This paper is motivated by the search for one cardinal utility for decisions under risk, welfare evaluations, and other contexts. This cardinal utility should have meaningprior to risk, with risk depending on cardinal utility, not the other way around. The rank-dependent utility model can reconcile such a view on utility with the position that risk attitude consists of more than marginal utility, by providing a separate risk component: a ‘probabilistic risk attitude’ towards probability (...) mixtures of lotteries, modeled through a transformation for cumulative probabilities. While this separation of risk attitude into two independent components is the characteristic feature of rank-dependent utility, it had not yet been axiomatized. Doing that is the purpose of this paper. Therefore, in the second part, the paper extends Yaari's axiomatization to nonlinear utility, and provides separate axiomatizations for increasing/decreasing marginal utility and for optimistic/pessimistic probability transformations. This is generalized to interpersonal comparability. It is also shown that two elementary and often-discussed properties — quasi-convexity (‘aversion’) of preferences with respect to probability mixtures, and convexity (‘pessimism’) of the probability transformation — are equivalent. (shrink)

Despite decades of research, we still lack a clear explanation for the emergence and persistence of inequality. Here we propose and evaluate a marginal utility of inequality hypothesis that nominates circumscription and environmental heterogeneity as independent, necessary conditions for the emergence of intragroup material inequality. After coupling the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample with newly generated data from remote sensing, we test predictions derived from this hypothesis using a multivariate generalized additive model that accounts for spatial and historical dependence as (...) well as subsistence mode. Our analyses show that the probability a society will be stratified increases significantly as a function of proxies of environmental heterogeneity and environmental circumscription. This supports the hypothesis that increasing environmental heterogeneity and circumscription drives the emergence and persistence of inequality among documented societies across the globe. We demonstrate how environmental heterogeneity and circumscription produce situations that limit individuals’ options so that some may find it in their best interest to give up some autonomy for material gain, while others may find it in their best interest to give up some material resources for another individual’s time or deference. These results support the marginal utility of inequality framework and enable future explorations of the ecological conditions that facilitate the emergence of intragroup inequality through time and across the globe. (shrink)

Some versions of perfectionism, e.g., Plato's and Nietzsche's, are antiegalitarian, but this is often because of claims about desert or maximax aggregation, which the best perfectionism rejects. And this perfectionism can give at least qualified support to distributive equality by arguing that people's natural abilities are fairly close to equal and that there is diminishing marginal utility of resources, in that these are more important for enabling moderate perfection than for allowing improvements from there to the highest heights. (...) Both these empirical claims are made more plausible by the Aristotelian values defended earlier in the book, especially those involving formal measures of theoretical and practical perfection. (shrink)

Nozick (1977) formulated a challenge to Austrians related to the application of the Law of diminishing marginal utility in the context of notion of indifference. To be able to claim that the value or attributed utility of the subsequent units of goods decreases, we must compare comparables, even if deliberate choice means that we have chosen a particular as being value-different. This causes a logical paradox. One cannot be indifferent and demonstrate a particular preference at the same (...) time. It is mutually exclusive. The paper discusses a critique of Wysocki (2021), who proposes a solution to the paradox in terms of a counterfactual perception of the Law. The critique points to the essence of why neo-Misesians cannot resolve the paradox, which lies in the interpretation of the origin of valuation within the particular value scale. The paper offers an alternative solution based on Hayek’s concept of mental order-ness with the implication of the general applicability of the Law to any order in reality. (shrink)

[321] Over a year ago, with his essay “die klassische Werttheorie und die Theorie vom Grenznützen” [“The Classical Value Theory and the Theory of Marginal Utility ”],1 which appeared in this yearbook and in which he declared himself in favor of the rival, older value theory, which bases the value of goods on costs, Professor Dietzel inaugurated a polemic against the modern value theory of marginal utility. This attack was not an isolated case. Somewhat earlier it (...) had been started by the eminent Danish scholar Scharling in his essay, well-known to the readers of this yearbook, concerning “Werttheorien und Wertgesetze” [“Theories of Value and Laws of Value”].2 In Italy, A. Loria3 conducts it with an extraordinarily quarrelsome spirit. It is present even in France. Finally, it is right now carried on in America with particular interest and keen activity. The outbreak and the rapid spread of this controversy is not in the least surprising. It is the completely natural consequence of the scientific situation in which the theory of value presently finds itself. So long as the theory of. (shrink)

One of the most common objections against utilitarianism is that it cannot account for the claims of distributive justice. This objection can be answered by appeal to the principle of Diminishing Marginal Utility (DMU), which says that the value of a given portion of a commodity tends to increase as a person's supply of the commodity decreases. DMU implies that, other things equal, the way to maximize the value of a commodity is to distribute it equally. Some economists (...) have objected to DMU on the ground that it presupposes interpersonal comparisons of utility, but the arguments which they have advanced against the objectivity of such comparisons are unsound. Moreover, the interpersonal comparisons presupposed by DMU are ordinal, rather than cardinal, and there are reasons for believing that ordinal comparisons, at least, do have an objective basis. (shrink)

Volume 26, Issue 4, December 2019, Page 389-392.

Volume 26, Issue 4, December 2019, Page 380-384.

Luce and Krantz (1971) presented an axiom system for conditional expected utility. In this theory a conditional decision is a function whose domain is a non-null subevent and whose range is a subset of a set of consequences. Given a family of conditional decisions that is closed under unions of decisions whose domains are disjoint and under restrictions to non-null subevents, the second major primitive is an ordering of the family. Axioms were given that are adequate to construct a (...) numerical utility function over decisions and a probability function over events for which the conditional expectation of the utility is order preserving. Several of the axioms are quite complex and seem a bit artificial, and the proof is very long. Here the structure is modified by adding to the set of outcomes a concatenation operation, and the representation theorem is modified by requiring that the utility function be additive over this binary operation as well as exhibiting the expected utility property. The advantages of this pair of changes are, first, it exploits the obvious fact that the union of consequences is itself a consequence; second, it reduces the mathematical burden carried by the set theoretic structure of conditional decisions and, as a result, the axioms can be made much easier to understand; and third, it permits a considerably shorter proof because one can draw more readily on known results. The major drawback of this approach is, of course, that it is inconsistent with the evidence that utility is not additive over consequences - at least, not over increasing amounts of a single good (diminishing marginal utility). (shrink)

In this article, I firstly discuss why a prioritarian clause can rescue the utilitarian doctrine from the risk of exacerbating inequality in the distribution of resources in those cases in which utility of income does not decline at the margin. Nonetheless, when in the presence of adaptive preferences, classic prioritarianism is more likely than utilitarianism to increase the inequality of resources under all circumstances, independently of the diminishing trend of utility. Hence, I propose to shift the informational focus (...) of prioritarianism from welfare to either social income or capabilities in order to safeguard those who are worse off. Following this, I argue that we may have reasons to limit the aggregative logic of priority-amended utilitarianism through one or more sufficiency thresholds, and that we can partially defuse the negative-thesis objection that is usually levelled against sufficientarianism, provided we interpret the threshold(s) as valid only as long as everyone is led above it. (shrink)

The curvature of a decision maker's utility function is often used to measure his risk preference. In order to comprehensively describe an individual's decision making behaviour, however, it would also seem desirable to measure the gain in utility from an increase in wealth or income before accounting for risk. If a small increase in wealth leads to a large utility gain, then it could be said that the individual's aspiration to achieve the wealth increase would be high. (...) This aspiration, however, may be more than offset by the risk involved in obtaining this extra wealth and the individual's attitude towards risk. In the following paper it is shown how the marginal utility of Marshall can be used in a measure of aspiration with this measure then combined with the usual measure of risk preference to explain the shape of any individuals utility curve. Using these measures, a general utility curve for all income or wealth classes is postulated. (shrink)

This paper clarifies and interprets some basic quantitative concepts of value, utility and utility function from a utilitarian point of view. First, I discuss the question as to whether value is objective or subjective. I hold that value is subjective and statistical in nature (although from the various subjective values of a certain object a norm can usually be obtained). Second, I emphasize the distinction between use value and exchange value in relation to utility. Third, I propose (...) a law of diminishing incremental interest, which refers to the incremental (marginal) utility of money. Fourth, I identify the utility of money with the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Fifth, I question the necessity of the usual normalization of utility functions and the restricted linear transformation (and the consequent concept of “strategic equivalence”). Sixth, I discuss in detail the terminal values and utilities of a utility function from a philosophical rather than mathematical point of view, particularly the boundedness of a utility function and the magnitudes of V0 and U0. Finally, I conclude that, in order to be able to have interpersonal comparisons of utility, utility should have the same dimension as value rather than no dimension, and the normalization problem should be reconsidered in the light of terminal values and utilities. (shrink)

There is a standard belief that the modern theory of marginal utility originated in the UK with Jevons, Germany with Gossen, Austria with Menger and France with Walras. In this new book, John Chipman introduces new English translations of important writings from German economists such as Rau, Hildebrand, Roscher and Knies showing that the introduction of this concept originated with them. This ground breaking book comes with a long introduction from John Chipman analysing the theory.

The neglect of marginalized stakeholders is a colossal problem in both stakeholder and entrepreneurship streams of literature. To address this problem, we offer a theory of marginalized stakeholder-centric entrepreneurship. We conceptualize how firms can utilize marginalized stakeholder input actualization through which firms should process a variety of ideas, resources, and interactions with marginalized stakeholders and then filter, internalize, and, finally, realize important elements that improve a variety of related socioeconomic, ethical, racial, contextual, political, and identity issues. This input actualization process (...) enables firms to innovate with marginalized stakeholders and develop marginalized stakeholder capabilities. To this end, firms fulfill both their moral and entrepreneurial claims to marginalized stakeholders. (shrink)

Proper utilization of antenatal and postnatal care services plays an important role in reducing the maternal mortality ratio and infant mortality rate. This paper assesses the utilization of health care services during pregnancy, delivery and post-delivery among rural women in Uttar Pradesh and examines its determinants. Data from a baseline survey of UP Community Mobilization project was utilized. A cross-sectional sample of currently married women who delivered a baby 15 months prior to the survey was included. Information was collected from (...) 2208 women spread over five districts of UP. Information on socio-demography characteristics, utilization of antenatal care, delivery and postnatal care services was collected. To examine the determinants of utilization of maternal health services, the variables included were three ANC visits, institutional delivery and PNC within 42 days of delivery. Separate multilevel random intercept logistic regressions were used to account for clustering at a block and gram panchayat level after adjusting for covariates. Eighty-three percent of women had any ANC. Of them, 61% reported three or more ANC visits. Although 68% of women delivered in a health facility, 29% stayed for at least 48 h. Any PNC within 42 days after delivery was reported by 26% of women. In the adjusted analysis, women with increasing number of contacts with the health worker during the antenatal period, women exposed to mass-media and non-marginalized women were more likely to have at least three ANC visits during pregnancy. Non-marginalized women and women with at least three ANC visits were more likely than their counterparts to deliver in an institution. Contacts with health worker during pregnancy, marginalization, at least three ANC visits and institutional delivery were the strong determinants for utilization of PNC services. Self-help group membership had no association with the utilization of maternal health services. Utilization of maternal health services was low. Contact with the health worker and marginalization emerged as important factors for utilization of services. Although not associated with the utilization, SHGs can be used for delivering health care messages within and beyond the group. (shrink)

Twenty years ago, Tibor Scitovsky questioned the assumption, embedded in neoclassical economics, that human happiness will be augmented if the level of consumption either rises or becomes more uniform over time. Evidence from the 1990–1993 World Values Survey suggests that his doubts were well‐founded: although economic gains apparently make a major contribution to subjective well‐being as one moves from societies at the subsistence level to those with moderate levels of economic development, further economic growth seems to have little or no (...) impact on subjective well‐being. This transition seems to reflect a basic cultural change that results in the diminishing marginal utility of economic growth. (shrink)

Among the violations of expected utility (E.U.) theory which have been observed by experimenters, the violations of its independence axiom is, by far, the most common. It seems that, in many cases, these inconsistencies can be ascribed to the desire for security - called the security factor by L. Lopes (1986) - which “makes people attach special importance to the worst outcomes of risky decisions” as well as to the sole outcomes of riskless decisions (certainty effect). J.-Y. Jaffray (1988) (...) has proposed a model which generalizes E.U. theory by taking into account this factor and is then able to account for certain violations. However, especially in experiments on choice involving prospective losses, violations of the von Neumann-Morgenstern independence axiom cannot be explained by the security factor alone and have to be partially ascribed to the potential factor (L. Lopes, 1986) which “reflects heightened attention to the best outcomes of decisions”, especially when the best outcome is the status quo. In this paper, we construct an axiomatic model for subjects taking into account simultaneously or alternatively the security factor and the potential factor. For this, as in Jaffray's model, it has been necessary to weaken not only the standard independence axiom but also the continuity axiom and, in the same time, to reinforce the dominance axiom. In the resulting model, choices are partially determined by the mere comparison of the (security level, potential level) (i.e. the (worst outcome, best outcome)) pairs offered, and completed by the maximization of an affine function of the expected utility, the coefficients of which depend on both the security level and potential level.In this model, a decision maker who (i) has constant marginal utility for money, (ii) is sensitive to the security factor alone in the domain of gains, (iii) is sensitive to the potential factor alone in the domain of losses, behaves as a risk averter for gains and a risk seeker for losses. (shrink)

In late-nineteenth-century economics, there was an epoch-defining shift from the labour theory of value to the marginal utility theory of value. According to the latter, the economic value of some circumstance (obtaining some good, some service, and so on) is its subjective utility at the margin. Thus, while there is an absolute sense in which I prefer having water to having diamonds, at the present moment I value one more unit of diamonds more than I value one (...) more unit of water. That is why I am willing to pay a higher price for a bowl of diamonds than a bowl of water of the same size, even though water is ‘more valuable’ in a sense. While the marginalists resolved a large array of anomalies that had troubled the labour theory of value, they also believed that utility should be measurable if their theory was to be scientifically respectable. Taking this shift as his starting point, Ivan Moscati has provided a well-written, thorough, and insightful account of the history of utility measurement from 1870 to 1985. (shrink)

This is the last of three chapters that analyze threshold-based fairness criteria, which are designed to combine a purely utilitarian metric with a maximin or leximax fairness criterion. The chapter focuses on a utility threshold criterion that applies a leximax criterion until the utility cost crosses a threshold, at which point it begins to apply a utilitarian criterion. The threshold is user-specified by a parameter Δ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Delta $$\end{document}, where larger values (...) of Δ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Delta $$\end{document} correspond to greater fairness. The socially optimal solution is found by solving a sequence of optimization models. The chapter presents mixed integer/linear programming formulations of these models, whose validity is proved in the literature. It describes the optimal solution subject to a budget constraint in closed form and establishes its correctness with a lengthy argument that relies on a series of lemmas. In particular, it shows that the stakeholder utility allotments in the solution are step functions of Δ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Delta $$\end{document}. The chapter concludes with a marginal analysis of stakeholder incentives to improve efficiency. (shrink)

Recent studies on non-dominant or minority groups have begun to look at how their members reconstruct resistance, sculpt a positive identity for themselves and engage in solidarity formation for group empowerment. The present study contributes to this growing scholarship by examining the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement’s use of Twitter to promote an emancipatory agenda for Black communities/people. Based on the tweets produced by the BLM movement, I analyze various discursive mechanisms utilized by the movement to resist institutional oppression and (...) systemic racism with vehemence, while advocating freedom, liberation and justice for Black people. Three discursive strategies were identified: (1) critiquing oppressive institutions and systemic racism, (2) denouncing white supremacy and redefining demeaning racial narratives and (3) calling out racist attitudes and commending people who oppose such behavior. Through these strategies, the BLM movement amplifies the voice(s) of Black people and moves issues concerning their development, progress and welfare from the margins to the center. The paper illustrates the agentive power of discourse to stimulate action towards social change. (shrink)

Nozick (1977) was a critique of the view of Austrian economics which rejected the notion of indifference in human action. This author claimed that this stance was incompatible with the notion of the supply of a good, and, also, with diminishing marginal utility, both of which were strongly supported by this praxeological school of thought. Block (1980) was an attempt to rescue the Austrian school from this brilliant intellectual challenge. Hoppe (2005; 2009) rejected Nozick’s challenge, and, also, Block’s (...) (1980) response. Block (2009a) and Block and Barnett (2010), defended Block’s (1980) analysis of indifference. The latest contribution to this ongoing discussion is Wysocki (2021) who maintains that Hoppe was correct in his rejection of Nozick, while Block was not. The present paper is a rejoinder to Wysocki (2021). (shrink)

Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility considers not just the probability of an outcome, but also the probability of getting a strictly better outcome, when weighting the contribution that outcome gives to the evaluation of a gamble. It uses a risk-weighting function $R$ sending probabilities in $\left[ {0,1} \right]$ to decision weights $\left[ {0,1} \right]$. I adapt this to allow weights in any real interval. Finite intervals yield nothing new, but if the interval is infinite, then the resulting rule can incorporate (...) maximin or maximax preferences (or both!) while still satisfying stochastic dominance. There are advantages to working with marginal risk-weighting, $R$ ’s derivative, $r$. (shrink)

This paper develops an arbitration scheme for resolving a distribution of wealth problem by applying Nash's assumptions to marginal rather than to total utilities. The problem considered is that of distributing a fixed amount of wealth between two claimants, and the paper compares properties of this problem's Nash solution with those of the marginal utility solution. The Nash solution is shown to emphasize application of symmetry considerations to the status quo ante, the marginal utility solution (...) their application to the players' post arbitration positions (as measured by functions that fully describe the players' utilities but that are independent of positive linear transformations). It is argued that while the Nash assumptions are appropriate for many arbitration problems in which a solution reflects the players' status quo ante positions, the marginal utility assumptions are useful when it is desired that a solution attempt to minimize post-arbitration differences between the players' positions. The latter seems to be preferable in contexts where an arbitrator weights the solution's effects on out-comes more heavily than he weights considerations of the status quo ante. Examples are situations such as those involving income redistribution, where attempts to reduce inequality may guide the redistribution decisions. The effects on each type of solution of changes in the status quo ante are also investigated and related to the risk preference properties of the players' utilities. (shrink)

This paper aims to characterize classes or types of values for transferable utility games in partition function form, accounting for externalities where the worth of a coalition depends on the cooperation structure outside it. We follow an axiomatic approach, focusing on values that represent two-stage anticipations. In the first stage, the worth of each coalition is computed as a weighted average of each of its possible worths (depending on the cooperation structure outside the coalition). In the second stage, these (...) anticipated worths for all coalitions are used to derive the value for participating in the game, treating the game as if it were one without externalities. We extend previous work by Macho-Stadler et al. (Journal of Economic Theory, 135, 339–356, 2007; Games and Economic Behavior, 108, 49–64, 2018) beyond Efficiency and Symmetry, providing axiomatic characterizations for values based on both exogenous and endogenous weights. Additionally, we model first-step anticipations as operators from games with externalities to games without externalities, characterizing the family of weighted average operators. We also explore the relationship of the average approach with marginalism, highlighting that marginalist values constructed from the average approach require weights satisfying a consistency condition, termed recursivity, but not necessarily a symmetry condition. Finally, we contrast these results with Grabisch and Funaki’s (2012) coalition formation value, which involves averages over dynamic coalition formation processes but cannot be constructed from the average approach. (shrink)

This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. We use a standard ultimatum game, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects (ItoF treatment) and, in another treatment, French subjects made offers to Indian subjects (FtoI treatment). We observed that FtoI treatment bargaining mostly ended up with unequal splits of money in favor of French, while nearly equal splits were the most frequent outcome in ItoF treatment interactions. The experimental (...) results are organized through a standard social reference model, modified for taking into account the different marginal value of money for bargainers. In our model bargaining is driven by relative standings comparisons between players, occurring in terms of real earnings (that is monetary earnings corrected for a purchasing power factor) obtained in the game. The norm of equity behind the equalization of real earnings is called local equity norm, and contrasted to a global equity norm which would encompass the wealth of players beyond the game. According to what we observed, no beyond-game concern seems to be relevantly endorsed by subjects. (shrink)

Wysocki (2024) is a critique of Block (2022). The present paper is a response to the former. We are in effect debating the best reaction to Nozick (1977) which criticized Austrian economics on the ground that it makes two claims that are incompatible with one another. On the one hand, the praxeological school is noted for its aversion to the concept of indifference. On the other hand, the Austrian school also accepts supply and demand curves, and diminishing marginal (...) class='Hi'>utility. These three concepts imply homogeneous elements that comprise them. But if they are truly homogeneous, people ought to be indifferent between the different elements of them. Hence, the tension, not to say logical contradiction, in this perspective. Block (1980) was an attempt to respond to Nozick (1977). Hoppe (2005a,b; 2009) and Wysocki (2016; 2017; 2021; 2024) who supports Hoppe, maintain that Block’s refutation of Nozick (1977) was not efficacious at all, at worst, or at best, certainly not fully successful. Specifically, Wysocki maintains that there is a bifurcation between choosing and preferring; for example, no one is even aware of which foot goes first when entering a restaurant, and, yet, one has to make a choice about it. He avers that it is entirely possible to prefer to save either son, equally, while actually picking one, and not the other. (shrink)

Robert Grosseteste’s utilization of Greek and Arabic Aristotelian commentators represents an intriguing aspect of his approach to Aristotle. This study centres on Grosseteste’s quotations from John Philoponus’ Commentary on Posterior Analytics, which Grosseteste employed to complement his own commentary on this Aristotelian work. After revisiting the debated medieval circulation of segments of Philoponus in connection with James of Venice’s Aristotelian translations, the article delves into the Renaissance Latin versions of Philoponus’ commentary. This includes the previously overlooked translation by Maurizio Zamberti (...) (1516, unpublished) and the initial Venetian editions (1534, 1539, 1542). The Venetian prints were derived from an anonymous and unfamiliar Latin version that followed James of Venice’s translation and terminology. This distinctive feature, along with the marginalia referencing Lincolniensis (i.e., Grosseteste) in Philippus Theodosius’ revised text (Venice 1542), allows for a comparison of passages from Grosseteste and Philoponus to validate their correspondences. The final segment of this study investigates Grosseteste’s sparse and elusive references to Aristotle’s On the Soul in light of the possibility that they may stem from fragments of Philoponus’ commentary accompanying James of Venice’s translation of that Aristotelian work. (shrink)

Utilizing data from over 11,000 posts and 127,000 responses on Reddit groups over a 10-year period, we employed AI-powered content analysis to examine patterns in the discussions of Reddit users who post about prison and who the model classifies as before/after incarceration across various topics. Our findings revealed significant shifts regarding personal issues. These included issues relative to users’ mental health, substance use, spirituality, family relationships, and guilt and blame expression. The results offered insights into the human challenges faced by (...) individuals navigating the carceral system as expressed through their virtual identities. This study showcases how computational analysis of social media can reveal nuanced, longitudinal patterns in perceived carceral experiences while also highlighting methodological trade-offs between data richness and anonymity. (shrink)

The use of marginal land (ML) for lignocellulosic biofuel production is examined for system stability, resilience, and eco-social sustainability. A North American prairie grass system and its industrialization for maximum biomass production using biotechnology and agro-technical inputs is the focus of the analysis. Demographic models of ML biomass production and ethanol farmer/producers are used to examine the stability properties of the ML system. A bio-economic model that maximizes the utility of consumption having the dynamics of MLs and the (...) farmer/producers as dynamic constraints is used to examine the effects of increased conversion efficiency, input costs, risk, and levels of base resources and inputs on the competitive and societal solutions for biomass production. We posit ML abandonment after biofuel production ceases could lead to permanent land degradation below initial levels that prohibit the establishment of the original flora and fauna. (shrink)

The terms ‘negative utility of gambling’ and ‘risk aversion’ conflate three things:Disutility from the mere act of taking a chance: i.e. negative effects that would not exist if there were no risk or uncertainty, effects which include serious business considerations such as the availability of loans — exemplified in von Neumann and Morgenstern's famous 1947 Appendix;Diminishing marginal utility of money: — exemplified in Bernoulli and Cramer's expected utility procedure; andA preference for safety: — exemplified in the (...) rank dependent utility models of Allais, Lopes, Quiggin and Yaari.Factor (iii) has not been previously distinguished from (i). Factor (i) is regularly either confused with (ii) or ignored as elusive and unimportant.The paper shows that (i) should not be ignored since it is crucial in many serious business decisions, and need not remain elusive. To separate (i) from (ii) and (iii), and consistently incorporate (i), (ii) and (iii) in decision models, the paper identifies progressive stages in people's knowledge of the future and decomposes people's overall valuation of an option into three steps: 1 utilities distinctive to each of its possible outcomes; 2 utility common to all its possible outcomes; 3 aggregation rules for forming the overall valuation out of 1 and 2. The separation procedure is illustrated and the ambiguity of current decision models with respect to (i), (ii) and (iii) delineated. (shrink)

This paper is a personal dialogue of maneuvering the landscape of scholarship in the United States as a nurse faculty. The principal thesis of this paper is that a discursive shift from margins to mainstream literature has occurred within nursing discourse during the past 20 years as the result of a growing body of work by nurse philosophers. I utilize my own work in nursing philosophy as an exemplar and provide a narrative situated in a feminist‐critical paradigm. This paper: (1) (...) presents a historical background through a critical‐feminist lens of the discursive shift using my own work and lived experiences as exemplars; (2) examines a contemporary mainstream ‘authoritative’ text as an exemplar of this discursive shift and (3) proposes both potential positive intersections and threats in the future development of nursing philosophy resulting from this discursive shift. (shrink)

Contemporary research highlights multiple societal and environmental benefits in addition to potential economic advantages associated with renewable energy (RE) utilization. As federal and state incentives for investments in RE technologies become more prevalent, RE sources represent increasingly viable alternatives to established fossil fuel energy. RE utilization is recognized as a key component of “green” product innovation that helps firms reduce the environmental impact of production processes and diminish their ecological footprints and energy consumption. Yet, despite consistent evidence that corporate sustainability (...) initiatives are favorably associated with firm performance, the limited research that examines associations between RE initiatives and firm performance yields mixed results and an explicit link has yet to be established. Drawing on the natural resource-based view of the firm, we examine the association between RE utilization and firm financial performance over time. Annual ROI, Tobin’s Q, and operating margin for large U.S. firms identified as exceptional users of RE in the EPA’s Fortune 500 Top Green Power Partners list are compared with their respective industry medians over a 7-year period (2007–2013) and post hoc bootstrapping and sensitivity analyses are performed to further validate the study findings. Our research advances current knowledge about the influence of RE utilization by demonstrating that top RE user firms consistently generated superior financial performance compared to their industry competitors. As such, the study findings lend credence to the existence of a business case that complements the societal and environmental benefits of RE utilization. (shrink)

A screening test for more than 50 cancers at earlier stages would strike many as a godsend. Such a test would promise, prima facie, to save 160,000 lives annually from a premature death from cancer, reduce the intensity of medical treatment, and reduce social costs. In brief, this is what is promised by the Galleri test. We will delineate those claims in greater detail and critically assess them from medical, economic, and ethical perspectives. We conclude, with many others, that this (...) test lacks clinical validity and clinical utility. In addition, annual public funding of $100 billion for this test would be socially unaffordable; the opportunity costs would be unacceptable for both ethical and economic reasons. Further, the least well off with respect to cancer care would be made worse off if this test were publicly funded for everyone over the age of fifty. (shrink)

By focusing on players’ relative contributions, we study some properties for values in positive cooperative games with transferable utilities. The well-known properties of symmetry (also known as “equal treatment of equals”) and marginality are based on players’ marginal contributions to coalitions. Both Myerson’s balanced contributions property and its generalization of the balanced cycle contributions property (Kamijo and Kongo Int J of Game Theory 39:563–571, 2010; BCC) are based on players’ marginal contributions to other players. We define relative versions (...) of marginality and BCC by replacing marginal contributions with relative contributions, and examine efficient values satisfying each of the two properties. On the class of positive games, a relative variation of marginality is incompatible with efficiency, and together with efficiency and the invariance property with respect to the payoffs of players under a player deletion, a relative variation of BCC characterizes the proportional value and egalitarian value in a unified manner. (shrink)

Scientists normally earn less money than many other professions which require a similar amount of training and qualification. The economic theory of marginal utility and cost-benefit analysis can be applied to explain this phenomenon. Although scientists make less money than entertainment stars, the scientists do research work out of their interest and they also enjoy a much higher reputation and social status in some countries.

Why disdain replicated art? If art is valuable because it evokes experiences of beauty, they should be comparable. In chapter 11 of the Elephant in the Brain, Simler and Hanson argue we actually care about the extrinsic properties of art—e.g. who made it—to signal our intelligence and taste. Here I defend a different explanation for the evidence cited by S&H: the extrinsic properties of art are central to what constitutes art, play a bigger role fixing the value of art than (...) S&H allow, and the potential for diminishing marginal utility on the value of the intrinsic properties of art—seeing the original Mona Lisa is rare; seeing a copy isn’t—explains why we assign such value to the extrinsic properties of art. And thus we have a non-signaling explanation of art consumption, which may or may not complement signaling theory. (shrink)

Generalizing the earlier conclusions about action omnipotence, this chapter argues that plans can be translated into conditional linear policies, with the result that the expected utility of the plan can be identified with the marginal expected value of the corresponding policy. This gives a precise definition of the expected utility of a plan that can be used in decision-theoretic reasoning. However, expanding the definition of the causal probability of an outcome given such a policy can lead to (...) an immense sum. However, this chapter shows that direct inference can simplify the sum so that the computations become manageable. (shrink)

The COVID‐19 pandemic has raised important universal public health challenges. Conceiving ethical responses to these challenges is a public health imperative but must take context into account. This is particularly important in sub‐Saharan Africa (SSA). In this paper, we examine how some of the ethical recommendations offered so far in high‐income countries might appear from a SSA perspective. We also reflect on some of the key ethical challenges raised by the COVID‐19 pandemic in low‐income countries suffering from chronic shortages in (...) health care resources, and chronic high morbidity and mortality from non‐COVID‐19 causes. A parallel is drawn between the distribution of severity of COVID‐19 disease and the classic “Fortune at the bottom of the pyramid” model that is relevant in SSA. Focusing allocation of resources during COVID‐19 on the ‘thick’ part of the pyramid in Low‐to‐Middle Income Countries (LMICs) could be ethically justified on utilitarian and social justice grounds, since it prioritizes a large number of persons who have been economically and socially marginalized. During the pandemic, importing allocation frameworks focused on the apex of the pyramid from the global north may therefore not always be appropriate. In a post‐COVID‐19 world, we need to think strategically about how health care systems can be financed and structured to ensure broad access to adequate health care for all who need it. The root problems underlying health inequity, exposed by COVID‐19, must be addressed, not just to prepare for the next pandemic, but to care for people in resource poor settings in non‐pandemic times. (shrink)

Begins the discussion of organ distribution for transplantation presented in the last four chapters of Part III of the book by analysing factors that may be relevant in three situations: true scarcity of resources, temporary scarcity of resources, and uncertainty as to the type of scarcity. The first two sections of the chapter consider the different concepts of need and urgency and their relation to each other: what makes one person needier than another and why is greater need a factor (...) that should give one person a stronger claim to resources? Arguments are presented for and against the view that the younger are needier than the older, and proposals offered concerning a possible diminishing marginal utility of life and diminishing marginal value of life, fairness, and the relation between helping the worst off and equality. The last section of the chapter starts by examining the concept of outcome with an eye to deciding what effects of a transplant and differential effects between potential recipients are morally relevant and irrelevant. It then considers the relation between the factors of need and outcome, and presents several rationales for procedures that give outcome more weight relative to need — moving away from the maximin approach (that of aiding the much worse off before the better off). (shrink)

Over the years I’ve written many papers defending an idiosyncratic version of interest-relative epistemology. This book collects and updates the views I’ve expressed over those papers. -/- Interest-relative epistemologies all start in roughly the same way. A big part of what makes knowledge important is that it rationalises action. But for almost anything we purportedly know, there is some action that it wouldn’t rationalise. I know what I had for breakfast, but I wouldn’t take a bet at billion to one (...) odds about it. Knowledge has practical limits. The first idiosyncratic feature of my version of interest-relative epistemology is how those limits are identified. Other interest-relative philosophers typically say that the limits have to do with stakes; in high stakes situations knowledge goes away. That’s no part of my view. I think knowledge goes away in long odds situations. High stakes situations are almost always are long odds situations, for reasons to do with the declining marginal utility of money. But the converse isn’t true. On my view, knowledge often goes away in cases where it is trivial to check before action. This idea, that interests matter in long odds cases, and not just in high stakes cases, is the main constant in what I’ve written on interest-relativity over the years. -/- But there are three other respects in which the view I’m going to set out and defend in this book is very different from the view I set out in older papers. -/- I used to identify the practical limits on knowledge with cases where relying on the purported knowledge would get the wrong answer. I focused, that is, on the outputs of inquiry. Knowledge goes away if relying on it would lead one to make a mistake. I now think I was looking at the wrong end of inquiry. Knowledge goes away if the thinker starts conducting an inquiry where the purported knowledge is an inappropriate starting point, and inappropriate for the special reason that it might be false. Now one way we can tell that something is a bad starting point is that starting there will mean we end up at the wrong place. But it’s not the only way. Sometimes a bad starting point will lead to the right conclusion for the wrong reasons. As the Nyāya philosophers argued, rational inquiry starts with knowledge. If it would be irrational to start this inquiry with a particular belief, that belief isn’t knowledge. -/- Not all inquiries are practical inquiries, but many are. And practical inquiries are usually going to be at the center of attention in this book. But what is someone trying to figure out when they conduct a practical inquiry? I used to think that they were trying to figure out which option maximised expected utility, and to a first approximation identified knowledge with those things one could conditionalise on without changing the option that maximised expected utility. As noted in the previous paragraph, I no longer think that we can identify knowledge with what doesn’t change our verdicts. But more importantly, I no longer think that expected utility maximisation is as central to practical inquiry as I once did. There are some theoretical reasons from game theory that raise some doubts about expected utility maximisation. Weak dominance reasoning is part of our theory of rational choice, and can’t be modelled as expected utility maximisation. Perhaps some kinds of equilibrium seeking are parts of practical inquiry, and can’t be modelled as expected utility maximisation. But there are also very practical reasons to think that practical inquiry doesn’t aim at expected utility maximisation. When there are a lot of very similar options - think about selecting a can from a supermarket shelf - and it’s more trouble than it’s worth to figure out which of them maximises expected utility, it’s best to ignore the differences between them and just pick. As I’ll argue in Chapter 6, this makes a big difference to how interests and knowledge interact. -/- In the version of interest-relativity that I’m defending here, everything in epistemology is interest-relative. Knowledge, rational belief, and evidence are all interest-relative. But they are all interest-relative in slightly different ways. The main aim here is to defend the interest-relativity of knowledge. A common objection to interest-relative theories of knowledge is that they can’t be extended into theories of all the things we care about in epistemology. Here I try to meet that challenge. The way I do so is a little messy. It would be nice if there was some part of epistemology that’s interest-invariant, as I used to think, or if all the interest-relative notions were interest-relative in the same way, as other interest-relative epistemologists argue. For better or worse, that’s not the view I’m defending. Interests matter throughout epistemology, and we just have to go case by case to figure out how and why they matter. (shrink)

The social welfare function (SWF) framework is a core methodology of welfare economics. This chapter describes the approach, discusses its application to health priority-setting, and illustrates this application with a concrete example. The SWF framework conceptualizes any given policy as a probability distribution over outcomes, with each outcome in turn a pattern of well-being among the population of concern. The well-being measure can be derived from utility functions representing individual preferences with respect to the attributes that determine well-being (e.g., (...) health, longevity, income). Different rules for ranking well-being patterns are possible, including both “utilitarian” and “prioritarian” rules. Unlike cost-effectiveness analysis, the SWF framework is sensitive to the way in which a given individual’s income, health, and longevity interact to determine her lifetime well-being. Unlike cost-benefit analysis, the utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs take account of the declining marginal utility of income. Health scholars’ traditional concerns about considering income in allocating health care are mitigated by this feature of both SWFs and, even more so, by the extra concern for the well-being of the worse off that is characteristic of prioritarianism. (shrink)

This note examines the theory of optimal insurance purchasing in the presence of a nonpecuniary background risk. The occurrence of the qualitative uninsurable background loss can increase, decrease or can leave the marginal utility of wealth unchanged, whereas a financial background loss (as in Doherty and Schlesinger, 1883a) always increases it. Existing theorems on the optimal level of insurance and the optimal form of insurance contracts are shown to hold only under restrictive assumptions on the correlation level between (...) risks. The paper shows that sufficient conditions for the validity of the theorems depend not only on the correlation between the insurable and noninsurable losses, but also on the variation of the marginal utility of wealth with respect to the nonpecuniary variable. (shrink)