Robb & Heil describe a higher-order version of the popular Causal Exclusion Problem. In particular, they ask whether the argument that led to a change in focus from event causation to causal relevance of properties can be iterated, leading us to focus on the causal relevance of properties of those properties, or properties of properties of those properties, and so on. In this paper, I investigate this curious higher-order problem and argue that the appeal of both the original (...) argument and its iterations reflects a lack of understanding of causal relata and a problem with the notion of causal relevance. (shrink)

The target article proposes that people perceive social robots as depictions rather than as genuine social agents. We suggest that people might instead view social robots as social agents, albeit agents with more restricted capacities and moral rights than humans. We discuss why social robots, unlike other kinds of depictions, present a special challenge for testing the depiction hypothesis.

Introduction. The philosophical reception of the foundations of the social and the principles of war act as connected processes. A historically specific type of socio-cultural being generates a unique way of philosophical articulation about the nature of the order of society and culture, war and peace. The purpose of the study is explicating the connection between the type of conceptualizing war (classical, total, new war) and understanding the principles of social order. Methods. The author uses methods of the historical and (...) constructivist approach as the leading methodology in studying the problem of the war and the sociocultural order connection. Scientific novelty of the research. By highlighting the strategic principles of different theories of war (classical trinitarian war, the concept of total war and mobilization, the theory of “new wars”), the connection between the order of war and the fundamental foundations of society and culture at different stages of historical development is shown. Results. Consideration of the three theories of war allows us to present them as different projects for understanding the socio-cultural order of the Art Nouveau philosophy. The author highlights and analyzes the leading provisions of historically different theories of wars: “war as a continuation of politics”; “the totality of war and mobilization” as the basis of the socio-political order; “new war” as a concept of cultural turn. Conclusions. Modern studies of war are distinguished by an active appeal to understanding the connection between armed clashes and the concreteness of cultural life, which sets the context, way of thinking and actions of potential actors in military operations. The article shows that current theories and practices of war are characterized by a kind of coexistence of layers of social reality that are different in their historical depth. (shrink)

The problem of higher-order misrepresentation poses a dilemma for the higher-order theory of consciousness. The two ways of conceiving of the theory each run into a different difficulty raised by the problem of misrepresentation. If the theory is conceived relationally, i.e., conceived so as the higher-order state causes or makes a first-order state conscious, then the theory faces a problem raised by Block concerning the implausibility of non-existent conscious states. If conceived non-relationally, i.e., conceived in such a (...) way as it is the higher-order state itself which is the conscious state, then consideration of Neander’s original misrepresentation problem, that this seems to make the first-order state a spinning wheel in the explanation of consciousness, raises the conceptual problem that this version of the higher-order theory seems not to offer a philosophical theory of consciousness that is distinct from the first-order theory. (shrink)

Kitcher has proposed an ideal-theory account—well-ordered science (WOS)— of the collective good that science’s research agenda should promote. Against criticism regarding WOS’s action-guidance, Kitcher has advised critics not to confuse substantive ideals and the ways to arrive at them, and he has defended WOS as a necessary and useful ideal for science policy. I provide a distinction between two types of ideal-theories that helps clarifying WOS’s elusive nature. I use this distinction to argue that the action-guidance problem that WOS (...) faces remains even under the aims/means distinction, because the WOS’s failure is more basic than critics have suggested. (shrink)

In his original semantics for counterfactuals, David Lewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. The same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to (...) reformulate all these theories in terms of lower bounds on partial preorders, conceived of as maximal antichains, and I show that treating lower bounds as cutsets does strictly better at capturing our intuitions about the semantics of modals, counterfactuals, and deontic conditionals. (shrink)

This paper argues that higher-order doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. One has a higher-order doubt with regards to P insofar as one justifiably withholds belief as to what attitude towards P is justified. That is, one justifiably withholds belief as to whether one is justified in believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief in P. Using the resources provided by Richard Feldman’s recent discussion of how to respect one’s evidence, I argue that if one has a higher-order doubt with regards to P, (...) then one is not justified in having any attitude towards P. Otherwise put: No attitude towards the doubted proposition respects one’s higher-order doubt. I argue that the most promising response to this problem is to hold that when one has a higher-order doubt about P, the best one can do to respect such a doubt is to simply have no attitude towards P. Higher-order doubt is thus much more rationally corrosive than non-higher-order doubt, as it undermines the possibility of justifiably having any attitude towards the doubted proposition. (shrink)

On the standard conception of risk, the degree to which an event is risky is the function of the probability of that event. Recently, Duncan Pritchard has challenged this view, proposing instead a modal account on which risk is conceived of in terms of modal ordering (2015). On this account, the degree of risk for any given event is a function of its modal distance from the actual world, not its likelihood. Pritchard's main motivation for this is that the (...) probabilistic account cannot always explain our judgements about risk. In certain cases, equally probable events are not judged to be equally risky. Here I will argue that Pritchard's account succumbs to a similar problem. Put simply, there are cases in which judgements about risk decouple from both probability and modal ordering. Thus, if we want a theory of risk that can explain our judgements about risk, neither the probabilistic nor modal account is successful. (shrink)

Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component and a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. We (...) begin by introducing the HOT theory and by indicating why we believe it is open to distinct interpretations. We then proceed to show that it is incapable of handling cases of radical confabulation. Finally, in the course of considering various possible responses to our position, we show that adoption of a disjunctive strategy, one that would countenance both one-component and two-component versions, would fail to provide any empirical or explanatory advantage. (shrink)

Context: The problems that are most in need of interdisciplinary collaboration are “wicked problems,” such as food crises, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development, with many relevant aspects, disagreement on what the problem is, and contradicting solutions. Such complex problems both require and challenge interdisciplinarity. Problem: The conventional methods of interdisciplinary research fall short in the case of wicked problems because they remain first-order science. Our aim is to present workable methods and research designs for doing second-order science (...) in domains where there are many different scientific knowledges on any complex problem. Method: We synthesize and elaborate a framework for second-order science in interdisciplinary research based on a number of earlier publications, experiences from large interdisciplinary research projects, and a perspectivist theory of science. Results: The second-order polyocular framework for interdisciplinary research is characterized by five principles. Second-order science of interdisciplinary research must: 1. draw on the observations of first-order perspectives, 2. address a shared dynamical object, 3. establish a shared problem, 4. rely on first-order perspectives to see themselves as perspectives, and 5. be based on other rules than first-order research. Implications: The perspectivist insights of second-order science provide a new way of understanding interdisciplinary research that leads to new polyocular methods and research designs. It also points to more reflexive ways of dealing with scientific expertise in democratic processes. The main challenge is that this is a paradigmatic shift, which demands that the involved disciplines, at least to some degree, subscribe to a perspectivist view. Constructivist content: Our perspectivist approach to science is based on the second-order cybernetics and systems theories of von Foerster, Maruyama, Maturana & Varela, and Luhmann, coupled with embodied theories of cognition and semiotics as a general theory of meaning from von Uexküll and Peirce. (shrink)

This paper uses the resources of higher-order logic to articulate a Fregean conception of predicate reference, and of word-world relations more generally, that is immune to the concept horse problem. The paper then addresses a prominent style of expressibility problem for views of broadly this kind, versions of which are due to Linnebo, Hale, and Wright.

We discuss the one–many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually understood problem about the identity of universals across particulars that instantiate them (the Hylomorphic Dispersal Problem). In fact some of the most interesting aspects of the problem occur purely with respect to the relationship between Forms. We argue that contemporary metaphysicians may draw from the Philebus at least three different one–many relationships between universals themselves: instantiation, (...) subkind and part, and thereby construct three new ‘problems of the one and the many’ (an Eidetic Dispersal Problem, a Genus–Species Problem, and an Eidetic Combination Problem), which are as problematic as the version generally discussed. We then argue that this taxonomy sheds new and interesting light on certain discussions of higher-order universals in recent Australian analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultation (CEC) has become all about right technique. When we encounter a case of conflict or confusion, clinical ethicists are expected to deploy a standardized, repeatable, and rationally defensible method for working toward a recommendation and/or consensus. While it has been noted previously that our techniques of CEC often foreclose on its internal goods, there remains an assumption that we must just find the _right_ efficient technique and the problem would be solved. In this paper, I question (...) that assumption, arguing that any standardized, identically repeatable model of CEC will pull us counterproductively away from ethical reflection, and toward the values of modern _techne_: primarily efficiency, efficacy, and repeatability. This is because standardized techniques of CEC pull the dynamism of being into what Catherine Pickstock calls “identical repetition,” a technologized ontology, which is fundamentally at odds with what being is. And, since ethics is a search for the good of being, avoiding the ontological heart of being severely restricts ethics. (shrink)

Higher‐order metaphysics is in full swing. Its proponents argue that higher‐order logic should replace set theory at the foundations of mathematics and metaphysics. But amid the enthusiasm, surprisingly little attention has been paid to some serious epistemological challenges facing the program—foremost among them a variant of the Benacerraf challenge, developed by Field and Clarke‐Doane. Roughly put, the challenge is to explain the reliability of our higher‐order logical beliefs. A similar problem is familiar from the philosophy of set theory, where (...) it has led to a pluralist reconception of the foundations of mathematics. In this paper, I argue that regardless of whether higher‐order logic is preferable to set theory on abductive grounds, they stand or fall together when faced with this epistemological challenge. They are companions in guilt (or innocence). I conclude that, absent other solutions, a promising path forward is to adopt a pluralist approach to higher‐order logic. The consequences of such a shift are difficult to overstate. (shrink)

We examine the definability and correspondence problems between the first-order language of order and the propositional language when given intuitionistic Kripke semantics. Our results are concerning classes of frames for the superintuitionistic logic $$LC = K + (p \rightarrow q) \vee (q \rightarrow p)$$. The frames for _LC_ are those partial orders in which every principal upper cone is linearly ordered – we call such orders postlinear and denote by _PL_ the class of all postlinear orders. We prove that the (...) monadic second-order theory of the class of countable postlinear orders is decidable and consequently that the definability and correspondence problems modulo finitely axiomatizable subclasses of _PL_ are decidable. (shrink)

The Higher-Order Theory (HOT) of consciousness holds that mental states become conscious when they are represented by another mental state. Most HOT theorists maintain that it is the higher-order, rather than the lower-order, state that supplies the content of conscious experience. This view entails that, for a state to become conscious, its content must be represented in the brain regions that produce higher-order states, which are widely thought to be in the Prefrontal Cortex (PFC). This article argues that this creates (...) a challenge for HOT: current neuroimaging evidence and functional considerations suggest that, if PFC activity is constitutive of consciousness, it enables the consciousness of content represented in visual areas rather than supplying the content itself. The conclusion will be that HOT research should focus more on developing the version in which the first-order state supplies the content of visual experience. (shrink)

It is widely held that consciousness is partially constituted by a “pre-reflective” self-consciousness. Further, it’s argued that the presence of pre-reflective self-consciousness poses a problem for “higher-order” theories of consciousness. Higher-order theories invoke reflective representation and so do not appear to have the resources to explain pre-reflective self-consciousness. This criticism is rooted in the Heidelberg School’s deep reflection on the nature of self-consciousness, and accordingly, I will label this challenge the “Heidelberg problem.” In this chapter, I will offer (...) a higher-order answer to the Heidelberg problem. Instead of attacking the problem head-on, I’ll argue that the view can explain why there appears to be a Heidelberg problem, even if consciousness is ultimately realized by higher-order representation. But I’ll also argue that the theory has indexical resources to more directly counter the Heidelberg problem. Either way, I hope to show that the higher-order theory survives its trip to Heidelberg. (shrink)

Our political thinking is driven, far more than philosophers recognize, by a concern for social equality and, more specifically, a concern to avoid relations of inferiority. Niko Kolodny argues that, in order to make sense of the most familiar ideas in our political thought and discourse - the justification of the state, democracy, and rule of law, as well as objections to paternalism and corruption - we cannot merely appeal to freedom (as libertarians like Nozick do) or to distributive fairness (...) (as liberals like Rawls do). We must, instead, appeal directly to claims against inferiority, that no one stands above or below. (shrink)

Recent authors have drawn attention to a new kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of a flawed process – for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle. The puzzle is that at least in some situations involving higher-order defeaters (...) the correct epistemic rules issue conflicting recommendations. For instance, a subject ought to believe p, but she ought also to suspend judgment in p. I discuss three responses. The first resists the puzzle by arguing that there is only one correct epistemic rule, an Über-rule. The second accepts that there are genuine epistemic dilemmas. The third appeals to a hierarchy or ordering of correct epistemic rules. I spell out problems for all of these responses. I conclude that the right lesson to draw from the puzzle is that a state can be epistemically rational or justified even if one has what looks to be strong evidence to think that it is not. As such, the considerations put forth constitute a non question-begging argument for a kind of externalism. (shrink)

Jonathan Weisberg has argued that Bayesianism’s rigid updating rules make Bayesian updating incompatible with undermining defeat. In this paper, I argue that when we attend to the higher-order beliefs we must ascribe to agents in the kinds of cases Weisberg considers, the problem he raises disappears. Once we acknowledge the importance of higher-order beliefs to the undermining story, we are led to a different understanding of how these cases arise. And on this different understanding of things, the rigid nature (...) of Bayesianism’s updating rules is no obstacle to its accommodating undermining defeat. (shrink)

PARTI The Problem of Method 1.1 Any discussion of order in past centuries was based on the conviction that the various real phenomena studied could be ...

I argue that Murayama and Jach's claim that higher-order motivational constructs face the “black-box” problem is misconceived because it doesn't clearly distinguish between personal and subpersonal explanations. To solve it they propose interpreting motivations as causal effects of mental computational processes. I suggest that their solution might be more compellingly presented as providing a fictionalist perspective on some personal-level constructs.

A critical survey of recent work in epistemology on higher-order evidence. It discusses the nature of higher-order evidence, some puzzles it raises, responses to those puzzles, and problems facing them. It concludes by indicating connections between debates concerning higher-order evidence in epistemology and parallel debates in ethics and aesthetics.

Higher‐order theories purport to account for the conscious character of such states in terms of higher‐order representations. This chapter focuses on three classes of higher‐order theory of phenomenal consciousness, including inner‐sense theory, actualist higher‐order thought theory, and dispositionalist higher‐order thought theory. All three of these higher‐order theories purport to offer reductive explanations of phenomenal consciousness. Inner‐sense theory has important positive virtues, but faces problems; whereas actualist higher‐order thought theory avoids those problems, but at the cost of losing the positive virtues. (...) Actualist higher‐order thought theory has the advantage that no special organs or mechanisms need to be postulated. Dispositionalist higher‐order thought theory claims to split the difference, providing an account that has all of the advantages of inner‐sense theory with none of the flaws. The success of dispositionalist higher‐order thought theory is premised upon the existence of dual analog contents. (shrink)

The main result is that is no effective algorithmic answer to the question:how to recognize whether arbitrary modal formula has a first-order equivalent on the class of finite frames. Besides, two known problems are solved: it is proved algorithmic undecidability of finite frame consequence between modal formulas; the difference between global and local variants of first-order definability of modal formulas on the class of transitive frames is shown.

In this thesis I provide a survey over different approaches to second-order logic and its interpretation, and introduce a novel approach. Of special interest are the questions whether second-order logic can count as logic in some proper sense of logic, and what epistemic status it occupies. More specifically, second-order logic is sometimes taken to be mathematical, a mere notational variant of some fragment of set theory. If this is the case, it might be argued that it does not have the (...) "epistemic innocence" which would be needed for, e.g., foundational programmes in mathematics for which second-order logic is sometimes used. I suggest a Deductivist conception of logic, that characterises logical consequence by means of inference rules, and argue that on this conception second-order logic should count as logic in the proper sense. (shrink)

Adaptationists explain the evolution of religion from the cooperative effects of religious commitments, but which cooperation problem does religion evolve to solve? I focus on a class of symmetrical coordination problems for which there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (1) ALL COOPERATE, which is efficient but relies on full cooperation; (2) ALL DEFECT, which is inefficient but pays regardless of what others choose. Formal and experimental studies reveal that for such risky coordination problems, only the defection equilibrium is evolutionarily (...) stable. The following makes sense of otherwise puzzling properties of religious cognition and cultures as features of cooperative designs that evolve to stabilise such risky exchange. The model is interesting because it explains lingering puzzles in the data on religion, and better integrates evolutionary theories of religion with recent, well-motivated models of cooperative niche construction. (shrink)

This article discusses the issue of arrangement /ordering of compulsory-comprehensive maqāsid. In this respect, the main purpose is to help clarify the ordering problem. To accomplish this task, the classical and contemporary studies on this subject were reviewed. Within the scope of this research, it has been determined that the universal principles are generally listed in the order of religion, nafs, mind, generation and property. However, alternative orderings can be found where the nafs is placed at the (...) forefront. The focal point of the ordering problem is emerges from the question of whether Allah's rights/otherworldly maqāsid should be priorities or servants' rights/worldly maqāsid. The conflict between religion, which is an otherworldly value, and other principles played an active role in this classification of maqāsid. Many legal scholars who placed religion in the first place in the classical period did not clearly explained the justification of their arrangement. Also, many of today's researchers also stated that religion should come first. The scholars who put both the religion and the nafs in the center have listed many evidence for their preference. The legal scholars who put religion at the center have pointed the verse " I have not created the jinn and men but they may worship Me" as the basis for their views. Accordingly, the main purpose of the creation of human being is to serve Allah. Because the most important right to be fulfilled is the right of Allah religion should take precedence over other virtues in maqasid. Religion is also the only essential way that leads to eternal happiness. According to the legal scholars who put religion into the center, other maqasid principles are secondary. Correlatively, other principles serve religion. The hadith "The debt to Allah is more worthy of being paid." has been made the basis. Since religion constitutes the essence of the maqāsid, it is also a requirement of reason to make religion essential. According to another reason they stated, the obligation of jihad also ensures that religion is at the center. The obligation of jihad causes lives to be sacrificed to protect the religion. This means that religion is superior to the nafs and other principles. Because jihad, which is the order of religion, is fard. The scholars who maintain that the rights of the servants should take precedence over the right of Allah have cited also a lot of evidence. We come across with their views presented as a weak view in the sources or as an answer to a possible question. There is no clear information about to whom these views belong. Therefore, it is stated that no one introduces the nafs to religion. As a matter of fact, it is stated that it is not correct to qualify these views as an independent view defended by scholars. In other words, the view putting the nafs at the center and the evidence to this preference at this point should be regarded as hypothetical. We are of the view that these claims of contemporary writers need to be proven. The basic reason of the views that puts the nafs in the center is based on the pre-acceptance that maslahahs like the nafs are the right of servants while religion is the right of Allah. The given reasons can be addressed under three main headings: punishments, mitigation of prayers, and concern with non-Muslims. In case where the rights of the servant and Allah unite, the rights of the servant should be preferred. Because, the rights of servants are on hardship, and the rights of Allah are on breadth and mercy. On the contrary to the rights of the servants, postponing or neglecting the right of Allah will not harm Allah. It is clear that if the rights of the servants face postponement, they will suffer serious damage. The fact that killing a man who both abandoned his religion and killed someone unfairly, not for his departure from religion, but for retaliation, that is, the right of a servant, is a concrete example of this. The shortening of the prayer during the journey, the patient’s abandoning standing in prayer and the fasting, and other examples also require the human to be in the center. Today, there are researchers who take the nafs to the center. The existence of religion for humans and society reflects the view of these researchers. Because it is clear that religion will remain dysfunctional where there is no human and society. When these evidences are examined carefully, it can be concluded that the opinion that defends the nafs to be at the center of comprehensive maqāsid is preferable. (shrink)

J. N. Crossley [1] raised the question of whether the implication 2 + A = A ⇒ 1 + A = A is true for constructive order types (C.O.T.'s). Using an earlier definition of constructive order type, A. G. Hamilton [2] presented a counterexample. Hamilton left open the general question, however, since he pointed out that Crossley considers only orderings which can be embedded in a standard dense r.e. ordering by a partial recursive function, and that his counterexample fails (...) to meet this requirement. We resolve the question by finding a C.O.T. A which meets Crossley's requirement and such that 2 + A = A but 1 + A ≠ A. At the suggestion of A. B. Manaster and A. G. Hamilton we easily extend this construction to show that for any n ≧ 2, there is a C.O.T. A such that n + A = A but m + A ≠ A for 0 < m < n. Hence, Theorem 3 of [2] and all of its corollaries hold with the new definition of C.O.T. The construction is not difficult and requires no priority argument. The techniques are similar to those developed in [3], but no outside results are needed here. (shrink)

This is, of course, a philosophical question, but it is one that I hope to undercut in this paper, by directing attention away from it to what I think is the more basic question, what are the conditions of order, whether the latter be something that arises in a mind by reason of its habits of analysis and synthesis, or whether it be something inherent in nature and discovered directly? It is, however, necessary to assume that order can be recognized, (...) whatever its origin, and while there is much evidence to suggest that men can be made more sensitive to order through training, I think it must be admitted that even the untrained can recognize order in many situations. I shall therefore make use of the phrases "intuitive order," and "the intuitive recognition of order," to apply to those cases in which order is recognized without the presence in consciousness of explicit principles of order. In other words, I assume that order reveals itself. If it did not, it would be difficult to understand how principles of order ever came to be recognized, for it is only on analysis of a given order that they come to consciousness. (shrink)

We identify the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem for FO 2 , the fragment of first-order logic consisting of all relational first-order sentences with at most two distinct variables. Although this fragment was shown to be decidable a long time ago, the computational complexity of its decision problem has not been pinpointed so far. In 1975 Mortimer proved that FO 2 has the finite-model property, which means that if an FO 2 -sentence is satisfiable, then it has (...) a finite model. Moreover, Mortimer showed that every satisfiable FO 2 -sentence has a model whose size is at most doubly exponential in the size of the sentence. In this paper, we improve Mortimer's bound by one exponential and show that every satisfiable FO 2 -sentence has a model whose size is at most exponential in the size of the sentence. As a consequence, we establish that the satisfiability problem for FO 2 is NEXPTIME-complete. (shrink)

Faced with the apologetic and exclusionary tendencies of liberal normativism, there is a marked trend in political theory to recover a more critical conception of justice, which does not adopt the dismissive attitude of traditional Marxism. In this context, the legacy of post-structuralism has been ambivalent. On the one hand, the work of thinkers such as Jacque Derrida, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze has helped to shape the direction of the relevant discourse. On the other hand, post-structuralist critiques of political (...) normativism have been often accused of leading to a subsumption of justice to power. Contributing to the ongoing discussion, my article explores the insights of Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and assembles them into a coherent line of analysis. The main argument advanced is that post-structuralist thought provides a fertile basis for a critical concept of justice, which foregrounds the notion’s material texture without forfeiting its normative and ethical traits. (shrink)

In this seminal work, acclaimed philosopher Bernhard Waldenfels deals with the problem of the nature of order after the “shattering of the world,” and the loss of the idea of a universal or fundamental order._ _ Order in the Twilight__ unites phenomenological methodology with recent work on the theory of order, normativity, and dialogue, as well as structuralism and Gestalt theory. Philosophically stringent, it expresses a more optimistic attitude than much modern philosophy, especially deconstruction._ Waldenfels passes the question of (...) order through numerous defining aspects, and concludes that there is not one global order, but rather various conflicting domains of order. Whenever the boundary of a vital or experiential domain is crossed, a discourse speaks at the boundary, not about it, and across a threshold without abolishing it. The rest is rationalization, i.e., an attempt to find a place in the respective order for what is to-be-ordered. But why, the author concludes, should a theory be more unambiguous than reality? _ Order in the Twilight__ is an important book at this time, because it may help lift the humanities out of the skeptical, relativistic disarray in which they have been embroiled in recent decades. Waldenfels does not attempt to dictate what reality should be; rather, he is open to any valid evidences. His book offers a solid footing to the human and social sciences as they seek to escape from deconstructive irrationalism. (shrink)

Difficulties in arriving at an adequate conception of vagueness have led many writers to describe a phenomenon that has come to be known as "higher-order vagueness". Almost as many have found it to be a problem that needs to be addressed. In what follows I shall argue that, whilst we must acknowledge its presence, it is a pseudo-problem. The crucial point is the vagueness of "vague", which shows the phenomenon to be unproblematic though real enough.

In this paper we deal with the extension of Nash bargaining theory to nonconvex problems. By focussing on the Social Welfare Ordering associated with a bargaining solution, we characterize the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Moreover, we obtain a unified method of proof of recent characterization results for the asymmetric single-valued NBS and the symmetric multivalued NBS, as well as their extensions to different domains.

Contract-based approaches have been a focus of attention in business ethics. As one of the grand traditions in political philosophy, contractarianism is founded on the notion that we will never resolve deep moral disagreement. Classical philosophers like Hobbes and Locke, or recent ones like Rawls and Gaus, seek to solve ethical conflicts on the level of social rules and procedures. Recent authors in business ethics have sought to utilize contract-based approaches for their field and to apply it to concrete business (...) dilemmas. However, the application of contractarianism to management contexts can cause difficulties. Our article discusses this conceptual problem of contractarian business ethics and presents the idea of order ethics as an alternative. Order ethics, as we argue, can make a difference by conceptually bridging the gap between contractarianism and business ethics. (shrink)

Higher-order theories account for intransitive consciousness by using the transitive notion ‘awareness-of.’ I argue that this notion implies a form of ‘seeming’ that the higher-order approach requires, yet cannot account for. I show that, if the relevant kind of seeming is declared to be present in all representational states, the seeming in question is objectionably trivialized; while using the higher-order strategy to capture not only intransitive consciousness but also the relevant kind of seeming results in an infinite regress. Finally, highlighting (...) distinctive features of representations that explain why they display seeming amounts to abandoning the higher-order approach altogether. (shrink)

The higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness is a reductive representational theory of consciousness which says that what makes a mental state conscious is that there is a suitable HOT directed at that mental state. Although it seems that any neural realization of the theory must be somewhat widely distributed in the brain, it remains unclear just how widely distributed it needs to be. In section I, I provide some background and define some key terms. In section II, I argue (...) against the view that HOT theory should treat first-order (i.e. world-directed) conscious states as requiring prefrontal cortical activity though it is reasonable to suppose that conscious states are realized in the brain. In section III, I then explore some of the key background metaphysical issues involved in understanding the nature of consciousness, such as the debate between realism and idealism as well as the prospects for solving the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness. Some of the differences in question often mirror the traditional differences between Western and Eastern perspectives on the nature of consciousness. Overall, I argue that some form of realism and physicalism is more plausible than the opposing views. I also argue that materialists (and especially HOT theorists) can offer plausible replies to the hard problem. (shrink)

Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness have in common the idea that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation. This volume presents fourteen previously unpublished essays both defending and criticizing this approach to the problem of consciousness. It is the first anthology devoted entirely to HO theories of consciousness. There are several kinds of HO theory, such as the HOT (higher-order thought) and HOP (higher-order perception) models, and each is (...) discussed and debated. Part One contains essays by authors who defend some form of HO theory. Part Two includes papers by those who are critics of the HO approach. Some of the topics covered include animal consciousness, misrepresentation, the nature of pain, subvocal speech, subliminal perception, blindsight, the nature of emotion, the difference between perception and thought, first-order versus higher-order theories of consciousness, and the relationship between nonconscious and conscious mentality. (Series A). (shrink)

This book examines the theoretical foundations of order ethics and discusses business ethics problems from an order ethics perspective. Order ethics focuses on the social order and the institutional environment in which individuals interact. It is a well-established paradigm in European business ethics. The book contains articles written by leading experts in the field and provides both a concise introduction to order ethics and short summary articles homing in on specific aspects of the order-ethical paradigm. It presents contributions describing fundamental (...) concepts, historical roots, and the economic, social, and philosophical background of the theory. The second part of the handbook focuses on the theory's application in business, society, and politics, casting new light on an array of topics that loom large in contemporary ethical discourse.​. (shrink)

The paper focuses on extending to the first order case the semantical program for modalities first introduced by Dana Scott and Richard Montague. We focus on the study of neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer in the first part of the paper a series of new completeness results for salient classical systems of first order modal logic. Among other results we show that it is possible to prove strong completeness results for normal systems without the Barcan Formula (like (...) FOL + K)in terms of neighborhood frames with constant domains. The first order models we present permit the study of many epistemic modalities recently proposed in computer science as well as the development of adequate models for monadic operators of high probability. Models of this type are either difficult of impossible to build in terms of relational Kripkean semantics [40].We conclude by introducing general first order neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer a general completeness result for the entire family of classical first order modal systems in terms of them, circumventing some well-known problems of propositional and first order neighborhood semantics (mainly the fact that many classical modal logics are incomplete with respect to an unmodified version of either neighborhood or relational frames). We argue that the semantical program that thus arises offers the first complete semantic unification of the family of classical first order modal logics. (shrink)

One of the distinctive features of the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU was the extreme attention devoted to the theoretical and practical problems of perfecting socialism. Guided by Marxist-Leninist theory, the Congress underscored particularly that fidelity to this theory consists not in repeating the classical postulates and conclusions of Marxism, but in its creative development on the basis of accumulated experience. The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Twenty-seventh Congress contained the following statement by Lenin: "'Our theory (...) is not a dogma but a guide to action.' This is what Marx and Engels always said in justly ridiculing the rote memorization and simple repetition of ‘formulas’ capable in the best of cases of only marking out general tasks, which must undergo modifications in accordance with the concrete economic and political circumstances of every particular phase of the historical process.". (shrink)