Several philosophers have argued that intention is conceptually governed by a normative standard of correctness. Intention normativism is supposed to be the practical counterpart of belief normativism, which is widely discussed in the literature. In this paper, I discuss the extant formulations of the norm of intention and find all of them wanting. I then suggest and defend a new formulation of the norm of intention. I argue that the suggested formulation is immune to the problems that beset other (...) candidates for the norm of intention. (shrink)

Although Charles S. Peirce, strictly speaking, never formulated a ‘full-blown’ normative theory—a single over-all architectonic system—we believe that there lies within his work a valuable sketch of the ideal for feeling, action, and thought, and how this ideal should be followed, and in connection to this, Peirce offered a model for rational behaviour, including self-control. In the following essay we will try, modestly, to draw a rough outline of this sketch. Firstly, we will focus on the three normative (...) sciences, their relationship and their task of finding out how feeling, action and thought ought to be controlled. Then, we will take a look at the sign-universe. The very universe is a sign-universe and within this evolutionary universe feeling, matter and thought incessantly melt together into ‘concrete reasonableness’; according to Peirce, rendering the world more reasonable. This is the Summum Bonum that man can and indeed should pursue. Hence it makes absolutely no sense to speak of the three normative sciences out of this metaphysical or cosmological context. Finally, we will try to see in what way rationality can be said to fall within the spheres of self-control, bearing in mind that self-control is directly related to conditional purpose. (shrink)

This article revises a paper I read at the SAAP session in honor of my late friend, Richard Robin. The discussion that followed the paper was much better than the paper, and my present effort, I hope, has benefited from that discussion. What I say here is exploratory. I am more confident of my criticisms of other authors than of the alternative I propose. It is the mere sketch of an idea, its many obvious difficulties blithely ignored. I hope in (...) later articles to make up for present deficiencies.I begin by developing a suggestion of Robin's, that Peirce's idea of a normative science grew out of his work on the norms of science, and proceed toward an explanation of the possibility of a normative science, hence of.. (shrink)

This essay posits that Peirce puts the Normative Sciences implicitly to work at three junctures of his Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (NARG): (1) in the distinguishing of musement from play; (2) in the generation of the Humble Argument via musement; and (3) in the portrayal of the Humble Argument as the first stage of an inquiry into its confirmability. Then, focus shifts to Peirce’s notions of the initiating “play” and the “plausibility” of the God-hypothesis, as a (...) means both to analyze and underscore the foundational role of esthetics in the Normative Sciences. After a discussion of the theological content of the argument, the essay concludes that Peirce did indeed employ the Normative Sciences as postulated, but that his truncation of NARG at the abductive stage renders the overall argument inconclusive, amounting more to a report of a religio-esthetic experience. (shrink)

Using Maya Angelou’s I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings as an example, this paper introduces Wilhlem Dilthey’s hermeneutics and pedagogical theory. Dilthey saw biographies as nothing less than “the highest and most instructive form of the understanding of life.” This, then, serves as the starting point for his hermeneutics or theory of understanding, which distinguishes humanistic understanding from scientific explanation, and sees any one moment or word as having meaning only in relation to a whole—the whole of a sentence (...) or text, or the whole of one’s life. It is also the starting point of his pedagogy, whose ultimate “duty” is “to develop the child as a person who carries their own purpose within themselves.” In introducing Dilthey’s hermeneutic pedagogy, this paper draws principally from his The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, a text that has been long neglected in hermeneutic and phenomenological studies of education. (shrink)

The article aims to show that Peirce, after realizing the appropriation that James and others made of Pragmatism, taking it far from an ideal of justice and keeping it in the service of a “nauseating utility”, whose principle was that only individual utility, including spiritual well-being, would be the ultimate goal of all practice, he sought a philosophy that would keep logic and science united in a realistic manner with laws that could be metaphysically real. In this way, he (...) perceived the necessity to transcend the hypothetical considerations incorporated into the sense of the pragmatic maxim, attempting to distance it from nominalist risk. In this process, he took into account two new normative sciences, esthetics and ethics, in addition to logic, so that Pragmaticism, in intelligent criticism, would investigate whether an admirable end of a subject could be pursued in an indefinite and prolonged course of action, without grounding it solely on individual utility, thus replacing the ideal of justice for the renamed Pragmatism, the Pragmaticism. (shrink)

: From 1902 onward, Peirce viewed esthetics, ethics, and logic as "normative sciences," interconnected spheres of philosophical inquiry that constitute his main work in value theory. The normative sciences provide the basis for a theoretical investigation of questions of value detached from practical interests. Because the normative sciences maintain Peirce's well-known insistence on realism, they set his pragmaticism apart from the more "nominalistic" pragmatism of James and Dewey. The paper aims to clarify Peirce's idea of the (...) class='Hi'>normative sciences, to show how his realism applies in the sphere of value, and to explore his views on the proper relation between theory and practice. The concluding section suggests examples of how we might understand Peirce's rich and innovative concept of normative esthetics.Resumo: De 1902 em diante, Peirce considerava a estética, a ética e a lógica como "ciências normativas", esferas interconexas de inquirição filosófica que constituem seu principal trabalho em teoria do valor. As ciências normativas fornecem a base para uma investigação teorética de questões sobre valor independentes de interesses práticos. Porque as ciências normativas mantém a notória insistência de Peirce no realismo, elas colocam seu pragmaticismo à parte do pragmatismo mais "nominalista" de James e Dewey. O artigo almeja esclarecer a idéia de Peirce das ciências normativas, mostrar como seu realismo se aplica à esfera do valor, e explorar suas visões da própria relação entre ciência e prática. A seção concludente sugere exemplos de como podemos entender o rico e inovador conceito peirciano de estética normativa. (shrink)

Abstract:This piece offers a reflection on James Liszka's book, Charles Peirece on Ethics, Esthetics, and the Normative Sciences. I consider Liszka's approach to Peirce's writings, especially the Minute Logic and "Evolutionary Love", and explore his extension of Peirce's ethical thought. I conclude that Liszka's work in this volume shows us what reasonableness as self-correction might require of us, and suggests ways in which we can take up the work of the normative sciences.

The advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other digital technologies is touted as ushering in the fourth industrial revolution (4IR). 4IR, also known as ‘Industry 4.0,’ pertains to the burning internet connectivity, sophisticated analytics and production, and automation’s transformative impacts on the world. The surge of change in the production arena started in the second half of 2010 and has continued to increase astronomically, with a remarkable probability of shaping the future of manufacturing and humanity. The 4IR is thus heralding (...) areas such as digitalisation, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, robotics, and 3D technologies amidst many other innovative digital technologies following the first, second and third industrial revolutions. The problem this paper addresses is the role of Arts and humanities (A&H) in the era of AI. Should A&H imbibe the empirical science methodology to stay relevant? How does A&H contribute to 4IR? Leveraging on philosophical tools of arguments and reconstruction of ideas, this paper argues for the significance of Kant’s thoughts in The Contest of the Faculties and that Arts and humanities are instrumental to humanising science and technology, helping to shape interdisciplinary collaboration and fostering understanding of the ethical, social and cultural dimensions of AI. (shrink)

In his Cambridge Lectures of 1898, Peirce seemed to dismiss the role of ethics as “a guide to conduct” in favor of a reliance on conventional morality and moral sentiment. Yet, in just two years, Peirce reversed his position. Drafts of The Minute Logic of 1902 show that Peirce now thought of logic as a normative science, grounded in ethics and esthetics and planned to devote a significant part of the work to the development of these sciences. In (...) the 1903 Harvard Lectures—he gives the first public presentation of this plan—and follows this up in the Lowell Lectures of the same year. In using manuscripts and other materials during this period, I explain why Peirce took this normative turn and suggest a coherent picture of his normative sciences. (shrink)

What is pedagogy, exactly? Merriam-Webster defines it simply as “the art, science, or profession of teaching.” In contemporary academic discourse, however, pedagogy is generally left undefined — with its apparent implicit meanings ranging anywhere from a specific “model for teaching” (e.g., behaviorist or progressivist instruction) to a broadly political philosophy of education in general (most famously, a “pedagogy of the oppressed”). In this paper, Norm Friesen and Hanno Su follow the Continental pedagogical tradition in giving pedagogy a general but (...) explicit definition. They do so by looking at how pedagogy arises both in everyday life and in school as unavoidably ethical activity undertaken primarily for the sake of the young person or child. Such activities, the authors maintain, are structured not so much by processes, methods, and outcomes, but by irresolvable oppositions and the tensions between them. They illustrate this inductively through a series of images and examples — moving gradually from ones involving parenting and early childhood to ones from elementary and secondary schooling. In this way, Friesen and Su show that pedagogy is not so much one or more ideologically focused or evidence-based instructional or psychological approaches to be mastered by a professional or teaching specialist. It is instead an independent but ethically informed practical perspective — one that can (and has) been extended to form a distinctively pedagogical theory and discipline. As such, it is something that is not only a part of our everyday life and culture, but arguably of all human cultures. (shrink)

Why are the fundamentals of education apparently so little changed in our era of digital technology? Is their obstinate persistence evidence of resilience or obsolescence? Such questions can best be answered not by imagining an uncertain high-tech future, but by examining a well-documented past--a history of instruction and media that extends from Gilgamesh to Google. Norm Friesen looks to the combination and reconfiguration of oral, textual, and more recent media forms to understand the longevity of so many educational arrangements and (...) practices. Friesen examines the interrelationship of reading, writing, and pedagogy in the case of the lecture and the textbook--from their premodern to their postmodern incarnations. Over hundreds of years, these two forms have integrated textual, oral, and (more recently) digital media and connected them with changing pedagogical and cultural priorities. The Textbook and the Lecture opens new possibilities for understanding not only mediated pedagogical practices and their reform but also gradual changes in our conceptions of the knowing subject and of knowledge itself. Drawing on wide-ranging scholarship in fields as diverse as media ecology and German-language media studies, Foucauldian historiography, and even archaeological research, The Textbook and the Lecture is a fascinating investigation of educational media. (shrink)

The paper deals with the problem of the nature of logic and its normativity in the context of the normativity of scientific knowledge in general. We proceed from a division between fundamental aspects of scientific knowledge which are related to the nature and subject matter of particular sciences, and its applied aspects which are related to the possible applications of sciences. This division fully applies to logic. The authors note that if we view logic as a completely objective discipline, devoid (...) of any "anthropological basis", then the only rational alternative to anti-realist approaches is an ontological (realistic) strategy to justify the logical ones that seek to justify a certain kind of being. To do this, it is necessary to abandon the normative interpretation of logical evaluations and logical systems. Logic can gain a true ontological foundation, based on the devoid of the normative color of understanding logical evaluations as a particular kind of object. Logic has both a deductive core, and various applied disciplines, modern informal logic among them. While formal deductive logic is concentrated on the systems of abstract logical entities (objects) such as truth values and logical functions, the main task of informal logic consist in studying a real argument, which people apply in communicative processes, by elaborating certain standards, criteria and procedures for their interpretation and evaluation. No science can be normative in its basic (fundamental) aspects, and so is logic. Nevertheless, any science is in some degree normative with respect to its applied aspects, and informal logic perfectly illustrates this in view of a normative evolving of applied systems of the modern theories of argumentation. In addition to denying the normativity of formal deductive logic as a fundamental theoretical discipline, the authors of this article demonstrate the fundamental possibility of normative measurement of logical knowledge, in particular in the applied aspect of the development of modern informal logic. (shrink)

According to Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) the universe is perfused with signs. There is an objective sign-logic at work in the universe which constitutes a growth of concrete reasonableness. However, this process is not value neutral but the Summum Bonum. Man is now cabable of a high degree of self control and can cultivate his habits of feeling, action, and thought in accordance with the ideal. A theory of these efforts of cultivation fall within Peirce's three normative sciences — (...) aesthetics, ethics, and logic. Even though Peirce never did formulate a fully coherent normative theory, there lies in his work an important sketch in understanding the ideal and how it should be followed, and in connection to this a model for rational behaviour including self-control. (shrink)

It is well known that we owe the term ‘aesthetics’ in its philosophical sense to the 18th century German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten. The eighteenth century's interest in aesthetics, however, pre-dated the invention of the term. In 1725, Francis Hutcheson published an Inquiry into the Original of Our Idea of Beauty and Virtue. This may be said to be the first sustained and significant work in philosophical aesthetics as we now know it. Hutcheson's volume preceded Baumgarten's by 10 years, and within (...) Scotland it inaugurated a series of philosophical writings on taste and beauty that continued for almost a century. Contributors included major philosophical figures like David Hume, Thomas Reid and Adam Smith, as well as influential figures less well known today such as Alexander Gerard, George Turnbull and Lord Kames. (shrink)

The increasing use of online simulations as replacements for animal dissection in the classroom or lab raises important questions about the nature of simulation itself and its relationship to embodied educational experience. This paper addresses these questions first by presenting a comparative hermeneutic-phenomenological investigation of online and offline dissection. It then interprets the results of this study in terms of Borgmann’s (1992) notion of the intentional “transparency” and “pliability” of simulated hyperreality. It makes the case that it is precisely encumbrance (...) and disruption—elements that are by definition excluded from simulations and interfaces—which give dissection its educational value. (shrink)

As we rapidly approach the 50th year of the much‐celebrated ‘cognitive revolution’, it is worth reflecting on its widespread impact on individual disciplines and areas of multidisciplinary endeavour. Of specific concern in this paper is the example of the influence of cognitivism's equation of mind and computer in education. Within education, this paper focuses on a particular area of concern to which both mind and computer are simultaneously central: educational technology. It examines the profound and lasting effect of cognitive (...) class='Hi'>science on our understandings of the educational potential of information and communication technologies, and further argues that recent and multiple ‘signs of discontent’, ‘crises’ and even ‘failures’ in cognitive science and psychology should result in changes in these understandings. It concludes by suggesting new directions that educational technology research might take in the light of this crisis of cognitivsm. (shrink)

One of the crucial debates within pragmatism concerns the import of Charles S. Peirce’s “pragmatic maxim.” The aim of this article is to show that Peirce maintains a twofold attitude toward his maxim. I would call this twofold approach ‘problematical,’ not because it is the origin of inconsistencies within Peirce’s thought, but because the collocation and use of the pragmatic maxim constitutes a genuine problem upon which Peirce continued to reflect throughout his life.1 This problem concerns the relationship among semantics, (...) metaphysics, and what Peirce called the “Normative Sciences,” i.e., the inquiry into the correct normative criteria for human self-control.On the one hand, Peirce stresses repeatedly that his.. (shrink)

This response paper begins by countering the contributions of Don Ihde and Robert Rosenberger to this special issue, making its case in existential terms. Then, addressing Darin Barney, these arguments are developed further in aesthetic terms, making use of the “modernist” educational theory of René Arcilla. This response article concludes by returning to the realm of the educational with the help of Albert Borgmann's and Estrid Sørensen's feedback.

Abstract:The influence of John Duns Scotus' doctrine of the free will on Charles Peirce's normative theory is proposed in the context of commentaries on James J. Liszka's latest book on Peirce and the normative sciences.

Abstract:In Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics and the Normative Sciences, I argue that Peirce was motivated to develop a normative science of ethics because of his growing concern with the corruption of science in the Gilded Age, and the recognition that the pragmatic maxim entailed an amoral instrumentalism. Rather than taking a Kantian approach to resolve the latter issue, he adopts an Aristotelian one, engaging in a search for an ultimate end that could order all other (...) ends. What is right is what would be conducive to that end. As such he sees the necessity of a science of esthetics which would study such an end. However, rather than eudaimonia as the highest end, Peirce sees reasonableness as the summum bonum. Although barely sketched by Peirce, I argue that its principal sense is that of an ongoing process of self-correction away from error. In regard to this end, what is most important is the design of practices and the establishment of habits of conduct and sentiment most conducive to self-correction. For this reason, a proper community of inquiry with these features ought to be established, armed with the general methodology of science to assess the norms that guide the experiments of living together. Assurance that communities of inquiries are moving away from error and toward improvement is based on a convergence theory of truth. (shrink)

In his later years, Peirce proposed the idea of ethics as a normative science. Is such a thing possible? John Dewey asks “whether scientific propositions about the direction of human conduct, about any situation into which the idea of should enters, are possible; and, if so, of what sort they are and the grounds upon which they rest”. If the meaning of ‘science’ here is taken in its contemporary sense—the way in which physics or biology might be (...) understood—then normative science implies ethical naturalism, the position that normativity is explainable as a natural property, and capable of empirical study. Russ Shafer-Landau defines it precisely in these terms, where moral properties.. (shrink)

Abstract:Peirce held a convergence theory of moral truth, as James Liszka persuasively argues in Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics, and the Normative Sciences (2021). Here I emphasize: (1) that Peirce's convergence theory follows from the application of the maxim of pragmatism to the concept of moral goodness or rightness; (2) that in connection with Peirce's account of the ethical summum bonum, morally right action can be understood as action that conforms or contributes to the growth of concrete reasonableness; and (...) (3) that, for Peirce, the growth of concrete reasonableness seems to be a movement or development toward "God". While I broadly agree with Liszka's approach, I highlight some disagreements. As do many readers of Peirce, Liszka seems to regard the convergence of beliefs and habits as necessarily a convergance among the "indefinite community" of distinct persons or inquirers; however, there is sufficient evidence that Peirce came to think that, if any given person were to live long enough, they would come to the same conclusions or rest in the same habits on their own. With respect to morality, even the most evil person would eventually come around to the moral truth. (shrink)

When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such risk arises when scientific claims cause cognitive or behavioural changes in the audience that contribute to the self-fulfilment of these claims. I argue that the ethical and epistemic problems that such self-fulfilment effects may pose are much broader and more common than hitherto appreciated. Moreover, these problems are often due to a specific psychological phenomenon that has been neglected in (...) the research on science communication: many people tend to conform to ‘descriptive norms’, that is, norms capturing (perceptions of) what others commonly do, think, or feel. Because of this tendency, science communication may frequently produce significant social harm. I contend that scientists have a responsibility to assess the risk of this potential harm and consider adopting strategies to mitigate it. I introduce one such strategy and argue that its implementation is independently well motivated by the fact that it helps improve scientific accuracy. (shrink)

François Jacob, biologiste français et Prix Nobel, a souligné dans les années 1970 que les sciences, les technologies et leur cortège expérimental font intervenir " un jeu des possibles " et constituent pour cette raison " une machine à fabriquer de l'avenir ". Autrement dit, les activités scientifiques, médicales ou encore artistiques exigent que soient instaurés des dispositifs qui à la fois concrétisent et contrôlent la génération de connaissances nouvelles et de pratiques originales. Ce livre vise à explorer les articulations (...) multiples entre les activités créatives et leurs limites constitutives. Les articles posent la question des limites de la créativité à partir de perspectives philosophiques et sociologiques tout en se référant à des études de cas qui sont à l'interface entre sciences, arts et normes sociotechniques. Le livre est le résultat d'une recherche sur la créativité menée à l'IRIST (Institut de Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur les Sciences et la Technologie) à l'Université de Strasbourg. (shrink)

Abstract:In my response to the commentators, I agree with Rosa Mayorga that Duns Scotus should be included as an important influence on Peirce's notion of agency, as well as his sense of the highest good. I explain, however, how Peirce's triadic view of agency is an improvement that relates to current debates between moral internalism and externalism. In response to Diana Heney, I defend Peirce's notion of evolutionary love as a form of intergenerational altruism, necessary to any community of inquiry. (...) I also argue, in response to her query, that Peirce did not subscribe to moral perfectionism. Instead, there is good reasons to think that he was a meliorist in Dewey's sense. The end is improvement, which seems to be an endless process, rather than the movement towards a static end. I agree with Aaron Wilson's claim that the pragmatic definition of truth implies the convergence theory of truth. However, I explain how the convergence theory of truth might be elaborated as to apply to ethical claims. I also discuss how the 'would be' of the convergence theory of truth is a problematic measure of moral claims. Like progress in science, it is better to measure a moral norm in terms of its improvement from previous ones. I take issue with Wilson's account of moral reality and his claim that truth can be attained by individuals in the absence of community. I end by arguing that reasonableness has to be understood as a process rather than a perfected state. (shrink)

In a pluralistic society, consensus in spirituality must rest on a common human basis. The relevant social sciences as currently conceived cannot provide one. Bernard Lonergan's analysis of the human spirit – or intentional consciousness – elaborates the overlooked element in a psychological account of the human mind and, thus, grounds a psychology of spirituality as the natural expression of ongoing human integration, an account that is fully open to and, indeed, begs for theological elaboration. Initially unpacking the complexities of (...) this matter and sketching a Lonerganian response, this paper focuses on the key complexity – the misidentification of the spiritual with the divine and the pervasive insistence, inherited from a pre-scientific age and perpetuated by Western piety, that first and foremost spirituality entails an explicit relationship with God. Treatment of a specifically Lonerganian topic – the suggestion that, because of the transformation effected by sanctifying grace in the human soul, consciousness includes a supposed fifth level characterized by the love of God – occasions an in-depth argument for the practical adequacy of a psychological treatment of spirituality apart from theological considerations. The ultimate goal of this argument is to establish, within a coherent interdisciplinary framework, an explanatory and normative treatment of spiritual issues, a science of spirituality. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore Kant’s account of normativity through the prism of the distinction between the natural and the human sciences. Although the pragmatic orientation of the human sciences is often defined in contrast with the theoretical orientation of the natural sciences, I show that they are in fact regulated by one and the same norm, namely reason’s demand for autonomy.

The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to (...) class='Hi'>normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights. (shrink)

Instructional technology, and the cognitivist and systems paradigms that underpin it, grew out of the military-industrial complex during the Cold War. Much as the Pentagon and this military complex defined the architecture of the Internet, they also essentially created, ex nihilo, the fields of instructional technology and instructional design. The results of the ongoing dominance or influence of the Pentagon in these specific disciplines have been traced in research that appeared during the final phases of the Cold War. But this (...) research has not been updated to reflect circumstances now most definitive of the post–Cold War world: the rapid development of Internet infrastructures and applications, and the aggressive expansion of US military spending and activity. Tracing the imprint left by the US military on instructional technology and design, this paper considers how this influence may now extend, like the Internet itself, into schools and the university. It will conclude by stressing that the end of the Cold War, along with more recent developments concerning the US military, presents a juncture offering both opportunity and challenge to the evolving field of educational technology or “e-learning.”. (shrink)

In this symposium, panelists presented research on benefit corporations and certified b corps. In the last decade, new incorporation laws have emerged in several states that explicitly allow firms to pursue both social purpose and profit. Panelists presented an overview of alternative incorporation statutes, evaluated the degree to which companies are externally accountable, and hold themselves internally accountable, to a broader social purpose. The panel also discussed strategies for teaching about certified b corps in the classroom. Finally, the plenary discussion (...) centered on two themes: Is a need for a legally mandated broader social purpose an American problem? Is the benefit corporate structure going to get us where we need to be? (shrink)

_Normativity and Naturalism in the Social Sciences_ engages with a central debate within the philosophy of social science: whether social scientific explanation necessitates an appeal to norms, and if so, whether appeals to normativity can be rendered "scientific." This collection brings together contributions from a diverse group of philosophers who explore a broad but thematically unified set of questions, many of which stem from an ongoing debate between Stephen Turner and Joseph Rouse (both contributors to this volume) on the (...) role of naturalism in the philosophy of the social sciences. Informed by recent developments in both philosophy and the social sciences, this volume will set the benchmark for contemporary discussions about normativity and naturalism. This collection will be relevant to philosophers of social science, philosophers in interested in the rule following and metaphysics of normativity, and theoretically oriented social scientists. (shrink)

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which (...) they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative. (shrink)