Recent work in social epistemology has begun to make use of the behavioral-scientific concept of the nudge, but without sustained attention to how it should be translated from behavioral to epistemic contexts. We offer an account of doxastic nudges that satisfies extensional and theoretical desiderata, defend it against other accounts in the literature, and use it to clarify ongoing discussions of how nudges relate to reason-giving, knowledge, and autonomy.

This paper argues that the concept and role of ‘institutional racism’ in contemporary discussions of race should be reconsidered. It starts by distinguishing between ‘intrinsic institutional racism’, which holds that institutions are racist in virtue of their constitutive features, and ‘extrinsic institutional racism’, which holds that institutions are racist in virtue of their negative effects. It accepts intrinsic institutional racism, but argues that a ‘disparate impact’ conception of extrinsic conception faces a number of objections, the most serious being that it (...) has no plausible account of what it is that makes extrinsically racist institutions racist. It also argues that claims about the explanatory indispensability of institutional racism are overstated (individual racism is at least as important), critiques structural approaches to racial inequality, and suggests that there is reason to doubt whether institutional reform can provide us with all that morality may require in the racial domain. (shrink)

We present experimental evidence that people's modes of social interaction influence their construal of truth. Participants who engaged in cooperative interactions were less inclined to agree that there was an objective truth about that topic than were those who engaged in a competitive interaction. Follow-up experiments ruled out alternative explanations and indicated that the changes in objectivity are explained by argumentative mindsets: When people are in cooperative arguments, they see the truth as more subjective. These findings can help inform research (...) on moral objectivism and, more broadly, on the distinctive cognitive consequences of different types of social interaction. (shrink)

This article discusses the adequacy of Rawls’ theory of justice as a tool for racial justice. It is argued that critics like Charles W Mills fail to appreciate both the insights and limits of the Rawlsian framework. The article has two main parts spread out over several different sections. The first is concerned with whether the Rawlsian framework suffices to prevent racial injustice. It is argued that there are reasons to doubt whether it does. The second part is concerned with (...) whether a Rawlsian framework has the resources to rectify past racial injustice. It is argued that it has more resources to do this than Mills allows. This second part of the article centers on two Rawlsian ideas: ideal theory and the fair equality of opportunity principle. It is argued that ideal theory is essential for the kind of rectificatory work that Mills wants nonideal theory to do, and that where there is a socioeconomic legacy of past injustice, it is hard to see how FEO could be implemented if it did no rectificatory work, a result which means that there is less need to turn to nonideal theory at all. (shrink)

This article examines how Modern theories of mind remain even in some materialistic and hence ontologically anti-dualistic views; and shows how Dewey's pragmatism, anticipating Merleau-Ponty, 4E cognitive scientists and especially enactivism, repudiates these theories. Throughout I place Dewey’s thought in the context of scientific inquiry, both recent and historical and including the cognitive as well as traditional sciences; and I show how he incorporated sciences of his day into his thought, while also anticipating enactive cognitive science. While emphasizing Dewey’s continued (...) relevance, my main goal is to show how his scientifically informed account of perception and cognition combats skepticism propagated by certain scientific visions, exacerbated by commonplace notions about mind, that jointly suggest that human beings lack genuine access to reality. (shrink)

Among mainstream political philosophers, Charles Mills is probably best known, not as the author of The Racial Contract, but for his long-running critique of ideal theory and Rawls for his association with it. Yet the critique of ideal theory that followed the publication of The Racial Contract is prefigured in that very work, where we find in inchoate form what would be further developed later on. In the book, this early formulation of the critique occupies a small part of a (...) larger, more general argument condemning mainstream political philosophy for the way that it has ignored race. In this paper, I explore the relation of the critique to this more general argument. It might be thought that the general argument leads inevitably to the critique of ideal theory. I will argue that this is not so. I will show how Mills’ more general argument can be made without taking the further step of critiquing ideal theorizing. The blame for why mainstream political philosophy has ignored race, and continues to ignore race, I will argue, should be placed elsewhere. (shrink)

This article argues that blacks should reject integration on self-protective and solidarity grounds. It distinguishes two aspects of black devaluation: a ‘stigmatization’ aspect that has to do with the fact that blacks are subject to various forms of discrimination, and an aesthetic aspect (‘phenotypic devaluation’) that concerns the aesthetic devaluation of characteristically black phenotypic traits. It identifies four self-worth harms that integration may inflict, and suggests that these may outweigh the benefits of integration. Further, it argues that, while the integrating (...) process may reduce stigmatization, there is less reason to think that it can do the same for phenotypic devaluation. (shrink)

In recent work in political philosophy there has been much discussion of two approaches to theorizing about justice that have come to be called ‘ideal theory’ and ‘non-ideal theory’. The distinction was originally articulated by Rawls, who defended his focus on ideal theory in terms of a supposed ‘priority’ of the latter over non-ideal theory. Many critics have rejected this claim of priority and in general have questioned the usefulness of ideal theory. In diagnosing the problem with ideal theory, they (...) have frequently fingered for blame the idealization it involves. In this paper I focus on one particular, much-discussed idealization—full compliance—in order to defend it. Focusing on the assumption, I argue that Rawls’s work is not ideal in the way that it is usually thought to be, is less ideal than is widely recognized, and became less ideal over time. I also argue that critics who in effect claim that it is not realistic enough simply fail to understand Rawls’s central motivation. Finally, I defend the assumption by arguing that there is an important sense in which all theories of justice must assume full compliance. Such an assumption, I argue, is needed if we are to have a plausible basis on which to judge the normative attractiveness of a theory. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to Robert Taylor's argument that a Rawlsian framework does not support strong affirmative action (AA) programs. The paper makes three main arguments. The first disputes Taylor's claim that strong AA would not be needed in ideal conditions. Private racial discrimination, I suggest, might still exist in such conditions, so strong AA might be needed there. The second challenges Taylor's claims that pure procedural justice constrains Rawlsian nonideal theory. I argue that this rests on a fetishizing (...) of pure procedural justice that is absent from Rawls's work. I also show that a revised formulation of Taylor's concern here also fails. My third argument makes a positive Rawlsian case for strong AA in nonideal conditions that builds on a Taylor concession. Taylor suggests that the goal of nonideal theory is to create a world in which ideal theory can be applied. My argument begins by showing that another permissible goal of Rawlsian nonideal theory is to ameliorate injustice. I then argue that Rawls's contractualist framework supports the strongest forms of AA (categories 4–5 interventions) when category 3 interventions are blocked. (shrink)

Current thinking and talk about race uses ‘racist’ for virtually everything that goes wrong in the domain of race. This paper examines the relationship between racial justice, racial discrimination and racism to argue for a more pluralistic approach to race-related ills. Such an approach provides the tools we need to understand an important if relatively neglected source of racial injustice, and does much to illuminate some race-related disputes. It starts by arguing that racial justice is a surprisingly limited ideal, and (...) then suggests understanding ‘racial discrimination’ in a minimal way. From there it is argued that while racial discrimination is necessary for racial injustice, the same is not true for racism. (shrink)

Patients belonging to ethnic, racial, and religious minorities have been all but excluded from the legal academy’s ongoing conversation about informed consent. Perhaps this is just as well, since the conversation appears to have concluded that the doctrine has failed to serve as a meaningful regulation of clinical relationships. Informed consent does not operate in practice the way it was intended in theory. More than a decade ago, Peter Schuck noted the “informed consent gap” that distinguishes the “proper” law of (...) informed consent “on the books” from the actual consent law in action, and called for a more contextualized approach to informed consent. Susan Wolf later called for a systemic approach to informed consent in order to accommodate multiple decision points in the managed care setting. Some reformers have sought enhancements to expand the doctrine. (shrink)

Malgré sa légalisation, l’éthique de l’aide médicale à mourir (AMM) reste controversée en raison de l’évolution des critères d’admissibilité et des implications qui en découlent pour les personnes souffrant de maladies non terminales, notamment de troubles mentaux. Compte tenu de la disponibilité croissante de l’AMM, il est important de comparer les discours de la société et ceux des médecins afin d’éclairer l’élaboration de politiques et de lois en matière de santé qui reflètent les valeurs et les préoccupations des différentes parties (...) prenantes. Cet article présente une analyse qualitative critique de deux types de données : 1) les réponses à des entretiens menés auprès de médecins canadiens concernant la pratique de l’aide médicale à mourir, et 2) les médias numériques canadiens, dans le but de déterminer les points de convergence et de divergence entre les discours des deux types de sources. Notre analyse a permis de dégager quatre thèmes généraux : 1) l’autonomie et le choix, 2) « mourir dans la dignité » et la réduction des risques, 3) le paternalisme et la vulnérabilité, et 4) la médicalisation de la souffrance. En général, si les médecins et les autres parties prenantes se disent attachés au principe de l’autonomie du patient, toutes les parties ont exprimé leurs préoccupations concernant les inégalités systémiques et le risque que l’AMM soit utilisée comme un substitut pour traiter les déterminants sociaux plus larges de la santé. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) was legalized in Canada following the Carter v. Canada ruling of 2015. In spite of legalization, the ethics of MAiD remain contentious. The bioethical literature has attempted to differentiate MAiD from withdrawing life-sustaining treatment (WLT) in an effort to examine the nature of the moral difference between the two. However, this research has often neglected the firsthand experiences of the clinicians involved in these procedures. By asking physicians if they perceive the major bioethical accounts as (...) clinically useful, we seek to distinguish between aspects of the contemporary bioethical landscape which are useful at the bedside and those which are divorced from the realities faced by clinicians. We applied a qualitative descriptive approach to explore physicians’ experiences and bioethical distinctions in providing MAiD and WLT. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 21 physicians, and the transcripts were thematically analyzed to identify common patterns and divergences in their perspectives. Three core themes were found: (1) consensus on MAiD’s moral equivalence with WLT despite differences between the practice, (2) discord regarding the use of the term ‘killing’, and (3) disjuncture between bioethical debates and practice. Theme 1 comprised of three sub-themes: (1.1) no moral difference between MAiD and WLT, (1.2) physician versus underlying medical condition as cause of death, and (1.3) relief of suffering. In order to have practical utility for clinical practice, it is essential for bioethicists to engage in dialogue with patients and their medical providers pursuing MAiD or WLT. Theoretical debates that are divorced from the realities of terminal illness do not assist physicians with navigating the ethical terrain of ending a patient’s life. This research captures meaningful accounts regarding MAiD and WLT that is rooted in the lived experience of the providers of these services in order for bioethical debates to have substantive impact in clinical practice and in legislation surrounding future health policies. (shrink)

The Treatment Escalation Plan (TEP) was introduced into our trust in an attempt to improve patient involvement and experience of their treatment in hospital and to embrace and clarify a wider remit of treatment options than the Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order currently offers. Our experience suggests that the patient and family are rarely engaged in DNR discussions. This is acutely relevant considering that the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) now obliges these discussions to take place. The TEP is a form (...) that the doctor completes, ideally with the competent patient or close relative, documenting what treatment options would be appropriate if that patient were to become acutely unwell. Ventilation of the lungs, cardiac resuscitation, renal replacement therapy, intravenous fluids and antibiotics are all discussed. The study evaluated patient and relative experiences with the TEP. 55 patients or their relatives were interviewed regarding their experience of the TEP and thoughts regarding the process. 96% of patients and relatives evaluated thought that the TEP was a good idea. Free text comments were all positive and only 34% of patients claimed to feel anxious when completing the form. Following this study, the TEP has been expanded hospital wide and into the community within our trust. Discussions are currently taking place in hospitals within our region to introduce the TEP form into other local trusts. (shrink)

If there is a “basic structure objection” (BSO) to G.A. Cohen’s incentive critique of Rawls, then there is also a BSO to claims that private racial discrimination thwarts social justice by reducing the opportunity of its targets. In this paper, I take up the debate about the site or purview of justice and discuss it with reference to the case of race. I argue that the dispute about the site of justice has been wrongly understood as a dispute about the (...) substantive requirements of justice instead of as a dispute about where it is appropriate to apply considerations of justice. (shrink)

I argue that Aristotle took pleasure to be a certain aspect of perfect activities of awareness, namely, their very perfection. I also argue that this reading facilitates an attractive interpretation of his view that pleasures differ in kind along with the activities they arise in connection with.

Across the country, legal and health care professionals who understand that health outcomes are most influenced by social and environmental conditions have improved patient health by adopting the interdisciplinary MLP health care delivery model. However, the MLP field cannot advance population health, let alone long-term health equity, until it addresses the structural determinants of health inequity that are rooted in discrimination, segregation, and other forms of racial and ethnic subordination.

This chapter argues that important explanatory roles should be assigned to structural features of the relation of perceptual acquaintance. It is argued that we should appeal to these structural features in accounting for certain aspects of the phenomenology of our perception of space, time, and absence. These structural features of the relation of perceptual acquaintance are shown to be relevant to some of the phenomenal differences between some of the different modalities of sense perception (e.g. vision and bodily awareness). The (...) chapter highlights some of the differences between the ways in which our conscious perceptual awareness of space and time are structured, and suggests ways in which these differences may be relevant to some of our different intuitions about space and time themselves. (shrink)

This chapter starts by discussing the idea that the activity of consciously thinking is, in some sense, private to its subject. The chapter then reconsiders Geach's argument for the claim that there is no stream of conscious thought. It defends the claim that there is a respect in which there can be said to be a stream of conscious thought, while preserving the idea that there are important ontological distinctions to be drawn between the conscious cognitive and conscious sensory aspects (...) of our mental lives. An account of the ontology of the conscious mental act of judging is proposed, according to which a distinctive form of self-knowledge accompanies the conscious mental act of judging. It is suggested that the significance of this form of self-knowledge is to be understood in terms of its role in agential mental activity. (shrink)

This chapter considers how the proposed account of the epistemology of mental action, and the proposed account of the self-knowledge involved in conscious thinking, bear on an account of one's knowledge of what one believes. The chapter also explores some of the ways in which the ethics of belief, and accounts of the suspension of judgement and belief revision, may be affected by the fact that we are, as self-conscious subjects, capable of engaging in agential epistemic conscious mental activity, including (...) self-critical reflection. (shrink)

_The assessment of institutional quality and its influence on economic performance is highly relevant in Nigeria due to the country's constantly changing governmental institutions, dynamic market circumstances, and diversified socioeconomic atmosphere. Thus, the study aims to investigate the impact of institutional quality on the economic performance of Nigeria. This study employed ex post facto research, while time series data was used, which spans from 1996 to 2021, sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). (...) The study employed unit root tests, Johansen cointegration, and the Error Correction Model as estimation techniques. However, post estimation tests such as normality, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and stability tests were carried to ascertain the level of statistical accuracy outcome of the variables used. The findings suggest that there is a sustained nexus between the quality of institutions and characteristics related to economic growth. Also, it was equally found out that political stability has a significant impact in the short run. This suggests that a unit increase in political instability would definitely amount to a decrease in economic performance in Nigeria during the period under investigation. The study suggests enhancing accountability, transparency, administrative efficiency, and law adherence to improve Nigerian institutions. This can be achieved through reform implementation, capacity building, and good governance mechanisms, while reducing political unrest and fostering stability._. (shrink)

This chapter discusses whether the claim that experience is ‘transparent’ undermines the claim that one can engage in the pre-judgemental activity of introspectively attending to an experience one is undergoing. The chapter considers the question of what is involved in noticing, looking at, and watching an object that one perceives, in order to elucidate what further activity may be involved in cases of introspectively attending to the experience itself. An account of the ontology of our knowledge of the phenomenology of (...) experience is outlined and this is applied in the course of defending a proposal about what the relationalist should say about the conscious character of hallucinations. (shrink)

This chapter argues that intention-in-action plays a role in providing us with a distinctive form of knowledge of what we are doing when we perform our intended actions. The chapter considers how this account of intention-in-action bears on an account of our knowledge of our own mental actions and how this, in turn bears, on an account of our knowledge of what we are doing when we are consciously thinking. The chapter considers some of O’Shaughnessy's claims about the role of (...) the ‘mental will’ in an account of the state of wakeful consciousness in the self-conscious subject – in particular, some claims he makes about the differences between dreaming and wakeful states of consciousness. In light of this discussion, it is argued that the avenue to self-knowledge afforded by intention-in-action plays a central and significant role in the ordinary, awake, conscious mental life of a self-conscious subject. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on aspects of the temporal phenomenology of conscious sensory experience. In particular, it discusses debates about our experience of events and the so-called ‘specious present’. It is argued that the right account of the ontology of conscious experience can help resolve puzzles that arise in these debates. Considerations are introduced that speak in favour of a relationalist view of the phenomenal character of conscious sensory experience. It is argued that a psychological relation of perceptual acquaintance has an (...) indispensable role to play in accommodating the temporal transparency of perceptual experience. (shrink)

This chapter introduces Geach's argument for rejecting William James’ suggestion that our conscious mental lives include a ‘stream of conscious thought’. The chapter explains Geach's claim that the propositional content of thought is a ‘non-successive unity’, and it shows how Geach's argument depends on assumptions about the temporal character of elements of the stream of consciousness. O’Shaughnessy's proposal about the ontology of the stream of consciousness is introduced, and these ontological concerns are connected with debates about sensory experience that are (...) framed in terms of the relation between representational content and phenomenal character. A proposal about the ontology of experience is introduced and it is suggested that this proposal can help diagnose the intuition that there is an ‘explanatory gap’ associated with attempts to understand the relation between phenomenal and physical/functional features of conscious experience. (shrink)

Abstract:Aristotle’s views on the choiceworthiness of friends might seem both internally inconsistent and objectionably instrumentalizing. On the one hand, Aristotle maintains that perfect friends or virtue friends are choiceworthy and lovable for their own sake, and not merely for the sake of further ends. On the other hand, in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9, Aristotle appears somehow to account for the choiceworthiness of such friends by reference to their utility as sources of a virtuous agent’s robust self-awareness. I examine Aristotle’s views on (...) the utility and choiceworthiness of friends, and offer a novel reading of Nicomachean Ethics IX.9. On this reading, Aristotle accepts a version of instrumental conditionalism about final value, that is, the thesis that goods (including friends) can be choiceworthy for their own sake (i.e., possess final or end value) at least partly on account of their instrumental properties. In articulating what sort of instrumental conditionalism it is reasonable to attribute to Aristotle, I argue that Aristotle appeals to the utility of perfect friends as part of a broadly material causal account of why such friends are choiceworthy for their own sake. On this reading, perfect friends are not choiceworthy for the sake of their utility in eliciting self-awareness; rather, their choiceworthiness for their own sake is (at least partly) realized in, or constituted by, their conduciveness to the virtuous agent’s self-awareness. This reading, I argue, frees Aristotle from the charge of inconsistency: Aristotle can appeal to the conduciveness of perfect friends to the virtuous agent’s self-awareness as a way of explaining why such friends are choiceworthy for their own sake. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the place and role of mental agency in suppositional reasoning and self-critical reflection. It considers Descartes’ suggestion that when one is engaged in these activities, which are the essential elements of Descartes’ method of doubt, ‘the mind uses its own freedom’. The chapter considers similar proposals made by O’Shaughnessy and Korsgaard. The chapter articulates what is right in these proposals, and in identifying where we should locate the role of mental agency in these forms of conscious reasoning (...) it provides a critique of Galen Strawson's proposal that the role of mental action in thinking and reasoning can at best be ‘merely catalytic’ and ‘indirect’. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the question of the place of mental action in an account of the metaphysics of mind. The chapter speculates on some of the background to the relative neglect of the topic of mental action in accounts of consciousness, mentality, and action, and then outlines some of the distinctive features of O’Shaughnessy's approach to the place of the mental will in an account of consciousness. This serves to introduce some of the main questions about mental agency and conscious (...) thinking that are addressed in Part II of the book. (shrink)

This chapter argues that we should appeal to the ontological category of ‘occurrent state’ in order to accommodate the distinctive form of conscious contact with time that our conscious sensory experiences provide us with. The chapter draws out some consequences of this account of the ontology of conscious sensory experience, pertaining to our experience of the ‘passage of time’, the ‘continuity’ of conscious sensory experience, the diachronic unity of consciousness, and Dennet's ‘Multiple Drafts’ model of consciousness.

This chapter considers the question of the place and role of mental action in an account of conscious thinking, and, more generally, the metaphysics of mind. It is argued that mental action has an essential role to play in an account of issues in the epistemology of mind that are central to our understanding of the sort of conscious thinking that self-conscious subjects can engage in. It is argued that in order to accommodate adequately these connections between mental action, the (...) epistemology of mind, and conscious thinking, we need the right account of the ontology of conscious thinking, and that the right account of the ontology of conscious thinking should lead us to reject the notion that we can conceive of mental actions as reducible to mental processes (e.g. transitions between mental states) that enable and explain overt bodily action. (shrink)

Repression continues to be controversial. One insight crystallized by the commentaries is that there is a serious semantic problem, partly resulting from a long silence in psychology on repression. In this response, narrow views (e.g., that repression needs always be unconscious, must yield total amnesia) are challenged. Broader conceptions of repression, both biological and social, are considered, with a special stress on repression of meanings (denial). Several issues – generilizability, falsifiability, personality factors, the interaction of repression with cognitive channel (e.g., (...) recall vs. dreams), and false-memory as repression – are discussed. (shrink)

David Miller, Professor of Politics at Oxford University, has long been one of the most important and interesting contributors to political theory and philosophy. He is well known for insisting on the mutual relevance of philosophical reflection and political practice, an approach well captured by the title of his recent book, Justice for Earthlings. In his most recent book, Strangers in our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration, Miller revises and extends the work he has been doing for several years (...) now on immigration. The result is a short yet rich defense of the right of states to control their own immigration policy. (shrink)

For many years now Allen Buchanan has been one of the most important theorists working on the philosophy of human rights, producing a large number of papers and two books significantly devoted to the topic. In the work under consideration in this symposium, Buchanan breaks new ground by examining what he claims to be the “heart” of international human rights practice – the international legal human rights (“ILHR”) system, subjecting it to moral and philosophical analysis and criticism. Buchanan's book was (...) the subject of an author meets critics session sponsored by the APA Committee on Law and Philosophy at the 2015 Pacific APA Meeting. The following paper introduces the resulting special issue of the journal, _Law and Philosophy_, summarizing Buchanan's important contribution and criticisms by William Talbot, Brooke Ackerley, Erin Kelly, and Mathias Risse, as well as Buchanan's replies. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the similarities between, and differences between, the phenomenology of conscious perceptual experience and the phenomenology of acts of perceptual imagination and perceptual recollection. An account of the ontology of perceptual imagination and perceptual recollection (including episodic recollection) is proposed that can accommodate and explain these similarities and differences. According to this proposal, conscious sensory experience is represented in acts of perceptual imagination and perceptual recollection. This account of perceptual imagination and perceptual recollection invokes a form of (...) knowledge that only a phenomenally conscious subject can possess – a form of knowledge of what it is (or was) like to have conscious sensory experience. (shrink)

This chapter discusses whether conscious sensory experience has a distinctive sensuous character and whether introspective reflection has a significant role to play in an investigation of that character. The chapter outlines some prominent and conflicting claims that philosophers have made about what is manifest to one in having a conscious sensory experience, and comments on how differences in these articulations can affect the direction taken by philosophical enquiry. The following issues are introduced and considered: (i) the way in which sense-datum (...) theorists, such as Moore, Russell, Broad, and Price appeal to a relation of perceptual acquaintance in their accounts of perceptual experience; (ii) the claim that perceptual experience has a representational content with veridicality conditions; (iii) the relational views of perceptual experience advocated by naïve realists. (shrink)

This chapter outlines the respects in which the phenomenology of bodily sensation is distinctive and puzzling. It elaborates an account of the ontology of bodily sensation that can accommodate and explain these distinctive aspects of the phenomenology and resolve the puzzles to which that distinctive phenomenology gives rise. The chapter discusses how the proposed ontology bears on debates about the intentionality and transparency of bodily sensation, and the biological function of pain.

Background Within the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry, many ontologies represent the execution of a plan specification as a process in which a realizable entity that concretizes the plan specification, a “realizable concretization” (RC), is realized. This representation, which we call the “RC-account”, provides a straightforward way to relate a plan specification to the entity that bears the realizable concretization and the process that realizes the realizable concretization. However, the adequacy of the RC-account has not been evaluated in (...) the scientific literature. In this manuscript, we provide this evaluation and, thereby, give ontology developers sound reasons to use or not use the RC-account pattern. Results Analysis of the RC-account reveals that it is not adequate for representing failed plans. If the realizable concretization is flawed in some way, it is unclear what (if any) relation holds between the realizable entity and the plan specification. If the execution (i.e., realization) of the realizable concretization fails to carry out the actions given in the plan specification, it is unclear under the RC-account how to directly relate the failed execution to the entity carrying out the instructions given in the plan specification. These issues are exacerbated in the presence of changing plans. Conclusions We propose two solutions for representing failed plans. The first uses the Common Core Ontologies ‘prescribed by’ relation to connect a plan specification to the entity or process that utilizes the plan specification as a guide. The second, more complex, solution incorporates the process of creating a plan (in the sense of an intention to execute a plan specification) into the representation of executing plan specifications. We hypothesize that the first solution (i.e., use of ‘prescribed by’) is adequate for most situations. However, more research is needed to test this hypothesis as well as explore the other solutions presented in this manuscript. (shrink)