that the individual mind is capable of classification and they seek the origin of the ‘classificatory function’ in society. On the basis of an intensive examination of forms and principles of symbolic classification reported from the Australian aborigines, the Zuñi and traditional China, they try to establish a formal correspondence between social and symbolic classification. From this they argue that the mode of classification is determined by (...) the form of society and that the notions of space, time, hierarchy, number, class and other such cognitive categories are products of society. Dr Needham’s introduction assesses the validity of Durkhiem and Mauss’s argument, traces its continued influence in various disciplines, and indicates its analytical value for future researches in social anthropology. (shrink)

There is a profound difference between the intellectual activity of the primitive man inclined to myth-making, superstition, and visualizing mystical powers and that of the educated European of our own day with his search for exact scientific knowledge. Modern culture tends to educate the mind in the direction of sober scientific thought, and it is very important that this tendency should be subjected to a critical examination. Before beginning the pursuit of the educational ideal it is essential to see (...) wherein the difference between the savage and the civilized mind really consists and to determine the relative value of primitive and scientific thought. (shrink)

This paper extends the three-valued paraconsistent logic LFI1 to a class of multimodal systems, generating an infinite hierarchy of three-valued paraconsistent multimodal logics. LFI1, a member of the family of Logics of Formal Inconsistency, is now enriched with multimodal operators. A system is classified as multimodal if its language has more than one modal operator as primitive and such operators are not interdefinable. We provide possible-worlds (or Kripke semantics) characterizations for all such multimodal logics by means of natural canonical (...) models ruled by a relation algebra, and discuss some aspects connected to the interpretation and uses of such logics. (shrink)

Preference, according to many theories of human behaviour, is a very important phenomenon. It is therefore some what surprising that philosophers of mind pay so little attention to it. One question about preference concerns its variety. Is preference always preference for one option or state of affairs rather than another? Or is there also, as ordinary language suggests, object-preference – preferences for one person rather than another, for one country rather than another, for one value rather than another? Another (...) question or rather group of questions concerns the nature of preference. Is it a mental state, disposition, act or episode, a theoretical construct, a purely behavioural phenomenon? If it is a mental state or act, is it an intellectual, affective or a conative phenomenon? If it is an affective phenomenon, does it enjoy a positive or negative “valence”? Is preference to be understood as a relation between a person’s attitudes or is it a primitive phenomenon? (shrink)

In this article, I first analyze and assess the epistemological and semantic status of canonical value-range equations in the formal language of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. I subsequently scrutinize the relation between (a) his informal, metalinguistic stipulation in Grundgesetze I, Section 3, and (b) its formal counterpart, which is Basic Law V. One point I argue for is that the stipulation in Section 3 was designed not only to fix the references of value-range names, but that it was (...) probably also intended to play a regulative role with an eye to Basic Law V. I further intend to shed new light on the status of Frege’s identification of the truth-values with their unit classes in Grundgesetze I, Section 10 and determine its place and importance in his overall logicist project. In a subsequent section, I first discuss the hypothetical extendability of the logical system of Grundgesetze. In what follows, I analyze the incompleteness of that system—were it not inconsistent and hence trivially complete—by focusing on the role of the definite description operator and the axiom governing it (= Basic Law VI) as well as on the role of the application operator. The latter is defined by means of the former. I further comment on the redundancy of an axiom that could be designed to supplement Basic Law VI by incorporating the second clause of Frege’s two-part elucidation of the description operator. I argue that although it seems likely that Basic Law VI could have been shown to be dispensable in Grundgesetze, Frege would probably have been reluctant to dispense with it, despite his commitment to axiomatic parsimony. In my view, the reason is that he considers it essential that every primitive function-name of his formal language be governed and grounded by a basic law that is tailored to the nature and the role of the primitive name occurring at a key point in the law. Toward the end of the article, I propose solutions to two problems with Frege’s use of “=” in the concept-script sentences that result from his definitions involving the replacement of the double stroke of definition with the judgment-stroke. I conclude the article with a summary of the main results that I have achieved. (shrink)

This article examines Deleuze & Guattari’s reworking of the Marxian category of surplus-value in Anti-Oedipus, expanding it beyond capitalism. The authors distinguish four types: surplus-value of code, specific to pre-capitalist societies (primitive and despotic), where an extra-economic instance (moral, religious, political) dominates the coding of flows and the extraction of surplus is discernible, as in tribute or corvée; the human, from the capital–labor contradiction; the machinic, from advanced capitalism with technoscience; and surplus-value of flow, which is (...) intrinsically capitalist and encompasses both the human and the machinic. A fifth type, financial surplus-value, is mentioned in seminars. Surplus-value of flow is properly capitalist, operating under generalized decoding, where the economic instance is determining and dominant. It is characterized by differential relations between flows of distinct potencies, such as financing and means of payment, capital and labor (human surplus-value), and market and technoscientific innovation (machinic surplus-value). Financial surplus-value functions in the integration of human and machinic surplus-values into surplus-value of flow. Machinic surplus-value underscores the centrality of knowledge and technoscience, where human labor becomes “machinic” and adjacent to productive processes. The immeasurable nature and non-localizable command are essential features of surplus-value of flow, which manifests as an impersonal economic force. (shrink)

In this influential work, first published in English in 1963, Durkheim and Mauss claim that the individual mind is capable of classification and they seek the origin of the ‘classificatory function’ in society. On the basis of an intensive examination of forms and principles of symbolic classification reported from the Australian aborigines, the Zuñi and traditional China, they try to establish a formal correspondence between social and symbolic classification. From this they argue that the mode of classification is determined by (...) the form of society and that the notions of space, time, hierarchy, number, class and other such cognitive categories are products of society. Dr Needham’s introduction assesses the validity of Durkhiem and Mauss’s argument, traces its continued influence in various disciplines, and indicates its analytical value for future researches in social anthropology. (shrink)

Beginning with a review of Michael Pollan's latest book about the renaissance of research into the use of psychedelics to treat addiction, depression, and end-of-life anxiety, this essay considers wisdom and insight that might be gained by examining the psychedelic practices of primitive people. Pollan finds that almost all who begin using psychedelics to treat the ill eventually come to the conclusion that they should be made available for the broader purpose of 'the betterment of well people'. By considering (...) both scientific and spiritual perspectives on these compounds, the book offers insight into the toxicity not only of our mental environment, but at the same time our relationship to fellow humanity and Mother Nature. However, Pollan does not consider what is perhaps the greatest source of wisdom regarding the pharmacological potential of psychedelics: primitive societies who have long incorporated these compounds into their ways of being. By casting anthropological accounts of primitive psychedelic practices against those of contemporary research, this essay seeks to deepen enquiry into the pathologies of modern personhood as they bear upon the ecological crisis, together with the potential value of entheogens for understanding and responding to these problems. (shrink)

Olthuis makes a singular contribution in bringing the "Philosophy of the Law-Idea" to the attention of philosophers who lack other access to this development in contemporary Dutch thought. His presentation concentrates on applications to ethics. He begins with a thorough exposition of G. E. Moore's ethical theory, to which he applies "history's critique"--a resumé of Ayer and Stevenson, of Oxford meta-ethics, and of the "new wave" of naturalism set in motion by Anscombe and Foot in 1958. Olthuis finds that neither (...) Moore nor the subsequent philosophers could long stave off the irreconcilable extreme of absolute value or absolute relativism. "... the main source of difficulty in the constrictive nature of the... ontological schema," and, underlying that, in the claim that theoretical thought is neutral. In a valuable final chapter, he presents a "perspective for a way out" based on work by H. Dooyeweerd and D. H. Th. Vollenhoven. One key to their Philosophy of the Law-Idea lies in "norm-laws." Like "natural" laws, what is subject to them cannot withdraw. Unlike "natural" laws, they demand human acknowledgment to be fulfilled. He rejects both "ought" and "goodness" as adequate primitive concepts for ethics in favor of stress upon its irreducible "sphere-sovereignty." The cosmos stands under a structural law-order, made up of many modal laws determining the many modalities of reality. Within the normative, ethics is only one special modal science. Its job is to investigate the ethical norm-law, that which is subject to it, and the correlations between these two.--M. B. M. (shrink)

The Paper is dedicated to philosophical fundamentals of the Marx’s theory of product value. The author proves that in the Marx’s theory the value of the product of labour and, correspondently, of the commodity is defined inaccurately. He thinks that the concept of labour, presented in the economic theory of K. Marx, undeservedly ignores the role of intellectual activity of an individual in production of material goods. Marx considered mental activity as integral part of physical labour. This Marx’s (...) viewpoint takes in account only the controlling mental activity of an individual in the process of labour. The author thinks that such form of labour existed only in conditions of primitive manufacture, when a worker himself invented the product of labour and then created it with the help of materialactivity. In the period of industrial production of material goods, starting from the late 18th century, the intellectual labour separated from the physical labour and by its status became a sufficient independent stage of public production process. In this connection it is necessary to reconsider a number of such important concepts of philosophical fundamentals of economics as labour, value and wealth. (shrink)

A model of judgment aggregation is presented in which judgments on propositions are not binary but come in degrees. The primitives are a set of propositions, an entailment relation, and a “triangular norm” which establishes a lower bound on the degree to which a proposition is true whenever it is entailed by a set of propositions. Under standard assumptions, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the collective judgments to be both deductively closed and free from veto power. This (...) condition says that the triangular norm used to establish the lower bound must contain a zero divisor. (shrink)

The problem of the value of knowledge is one of the most discussed in epistemology in recent times. Why should we strive to acquire knowledge, and not just true beliefs or relevant information about the subject of our cognitive interest? It is not hard to show that knowledge has certain instrumental value; but defenders of the idea in question usually mean that knowledge is valuable regardless of its practical consequences. It is not easy to justify this position, though. (...) Some believe that knowledge is a better guide to truth than just true beliefs, or even that knowledge guarantees truth. Others try to identify intrinsic properties of knowledge which can give knowledge additional value due to having their own relevant value. Yet others deny that knowledge has special value that distinguishes it cognitively from true belief, at least universally. Many agree that it can be shown that the possession of knowledge of one kind or another is more valuable than just believing the proposition which is true. But it is much more difficult to show that knowledge is universally more valuable due to some of its own properties, rather than circumstances. But those, who talk about special value of knowledge, normally mean some intrinsic and universal value to be reflected in definition. The article examines several popular explanations of the special epistemic value of knowledge and identifies their shortcomings. The author believes that it is easier for some types of knowledge than for some others to show how knowledge is more valuable than just true belief. The most primitive as well as the most abstract types of knowledge are most often functionally indistinguishable from the corresponding true beliefs. Meanwhile, many types of knowledge have modal functional differences from the corresponding true beliefs, and it is possible to show why they may have additional epistemic value. However, in its universal form, this idea is most likely impossible to defend. (shrink)

The problem of the value of knowledge is one of the most discussed in epistemology in recent times. Why should we strive to acquire knowledge, and not just true beliefs or relevant information about the subject of our cognitive interest? It is not hard to show that knowledge has certain instrumental value; but defenders of the idea in question usually mean that knowledge is valuable regardless of its practical consequences. It is not easy to justify this position, though. (...) Some believe that knowledge is a better guide to truth than just true beliefs, or even that knowledge guarantees truth. Others try to identify intrinsic properties of knowledge which can give knowledge additional value due to having their own relevant value. Yet others deny that knowledge has special value that distinguishes it cognitively from true belief, at least universally. Many agree that it can be shown that the possession of knowledge of one kind or another is more valuable than just believing the proposition which is true. But it is much more difficult to show that knowledge is universally more valuable due to some of its own properties, rather than circumstances. But those, who talk about special value of knowledge, normally mean some intrinsic and universal value to be reflected in definition. The article examines several popular explanations of the special epistemic value of knowledge and identifies their shortcomings. The author believes that it is easier for some types of knowledge than for some others to show how knowledge is more valuable than just true belief. The most primitive as well as the most abstract types of knowledge are most often functionally indistinguishable from the corresponding true beliefs. Meanwhile, many types of knowledge have modal functional differences from the corresponding true beliefs, and it is possible to show why they may have additional epistemic value. However, in its universal form, this idea is most likely impossible to defend. (shrink)

Abstract: Traditional economics treats core concepts such as "value" and "utility" as a priori, quantifiable givens, leading to a "disembodied" dilemma in its theoretical framework. Based on the triad of "Embodied Perception, Information Exchange, and Dynamic Interconstitution" proposed in Embodiment-Symbiosis: The Construction and Interpretation of a Dynamic Philosophical System Framework, this paper constructs a new framework for interpreting economic philosophy. This framework anchors the essence of economic activity in the expansion and interaction of individual and collective "meaning-generating spaces," thereby (...) providing a consistent and profound meta-theoretical explanation for the origin of value, the motivation for transaction, the nature of currency, the operation of financial markets, distributive justice, and the production-consumption cycle. This paper argues that the economy is not an objective system detached from subjective experience, but rather a meaning network rooted in human embodiment, achieving consensus through information exchange, and continuously evolving through dynamic co-construction. This perspective not only explains various economic phenomena, ranging from primitive exchange to complex finance, but also, through its inherent normativity, provides a solid philosophical foundation for critiquing economic alienation and power exploitation. (shrink)

The dominant framing of artificial general intelligence (AGI) alignment treats the alignment problem as one of value specification: how to ensure that a sufficiently capable artificial system pursues goals or instantiates values that are beneficial to humanity. This paper argues that the values framing inherits a philosophical misconception that makes the alignment problem structurally harder than it needs to be, and proposes an alternative grounded in Constraint Theory (CT) — the thesis, established by transcendental argument, that constraint is the (...) ontological primitive constitutive of determinate existence as such. -/- On the CT account, what makes an agent the agent it is is not the goals it pursues but the constraint profile it instantiates: the specific configuration of exclusion relations that constitutes its possibility space and determines what actions are admissible and what are not. The alignment problem, reframed, is not the problem of specifying the right values for an AGI but the problem of instantiating the right constraint profile: a structure of admissibility and inadmissibility that makes beneficial actions available and harmful actions genuinely impossible rather than merely penalised. -/- CT’s distinction between constitutive and merely restrictive constraint is directly applicable here and has not previously been deployed in the alignment literature. A merely restrictive constraint penalises certain behaviours within a pre-given possibility space; a constitutive constraint structures the possibility space itself, making certain actions inadmissible rather than costly. The paper argues that robust AGI alignment requires constitutive constraints — constraints that are instantiated in the system’s architecture at a sufficiently deep level that they cannot be circumvented by instrumental reasoning. The values framing systematically produces merely restrictive constraints, which is why it generates the pathological failure modes — reward hacking, specification gaming, goal misgeneralisation — that are well-documented in the alignment literature. -/- The paper engages the principal approaches to alignment — utility maximisation, RLHF, Constitutional AI, value learning, corrigibility — and shows how the CT framework either explains their limitations or grounds their successes. It develops a positive proposal: AGI alignment as constraint profile specification, the selection of the admissibility structure within which AGI capability operates. It addresses the principal objections and closes with the implications of the CT account for the governance and institutional design of advanced AI systems. (shrink)

The beginning of Marx’s Capital has references to Hegel’s Logic of Being. From the individual commodity considered in isolation, Marx derives the value form as the germ cell of capitalist society. Marx’s materialist inversion of the Hegelian dialectic posits the value form as a spectral objectivity that constitutes the real abstraction specific to capitalism. As the most abstract expression of capital, it rules unconsciously the totality of social praxis as an absolute fetish. Value arises from a double (...) mystification: the reification of capitalist social relations of production in an objective abstract form, and its representation in concrete objects, as commodities and money in circulation. Value, as the real abstraction of capitalist social relations of production, is the disjunctive synthesis between the despotic command of capital in production and the reciprocity of exchange in circulation. In the final chapter on primitive accumulation, Marx identifies its historical genesis in the dispossession of the commons, which, by separating the subjective from the objective conditions of production, gives rise to the capital-wage labour relation. (shrink)

Frege's concern in GGI §10 is neither with the epistemological issue of how we come to know about value-ranges, nor with the semantic-metaphysical issue of whether we have said enough about such objects in order to ensure that any kind of reference to them is possible. The problem which occupies Frege in GGI §10 is the general problem according to which we ‘cannot yet decide’, for any arbitrary function, what value ‘’ has if ‘ℵ’ is a canonical (...) class='Hi'>value-range name. This is a problem with the ‘reference’ of value-range names, but only in the weak sense that, if we do not exercise care, value-range terms might become ‘bedeutungslos’ for purely formal reasons. Frege addresses the general problem only for the primitive function- and object-names he has already introduced into his concept-script. I argue that this methodology was perfectly intentional: his intention for GG in general, on display in GGI §10, is to check, for each primitive function- and object-name, as it is introduced into concept-script, whether it interacts with the other primitive names which have already been introduced in such a way that these atomic combinations of primitive names do not become bedeutungslos. If there is a risk of producing a bedeutungslos combination, Frege will make an arbitrary stipulation to ensure that logical hygiene is maintained. I argue that this interpretation does not violate some of the other principal commitments of GG. (shrink)

Computational functionalism [5] fails to understand the embodied and situated nature of behaviour by taking steady state functions as theoretical primitives, and by interpreting cognitive behaviour from a language-like, observer dependant framework without a naturalized normativity. Evolutionary functionalism [28, 27], on the other hand, by grounding functional normativity on historical processes fails to give an account of normative functionality based on the present causal mechanism producing behaviour. We propose an alternative autonomous dynamical framework where functionality is defined as contribution to (...) self-maintenance [15, 10, 35] and normativity as satisfaction of closure criteria. We develop this framework by a set of formal definitions in the framework of dynamical system theory and propose the hypothesis of an homeostatic-plasticity [31, 40] based general purpose value system as an internalized normative mechanism that selects between internal state trajectories to produce adaptive functionality under different environmental conditions. To test the hypothesis we develop a simulation model where lower level specifications of a control arquitecture (an homeostatic plastic DRNN) give rise (through a simulated evolutionary process) to adaptive behaviour in a foraging task where food sources can be poisonous or profitable. Analysis of the evolved agent show that plastic changes occur when the agent produces salient adaptive interactions, those plastic changes determining the adaptive strategy. The embodied and interactive adaptive functionality is dynamically analysed, illustrating the autonomous dynamical framework. (shrink)

Marx, like many of his contemporaries, uncritically assumed that humanity develops from primitive beginnings to ever more perfect stages. In his theory of human development he measured progress by two main standards: the decrease of all forms of dependence, and the increase of universality in man's relations to nature and to his fellow man. In our century, not only have new structures of power and dependence emerged, but successive movements have also been generated to restore the more ordered and (...) limited relationships of the past. If belief in progress is nowadays no longer self-evident, such a state of affairs can help us reflect on the conditions necessary to realize the values which determined Marx's categorical imperative, or his insistence that we overthrow all relations by which man is made a debased and enslaved being. One of these conditions is the voluntary limitation of our needs: the need to use material goods without regard for others, the need to build up or maintain security even at the cost of violence, and the need to restrict the circle of those with whom we identify to our own particular culture, race, class or ways of thinking and acting. (shrink)

Explicit axioms relating ◊ϕand □ϕ appear to be needed if ◊ is taken to be primitive. We prove that such axioms are in fact indispensable.

The paper builds on both a simply typed term system ${\cal PR}^\omega$ and a computation model on Scott domains via so-called parallel typed while programs (PTWP). The former provides a notion of partial primitive recursive functional on Scott domains $D_\rho$ supporting a suitable concept of parallelism. Computability on Scott domains seems to entail that Kleene's schema of higher type simultaneous course-of-values recursion (scvr) is not reducible to partial primitive recursion. So extensions ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ and PTWP $^e$ are (...) studied that are closed under scvr. The twist are certain type 1 Gödel recursors ${\cal R}_k$ for simultaneous partial primitive recursion. Formally, ${\cal R}_k\vec{g}\vec{H}xi$ denotes a function $f_i \in D_{\iota\to\iota}$ , however, ${\cal R}_k$ is modelled such that $f_i$ is finite, or in other words, a partial sequence. As for PTWP $^e$ , the concept of type $\iota\to\iota$ writable variables is introduced, providing the possibility of creating and manipulating partial sequences. It is shown that the PTWP $^e$ -computable functionals coincide with those definable in ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ plus a constant for sequential minimisation. In particular, the functionals definable in ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ denoted ${\cal R}^{\omega e}$ can be characterised by a subclass of PTWP $^e$ -computable functionals denoted ${\rm PPR}^{\omega e}$ . Moreover, hierarchies of strictly increasing classes ${\cal R}^{\omega e}_n$ in the style of Heinermann and complexity classes ${\rm PPR}^{\omega e}_n$ are introduced such that $\forall n\ge 0. {\cal R}^{\omega e}_n ={\rm PPR}^{\omega e}_n$ . These results extend those for ${\cal PR}^\omega$ and PTWP [Nig94]. Finally, scvr is employed to define for each type $\sigma$ the enumeration functional $E^\sigma$ of all finite elements of $D_\sigma$. (shrink)

The paper builds on a simply typed term system ${\cal PR}^\omega $ providing a notion of partial primitive recursive functional on arbitrary Scott domains $D_\sigma$ that includes a suitable concept of parallelism. Computability on the partial continuous functionals seems to entail that Kleene's schema of higher type simultaneous course-of-values recursion (SCVR) is not reducible to partial primitive recursion. So an extension ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ is studied that is closed under SCVR and yet stays within the realm of subrecursiveness. (...) The twist are certain type 1 Gödel recursors ${\cal R}_k$ for simultaneous partial primitive recursion. Formally, the value ${\cal R}_k\vec{g}\vec{H} x i$ is a function $f_i$ of type $\iota \to \iota$ , however, ${\cal R}_k$ is modelled such that $f_i$ is a finite element of $D_{\iota\to\iota}$ or in other words, a partial sequence. It is shown that the Ackermann function is not definable in ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$. (shrink)

In Hegel Contra Sociology, Gillian Rose argues that Hegel's political theory is written in the “severe style,” marking speculative thinking as the appropriate mode of exposition of capitalist modernity. By taking distance from Hegel, she maintains, Marx and Marxism retain a distinction between thought and actuality that forecloses a proper account of capital. I argue that Marx pursues speculative thinking when accounting for capital's logic of self-valorization. Speculative thinking in Rose's sense allows us to move beyond production, linking self-valorization to (...) the historical coming to be of capital. Stephanie Smallwood's work is decisive, moving beyond the commodification of labor power for the extraction of surplus value in free labor, tracing the genesis of the capital relation and the money-form itself to the circulation of African people as commodities in the trade. This is not the prehistory of capital, a primitive accumulation, but the totality of conditions that articulate capital's movement. (shrink)

We suggest possible approaches to point-free geometry based on multi-valued logic. The idea is to assume as primitives the notion of a region together with suitable vague predicates whose meaning is geometrical in nature, e.g. ‘close’, ‘small’, ‘contained’. Accordingly, some first-order multi-valued theories are proposed. We show that, given a multi-valued model of one of these theories, by a suitable definition of point and distance we can construct a metrical space in a natural way. Taking into account that interesting metrical (...) approaches to geometry exist, this looks to be promising for a point-free foundation of the notion of space. We hope also that this way to face point-free geometry provides a tool to illustrate the passage from a naïve and ‘qualitative’ approach to geometry to the ‘quantitative’ approach of advanced science. (shrink)

The analogy between colors and values is strongly interlinked with the idea that these properties are by nature dispositions or response-dependent properties. Indeed, that colors are essentially visible, and values are inherently motivational, cries out for a dispositional or a response-dependent account. Recently, Primitivism has challenged the viability of the dispositional account of colors, taking the apple, for instance, to be “gloriously, perfectly, and primitively red.” Unsurprisingly, the attack on the dispositional account of colors has found a moral analogue in (...) the view that values are sui generis irreducibly primitive properties. The question this article addresses is whether given Primitivism the analogy between colors and values is preserved; or in other words, whether Primitivism breaks the bond between the dispositional account and the analogy between colors and values. (shrink)

The well-known logic first degree entailment logic (FDE), introduced by Belnap and Dunn, is defined with |$\wedge $|⁠, |$\vee $| and |$\sim $| as the sole primitive connectives. The aim of this paper is to establish the lattice formed by the class of all 4-valued C-extending implicative expansions of FDE verifying the axioms and rules of Routley and Meyer’s basic logic B and its useful disjunctive extension B|$^{\textrm {d}}$|⁠. It is to be noted that Boolean negation (so, classical propositional (...) logic) is definable in the strongest element in the said class. (shrink)

This chapter posits that the secret of commodity fetishism is nothing other than “The Secret of Primitive Accumulation” of chapter twenty-six of _Capital_. It is no coincidence that the titles of chapter one, section four and chapter twenty-six are the only two in all of _Capital_ to reference “the secret.” They are two sides of the same twofold kinetic theory of value laid out in this book. Fetishism and primitive accumulation are entangled with each other in a (...) way rendered explicit in the history of colonialism and in the founding mythology of capitalism itself: the story of Robinson Crusoe. (shrink)

In this paper, we contribute to the further development of non-deterministic semantics for propositional modality within the 8-valued framework. As our point of departure, we take MnD, a very weak modal logic where modal operators are inter-definable and uninterpreted. We study its extensions with respect to $\Box,\Diamond,\vee,\wedge,\rightarrow $ by means of simple refinements. We provide axiomatisations for all extensions obtained through these refinements. This systematic approach enables the exploration of a wide range of non-deterministic modal logics and hones our understanding (...) of non-deterministic semantics for modality. (shrink)

In 1989, Plaza introduced the “knowing value” operator $$\mathsf{Kv}_i d$$—read as “agent $$i$$ knows the value of designator $$d$$”—as a primitive modal operator within Public Announcement Logic ($$\mathbf{PAL}$$), enabling the propositional formalization of epistemic puzzles such as “Mr. Sum and Mr. Product.” Despite this elegant innovation, the problem of providing a _complete_ axiomatization for the resulting logic $$\mathbf{PALKv}$$ remained open for over three decades. This paper resolves that problem and substantially extends the scope of knowing-value logic. (...) Our first contribution is the construction of complete axiom systems for $$\mathbf{PALKv}$$ over the class of all frames, and for its $$S5$$ extension $$\mathbf{S5PALKv}$$ over the class of $$S5$$ frames. The proof employs an abstract ternary-relation semantics that internalizes value disagreement, enabling a modular canonical-model completeness argument that circumvents the need to track designator valuations explicitly. Our second contribution generalizes knowing-value from designators to predicates. We introduce the operator $$\mathsf{Kv} P$$, interpreted as “knowing the value of predicate $$P$$,” and provide a complete semantic analysis under two interpretations drawn from linguistic question semantics: Mention-Some (knowing at least one instance) and Mention-All (knowing the complete extension). We prove strong completeness for four corresponding single-agent axiom systems: $$\mathbb{MSELKVP}_1$$, $$\mathbb{MAELKVP}_1$$, and their combined extensions incorporating both $$\mathsf{Kv} d$$ and $$\mathsf{Kv} P$$. (shrink)

This chapter closely reads the third section of _Capital_ chapter one as a crucial and illuminating foundation to Marx’s theory of value: _the appropriation of women’s labor_. This brief introductory section, found right before the start of Marx’s kinetic theory of value, thus links the first two sections of chapter one to the third section by indicating that it is precisely the twofold nature of the devalorization and value creation process immanent to the commodity that shapes the (...) patterns of motion that occur in the exchange relations of commodities. To understand value in motion, it is first necessary to see how the source of motion itself is “home-baked” in the _patriarchy of value_. This is the aim and argument of this chapter. (shrink)

in Undetermined Table d’Hôte Ingar Brinck: Investigating the development of creativity: The Sahlin hypothesis 7 Linus Broström: Known unknowns and proto-second-personal address in photographic art 25 Johan Brännmark: Critical moral thinking without moral theory 33 Martin Edman: Vad är ett missförhållande? 43 Pascal Engel: Rambling on the value of truth 51 Peter Gärdenfors: Ambiguity in decision making and the fear of being fooled 75 Göran Hermerén: NIPT: Ethical aspects 89 Mats Johansson: Roboethics: What problems should be addressed and why? (...) 103 Johan Laserna: Ambivalenta bilder 113 Anna-Sofia Maurin: Metaphysical explanation 161 Kevin Mulligan: Is preference primitive? 169 John D. Norton: How does your garden grow? 181 Johannes Persson & Annika Wallin: The distinction between internal and external validity 187 Johanna Seibt: Becoming our selves 197 Paul Slovic, Robin Gregory, David Frank, and Daniel Vastfjall: Confronting the collapse of humanitarian values in foreignpolicy decision making 209 Peter Sylwan: Det eviga livet 215 Claudine Tiercelin: Chance, love and logic: Ramsey and Peirce on norms, rationality and the conduct of life 221 Epilog 257 Frank Ramsey. (shrink)

Consider a language SL having as its primitive signs one or more atomic statements, the two connectives ‘∼’ and ‘&,’ and the two parentheses ‘’; and presume the extra connectives ‘V’ and ‘≡’ defined in the customary manner. With the statements of SL substituting for sets, and the three connectives ‘∼,’ ‘&,’and ‘V’ substituting for the complementation, intersection, and union signs, the constraints that Kolmogorov places in [1] on probability functions come to read:K1. 0 ≤ P,K2. P) = 1,K3. (...) If ⊦ ∼, then P = P + P,K4. If ⊦ A ≡ B, then P = P.2. (shrink)

This chapter shows how the projection of pleasure and pain can be integrated into a subtle form of realism. It is argued that Hume's account of the moral sense can be seen as modelled on a view of primitive animal cognition, whereby what is good for the animal is made salient in pleasurable experience; what is bad for it through painful experience. The moral pleasure and pains render salient Hume's catalogue of the morally relational values, namely that which is (...) useful or pleasing. (shrink)

This chapter argues on purely computational grounds that binary preferences cannot constitute the primitive evaluative data structure employed by evaluative cognition. The only way to make evaluative cognition work is to have a database of “computationally primitive values” from which other values not included in the database can be computed. This is called “the database calculation”. This is the only way to avoid having to store more values than it is possible to store. For such computations to make (...) sense, the computationally primitive values must be stored in such a way that it makes sense to perform mathematical computations on the values. The obvious way to do this is to store them in the form of a real-valued cardinal measure. However, for rational decision making, agents must have introspective access to the stored values, and humans cannot introspect real-valued measures of values. (shrink)

Plural logic is a logical system in which plural terms and predicates figure as primitive expressions alongside the singular resources of ordinary first-order logic. The philosophical significance of this system depends on two of its alleged features: being pure logic and providing more expressive power than first-order logic. This chapter first introduces the language and axioms of plural logic and then analyzes this logic’s main philosophical applications in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, and semantics.