Peter Strawson holds that on a proper conception of personhood, the problem of Other Minds does not arise. I suggest that the viability of his proposal depends on a particular account of person perception. I argue that neither the theory theory nor the simulation theory of mindreading constitutes a suitable basis for this account. I then go on to defend Peter Hobson's notion of 'feeling perception' as an intersubjectivist alternative that, if properly developed, delivers a basis for (...) a viable account of person perception. In developing that alternative, I draw on John Campbell's suggestion that self-understanding is constituted, in part, by an understanding of oneself as a cause of many events. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDynamic changes in emotional expressions are a valuable source of information in social interactions. As the expressive behaviour of a person changes, the inferences drawn from the behaviour may also change. Here, we test the possibility that dynamic changes in emotional expressions affect person perception in terms of stable trait attributions. Across three experiments, we examined perceivers’ inferences about others’ personality traits from changing emotional expressions. Expressions changed from one emotion to another emotion, allowing us to disentangle (...) potential primacy, recency, and averaging effects. Drawing on three influential models of person perception, we examined perceptions of dominance and affiliation, competence and warmth, and dominance and trustworthiness. A strong recency effect was consistently found across all trait judgments, that is, the end emotion of dynamic expressions had a strong impact on t... (shrink)

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation (...) and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability. (shrink)

This research delves into the intricate process of person perception, exploring how individuals form impressions and make judgments about others’ personality traits based on facial appearances. Through a survey conducted among engineering students involving N = 246 participants, this study investigates the confidence and accuracy of judgments regarding sociability, morality, and competence. Utilizing attribution task based scale and AI-generated facial images, participants assessed personality traits and their confidence in facial judgments. The analysis reveals notable gender differences in the (...) accuracy of score predictions, with females demonstrating higher accuracy than males in forming impressions based on first encounters. Additionally, females exhibit greater accuracy in judging personality traits from facial expressions compared to males, highlighting their nuanced perception abilities. Moreover, behavior emerged as the most reliable indicator of personality traits beyond facial appearance, emphasizing the multi-faceted nature of impression formation. Overall, this study contributes to the understanding of social cognition processes and the importance of considering factors beyond facial appearance in accurately assessing personality traits. (shrink)

This study investigated person perception in respect of variables associated with affect in music following motor synchronization to music. Participants were tested in a task involving stepping with a researcher to the beat of slow or fast music in major or minor mode, following which measures concerning the synchronised partner were collected. Significant effects were found only for the ‘likeability’ measure, modulated by gender, suggesting that variables associated with affect perception in music, such as mode and tempo (...) appear relevant for person perception in a synchronization task in ways that differ for men and women. The results of this ‘proof of concept’ study indicate the need for further research on the effect of motor synchronization based on ecologically valid musical interaction tasks. (shrink)

Employee counterproductive work behavior is costly to organizations and those who work within them. Evidence suggests that employees are motivated to engage in CWB because they believe that these behaviors will make them feel better in response to negative workplace events. However, research has yet to consider the situational and individual factors that shape the extent to which employees view CWB in such a manner. In order to provide insight into the decision-making process surrounding the use of CWB as a (...) coping strategy, this study leverages coping theory to examine the factors that contribute to employees’ beliefs that CWBs will be instrumental for emotion regulation aims in response to workplace stressors. In a repeated measures scenario-based study of 297 employees, we found that individuals’ perceived coping instrumentalities for CWBs are a function of the controllability and source of the stressor as well as a more stable learned response to stressful situations at work. (shrink)

They are one personThey are two aloneThey are three togetherThey are for each other— Stephen StillsJose Luis Bermúdez has presented an argument for the “Symmetry Thesis”—that a subject's psychological awareness is constitutively linked to his awareness of other minds—by outlining an account of joint engagement. I critique Bermúdez's Neo-Lockean account of joint engagement. Since it depends upon a psychological sortal, it cannot show that self-ascription is constituted by intersubjective relations in joint engagement. It is also too rich because grasping sortals—especially (...) a psychological sortal—is a more difficult ability than joint engagement. Instead of the Neo-Lockean account, I propose the “Persons Theory” of joint engagement, according to which the recognition and acknowledgement of oneself as a person among persons is central. I argue that the Persons Theory can show that self-ascription is constituted by intersubjective relations in joint engagement and is not too rich, because recognition and acknowledgement of persons is not a more difficult ability than joint engagement. I offer two objections to my argument, and overturn both. I conclude by suggesting that the Persons Theory provides a genuinely new account of mentalizing that differs from the theory-theory and the simulation theory. (shrink)

This study aims to characterise Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) members’ perceptions on five main themes associated with ethics reviews, namely, the nature of research, ethical/moral issues, assent, participants’ risk and HREC prerogatives issues. Three hundred and sixteen HREC members from over 200 HRECs throughout Australia responded to an online questionnaire survey. The results show that in general, HREC members’ beliefs are reasoned and align with sound principles of ethical reviews. There seems to be a disposition for living up to (...) ethical/moral values, avoiding the issue of consent waivers and respecting participants’ welfare, as well as a sense of ambiguity about HREC prerogatives. Problematic areas were a tendency towards over-valuing quantitative research methods for their perceived validity and a neutral view on issuing consent waivers to participants with intellectual disability and, finally, the belief that research that limits disclosure, plans deception or actively conceals is morally unjustifiable. Implications for professional development and policy-making are discussed. (shrink)

While first-person methods are essential for a science of consciousness, it is controversial what form these methods should take and whether any such methods are reliable. I propose that first-person experiments are a reliable method for investigating conscious experience. I outline the history of these methods and describe their characteristics. In particular, a first-person experiment is an intervention on a subject's experience in which independent variables are manipulated, extraneous variables are held fixed, and in which the subject (...) makes a phenomenal judgement about the target experience of the investigation. I examine historical and contemporary examples of first-person experiments: Mariotte’s demonstration of the visual blind spot, Kanizsa’s subjective contours, the Tse Illusion, and investigations of the non-uniform resolution of the visual field. I discuss the role that phenomenal contrast plays in these methods, and how they overcome typical introspective errors. I argue that their intersubjective repeatability is an important factor in their scientific status, however, it is not the only factor. That they control for extraneous factors and confounds is another factor which sets them apart from pseudoscience (e.g., the perception of auras), and hence another reason for classifying them as genuine experiments. Furthermore, by systematically mapping out the structure of visual experience, these methods make scientific progress. Praises of such first-person experimental approaches may not always be sung by philosophers and psychologists, but they continue to flourish as respectable scientific methods nevertheless. (shrink)

Background:The understanding of factors that shape risk perception is crucial to modulate the perceived threat and, in turn, to promote optimal engagement in preventive actions.Methods:An on-line, cross-sectional, survey was conducted in Italy between May and July 2020 to investigate risk perception for COVID-19 and the adoption of preventive measures. A total of 964 volunteers participated in the study. Possible predictors of risk perception were identified through a hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis, including sociodemographic, epidemiological and, most of (...) all, psychological factors. A path analysis was adopted to probe the possible mediating role of risk perception on the relationship between the independent variables considered and the adoption of preventive measures.Results:Focusing on the psychological predictors of risk perception, high levels of anxiety, an anxious attachment, and an external locus of control predicted higher perceived risk. Conversely, high levels of openness personality and of avoidant attachment predicted a lower perception of risk. In turn, the higher was the perceived risk the higher was the adoption of precautionary measures. Furthermore, psychological factors influenced the adoption of preventive behaviors both directly and indirectly through their effect on risk perception.Conclusions:Our findings might be taken into high consideration by stakeholders, who are responsible for promoting a truthful perception of risk and proper compliance with precautionary measures. (shrink)

Knowledge of what it is for one of one’s psychological states to be causing another depends on one’s having an understanding of what happens when there is an external intervention on one’s mental life. It is our understanding of perception that provides us with our grasp of the prototypical interventions on our mental life; these interventions cannot be interpreted in agentive terms, it is a matter of the world acting on one’s beliefs, not an agent acting on one’s beliefs. (...) There is a distinction between ‘surgical’ and ‘silencing’ interventions on one’s mental life, and the paper argues that ‘silencing’ interventions are what matter for non-inferential perceptual knowledge. Grasp of the role of perception in providing these ‘silencing’ interventions is essential to an understanding of one’s own causal structure, and thus it is essential to an understanding of the first person. (shrink)

This volume grew out of a dissatisfaction with some issues that seem to be rooted in the Empiricist tradition. At least since Locke, that which is perceived has enjoyed a major share in any systematic account of what we claim to know. A main purpose of this study therefore is first to distinguish, and subsequently to relate, what can be perceived and what can be under stood. To this end, the account of persons and personal identity begins with a description (...) of selected types of sense perceptions. While writing a good part of the discussion on vision, I had the advantage of questioning Dr. P. B. Loder about the properties of light. She not only clarified some issues, but prevented several errors from creeping into the text, a result for which I am very grateful. I should like also to express my appreciation to Mrs. G. K. Stamm-Okkinga, who provided hospitality and a friendly interest from the beginning of this study. Finally I wish to thank Miss I. Ris and Mr. W. de Regt for their careful and resourceful preparation of the typescript. (shrink)

In Aspiration, Agnes Callard examines the phenomenon of aspiration, the process by which one acquires values and becomes a certain kind of person. Aspiring to become a certain type of person involves more than wanting to act in certain ways. We want to come to see the world in a certain way and to develop the dispositions, attributes, and skills that allow us to seamlessly and effectively respond to situations. The skilled athlete or musician, for example, has developed (...) the muscle memory and the perceptual equivalent to naturally see what a situation requires and to respond well, whether playing a Rachmaninoff concerto or returning a tennis volley. -/- I use Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception to flesh out the process of becoming, through which aspired-to values, skills, and characteristics become part of one’s embodied being-in-the-world. Although some rightly focus on Merleau-Ponty’s efforts to avoid over-intellectualizing skillful action, without appreciating his distinction between habitual actions and human (or personal) acts, we overlook an important aspect of robust human agency—the way “a human act becomes dormant and is continued absent-mindedly as a reflex” (90). Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit and its relation to personal acts offers a rich and phenomenologically sensitive picture of aspiration. (shrink)

Fregoli delusion is the mistaken belief that some person currently present in the deluded person's environment is a familiar person in disguise. The stranger is believed to be psychologically identical to this known person even though the deluded person perceives the physical appearance of the stranger as being different from the known person's typical appearance. To gain a deeper understanding of this contradictory error in the normal system for tracking and identifying known persons, we (...) conducted a detailed survey of all the Fregoli cases reported in the literature since the seminal Courbon and Fail paper. Our preliminary reading of these cases revealed a notable lack of definitional clarity. So, we first formulated a classification scheme of different person misidentification delusions so as to identify those cases that qualified as instances of Fregoli according to the above characterization: the mistaken belief that a known person is present in the environment in a different guise to his or her typical appearance. We identified 38 clear cases of this type and set out to answer a series of questions motivated by current hypotheses about the origin of the Fregoli delusion. We asked whether the patients misidentified particular strangers, made reference to the misidentified known persons using wigs or plastic surgery , misidentified many different strangers or only one, showed other symptoms , and made inferences about the motives of the known persons in disguise. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for current hypotheses concerning the origin of the Fregoli delusion. (shrink)

This paper develops a view of the content of perceptual states that reflects the cognitive significance those states have for the subject. Perhaps the most important datum for such a theory is the intuition that experiences are ‘transparent’, an intuition promoted by philosophers as diverse as Sartre and Dretske. This paper distinguishes several different transparency theses, and considers which ones are truly supported by the phenomenological data. It is argued that the only thesis supported by the data is much weaker (...) than those typically considered in the literature, and has no obvious implications for the existence of sensory intermediaries. It does, however, have implications for the content of perceptual experience. It is argued that combining the first personal project with the transparency intuition yields an error theory of perception. The counterintuitive implications of this error theory are mitigated, however, by an account of perceptual beliefs which allows for them to be true even if the perceptual states are non-veridical. (shrink)

Demonstrates the unique, pervasive, and overwhelmingly important role of other people within our lived experience. Drawing on the original phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Simone de Beauvoir, and John Russon, as well as recent research in child psychology, The Other in Perception argues for perception’s inherently existential significance: we always perceive a world and not just objective facts. The world is the rich domain of our personal and interpersonal lives, and central to this world is the (...) role of other people. We are “paired” with others such that our perception is really the enactment of a coinhabiting of a shared world. These relations with others shape the very way in which we perceive our world. Susan Bredlau explores two uniquely formative domains in which our pairing relations with others are particularly critical: childhood development and sexuality. It is through formative childhood experience that the essential, background structures of our world are instituted, which has important consequences for our developed perceptual life. Sexuality is an analogous domain of formative intersubjective experience. Taken as a whole, Bredlau demonstrates the unique, pervasive, and overwhelmingly important role of other people within our lived experience. (shrink)

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Second person intentional relations, involving intentional activities directed at the perceptor, are qualitatively different from first and third person relations. They generate a peculiar, bidirectional kind of intentionality, especially in the realm of visual perception. Systems specialized in dealing with this have been selected by evolution. These systems can be considered to be the evolutionary precursors to the human theory of mind.

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits—using both self and peer report measures—from groups of people who knew each other well . In previous papers, we (...) have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits. (shrink)

Social exclusion, especially social exclusion in old age, represents an area of interest at European level, in the context of demographic transformations. At national level, studies and research on social exclusion in old age are scarce, although the older population is more likely to be at risk of social exclusion. The article presents the results of a quantitative research methodology based on a questionnaire applied to older people of age 65 years and over. The research was conducted during November - (...) December 2021 and the survey was representative at national level with a margin of error of ±3.5%. The aim of this article is to analyse the perceptions of older persons regarding the access and quality of social and healthcare services accessed, and thus, to gain a better understanding on how these types of services could contribute to social inclusion. Data interpretation was made using techniques of descriptive statistical analysis. Results emphasize that access to social and healthcare services are essential in old age. Perceptions of older persons highlight the need for structural changes at national level, so that social and healthcare services could make a real contribution to reducing social exclusion. (shrink)

Mind-wandering is a psychological process involving the emergence of spontaneous thoughts in daily life. Research has shown that mind-wandering influences diverse psychological outcomes; however, less is known about possible individual differences that may drive mind-wandering. In this study, we argue that personality traits, expressed in neuroticism and openness to experience, may lead to the individual’s self-perception of their mind-wandering activity, due to meta-awareness processes. In a three-wave survey study with 273 college students, we gathered data which supported a positive (...) association of both neuroticism and openness to experience with mind-wandering self-perception, mediated by the individual’s meta-awareness. Thus, this study contributes to the literature on spontaneous thinking by showing that mind-wandering processes may be a function of individual differences expressed in personality traits. (shrink)

Richard Popkin gives the frame into which the topics of the colloquium fit: Cartesian skepticism about our knowledge of the existence of the self and the external world. Robert Fogelin sketches a prescriptive model for human action, using classical and contemporary ideas on the grammar of act descriptions. Following these individual papers, there are three symposia, consisting of a paper, comments, and author's reply. In the first, with Philip Hugly as commentator, Fred Dretske attempts to undercut skeptical attack on the (...) validity of ordinary perceptual claims. He holds that an epistemic perceptual report conveys two items: a description, and a justification of the increment in knowledge which is the crux of each particular claim. The second symposiast is Roderick Chisholm, writing with historical fluency and analytic skill on the loose and strict senses of identity. In his comments, S. Shoemaker offers a "special concern" criterion for personal identity. In the third symposium, Jaakko Hintikka argues that the logic of perceptual terms is modal, in the extended sense that most of the words used to express propositional attitudes, words like 'knows', 'believes', 'strives', serve as modal operators. Romane Clark is Hintikka's commentator. Again, the comments seem genuinely helpful in clarifying or emphasizing the issues for the reader. Hintikka tells us that he finds that traditional problems in perception are closely related to difficulties logicians have met as they try to understand the interplay between modal notions and the basic logical concepts of identity and existence. His comment expresses the sense of discovery and promise which pervades these papers. It strikes one that this Colloquium achieved a felicitous combination of high-level technique and creative scholarship.--M. B. M. (shrink)

The containment measures imposed during the first COVID-19 outbreak required economic, social, and behavioral changes to minimize the spread of the coronavirus. Some studies have focused on how personality predicts distinct patterns of adherence to protective measures with psychopathic and antisocial traits predicting reduced engagement in such measures. In this study we extended previous findings by analyzing how boldness, meanness, and disinhibition psychopathic traits relate with both risk perceptions and protective behaviors during the first COVID-19 outbreak. A sample of 194 (...) individuals engaged in the survey, were assessed for psychopathic traits with the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure, and completed a COVID-19 survey targeting risk perceptions and frequency of protective behaviors. Overall results show that boldness predicts reduced estimate of COVID-19 spread, reduced perceived risk of becoming infected, reduced state anxiety toward COVID-19, and reduced frequency of protective behaviors. Exploratory mediation models suggest that risk perceptions are not significant mediators of the association between psychopathic traits and reduced engagement in protective behaviors. Our results unveil that psychopathic traits affect risk perceptions and the propensity to engage in protective measures, emphasizing the need to accommodate these personality features in the public health strategy to control the COVID-19 spread. (shrink)

The first part of the paper focuses on the role played in thought and action by possession of the first‐person concept. It is argued that only one who possesses the I concept is in a position to fully articulate certain fundamental, a priori aspects of the concept of reason. A full understanding of the concept of reason requires being inclined to be affected or immediately motivated by reasons—to form, change or confirm beliefs or other attitudes in accordance with them—when (...) those reasons apply to one's own attitudes. The cases where rational evaluations of acts and attitudes rationally motivate immediate implementation of the evaluations to shape the acts and attitudes are distinguished from cases where they do not, by the use of the first‐person concept to mark those acts and attitudes as one's own. The second part of the paper examines asymmetries between self‐knowledge and knowledge of other minds. The usual view that self‐knowledge has an immediate and a priori warrant, whereas knowledge of others’ minds rests on observation and inference is disputed. A sketch is given of knowledge of other minds that can be non‐inferential and can rest on an intellectual, non‐perceptual entitlement. When one seemingly understands an utterance in interlocution, one is a priori prima facie entitled to suppose that it comes from a rational source, and because knowledge of other minds can be immediate and epistemically grounded in intellectual, non‐empirical entitlements, it is distinguished from self‐knowledge not by being necessarily inferential or by being necessarily grounded in perception, but by being in some known contrast with thought known as one's own. (shrink)

This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate (...) this point with a historical debate between Gestalt psychologist and atomists, both of whom used first-person methods to investigate perception. (shrink)

The debate about direct perception encompasses different topics, one of which concerns the richness of the contents of perceptual experiences. Can we directly perceive only low-level properties, like edges, colors etc., or can we perceive high-level properties and entities as well? The aim of the paper is to defend the claim that the content of our perceptual experience can include emotions and also person impressions. Using these examples, an argument is developed to defend a liberal-content view for core (...) examples of social cognition. This view is developed and contrasted with accounts which claim that in the case of registering another person’s emotion while seeing them, we have to describe the relevant content not as the content of a perceptual experience, but of a perceptual belief. The paper defends the view that perceptual experiences can have a rich content yet remain separable from beliefs formed on the basis of the experience. How liberal and enriched the content of a perceptual experience is will depend upon the expertise a person has developed in the field. This is supported by the argument that perceptual experiences can be systematically enriched by perceiving affordances of objects, by pattern recognition or by top-down processes, as analyzed by processes of cognitive penetration or predictive coding. (shrink)