I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, (...) we have not been given good reasons to think that normativism is false. (shrink)

According to Amie Thomasson’s modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a "semantic rule"? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry asks about the normative status of semantic (...) rules. (shrink)

In the middle of the last century, it was common to explain the notion of necessity in linguistic terms. A necessary truth, it was said, is a sentence whose truth is guaranteed by linguistic rules. Quine famously argued that, on this view, de re modal claims do not make sense. “Porcupettes are porcupines” is necessarily true, but it would be a mistake to say of a particular porcupette that it is necessarily a porcupine, or that it is possibly purple. Linguistic (...) theories of necessity fell out of favour with the publication of Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, and Quine’s arguments were put aside. In her recent book, Norms and Necessity, Amie Thomasson presents her modal normativism, which is an updated version of the mid-century theories just described. Quine’s arguments are thus relevant once again. We recapitulate Quine’s central argument, in the context of modal normativism. We then criticise Amie Thomasson’s discussion of de re modality. We finish by briefly presenting an alternative account of de re modal statements, which is compatible with modal normativism. (shrink)

This chapter covers normativism, which attempts to derive moral conclusions from normative but non-moral premises. One version refers to moral explanations, another version includes contractarianism and contractualism, which justifies moral beliefs by reference to contractors who are rational, impartial, and/or reasonable. Neither version can solve the skeptical regress problem.

Belief normativists claim that certain mental phenomena are best explained by holding that belief is constituted by a truth norm. These phenomena include deliberative transparency, according to which the deliberative question whether to believe that p is necessarily and immediately settled by answering the question whether p, and Moore's paradox, which concerns the impossibility or sheer absurdity of believing that p while judging that not-p. Critics of normativism have argued that the normative explanation of such phenomena fails because it (...) presupposes an implausibly strong motivation through adherence to norms. I call this the motivation problem for the normative explanation of deliberative transparency and Moore’s paradox. The motivation problem can be easily extended to the normative explanation of all psychological phenomena involving belief that inevitably happen or fail to happen. Therefore, this problem can greatly diminish the explanatory promise of belief normativism. In this paper, building on a specific version of belief normativism called normative dispositionalism, I provide a solution to the motivation problem. The upshot is that properly understood, belief normativism need not worry about the motivation problem in claiming to be the best explanation of deliberative transparency and Moore’s paradox. (shrink)

I argue that we can accept modal normativism—a view that the function of modal claims is to express semantic rules—while also accepting possible worlds semantics. I argue that by keeping the metaphysical insights of normativism at the level of metasemantics—i.e., at the level of accounts of what metaphysically explains facts about the meaning of modal claims—it is open to the normativist to wholeheartedly accept possible worlds semantics.

“Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved (...) in the natural sciences. Thus, according to Normativism, whether or not someone thinks that fish sleep, or even can represent fish at all, depends upon making a judgment about the person’s goodness or rationality, of a sort that would not be involved in merely determining whether or not fish in fact sleep. (shrink)

The paper argues that applications of the principle that “ought” implies “can” (OIC) depend on normative considerations even if the link between “ought” and “can” is logical in nature. Thus, we should reject a common, “factualist” conception of OIC and endorse weak “normativism”. Even if we use OIC as the rule ““cannot” therefore “not ought””, applying OIC is not a mere matter of facts and logic, as factualists claim, but often draws on “proto-ideals” of moral agency.

The paper substantiates the prospects of normativism in law, namely the possibility of using purely logical means to make a judgment as a logical conclusion. The main criticism of normativism is based on the possibility of conflicts of judicial decisions and especially on conflicts of the norms themselves, when a court under similar circumstances can make opposing decisions which are formally valid. Critics of normativism argue that logic is helpless in resolving the conflicts and that higher justice (...) must be guided by the discretion of judges who share common values or a common ideology, especially in the case of totalitarian societies. However, we show that there are two types of logical argumentation in the elimination of these conflicts: (a) Aristotelian, when a more general basis is sought, from which only one of the contradictions follows; (b) non-Aristotelian, when a compromise is reached between two contrary statements. In the second case, this technique is used mainly for civil cases. Moreover, this technique is quite formal and does not require an appeal to paraconsistent or other non-classical logics for eliminating the conflict. Using two recent court cases, we demonstrate how the proposed two types of logical argumentation work. (shrink)

The renewed interest on political realism can offer a new reading of the traditional dichotomy between normative and realist conception of constitutionalism. The purpose of this article is to analyse this renewed discussion, especially by focusing on the relationship between “political realism” and “political constitutionalism,” in the light of some theorists and authors—such as Richard Bellamy and Jeremy Waldron. After a brief introduction in which political realism will be discussed, especially through Bernard Williams’ reinterpretation, the article proposes a rereading of (...) democratic constitutionalism from the classical dichotomy between normativism and realism in political theory. The focus will be set on three key issues: 1. Richard Bellamy’s constitutional theory in a realist perspective; 2. An insight of legal constitutionalism under a normative banner; 3. A brief conclusion in which the risks of a majoritarian and populist constitutionalism will be discussed. (shrink)

Literal talk of possible worlds and similarity between them is thought to presuppose accepting substantive forms of realism about possible worlds. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims—i.e. claims of metaphysical necessity and possibility—are not descriptive claims reporting on possible worlds, primitive modal facts, or any kind of modal truth maker. Instead, the function of basic modal discourse is normative: basic modal claims express and endorse semantic rules governing the terms involved in those claims. Taking the two idea together, (...) it might be thought that modal normativism should avoid literal talk about possible worlds or should accept a form of fictionalism about possible worlds. In this paper, I will argue that this is false: modal normativism can and ought to keep literal talk of possible worlds and similarity between them. I will show how literal talk of worlds quite naturally falls out the normativist’s characterization of the function of modal discourse. Moreover, I will show how literal talk of similarity between worlds naturally falls out of our practice of expressing semantic rules using counterfactual claims on the normativist account. (shrink)

According to doxastic normativism, part of what makes an attitude a belief rather than another type of attitude is that it is governed by a truth-norm. It has been objected that this view fails since there are true propositions such that if you believed them they would not be true, and thus the obligation to believe true propositions cannot hold for these. I argue that the solution for doxastic normativists is to find a norm that draws the right distinction (...) between those true propositions we are obliged to believe (“ordinary non-tricky propositions”) and those we are not (“tricky propositions”). I develop a norm which I argue does exactly this, and further argue that it can be used to salvage the idea that belief is constitutively normative. (shrink)

Eine Analyse der Politischen Philosophie der Neuzeit kann – soll sie nicht lediglich einzelne Autoren oder Werke reihen – zwei methodische Wege einschlagen. Sie kann zum einen mit einer detaillierten Werkinterpretation wichtiger Denker wie Hobbes, Locke oder Kant beginnen und quasiinduktiv den historischen Fortgang der Hauptdiskussionen zu rekonstruieren suchen. Sie kann aber auch wesentliche abstrakte Verlaufskategorien vorschlagen, mit deren Hilfe dann umgekehrt in einem quasideduktiven Konkretionsschritt die Beiträge eminenter Denker möglichst gut verstanden, eingeordnet und gewürdigt werden.Der vorliegende Text wird zum (...) Zweck der Beurteilung dieser beiden großen Alternativen zunächst einige Anforderungen vorschlagen, die derartige abstrakte begriffliche Kategorien erfüllen sollten, um zum Verständnis der Ideengeschichte der neuzeitlichen Politischen Philosophie beitragen zu können . In einem zweiten Schritt werden die beiden soeben genannten Gegensatzpaare an Hand dieser Anforderungen beurteilt . Diese Beurteilung wird zu dem Ergebnis führen, daß beide Gegensatzpaare zwar unabdingbar notwendig sind, um wesentliche Autoren der Politischen Philosophie der Neuzeit würdigen zu können. Für die Erfassung des Verlaufs der grundlegenden Auseinandersetzung in der neuzeitlichen Politischen Philosophie reichen sie aber nicht aus. Deshalb wird drittens das schon im Titel dieses Beitrags genannte Kategorienpaar „Normativer Individualismus versus normativer Kollektivismus" vorgeschlagen . Mit Hilfe dieses Gegensatzpaares und einiger Ergänzungen wird dann viertens die Grundlinie der Auseinandersetzung in der neuzeitlichen Politischen Philosophie skizziert werden . Diese Skizze soll schließlich zu einem besseren Verständnis der gegenwärtigen Diskussionslage führen. (shrink)

The separability thesis claims that the concept of law can be explicated independently of morality, the normativity thesis, that it can be explicated independently of fact. Continental normativism, prominent above all in the work of Hans Kelsen, may be characterized in terms of the coupling of these theses. Like Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart is a proponent of the separability thesis. And–a leitmotiv–both theorists reject reductive legal positivism. They do not, however, reject it for the same reasons. Kelsen's reason, (...) in a word, is the normativity thesis. Hart, however, grounds his theory in social fact. In place of the reductive thesis of the legal positivist tradition, and in sharp contrast to Kelsen's normativity thesis, Hart defends a non‐reductive version of what the author terms the facticity thesis. (shrink)

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that evaluative normativism leads to unacceptable research biases, and should be avoided. Though it is stipulated that the particular biases they discuss are cause for concern, this argument should not be generalized. The boundary between evaluative and goal-directed norms is difficult to define, and normative assumptions are an integral part of academic progress; moreover, the biases that result may have beneficial potential.

My aim in this chapter is to defend the claim that “the intentional is normative” against a number of objections, including those that Georges Rey has presented in his contribution to this volume. In the first section of this chapter, I shall outline a specific version of this claim; and in the second section, I shall give a quick sketch of the principal argument that I have used to support this claim, and briefly comment on Rey’s criticisms of this argument.

Den här boken är en övningsbok i logik och en kort introduktion till normativ etik. Den innehåller nio kapitel. Det första kapitlet är en allmän inledning till normativ etik. Det innehåller information om vad normativ etik är och hur den normativa etiken förhåller sig till metaetik, praktisk (eller tillämpad) etik och deskriptiv moralfilosofi. Kapitel 2 handlar om dygdetik. Kapitel 3 handlar om naturlagsetik. Kapitel 4 handlar om kontraktualism (kontraktsetik) och rättighetsetik. Kapitel 5 handlar om kantianism, sinnelagsetik och pliktetik. Kapitel 6 (...) handlar om konsekvensetik. Kapitel 7 handlar om prima-facie-etik, omsorgsetik och situationsetik. Kapitel 8 handlar om fenomenologisk etik och existentialistisk etik. Kapitel 9 innehåller kort information om diverse andra normativa teorier och blandade övningar. Den här boken innehåller en stor mängd argument. Genom att studera dessa kan läsaren öva upp sin förmåga att analysera och värdera olika filosofiska härledningar, samt att tänka och resonera logiskt. Boken kan användas i undervisning i filosofi och logik på en grundläggande nivå eller för självstudier. Läsningen kompletteras lämpligen med en eller flera introduktionsböcker till logik, som behandlar olika fundamentala logiska fakta och metoder. OBS: De flesta argument i denna bok har tidigare publicerats i boken Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi och många lösningar har tidigare publicerats i boken Facit till Några Argument i ”Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi”, även om den också innehåller många argument som är nya. -/- Produkt information Publicerad: April 15, 2021 Språk: Svenska Format: Paperback Antal sidor: 418 sidor. (shrink)

We propose a critique ofnormativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial “is-ought” inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we (...) propose that a clear distinction between normative systems and competence theories is essential, arguing that equating them invites an “is-ought” inference: to wit, supporting normative “ought” theories with empirical “is” evidence. We analyze in detail two research programmes with normativist features – Oaksford and Chater's rational analysis and Stanovich and West's individual differences approach – demonstrating how, in each case, equating norm and competence leads to an is-ought inference. Normativism triggers a host of research biases in the psychology of reasoning and decision making: focusing on untrained participants and novel problems, analyzing psychological processes in terms of their normative correlates, and neglecting philosophically significant paradigms when they do not supply clear standards for normative judgement. For example, in a dual-process framework, normativism can lead to a fallacious “ought-is” inference, in which normative responses are taken as diagnostic of analytic reasoning. We propose that little can be gained from normativism that cannot be achieved by descriptivist computational-level analysis, illustrating our position with Hypothetical Thinking Theory and the theory of the suppositional conditional. We conclude that descriptivism is a viable option, and that theories of higher mental processing would be better off freed from normative considerations. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that not only is metaphysical modal normativism an attractive view but that, as a matter of fact, many of us have, all along, been metaphysical modal normativists of a particular stripe. Namely, we have been the kinds of modal normativists, in the form of counterpart theorists, who are robust realists about possibility simpliciter. Having introduced modal normativism as Thomasson does in Norms and Necessity, I go on to recast it in somewhat different terms. (...) With this re-casting in place we can see that while the view offers a pleasingly deflationary account of metaphysical necessity and possibility it does so only against the backdrop of robust realism about possibility simpliciter. If that is right, then Lewis’ counterpart theory turns out to be a potent version of metaphysical modal normativism. So many of us have, all along, been metaphysical modal normativists, and so much the better for it. (shrink)

This essay takes issue with the way the highly fashionable concept of hybridity has been used to skew our understanding of cultural identity, and render conceptually and normatively indefensible the political claims of culture. It also challenges the current ‘anti-essentialist’ orthodoxy about what culture ‘really is,’ and shows that neither ‘essentialism’ nor ‘anti-essentialism’ helps us get right the place of culture in politics, because both fail to recognize the identity and non-identity of culture with itself.

Normativity is one of the keywords of contemporary philosophical discussions (which partly reincarnate traditional debates about the differences between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften ). But are the philosophers who argue for the irreducible role of normativity within accounts for human societies obliged to assume, as Stephen Turner has recently put it, the existence of a "non‐natural, non‐empirical stuff that is claimed to be necessarily, intrinsically there and to in some sense account for the actual"?

Stephen Turner’s anti-normativism is based on the idea that the normative can be explained away by social science. Exploiting the idea fostered by the sociology of scientific knowledge that reasons can be understood naturalistically as the causes of the beliefs of scientists and endorsing a non-normative conception of rationality, Turner has argued that normative accounts are better understood as “Good Bad Theories” (GBT). GBT are understood as false accounts that play a role in social coordination like magical or religious (...) rituals in primitive societies (e.g. Tabu and the like). According to Turner, “norms,” “obligations,” “reasons,” and “commitments” are like Tabu and can be explained away as GBT. Hence, Turner expected normative accounts to disappear completely in a fully disenchanted world. Turner focuses on the idea, widespread among philosophers, that the normative does not reduce to the causal: his main claim is that social science succeeds in the reduction of the normative in causal terms, overcoming normative/causal dualism. Furthermore, this success is presented as creating a serious challenge for normativism. By focusing on certain (supposedly normative) features of beliefs like those involved in belief change dynamics, I will point out some interesting implications and problems for Turner’s anti-normativism. (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 295-311, September 2021.

ABSTRACT: I explain and rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption that the normative supervenes on the non-normative.

Using normative correctness as a diagnostic tool reduces the outcome of complex cognitive functions to a binary classification (normative or non-normative). It also focuses attention on outcomes, rather than processes, impeding the development of good cognitive theories. Given that both normative and non-normative responses may be produced by the same process, normativity is a poor indicator of underlying processes.

In considering the debate about the meaning of ‘disease’, the positions are generally presented as falling into two categories: naturalist, e.g., Boorse, and normativist, e.g., Engelhardt and many others. This division is too coarse, and obscures much of what is going on in this debate. I therefore propose that accounts of the meaning of ‘disease’ be assessed according to Hare’s (1997) taxonomy of evaluative terms. Such an analysis will allow us to better understand both individual positions and their inter-relationships. Most (...) importantly, it will show that it is unlikely that there is a single unique disease-concept at issue. Rather, different authors are, for the most part, considering different concepts. (shrink)

The paper aims to further concretise our previously proposed normative-functional concept of the criminal offense. It is rooted in a liberal paradigm and guides not only the criminal offense doctrine, which provides for specific criteria to warrant a legitimate verdict and the determination of legal consequences (in the sense of an adequate additional hardship imposed in the context of the sentencing itself). Furthermore, it offers a much-needed refinement in cases where the same act violates more than one criminal statute (Konkurrenzen), (...) and for the concept of the criminal offense within the criminal proceedings. Our concept characterizes the offense by a sufficiently substantial breach of a legally required conduct norm (along with specific consequences thereof, in some cases). Such a legal rule of conduct – determined for the respective individual according to the specific circumstances they find themselves in – affects at the least their personal autonomy, and thus requires legitimisation. This legitimisation must heed the constitutional standard of proportionality – the benchmark of which establishes the individual opportunity for self-expression that is compatible with the legitimate interests of others. At its core lies a broad understanding of freedom that appropriately explains the trade-off between conflicting interests necessary for the justification of legally required standards of behaviour, at the same time. This offers a solution to the issue of trying to identify the minimum level of applicable criminal sanctions. Thus, this concept is preferable to competing concepts. (shrink)

Alle Entscheidungen sind in letzter Instanz durch den Bezug auf die betroffenen Individuen zu rechtfertigen – so lautet die zentrale Annahme des normativen Individualismus. Der Beitrag entfaltet, präzisiert und begründet diese These für den Bereich der politischen Ethik. Den Abschluß bildet eine Skizze von Realisationen des normativen Individualismus im deutschen Recht.

My aim in this paper is two?fold. I start by contrasting three versions of externalist arguments based on etiological considerations, whose differences are not often appreciated. My purpose in doing so is to isolate one of these versions of externalism as most supportive of current anti?individualist attitudes toward the mental. My second aim is to show that this version, which I call (for reasons soon to be clear) Dialectal Etiology , is marred to a greater extent than the other two (...) by an important problem of language individuation.ii.. (shrink)

Review Essay of Stephen P. Turner, Explaining the Normative, 2010.

Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First, rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&E seek. Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive version of normativism.

This chapter focuses on a question about one role: the explanatory role of normativism or normativity in relation to ordinary 'scientific', meaning social scientific, explanations of actions and beliefs, especially the empirical, observable, or empirically relevant aspects of human conduct. Call this the epistemic form of the naturalistic moment problem. It call this a 'naturalistic moment', a place where normativism makes factual assertions about real processes in the natural world. This pseudo argument boils down to a series of (...) equivocations. The normativist must claim that there is some super-added normative element that cannot be accounted for naturalistically or by social science. Transcendental arguments to the effect that they have to have such and such mental content are likely to fail the mosquito test. The default position of rationalistic normativists, well encapsulated by Korsgaard, who rejects it, is that normativity in particular, rightness is an objective property grasped by reason. (shrink)

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue against prescriptive normativism and in favor of descriptivism. I challenge the assumption, implicit in their article, that there is a choice to be made between the two approaches. While descriptivism may be the right approach for some questions, others call for a normativist approach. To illustrate the point, I briefly discuss two questions of the latter sort.

Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law is the most prominent example of legal normativism. This text traces its origins and its genesis. In philosophy, normativism started with Hume's distinction between Is- and Ought-propositions. Kant distinguished practical from theoretical judgments, while resting even the latter on normativity. Following him, Lotze and the Baden neo-Kantians instrumentalized normativism to secure a sphere of knowledge which is not subject to the natural sciences. Even in his first major text, Kelsen claims that (...) law is solely a matter of Ought or normativity. In the second phase of his writings, he places himself into the neo-Kantian tradition, holding legal norms to be Ought-judgments of legal science. In the third phase, he advocates a barely coherent naive normative realism. In the fourth phase, he supplements the realist view with a strict will-theory of norms, coupled with set-pieces from linguistic philosophy; classical normativism is more or less dismantled. (shrink)

Full aptness is the most important concept in performance-based virtue epistemology. The structure of full aptness, in epistemology and elsewhere, is bilevelled. At the first level, we evaluate beliefs, like performances, on the basis of whether they are successful, competent, and apt—viz successful because competent. But the fact that aptness itself can be fragile—as it is when an apt performance could easily have been inapt—points to a higher zone of quality beyond mere aptness. To break in to this zone, one (...) must not merely perform aptly but also in doing so safeguard in skilled ways against certain risks to inaptness. But how must this be done, exactly? This paper has two central aims. First, I challenge the credentials of mainstream thinking about full aptness by raising some new and serious problems for the view. I then propose a novel account of full aptness—what I call de minimis normativism—which keeps all the advantages of the canonical view, avoids its problems entirely, and offers some additional payoffs. (shrink)

Engel defends the normative interpretation of the aim of belief against the main criticisms and alternatives. According to this interpretation, belief aims at truth because truth is the most fundamental norm of belief, and is constitutive of the concept of belief. He replies to the objections that it is impossible to apply, and that it fails to regulate belief (Sections 2 and 3). In Section 4 he confronts the normative account with the view that the notion of an aim of (...) belief is to be interpreted literally as a teleological goal. In Section 5, he argues that the normative account offers a better analysis of the regulation of belief. Finally he considers (Section 6) the relationship between the norm of truth and the norm of knowledge. (shrink)

What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action, necessarily something and potentially quite a bit. They contend that collective action inherently involves a special normative status amongst participants, which may, for example, involve mutual obligations to receive the concurrence of the others before leaving. We build on recent empirical work whose results lend plausibility to a normativist account by further investigating the specific package of mutual obligations associated with collective action according to (...) our everyday understanding. However, our results cast doubt on a proposed obligation to seek the permission of co-actors before exiting a collective action, and suggest instead that this obligation is a function of explicit promising. We then discuss how our results pave the path for a new normativism, a theory that neither under- nor overshoots the target given by our common conception of the interpersonal obligations present in collective action.*. (shrink)

In this article, it is argued that Sellars’ view of normativity is the key for a proper resolution of the debate between normativism and anti-normativism, as the latter is described in Turner’s recent book Explaining the Normative. Drawing on an early Sellarsian article, I suggest that both normativism and anti-normativism are ultimately unsatisfactory positions and for the same reason: due to their failure to draw a distinction between causal or explanatory reducibility and logical or conceptual reducibility (...) of the normative to the non-normative. (shrink)