Gender-based violence (GBV), particularly rape, continues to be a deeply entrenched crisis in South Africa, with one in three women experiencing sexual or physical abuse in their lifetime. This article explored a wounded healing approach to rape survivors within the context of GBV, drawing on the theological metaphor of Christ as the ultimate wounded healer to propose a framework for pastoral care that facilitates the transformation of social pain into social healing. Central to this exploration is the question: How does (...) the church respond to the pervasive issue of rape, and what is its public and pastoral role in addressing GBV? Using a literature-based methodology that follows a practical theological approach, the article explores the intersection of theological reflection, empirical analysis and contextual pastoral care. It examines the church’s potential as both a site of healing and an agent of public witness against gendered violence. The article highlighted how the lived experiences of survivors, when acknowledged and integrated into pastoral responses, can become resources for transformative care. In this wounded healer approach, survivors are not merely passive recipients of help but active participants in a healing process that draws on shared suffering and redemptive narratives. The article further proposes practical theological interventions that equip churches to shift from silence or complicity to active engagement and advocacy.Contribution: The article contributes to addressing a gap in theological scholarship on GBV by offering a contextual and praxis-oriented model of care rooted in Christian compassion, justice and social responsibility. (shrink)

Government has played a pervasive and largely overlooked role in journalists' ethical decision making. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules governing program content, and a libel law system run amok, are only two wats government influences journalists' behavior. This substitution of government ethics for private ethics creates minimum standards of conduct rather than challenging journalists to an ethical ideal. More subtly, government erects structural barriers to the development of the very technologies (like cable TV) that can offer journalists a more ethically (...) hospitable environment. In the information age, ethicists will need to be aware of, and wary of, government attempts to control development of the very media that hold the greatest ethical promise. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the basic neural mechanisms that enable action execution in humans. Using a reverse-engineering approach, the chapter starts from the phenomenon to be explained, namely, a muscle contraction, and traces its causation back to proximal neural causes in the primary motor cortex. It then searches for the causes triggering those neurons to send a motor command. One theory postulates two main pathways linking higher-order association areas to the motor cortex: a lateral and a medial one. These pathways are (...) primarily responsible for initiating movements that are either triggered by an external stimulus or are endogenously initiated, respectively. The chapter further considers whether the concept of endogenous initiation provides a satisfactory account of the intentional nature of human actions. (shrink)

This book presents the origins of Central and Eastern European phenomenology. It features chapters that explore the movement's development, its most important thinkers, and its theoretical and historical context. This collection examines such topics as the realism-idealism controversy, the status of descriptive psychology, the question of the phenomenological method, and the problem of the world. The chapters span the first decades of the development of phenomenology in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Yugoslavia before World War II. The contributors track the (...) Brentanian heritage of the development. They show how this tradition inspired influential thinkers like Celms, Špet, Ingarden, Frank, Twardowski, Patočka, and others. The book also puts forward original investigations. Moreover it elaborates new accounts of the foundations of phenomenology. While the volume begins with the Brentanian heritage, it situates phenomenology in a dialogue with other important schools of thought of that time, including the Prague School and Lvov-Warsaw School of Logic. This collection highlights thinkers whose writings have had only a limited reception outside their home countries due to political and historical circumstances. It will help readers gain a better understanding of how the phenomenological movement developed beyond its start in Germany. Readers will also come to see how the phenomenological method resonated in different countries and led to new philosophical developments in ontology, epistemology, psychology, philosophy of culture, and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

The Naked Self is a great book. It is good Kierkegaard scholarship and an excellent model of bringing history of philosophy to bear on contemporary metaphysics. After a stage-setting introduction, the book has eight main chapters and a conclusion including questions and answers from an imagined interlocutor. Stokes takes the reader from how “Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of self-experience may… be a useful resource for neo-Lockean metaphysics” to a sustained defense that “Kierkegaard himself is playing a different, and altogether more interesting, game”.Stokes’s (...) boldness is evident in his title, which remains mysterious until late in the book. Stokes draws on two key passages... (shrink)

The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. (...) Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival. (shrink)

Why do humans make music? Theories of the evolution of musicality have focused mainly on the value of music for specific adaptive contexts such as mate selection, parental care, coalition signaling, and group cohesion. Synthesizing and extending previous proposals, we argue that social bonding is an overarching function that unifies all of these theories, and that musicality enabled social bonding at larger scales than grooming and other bonding mechanisms available in ancestral primate societies. We combine cross-disciplinary evidence from archeology, anthropology, (...) biology, musicology, psychology, and neuroscience into a unified framework that accounts for the biological and cultural evolution of music. We argue that the evolution of musicality involves gene–culture coevolution, through which proto-musical behaviors that initially arose and spread as cultural inventions had feedback effects on biological evolution because of their impact on social bonding. We emphasize the deep links between production, perception, prediction, and social reward arising from repetition, synchronization, and harmonization of rhythms and pitches, and summarize empirical evidence for these links at the levels of brain networks, physiological mechanisms, and behaviors across cultures and across species. Finally, we address potential criticisms and make testable predictions for future research, including neurobiological bases of musicality and relationships between human music, language, animal song, and other domains. The music and social bonding hypothesis provides the most comprehensive theory to date of the biological and cultural evolution of music. (shrink)

This book publishes 31 of the author's selected papers which have appeared, with one exception, since 1970. The papers cover a wide range of topics in the philosophy of science. Part I is concerned with general methodology, including formal and axiomatic methods in science. Part II is concerned with causality and explanation. The papers extend the author's earlier work on a probabilistic theory of causality. The papers in Part III are concerned with probability and measurement, especially foundational questions about probability. (...) Part IV consists of several papers, including two historical ones, on the foundations of physics, with the main emphasis being on quantum mechanics. Part V, the longest part, is on the foundations of psychology and includes papers mainly on learning and perception. The book is aimed at philosophers of science, scientists concerned with the methodology of the social sciences, and mathematical psychologists interested in theories of learning, perception and measurement. (shrink)

Although Machiavelli is usually considered a pioneer among modern political philosophers, he read deeply in and was greatly influenced by the works of classical Roman thinkers such as Livy. There is thus a fundamental tension between the modern and the ancient within Machiavelli's philosophy; he is both a precursor to the Enlightenment and a throwback to republican Rome. This is the main thesis behind Patrick Coby's innovative study of the neglected Machiavellian classic Discourses on Livy. Coby argues that scholars (...) have been too quick to dismiss the ancient antecedents of Machiavelli's thought, particularly with regard to the modes and orders of the Roman republic. The book seeks to resolve the central paradox of the Discourses, that Machiavelli recommends adoption of Roman modes and orders even though those modes and orders destroyed the virt?, the strength, which Machiavelli would have moderns resuscitate by imitating Rome. A sophisticated, highly engaging book, Machiavelli's Romans will be of special interest to political theorists, Renaissance scholars, and classicists. (shrink)

This book is a major new introduction to the field of ecological ethics. Taking issue with the common assumption that existing human ethics can be 'extended' to meet the demands of the ongoing ecological crisis, Patrick Curry shows that a new and truly ecological ethic is both possible and urgently needed. With this distinctive proposition in mind, Curry introduces and discusses all the major concepts needed to understand the full range of ecological ethics. Focussing first on the major concepts (...) of ethics - religious and secular - and value, Curry then examines the gradations of ecological ethics. He discusses light green, shallow or anthropomorphic ethics with the examples of stewardship, lifeboat ethics, and social ecology; mid-green or intermediate ethics represented by animal liberation/rights and biocentrism; and dark green, deep, or ecocentric ethics. Particular attention is given to the various kinds of ecocentric ethics, such as the Land Ethic, The Gaia Hypothesis, and Deep Ecology and its offshoots: Deep Green Theory, Left Biocentrism and the Earth Manifesto. Ecofeminism is also considered in this context. The concluding chapters discuss green ethics as post-secular, moral pluralism and pragmatism, green citizenship, and human population in the light of ecological ethics. This comprehensive and wide-ranging textbook offers a radical but critical introduction to the subject. It will be of great interest to students, activists, and to a wider public concerned with the ecocrisis, its main theories, debates, and possible solutions. (shrink)

Abstract: There is no such thing as ‘the’ hylemorphic account of personal identity. There are several views that count as hylemorphic, and these views can be grouped into two main families—the corruptionist view, and the survivalist view. The differentiating factor is that the corruptionist view holds that the persistence of the soul is not sufficient for the persistence of the person, while the survivalist view holds that the persistence of the soul is sufficient for the persistence of the person. In (...) this paper, I argue that hylemorphists should prefer the corruptionist view. This project ought to be of interest to anyone working on issues of personal identity, not only because hylemorphic views are historically important, but also because they are currently receiving significant attention in the personal identity literature. (shrink)

Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) extends purely modal epistemic logic (S5) by adding dynamic operators that change the model structure. Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) extends basic modal logic with programs that allow the de nition of complex modalities. We provide a common generalisation: a logic that is dynamic in both senses, and one that is not limited to S5 as its modal base. It also incorporates, and signi cantly generalises, all the features of existing extensions of DEL such as BMS [3] (...) and LCC [21]. Our dynamic operators work in two steps. First, they provide a multiplicity of transformations of the original model, one for each action in a purely syntactic action structure (in the style of BMS). Second, they specify how to combine these multiple copies to produce a new model. In each step, we use the generality of PDL to specify the transformations. The main technical contribution of the paper is to provide an axiomatisation of this general dynamic dynamic logic (GDDL). This is done by providing a computable translation of GDDL formulas to equivalent PDL formulas, thus reducing the logic to PDL, which is decidable. The proof involves switching between representing programs as terms and as automata. We also show that both BMS and LCC are special cases of GDDL, and that there are interesting applications that require the additional generality of GDDL, namely the modelling of private belief update. More recent extensions and variations of BMS and LCC are also discussed. (shrink)

"I think this is an outstanding book. The coverage is comprehensive, the lines of thought and exposition are clear, and the level of discussion is very high yet remarkably lively and accessible. It has an underlying intellectual seriousness and engagement which shines out through the individual chapters, and the author's unwillingness to make do with secondary analyses and received ideas gives it a strength and freshness of approach which is extremely welcome." -- Professor William Outhwaite, University of Sussex Social Theory (...) in the Twentieth Century offers an easy-to-read but provocative account of the development of social theory. Patrick Baert covers a wide range of key figures and schools of thought, including Giddens, Foucault and Habermas. Written in a lively style and avoiding jargon, this book is aimed at students who wish to understand the main debates and dilemmas driving social theory. Rather than providing a neutral summary of the different thinkers and theories, Baert challenges the conventional readings of social theory with new and original interpretations. In effect, he bridges the gap between philosophy and social theory by placing the theoretical views within wider historical traditions. Social Theory in the Twentieth Century will undoubtedly become the standard introduction to social theory for students in sociology, politics, and anthropology. (shrink)

Giam, Patrick This article seeks to explore some further ethical and legal issues surrounding the practice of preimplantation genetic diagnosis which was the subject of a 2009 article for BRN. After briefly reviewing the state of regulation of PGD in Australia, focusing mainly on the national Guidelines developed by the National Health and Medical Research Council, I proceed to consider the ethical problems with PGD from the Catholic and natural law position that the embryo is a human person with (...) inherent dignity and the right to life, which forms the basis for revisiting the conclusions reached in my previous article on the proper response to the regulation of such technology. (shrink)

Three main lines of arguments are presented as a defense of randomization in experimental design. The first concerns the computational advantages of randomizing when a well-defined underlying theoretical model is not available, as is often the case in much experimentation in the medical and social sciences. The high desirability, even for the most dedicated Bayesians, of physical randomization in some special cases is stressed. The second line of argument concerns communication of methodology and results, especially in terms of concerns about (...) bias. The third line of argument concerns the use of randomization to guarantee causal inferences, whether the inference consists of the identification of a prima facie or a genuine cause. In addition, the relation of randomization to measures of complexity and the possibility of accepting only random procedures that produce complex results are discussed. (shrink)

Martin’s conjecture is an attempt to classify the behavior of all definable functions on the Turing degrees under strong set theoretic hypotheses. Very roughly it says that every such function is either eventually constant, eventually equal to the identity function or eventually equal to a transfinite iterate of the Turing jump. It is typically divided into two parts: the first part states that every function is either eventually constant or eventually above the identity function and the second part states that (...) every function which is above the identity is eventually equal to a transfinite iterate of the jump. If true, it would provide an explanation for the unique role of the Turing jump in computability theory and rule out many types of constructions on the Turing degrees.In this thesis, we will introduce a few tools which we use to prove several cases of Martin’s conjecture. It turns out that both these tools and these results on Martin’s conjecture have some interesting consequences both for Martin’s conjecture and for a few related topics.The main tool that we introduce is a basis theorem for perfect sets, improving a theorem due to Groszek and Slaman. We also introduce a general framework for proving certain special cases of Martin’s conjecture which unifies a few pre-existing proofs. We will use these tools to prove three main results about Martin’s conjecture: that it holds for regressive functions on the hyperarithmetic degrees, that part 1 holds for order preserving functions on the Turing degrees, and that part 1 holds for a class of functions that we introduce, called measure preserving functions.This last result has several interesting consequences for the study of Martin’s conjecture. In particular, it shows that part 1 of Martin’s conjecture is equivalent to a statement about the Rudin-Keisler order on ultrafilters on the Turing degrees. This suggests several possible strategies for working on part 1 of Martin’s conjecture, which we will discuss.The basis theorem that we use to prove these results also has some applications outside of Martin’s conjecture. We will use it to prove a few theorems related to Sacks’ question about whether it is provable in $\mathsf {ZFC}$ that every locally countable partial order of size continuum embeds into the Turing degrees. We will show that in a certain extension of $\mathsf {ZF}$, this holds for all partial orders of height two, but not for all partial orders of height three. Our proof also yields an analogous result for Borel partial orders and Borel embeddings in $\mathsf {ZF}$, which shows that the Borel version of Sacks’ question has a negative answer.We will end the thesis with a list of open questions related to Martin’s conjecture, which we hope will stimulate further research.prepared by Patrick Lutz.E-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised in such a way that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers,despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main (...) views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this article, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves. (shrink)

This article outlines the emergence of ABA (Applied Behaviour Analysis) in the mid-20th century, and the current popularity of ABA in the anglophone world. I draw on the work of earlier historians to highlight the role of Ole Ivar Lovaas, the most influential practitioner of ABA. I argue that reception of his initial work was mainly positive, despite concerns regarding its efficacy and use of physical aversives. Lovaas’ work, however, was only cautiously accepted by medical practitioners until he published results (...) in 1987. Many accepted the results as validation of Lovaas’ research, though both his methods and broader understanding of autism had shifted considerably since his early work in the 1960s. The article analyses the controversies surrounding ABA since the early 1990s, considering in particular criticisms made by autistic people in the ‘neurodiversity movement’. As with earlier critics, some condemn the use of painful aversives, exemplified in the campaign against the use of shock therapy at the Judge Rotenberg Center. Unlike earlier, non-autistic critics, however, many in this movement reject the ideological goals of ABA, considering autism a harmless neurological difference rather than a pathology. They argue that eliminating benign autistic behaviour through ABA is impermissible, owing to the individual psychological harm and the wider societal impact. Finally, I compare the claims made by the neurodiversity movement with those made by similar 20th- and 21st-century social movements. (shrink)

Rawls’s difference principle and the position dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ are often viewed as competing theories of distributive justice. However, recent work has emphasised that Rawlsians and luck egalitarians are working with different understandings of the concept of justice, and thus not only propose different theories, but different theories of different things. Once they are no longer seen in direct competition, there are some questions to be asked about whether these two theories can be consistently endorsed alongside one another. In this (...) essay, I (begin to) investigate whether Rawls’s theory (or elements of it) and (some form of) luck egalitarianism can be consistently endorsed. -/- I begin by outlining the main aspects of Rawls’s theory and luck egalitarianism, showing them to be different kinds of theory and therefore not in direct competition. I then propose an understanding of how these ideas came to be seen to be in direct competition. Finally, I outline five different ways in which one might consistently be (some kind of) a luck egalitarian and (some kind of) a Rawlsian, and try to say something about what is to be said for and against each of these ways of combining the theories. (shrink)

Many of the formalisms used in Attribute Value grammar are notational variants of languages of propositional modal logic, and testing whether two Attribute Value Structures unify amounts to testing for modal satisfiability. In this paper we put this observation to work. We study the complexity of the satisfiability problem for nine modal languages which mirror different aspects of AVS description formalisms, including the ability to express re-entrancy, the ability to express generalisations, and the ability to express recursive constraints. Two main (...) techniques are used: either Kripke models with desirable properties are constructed, or modalities are used to simulate fragments of Propositional Dynamic Logic. Further possibilities for the application of modal logic in computational linguistics are noted. (shrink)

Combining logics has become a rapidly expanding enterprise that is inspired mainly by concerns about modularity and the wish to join together tailor made logical tools into more powerful but still manageable ones. A natural question is whether it offers anything new over and above existing standard languages. By analysing a number of applications where combined logics arise, we argue that combined logics are a potentially valuable tool in applied logic, and that endorsements of standard languages often miss the point. (...) Using the history of quantified modal logic as our main example, we also show that the use of combined structures and logics is a recurring theme in the analysis of existing logical systems. (shrink)

The main claim of this essay is that knowledge is no more
valuable than lasting true belief.
This claim is surprising. Doesn't knowledge have a unique
and special value? If the main claim is correct and if, as it seems,
knowledge is not lasting true belief, then knowledge does not have a unique value:
in whatever way knowledge is valuable, lasting true belief is just as valuable.
However, this result does not show that knowledge is worthless, nor does it undermine
our knowledge gathering practices. There (...) is, rather, a positive philosophical payoff:
skepticism about knowledge is defused. Assuming one can have lasting true belief,
then even if one cannot have knowledge, one can have something just as valuable.
. (shrink)

This article is concerned to formulate some open problems in the philosophy of space and time that require methods characteristic of mathematical traditions in the foundations of geometry for their solution. In formulating the problems an effort has been made to fuse the separate traditions of the foundations of physics on the one hand and the foundations of geometry on the other. The first part of the paper deals with two classical problems in the geometry of space, that of giving (...) operationalism an exact foundation in the case of the measurement of spatial relations, and that of providing an adequate theory of approximation and error in a geometrical setting. The second part is concerned with physical space and space-time and deals mainly with topics concerning the axiomatic theory of bodies, the operational foundations of special relativity and the conceptual foundations of elementary physics. (shrink)

'Photo-credit: David Hume': a dialogue showing how application of Hume's three vivacity principles of resemblance, contiguity and causation--even his illustrations of them--not only immediately clarify the main sources of interest in photography, but locate photography in the broad and fascinating history of various functions that images serve us, thereby dispelling ongoing mystification about it. (In the dialogue, Veronica represents our contiguity and causal interests, Miranda [named for a Japanese camera company] our depictive ('resemblance') interests, while Clara serves as philosophical moderator.).

Epistemically circular arguments have been receiving quite a bit of attention in the literature for the past decade or so. Often the goal is to determine whether reliabilists (or other foundationalists) are committed to the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. It is often assumed that epistemic circularity is objectionable, though sometimes reliabilists accept that their position entails the legitimacy of some epistemically circular arguments, and then go on to affirm that such arguments really are good ones. My goal in this (...) paper is to argue against the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. My strategy is to give a direct argument against the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments, which rests on a principle of basis-relative safety, and then to argue that reliabilists do not have the resources to resist the argument. I argue that even if the premises of an epistemically circular argument enjoy reliabilist justification, the argument does not transmit that justification to its conclusion. The main goal of my argument is to show that epistemic circularity is always a bad thing, but it also has the positive consequence that reliabilists are freed from an awkward commitment to the legitimacy of some intuitively bad arguments. (shrink)

In this paper, missing attribute values in incomplete data sets have three possible interpretations: lost values, attribute-concept values and ‘do not care’ conditions. For rule induction, we use characteristic sets and generalized maximal consistent blocks. Therefore, we apply six different approaches for data mining. As follows from our previous experiments, where we used an error rate evaluated by ten-fold cross validation as the main criterion of quality, no approach is universally the best. Thus, we decided to compare our six approaches (...) using complexity of rule sets induced from incomplete data sets. We show that the smallest rule sets are induced from incomplete data sets with attribute-concept values, while the most complicated rule sets are induced from data sets with lost values. The choice between interpretations of missing attribute values is more important than the choice between characteristic sets and generalized maximal consistent blocks. (shrink)

Starting with his own personal experiences as Rom Harré’s PhD student in the late 1980s, Patrick Baert presents Harré as a remarkably versatile and broad intellectual, who has been able to work and contribute significantly in a variety of fields. This chapter shows how Rom Harré’s breadth has enabled him to innovate in various disciplines by relying on metaphors derived from analogies with other disciplines—a methodological strategy that is perfectly compatible with some of the main tenets of his realist (...) philosophy. Baert argues that this strategy has been particularly fruitful in the Social sciences. Baert then shows the link between Harré’s Positioning theory and his own use of the theory in the fields of Intellectual history and the Sociology of intellectuals. (shrink)

The main guiding assumption of this paper is that there is need for a taxonomy of ethical sentences that does not overgenerate, yet can make useful contributions to debates about certain controversial sentences. After surveying the recent literature and concluding that no extant taxonomy that satisfies both of these conditions is available to us, I propose and explain a novel taxonomy which does satisfy them. I then defend my proposal from five potential objections.

Three leading scholars examine one of the oldest professorships, the Lady Margaret's Chair of Divinity at Cambridge, plotting its development in the context of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century history. The current Lady Margaret's Professor Graham Stanton sets the scene with an introduction briefly considering theology at Cambridge before 1502 and after 1649. In the two main chapters Richard Rex - an authority on John Fisher, first holder of the Chair - deploys new evidence to propose changes in the list of early (...) professors and shows how their appointment and dismissal reflected the vagaries of the Reformation; and Patrick Collinson investigates how the Elizabethan and early Stuart professors continued to be caught up in the religious and political turmoil of the times. There is a complete list of holders from 1502 to the present. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Montaigne Among the Moderns: Receptions of the “Essais”Patrick HenryMontaigne Among the Moderns: Receptions of the “Essais,” by Dudley M. Marchi; xiii & 334 pp. Providence, Rhode Island: Berghahn Books, 1994, $49.95.This ambitious project is not a study of the Essais per se, but rather an analysis of their receptions from the seventeenth century to the present. Written by a comparativist with access to German, French, and English (...) literature and philosophy, it deals with authors from diverse backgrounds and time periods and pays careful attention throughout both to intertextuality and to the particular “horizons-of-experience” in which the Essais were received. “Reception” here does not mean some un-Mont aigne-like passive acceptance, but rather the assimilation and reactivation of the essayist’s concept of literature, writerly project, and theories of reading and writing in the works of later writers, mainly “premodernists” (Emerson and Nietzsche), “high modernists” (Pater and Woolf), and “postmodernists” (Butor, Chaillou, Sollers). In the most general sense, what Montaigne shares with all these authors is the need to make central in the form and substance of his work the paradox of a rupture with the pa st and its simultaneous continuation. Here modernism is less a period concept than a recurring literary phenomenon whereby the essayist not only influences the moderns and the postmoderns but is one of them. This enables us, finally, to perceive in the Essais a dialogical process that resists closure and reenacts the literary and philosophical debates of our own historical situation.Chapter One schematizes the history of the receptions of the Essais in France from 1580 to 1950 focusing mainly on the stylistic and religious readings of major figures in French literature. While much of this has already been done, Marchi syn thesizes well, makes his own original points, and offers us exceedingly interesting pages on the essayist’s covenant daughter and most active literary executrix, Marie le Jars de Gournay. Throughout he depicts how the shifting nature of the Essais’ textuality (their “hermeneutic undecidability” [p. 74]) allows them to assume various identities in the minds of different interpreters through the ages, thus problematizing the very act of reception and granting the reader a role in the production of me aning.The next chapters constitute the most original parts of the study and analyze the reception of the Essais in the works of Emerson, Nietzsche, Pater, Woolf, Butor, Chaillou, and Sollers. In Emerson and Nietzsche, we find reactivated the Montaig nean dialogue between the unique self and cultural tradition. Emerson read the Essais in the Cotton translation and wrote about Montaigne in Representative Men but only relied on the essayist to help him reach his own intellectual independen ce, finally moving from a more ego-centered position to the security of past models and rejecting skepticism in favor of dialectical resolution. Nietzsche read Montaigne in the original and knew him through Emerson. Marchi finds “an active inter textual Montaignean dimension” (p. 124) [End Page 140] in Nietzsche’s work and underscores their mutual preoccupation with radical skepticism, self-cultivation, self-portraiture, mutability, the instability of language, and the crisis of representa tion. He discovers two sides to Nietzsche’s reception of the Essais: the Apollonian “Socrantic optimism” and the Dionysian “libertine transgression” (p. 165) and indicates how the essayist’s concreteness and acceptance of human limitations tempered respectively Nietzsche’s propensity toward abstract metaphysics and Schopenhaurean pessimism.The third chapter unveils the aesthetic and thematic elements of the Essais in the critical and creative works of Pater and Woolf who went beyond the philosophical essaying of Emerson and Nietzsche, were the first to extend aspects of the E ssais in narrative works since Marie de Gournay, and created Montaigne the modernist “by insisting on the qualities of his textuality most akin to their own” (p. 186). The most interesting pages here delineate, on the one hand, Pater’s failed attempt to reconcile the religion of Pascal and the aesthetics of Montaigne and the essayist’s presence in Pater’s Gaston de Latour and, on the other, Woolf’s Montaigne-like essayistic techniques of weighing probabilities, suspending dogmatic judgment, and breaking of narrative sequentiality and her concomitant assimilation... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.2 (2002) 127-129 [Access article in PDF] Linguistic Markers of Recovery:Underpinnings of First Person Pronoun Usage and Semantic Positions of Patients Patrick Suppes Keywords: association, freedom, habits, psychotherapy, roles, semantics. USING LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE to evaluate recovering psychotherapy patients is an attractive and useful idea. I agree with much of Dr. van Staden's proposals for doing so. The purpose of this commentary is to give (...) some comments and criticisms on points of detail. Roles, Not Semantics A fair amount of Dr. van Staden's article is concerned with the semantics of relations. The focus on relations is a good thing. Restricting discourse about patients to properties is not sufficient, for everyone regards how a person is relating to others, and even to other things, as an important feature of normal behavior and mental health. We do not want just to report, "John was upset," but consider it definitely more informative to say, "John was upset by his father's criticisms." The English language and all other natural languages are rich in verbs for expressing relations with emotional affect between two or more persons, or a person and an event or thing. Staden's article focuses on the interesting and important case of first person pronouns. To go from saying, "She made me do it" to "I did it" is, for reasons that need not be spelled out, a sign of progress. A way to describe this change is that the speaker has indicated that in the implicit context assumed he or she has shown signs of moving from the role of being a patient to that of being an actor, from being a recipient of actions to being a performer of acts.van Staden concentrates on the semantics of relations to bring out what I call the change of roles. I would certainly agree that such change of roles is important to the semantics of affective or action verbs and verb phrases. We have no disagreement at all about this. Yet I am critical of his wanting to range much wider in his analysis of semantics. The logical or formal treatment of relations is a large topic, full of many distinctions and subtleties that seem to me not too relevant to his main theme. In a very general way he wants to say that what is usually thought of as [End Page 127] the first position in a relation, what he calls the alpha position, is occupied by the owner of the relation, and the second position, in a binary relation—the main case discussed—is occupied by the accidental to that particular relation. This second position is called the omega position.This runs contrary to much of the mathematical literature on relations, which occupy an important place in many parts of mathematics such as geometry. So when we say that one triangle is larger than another, it seems positively weird to say the second triangle is somehow accidental to the relation. But this is true and confusing even for the familiar and classical kinds of actions often cited by van Staden. In analyzing the sentence "Brutus killed Caesar intentionally" it sounds really strange to say that Caesar occupied the accidental position in the expressed relation of killing.Moreover, in the conceptual and philosophical discussion of relations, it is common practice to stress that even if the natural grammar of a sentence has a subject-predicate structure, as in "Elizabeth is the mother of Charles," no special logical force is given to what van Staden calls the first or alpha position in most mathematical relations, such as "The number 2 is less than the number 3," expressed in ordinary mathematical notation as "2 < 3."On the other hand, I stress that it is natural to distinguish in a relational sentence expressing an action between the role of actor and the role of patient, no matter which is the grammatical subject of the sentence, as in the following pair "John hurt Mary" and "Mary was hurt by John." The roles of actor... (shrink)

The main object of this thesis is to present the theoretical outline of a temporalised sociology; that is, a sociology which both takes novelty as its starting point, and makes the link between the shorter and longer temporal spans. This temporalised sociology draws upon a variety of sources. Firstly, it builds on the legacy of four theoretical traditions: positivism, functionalism; structuralism and ethnomethodology. Although these four traditions are criticised for failing to take a temporalised perspective themselves, they yet offer a (...) number of fruitful ideas and concepts which form the basis of my approach. The core of my argument for a temporalised pespective utilises the work of G.H. Mead. Indeed, a secondary, but not unimportant, aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the contemporary significance of G.H. Mead's writings. The discussion of his work is in two parts, one focusing on the self and knowledgeability, and another on the self and temporality. In both parts, first his ideas are presented, and then, without changing their underlying philosophy, amendments are suggested and new, related concepts are introduced. An attempt is made to harmonise those Meadian insights with the relevant ideas from the four theoretical traditions mentioned above. This means linking the shorter with the longer temporal spans, and integrating the Meadian concepts with problems related to social structure and unintended consequences. Finally, the relationship between history and sociology is viewed from a temporalised perspective. (shrink)

The main object of this book is to present the theoretical outline of a temporalized sociology; that is, a sociology which both takes novelty as its starting point, and makes the link between the shorter and longer temporal spans. This temporalized sociology draws upon a variety of sources. Firstly, it builds on the legacy of four theoretical traditions: positivism, functionalism, structuralism and ethnomethodology. Although these four traditions are criticized for failing to take a temporalized perspective themselves, they yet offer a (...) number of fruitful ideas and concepts which form the basis of this author's approach. The core of the argument for a secondary, but not umimportant, aim is to demonstrate the contemporary significance of G.H. Mead's writings. (shrink)

The main goal of the second issue of the Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion, devoted entirely to religion and politics, is precisely to question the sense of a reconstruction of the mutual and simultaneous relations between these two spheres of social life. What does this process mean and where is it taking us?

The main purpose of this paper is to argue that the idea of a feminine sublime – as theorised by critics such as Barbara Claire Freeman, Patricia Yaeger and Joanna Zylinska – opens the way for a no...

One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regard- less of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number (...) of laws and policies adopted at the municipal level that contradict the liberal principle of neutrality. In this paper, I want to suggest that these perfectionist laws and policies are legitimate at the urban level. Specifically, I will argue that the principle of neutrality applies only indirectly to social institutions within the broader framework of the nation-state. This is clear in the case of voluntary associations, but to a certain extent this rationale applies also to cities. In a liberal regime, private associations are allowed to hold and defend perfectionist views, focused on a particular conception of the good life. One problem is to determine the limits of this perfectionism at the urban level, since cities, unlike private associations, are public institutions. My aim here is therefore to give a liberal justification to a limited form of perfectionism of municipal laws and policies. (shrink)

This paper argues against a common misunderstanding of Foucault's work. Even after the release of his lectures at the Collège de France, which ran throughout the 1970s until his death in 1984, he is still often taken to have made an "ethical" turn toward the end of his life. As opposed to his genealogies of power published in the 1970s, which are relentlessly suspicious of claims of individual agency, his final monographs focus on the ethical self-formation of free individuals. I (...) suggest that this basic misinterpretation makes possible interpretations of Foucault's work as being sympathetic to neoliberal government, by linking the ethical turn to a "liberal" or "neoliberal" turn in his thought. I present a case against the ethical turn by arguing that Foucault's main focus, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, is a concern for the ways in which we become obligated by truth. (shrink)

Commentators almost universally agree that Locke denies the possibility of thinking matter in Book IV Chapter 10 of the Essay. This article develops an alternative interpretation according to which Locke allows for the possibility that a system of matter could think (even prior to any act of superaddition on God’s part). In addition, it contends that this does not destroy Locke’s argument in the chapter, instead it helps to illuminate the nature of it. The article proceeds in two main stages. (...) First, a distinction between two senses of ‘production’ is made to clarify Locke’s claim that matter cannot produce thought. Second, Locke’s claim that God could not be a system of randomly moving particles is interpreted as a claim about God’s wisdom and knowledge and not as a claim about thinking matter. (shrink)

Philosophical work on free will, contemporary as well as historical, is inevitably framed by the problem of free will and determinism. One of my goals in what follows is to give a feel for the main lines of that debate in philosophy today. I will also be outlining a particular perspective on free will. Many working philosophers consider themselves Compatibilists; the perspective outlined, building on a number of arguments in the recent literature, is a contemporary form of such a view. (...) It cannot, however, claim to be the contemporary philosophical perspective. There is no such thing. Against a background of the perennial problem of free will and determinism, through ongoing argument and debate, philosophers continue to try to work toward an understanding of precisely what it means for an action to be free. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy, arguments for “fatalism” are arguments for the conclusion that no human actions are free. Such arguments typically come in two varieties: logical and theological. Arguments for logical fatalism proceed, roughly, from truths about future actions to the conclusion that those actions are unavoidable, and hence unfree. Arguments for theological fatalism, on the other hand, proceed, roughly, from divine beliefs about future actions to the conclusion that those actions are unavoidable, and hence unfree. What is characteristic of any (...) argument for fatalism is that, first, it purports to show by appeal to quite general logical or metaphysical assumptions that no human action is free, and, second, it does so without explicitly invoking the thesis that those actions are causally determined. There is, of course, a venerable argument for the conclusion that causal determinism is incompatible with free will (understood as the ability to do otherwise), but philosophers advancing such arguments are not now generally understood to be advancing the cause of “fatalism.” To endorse fatalism is thus not simply to endorse the view that no human action is free, but also to endorse the further claim that this can be shown by appeal to the general logical or metaphysical assumptions at issue. Fatalistic arguments of both sorts are and have been intimately bound up with philosophical questions about the logical status of future contingent propositions—propositions saying of causally undetermined events that they will happen. This entry will thus cover the main positions in the debates concerning logical fatalism, the logic of future contingents, and theological fatalism. (shrink)

Studies on the evidential foundations of probabilistic reasoning are extended using the notion of weight of evidence to measure evidential phenomena in the presence of a mass of evidence giving rise to complex reasoning patterns. The main results provided in this paper are methods to measure inferential interactions and dissonances among items of evidence. All measures are defined to ensure a versatile applicability in inferential tasks involving the combination of evidence and a mass of evidence. These measures enable a detailed (...) examination of recurrent phenomena in evidence-based reasoning, such as convergence, contradiction, redundancy, and synergy. Most of these phenomena have—as far as the authors are aware—either not been formally described or any formal description proposed has been of limited use for evidence-based reasoning tasks. The present research addresses this deficit in the current understanding and treatment of these evidential phenomena. It is shown by way of examples that incorrect consideration of evidential phenomena can lead to substantial misrepresentations of the value of evidence. (shrink)

A popular and enduring approach to the liar paradox takes the concept of truth to be inconsistent. Very roughly, truth is an inconsistent concept if the central principles of this concept (taken together) entail a contradiction, where one of these central principles is Tarski's T-schema for truth: a sentence S is true if and only if p, (where S says that p). This article targets a version of Inconsistentism which: retains classical logic and bivalence; takes the truth-predicate “is true” to (...) pick out a property (and determine a non-empty extension relative to a given world); and holds that liar sentences exhibit a certain kind of indeterminacy in truth-value. Call such a view Modest Inconsistentism since it is somewhat more conservative in its outlook than various other forms of Inconsistentism. Such a modest view has its attractions: we retain the thesis that the liar sentence is meaningful; we get to respect the claims that there are truths and that there is a property of truth; we get to keep classical logic and bivalence; and, prima facie, no strengthened liar paradox is in the offing. The main aim in this paper is to show that Modest Inconsistentism, despite its initial attractions, is in deep trouble—because it does, after all, give rise to a strengthened liar paradox. We shall also see that there are related kinds of theory which are also subject to the same worry. (shrink)

This article is mainly concerned with the methodology of public policy studies and how this methodology compares with that of standard scientific studies. The main systematic section of the article develops a concept of justified policy which is related to the concept of justified procedure that originates in ancient Greek mathematics. The last section sketches some ways in which philosophers can make a methodological contribution to policy analysis. Possible contributions are discussed under four headings: numerical models, statistical methodology, philosophy of (...) applications, and analysis of predictions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:137. PROBABILITY IN HUME'S SCIENCE OF MAN This paper is an attempt to make sense of a fragment of Hume's positive philosophy, namely his theory of how we apportion belief on the basis of ambiguous evidence. The topic is one that has received little critical attention from philosophers. One reason for this neglect is the belief that Hume's discussion of probable reasoning is not addressed to philosophical questions, but (...) rather is concerned merely to give a psychological theory of why we tend to make the inferences we do. Another is the view that Hume's psychology of probability is too obscure to merit serious study. I hope to show, however, that Hume's discussion of probable reasoning contains more philosophy, and more interesting psychology, than the prevalence of these attitudes would suggest. The main philosophical content that I see in Hume's account of probable reasoning is that it embodies a certain theory of belief, worked out in some detail. Here the central notion is the "belief-feeling", vivacity. After an initial discussion of Hume's use of this notion, I hazard the opinion that vivacities are related to probabilities by a simple subtraction formula (§1). The investigation of Hume's account of probable inference (§2) gives strong grounds for thinking that this conjecture is indeed correct. Finally, an examination of what Hume says about the influence of probability on the passions unearths a bold theory of the specific psychological mechanism by which the subtraction of probabilities is effected (§3).§1 Degrees of belief Hume's philosophy makes heavy use of the quality of perceptions which he referred to variously as "force", "liveliness", "violence", "vivacity", "strength", "firmness" and so on. As the variety of these terms indicates, Hume was not entirely happy with any of them. He says it is 138. impossible by words to describe this feeling, which every 2 one must be conscious of in his own breast (A19). But we need to use some word, and rather than emulate Hume's diverse usage it will be convenient to adhere uniformly to the single term 'vivacity'. The first use to which Hume puts vivacity is in distinguishing impressions from ideas. Intuitively, impressions are either sensations, passions or emotions, whereas ideas are the perceptions involved in thinking or reasoning. And Hume maintains that we can distinguish these two kinds of perceptions by their differing degrees of vivacity: all impressions have greater vivacity than any idea. Apparently Hume thinks that the difference in vivacity between impressions and ideas is normally quite considerable, although in a few instances there is only a small differential (T2). Vivacity is again used by Hume to distinguish between belief and conception. Although to have an idea of God, say, is not the same thing as to believe in God, Hume argues that what distinguishes the latter is only the manner of conception. In belief, the idea feels different to an idea that is entertained incredulously. And this difference in feeling is identified by Hume with a difference in vivacity (T96).3 In general, Hume thinks of beliefs as being ideas, not impressions (T86 being an exception). This is the natural view, if one thinks of the distinction between impressions and ideas as a distinction between feeling and thinking (T2, A9 ). What distinguishes beliefs then is a somewhat intermediate vivacity, inferior to the vivacity of an impression but superior to the vivacity of a mere conception. A third use to which Hume puts vivacity is in making the distinction between memory and other beliefs. Just as beliefs are distinguished from other conceptions by their greater vivacity, so likewise memories are distinguished from other beliefs by their greater vivacity (T153). 139. Each of these three applications of vivacity seems to be implausib^e. Introspection inevitably suggests that impressions are not always more vivacious or forceful, or whatever, than ideas. Similarly it seems that our beliefs, and even our memories, are often less vivid than our fancies, contrary to what Hume claims. A considerable part of Hume's appendix to the Treatise is concerned with such objections. Hume appears to allow that what we would naturally call the vivacity of ideas is not a quality... (shrink)

In recent years there has been an active debate between proponents of two different models of rational decision. One model is evidential decision theory, which is characterized by the fact that it holds the principle of maximizing expected utility to be appropriate whenever the states are probabilistically independent of the acts. The other model, causal decision theory, holds that the principle of maximizing expected utility is appropriate whenever the states are causally independent of the acts. The proponents of evidential decision (...) theory include Richard Jeffrey and Ellery Eells, who claim that evidential decision theory has significant advantages over causal decision theory. In this paper I discuss the two main advantages which have been claimed for evidential decision theory, and show that in fact evidential decision theory does not possess either of these advantages. (shrink)

The paper examines the nature of scientific progress through the lens of the history of modern cosmology (i.e. from Einstein’s, 1917 static universe to the present-day Standard (ΛCDM) model of cosmology). We distil three novel lessons, germane to the debate between the two main accounts of scientific progress (the noetic and the epistemic one, respectively). First, it’s difficult to sharply locate—to precisely pinpoint the locus of—the epistemic content of scientific knowledge. Cosmology displays stark epistemic holism: epistemic content and evidence are (...) typically inextricably distributed over a wider “web of beliefs”. Secondly, cosmologists employ a variety of justificatory practices and modes of reasoning. More often than not, they fall short of the fastidious standards of traditional epistemology. Thirdly, cosmological claims typically defy easy and unambiguous characterisation in terms of truth. These three lessons are shown to pose grave challenges to the epistemic account of scientific progress (on which progress consists in the accumulation of knowledge). By contrast, the rivalling noetic account (which characterises progress in terms of improved understanding) can naturally accommodate those lessons. (shrink)

BackgroundReconciling results obtained using different types of sensory measures is a challenge for autism sensory research. The present study used questionnaire, psychophysical, and neurophysiological measures to characterize autistic sensory processing in different measurement modalities.MethodsParticipants were 46 autistic and 21 typically developing 11- to 14-year-olds. Participants and their caregivers completed questionnaires regarding sensory experiences and behaviors. Auditory and somatosensory event-related potentials were recorded as part of a multisensory ERP task. Auditory detection, tactile static detection, and tactile spatial resolution psychophysical thresholds were (...) measured.ResultsSensory questionnaires strongly differentiated between autistic and typically developing individuals, while little evidence of group differences was observed in psychophysical thresholds. Crucially, the different types of measures appeared to be largely independent of one another. However, we unexpectedly found autistic participants with larger auditory Tb ERP amplitudes had reduced hearing acuity, even though all participants had hearing acuity in the non-clinical range.LimitationsThe autistic and typically developing groups were not matched on cognitive ability, although this limitation does not affect our main analyses regarding convergence of measures within autism.ConclusionOverall, based on these results, measures in different sensory modalities appear to capture distinct aspects of sensory processing in autism, with relatively limited convergence between questionnaires and laboratory-based tasks. Generally, this might reflect the reality that laboratory tasks are often carried out in controlled environments without background stimuli to compete for attention, a context which may not closely resemble the busier and more complex environments in which autistic people’s atypical sensory experiences commonly occur. Sensory questionnaires and more naturalistic laboratory tasks may be better suited to explore autistic people’s real-world sensory challenges. Further research is needed to replicate and investigate the drivers of the unexpected association we observed between auditory Tb ERP amplitudes and hearing acuity, which could represent an important confound for ERP researchers to consider in their studies. (shrink)