Der Begriff der Natur gehort zu den grundlegenden Kategorien des abendlandischen Weltverstandnisses. Das Wort, das ihn bezeichnet, Natur, ist ein unubersetzbares Fremdwort von paneuropaischem Gebrauchsumfang. Seine lateinische Form ist jedoch selbst eine Lehnubersetzung des griechischen physis. Die Griechen waren also die Schopfer des Wortes und damit der Idee, daa die uns umgebende Welt Natur ist. Ziel dieser Untersuchung ist es, diesen ersten Schopferakt sprachlich-semantisch zu verstehen als unentbehrliche Voraussetzung einer eigentlichen Begriffsgeschichte. (Franz Steiner 1993).

Der Artikel analysiert, welchen Einfluss das Konzept der Natur (physis) auf die Gestaltung der Ethik bei Aristoteles hat. Er zeigt, wie Aristoteles insbesondere über das Konzept des menschlichen ergon eine Verbindung von deskriptiven und normativen Momenten herstellt, ohne dadurch in einen naturalistischen Fehlschluss vom Sein auf das Sollen zu verfallen. Im Zuge dieses Unternehmens wird auch der teleologische Charakter des aristotelischen Naturbegriffs im Einzelnen rekonstruiert.

The physis and nomos controversy first emerged in ancient Greek thought. This article explores Castoriadis' reactivation of the issues concerned; in particular, his radicalization of Aristotle's conception of physis and nomos. It suggests that nomos appears as multifaceted in his work. However, three key variations may be identified: empirical nomos, normative nomos and generic nomos. Empirical nomos signifies the human creation of laws. It challenges the notion, long held in western philosophy, that Being = being determined. Although all (...) laws are by humans created and thus in one sense autonomous, Castoriadis further distinguishes normatively between those societies which embrace their self-creating and self-transformative capacity and those which obscure it. Normative nomos, then, refers to the autonomous or heteronomous institution of society. The third sense of nomos refers to the creation of form. In this generic sense, it is argued that the debate shifts from the human to the non-human realm; that nomos also manifests itself in the realm of physis. (shrink)

The relationship between the physical world and technology is fraught with complications; and yet both physis and techne are necessary to create the environment in which humanity may flourish. Approaching the issue from a philosophical standpoint, this article introduces a series of papers that deal with the interface between philosophy and technology, the critical discussion of the challenges posed by technologies, and their impact or implications.

El artículo aborda la reinterpretación heideggeriana del concepto griego de physis a partir de su exégesis de Heráclito y, particularmente, desde la mística apofática de Angelus Silesius. Esta reinterpretación apofática de la physis, evidentemente extemporánea, está orientada esencialmente no por motivos estrictamente religiosos o por una oposición entre lo racional y lo irracional, sino por la búsqueda de una nueva forma de racionalidad fenomenológica - distinta de la ratio moderna - capaz de enfrentar el pensar representativo propio de (...) la técnica moderna. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band umfasst Beitrage zu einem zentralen Thema bei Platon: 'Physis' kann bei Platon im naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne als physische, biologische, materielle Natur oder im ubertragenen Sinne als eigenes Wesen, etwa hinsichtlich Seele, Kosmos oder Gottlichem, verstanden werden. So werden in diesem Band medizinische, biologische und kosmologische Ansatze ebenso wie ontologische, epistemologische und padagogische Themen zu Platons 'Physis'-Konzept fokussiert. Die zeitgenossische Nomos-Physis-Diskussion Platons mit den Sophisten sowie seine sprach- und kulturphilosophischen Uberlegungen spielen hier eine wichtige Rolle. Die (...) anspruchsvolle literarische Gestaltung der Platonischen Dialoge ist fur die genannten Fragestellungen hochst relevant, ebenso die Auseinandersetzung spaterer platonischer Philosophen mit Platons Physis-Konzept. Mit Beitragen von:Michele Abbate, Christian Brockmann, Ramon Cornavaca, Diego De Brasi, Pantelis Golitsis, Julia Knauss, Dietmar Koch, Mai Oki-Suga, Irmgard Mannlein-Robert, Oliver Primavesi, Mario Regali, Carlos Steel, Angela Ulacco. (shrink)

The ontological turn in Castoriadis' thought is exemplified in The Imaginary Institution of Society (IIS). Castoriadis did not stop there, however, but was drawn to enquire into more general ontological questions. In turn, this line of questioning made its presence felt significantly in Castoriadis' intellectual trajectory, such that, as I argue in this article, we can speak of a shift from a regional ontology of the social-historical (as developed in the IIS) to a later transregional ontology of physis as (...) creative emergence. Castoriadis' ontology of physis occurs at the convergence of three intertwined threads in his thought: the rethinking of the idea - and regions - of nature, his growing onto-epistemic critique of `objective' knowledge and his theorization of the creativity of being via time. This leads him to develop an (unfinished) philosophical cosmology that, although placing more emphasis on continuity between anthropic and non-anthropic modes of being, can still highlight the autonomy and uniqueness of the social-historical. (shrink)

Threatening the whole of nature, the climate crisis puts us on the verge of self-destruction. But what can philosophy contribute to considering this problem? It can take up the task of thinking nat...

Contemporary Western thinkers recognise the destructive effects of long-standing attitudes of mastery over nature and the dualistic and hierarchical thinking that informs them. Heraclitus’ metaphysical position is ideal for reframing these traditional stances for several reasons: first, Heraclitus’ concept of identity is dynamic and relies on a sophisticated understanding of opposites that recognises ambiguity; secondly, his philosophical position produces a model of truth as multiple rather than univocal; and finally, in Heraclitus’ self-making kosmos, human beings are not separate from the (...) processes of physis but inextricably entangled in them. Heraclitus’ philosophy offers relevant avenues for reimagining contemporary philosophical issues, particularly theories of identity, the multiplicity of truth, and the proper ethical human relation to nature. (shrink)

Questo studio investiga quali siano i punti di contatto tra il filosofo tedesco Friedrich Nietzsche e lo scrittore svedese Hjalmar Söderberg nel romanzo di quest’ultimo Doktor Glas. L’articolo prende in esame due testi nietzschiani finora poco messi in relazione con l’opera söderberghiana, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne e Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, evidenziando gli influssi che il pensiero del filosofo tedesco ha esercitato sulla concezione del Doktor Glas. L’analisi prende le mosse dai concetti di menzogna e conoscenza così come (...) formulati in Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne e dal concetto di “morte di Dio”, identificando in quest’ultimo il crollo della metafisica nel pensiero filosofico europeo a partire dalla rivoluzione copernicana. Il saggio illustra come a questo cambiamento sia sopraggiunto lo svilupparsi di una nuova sensibilità tecnico-scientifica legata alla physis, cambiamento che vede nella figura del medico il suo massimo esponente. L’articolo mette dunque in luce come nel Doktor Glas il passaggio dalla metafisica alla physis venga rappresentato come un momento di crisi esistenziale, non avendo il medico la capacità di superare il trauma della perdita della metafisica. Quest’incapacità è causata dalla conoscenza, la quale se offre la possibilità di scoprire le menzogne usate dalla società, non consente però di trovare lo stimolo per superare la condizione di vuoto causata dalla “morte di Dio”. Söderberg fornisce dunque nel suo romanzo un’interpretazione pessimistica della crisi di Fin de siècle, inquadrando nella paralisi interiore del dottor Tyko Gabriel Glas e l’omicidio inconcludente del pastore Gregorius il fallimento del passaggio dal paradigma metafisico al paradigma della physis e l’impossibilità di superare la crisi tramite una metamorfosi nella condizione di Übermensch. (shrink)

The relationship between nature and normativity in Aristotle’s practical philosophy is problematic. On the one hand, Aristotle insists that ethical virtue arises through the habitual repetition of ethically good actions, and thus no one is good or virtuous by nature. Phusikê aretê or “natural virtue” is more like cleverness (demotes) than prudence (phronêsis) and it can result in wrong actions. Yet on the other hand, at times Aristotle appears to use nature to justify normative claims. Thus the problem with Aristotle’s (...) use of the notion of nature in his practical philosophy is that in some instances what is natural seems to be ethically neutral, but in other instances it seems to set the standard for human perfection. Modern Aristotle exegetes have sometimes argued that Aristotle must, consciously or not, be using the term “nature” in at least two different senses here. To use the language of Julia Annas, when Aristotle talks about “natural virtue” in the sense of the talents or abilities which one possesses from birth, he has in mind the notion of “mere nature,” but when he discusses the perfections which a virtuous individual enjoys by his or her nature, Aristotle has in mind the notion of nature as an “ethical ideal.” I would like to suggest an alternative solution to the problem of reconciling Aristotle’s different senses of nature in his Ethics. In Nicomachean Ethics V.7, Aristotle claims that political justice {to dikaion politikon) possesses a “natural” {phusikon) part and a “conventional” {nomikori) part. Aristotle claims that both nature and convention admit of variation, and his language suggests that the two are ultimately parts which need to be interwoven or combined. Scholars who have struggled with Aristotle’s apparently disparate senses of the idea of nature have assumed that nature is an ethical ideal which can be separated from and serve as a guide for that which is merely conventional. I argue that when Aristotle invokes what is “natural” as a norm, he does so under the assumption that the natural component of a norm is ultimately separable from its conventional part only in abstraction. Just like the syllable “BA” is not reducible to the letters “b” and “a,” but instead is a whole greater than its two parts, political justice is a composite unity of nature and convention which, in unifying the two parts, transforms them. (shrink)

It is often claimed that classification, on Locke’s view, proceeds by attending to similarities between things, and it is widely argued that nothing about the sensible similarities between things determines how we are to sort them, in which case sorting substances at the phenomenal level must be arbitrary. However, acquaintance with the “internal” or hidden qualities of substances might yet reveal objective boundaries. Citing what I refer to as the Watch passage in Locke’s Essay (henceforth Watches), many commentators claim that (...) classification at the microphysical level must also be arbitrary. They conclude that sorting is arbitrary at any level of description. I refer to this as the standard reading of Locke on classification. In this paper I argue that Locke does not claim that sorting is arbitrary, either at the phenomenal level, or at the microphysical level. First, Locke does not claim in Watches that sorting is arbitrary at the microphysical level. The existence or nonexistence of objective boundaries at the microphysical level is not Watches’ topic and the passage is in fact silent on that question. Here, the standard reading mistakes a claim about the nature of the task of locating “specific differences” for a claim about the nature of the task of classification. This diagnosis proves instructive, for I argue that a similar conflation underwrites the standard reading’s claim that sorting at the phenomenal level must be arbitrary. Far from arbitrarily choosing how to sort things in terms of their phenomenal similarities, Locke thought that the mind simply follows nature’s lead. This characterization of the mind’s activity, I go on to argue, accords well with Locke’s claim that species are the workmanship of the understanding. (shrink)

“Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles” argues that Empedocles’ vision of nature stands at the juncture between the archaic conception of nature as sublime force, and the classical Greek notion of self-replicating substance. The essay first traces the Homeric notions of phyein (“to bring forth or produce”) and physis (“the entirety of a thing, all of its capacities and hidden parts”). It proceeds to argue that Empedocles attributes ontological primacy exclusively to the four roots and the (...) forces of love and strife, whose constant mixture and separation produces all things. When compared to the classical Aristotelian notion of nature, Empedocles allows for internal force and creativity, but rejects an Aristotelian telos. He instead prioritizes physis in terms of persistent principles that cause continuous coming to be and passing away through mixture, without divine purpose beyond their own motions. For Empedocles, the cosmos dances from limit to opposed limit, while leaving a wondrous trail of temporary beings in its wake. Finally, the essay relates Empedocles’ view of nature to Nietzsche’s, arguing that Nietzsche’s philosophy echoes Empedocles’ rejection of functionalism and teleology, embracing his emphasis on existence as lived. Since for Empedocles nature and culture are at one with the roots, a Nietzschean philosophy of the city that embraces existence and the union of self, others, rocks, and plants becomes possible. (shrink)

El concepto de _physis_ y sus derivados aparecen cientos de veces en los diálogos de Platón. Dado el carácter poco sistemático de su autor y los muchos años que dedicó a la escritura filosófica, no debe sorprender la diversidad de sentidos en que emplea un término ya de por sí complejo y polisémico. Por otra parte, Platón recoge, sintetiza y reelabora algunas de las concepciones fundamentales de la _physis_, siendo de especial relevancia las de los filósofos pluralistas, interesándose por los (...) elementos constitutivos del mundo físico y tomando partido en la discusión en torno a su carácter, bien mecánico, bien teleológico. En este estudio se analiza tanto la asimilación platónica de la física presocrática, como la influencia ejercida en el planteamiento aristotélico, especialmente por lo que respecta a la causalidad final y al principio del movimiento. (shrink)

The Transfigured Physis: Art and Culture as Retrieval of Nature. Immediate artistic states of nature: this is how Nietzsche characterises the states of Apollonian dream and Dionysian intoxication, to which he traces back the entire development of Greek art and culture. Art and culture are thus fundamentally natural phenomena. In striking contradiction to an important tradition rooted in contractualist theories, which tend to let culture begin only where nature ends, Nietzsche assumes an interesting continuity, if not a profound identity, (...) between the two poles. It is precisely in this sense that the second “Untimely Meditation” refers to culture as a new, improved or transfigured physis. In my chapter I will try to show that the young Nietzsche understands the transfiguration of nature that gives rise to culture as a retrieval of man’s primitive naturalness, that had to be repressed in the process of civilization. (shrink)

Die in der europäischen Philosophie schon im Mittelalter einsetzende Transformation des Seinsverständnisses zielte auf eine grundlegende Veränderung der begrifflichen Bestimmung: Das Verständnis von ‚Sein‘, bis dahin als ‚esse‘ begriffen, reduzierte sich in der Neuzeit mehr und mehr auf ein Daseinsverständnis, das sich schließlich im ‚exsistere‘ erschöpft. Damit ergeben sich weitreichende Folgen für den Naturbegriff, der in der Geschichte des Denkens einen grundlegenden Wandel erfährt. Der folgende Beitrag versucht, Konturen dieses Wandels bis hin zum zeitgenössischen Begriffsverständnis nachzuzeichnen.

Der Aufsatz umreißt eine alternative Herangehensweise an das Leib-Seele-Problem, indem er aufzeigt, wie sich im Übergang von einem vorwissenschaftlich-lebensweltlichen zu einem wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt überhaupt ein Leib-Seele-Problem stellen kann und wie sich dabei die überkommenen Schwierigkeiten aus zwei Typen von zu vermeidenden ("naturalistischen") Fehlschlüssen ergeben.

The main aim of this paper is to discuss the meaning of Lacan's uses of the structural paradigm. The investigation will emphasize the function of this use in terms of relations between psychoanalysis and history of sciences. Freud, in order to establish the epistemological identity for psychoanalyses was impelled to choose between Naturwissenschaften or Geisteswissenschaften. By assuming the natural sciences model Freud has created what one can call a certain epistemological discomfort: model and object seems not to fit each other. (...) The influence of Koyre's work is here remarkable. Lacan's uses of structural paradigm may be seemed as a strategy to create a new space for psychoanalysis in science. Only a structuralist science could formulate a conception of the subject that is nor naturalistic, nor psychological. This is showed particularly in what concerns the category of cause. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty, já ligado, em A fenomenologia da percepção, ao Lebenswelt do último Husserl e ao ser-no-mundo de Heidegger, procurará manter com a ontologia deste, em sua última e inacabada obra O visível e o invisível, mais estreita ligação, mormente em trono da questão da linguagem. Não obstante com a generalidade da noção de carne, aplicada à Natureza, e também ao corpo humano, enquanto fundante de novo Cogito, uma categoria que repele a antecedência do Dasein, sem o qual não haverá mundo (...) atual.Merleau-Ponty, already connected in The Phenomenology of Perception, to the Lebenswelt of the late Husserl and the Being - in - the - World of Heidegger, seeks to closely maintain his ontology in his final and unfinished work The Visible and the Invisible, principally in terms of the question of language. Nonetheless, there is the generality of the notion of flesh, applied to Nature, as well as to the human body, as the basis for the new Cogito, a category that repels the precedence of Dasein, without which there would be no world. (shrink)

Il saggio tratta della figura di Empedocle – pensiero e uomo insieme, per­fettamente coerenti uno con l’altro – considerandolo come un pensatore di confine, un symbolon, nel quale s’incontrano senza fondersi e senza pre­varicarsi due universi, quello del mythos e quello del logos, con tutte le lo­ro rispettive e complesse implicazioni. Tutto ciò è necessario per com­prendere la lettura che Empedocle presenta della physis, processo naturale e modo di essere ad un tempo, che si esplicita nelle quattro radici – (...) acqua, aria, terra e fuoco – che costituiscono il tutto, relazionandosi attraverso Philia e Neikos, le due forze contrarie e polari che tengono insieme l’es­sere uno e molteplice. The essay deals with the Empedocle’s figure – both man and mind per­fectly acting consistently each other – considering him like a border thin­ker, a symbolon, in wich two universes, one of the mythos and one of the logos with their respective and complex implications, meet without mixing and without prevaricating. All this is necessary to understand the Empe­docle’s reading about the physis, either a natural process or a way of being at the same time expressing itself in four roots – water, air, land and fire – which consisted the whole reporting each other through Philia and Neikos, two opposite and polar forces that keep together the one and various being. (shrink)

In EN II.1, Aristotle claims that our nature (physis) is inadequate for moral virtue. We are not, he says, in the same relation to virtue as a stone falling to earth; moral excellence is neither by nature nor contrary to our nature but reached by habituation (cf. 1103a15–20). Other texts such as Pol. I.13 and Pol. VII.12 about natural capacities, as well as those like Phys. II.1 and Meta. V.4 about physis in general, complicate the picture concerning the (...) bases for moral excellence in EN. This essay considers the range of applications of physis, focusing on the practical works, so as to examine the extent to which Aristotle thinks moral and political nature is amenable to external determinants such as cultural education. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo examinar o sentido de physis na discussão educacional das obras platônicas, contrapondo-a com o conceito de paideia. Um primeiro momento nessa discussão ocorre no Protágoras, quando o sofista epônimo propõe que todos os homens, por sua própria natureza, partilham da virtude política, afirmando, porém, que essa virtude é ensinável. Essas duas propostas aparentemente conflitantes são conciliadas na República, em que Sócrates determina a physis e a paideia como duas condições para ser integrado (...) à cidade completamente justa. Palavras-chave: filosofia grega; Platão; physis; paideia. (shrink)

Parménides es uno de los pensadores más influyentes de la filosofía occidental. El presente libro ofrece una hipótesis hermenéutica que se puede resumir en dos afirmaciones esenciales: primera, Parménides, como todos los pensadores de su tiempo, era ante todo un físico o fisiólogo (como los denominó Aristóteles), cuyas inquietudes y aportaciones se expresan en la segunda parte de su poema Sobre la naturaleza. Esa parte, escasamente representada en los fragmentos conservados, exponía una teoría original que se caracterizaba por defender una (...) física dualista frente al monismo de los milesios. Segunda, Parménides, a diferencia de la mayoría de los físicos, tomó conciencia por primera vez de la necesidad de explicar, no solo el orden de la naturaleza (physis) y las leyes que la rigen (tarea de los físicos), sino también el orden y las leyes del mundo del discurso (logos), de la teoría que trata de explicar el mundo. A esta segunda tarea, que sin duda puede ser calificada como el descubrimiento de la lógica, dedicó la primera parte de su Poema a modo de un discurso del método y no de una anacrónica especulación metafísica. (shrink)

Este artículo puede ser considerado como un comentario de Física, I. En él se expone, por lo tanto, una interpretación de la investigación mediante la que Aristóteles intenta responder a la pregunta acerca de cuántas y cuáles son las archaí del saber relativo a la physis. A través de un análisis de la crítica aristotélica de las respuestas dadas a esa pregunta por los filósofos precedentes, buscamos además aclarar y facilitar la comprensión del desarrollo de dicha interpretación. This article (...) may be considered as a commentary on Physics, I. In it is expounded, therefore, an interpretation of the research by which Aristotle tries to answer the question about how many and which are the archai of the knowledge concerning physis. By an analysis of the Aristotle's criticism of the answers given to this question by the previous philosophers, we also try to clarify and make easier the understanding of that interpretation¿s development. (shrink)