We tested whether the Reasoned Action Approach (RAA) model could predict both students’ intentions and the frequency with which they had previously misused generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) for producing assessment content (behaviour). We also tested the extent to which the additional constructs of moral norm and anticipated regret improved the predictive validity of the RAA in respect of this behaviour. The participants (N = 369 psychology undergraduates) completed an online questionnaire measuring the RAA and additional constructs. Hierarchical linear regressions showed (...) that the RAA accounted for 74% of the variance in students’ intentions and 65% of the variance in behaviour. Moral norm and anticipated regret led to a significant (1% point) increment to explained variance in the prediction of intentions but not behaviour. The independent predictors of intentions were instrumental attitude, injunctive norm and anticipated regret. Intention was the sole predictor of behaviour. The results demonstrate, for the first time, that the RAA is a useful model for predicting university students’ misuse of GenAI in the production of assessment content, and that anticipated regret constitutes a useful addition to the model in this context. Practical implications for decreasing GenAI misuse are discussed. (shrink)

Findlay, J. N. The contemporary relevance of Hegel.--Kaufmann, W. The Hegel myth and its method.--Kaufmann, W. The young Hegel and religion.--Hartmann, K. Hegel: a non-metaphysical view.--Solomon, R. C. Hegel's concept of "geist."--Taylor, C. The opening arguments of the Phenomenology.--Kelly, G. A. Notes on Hegel's "Lordship and bondage."--MacIntyre, A. Hegel on faces and skulls.--Kosok, M. The formalization of Hegel's dialectical logic.--Schacht, R. L. Hegel on freedom.--Avineri, S. Hegel revisted.

First published in 1974, J.N. Findlay's classic work on Plato has now been re-issued.

Professor Findlay in this book, originally published in 1961, set out to justify, and to some extent carry out, a ‘material value-ethic’, ie. A systematic setting forth of the ends of rational action. The book is in the tradition of Moore, Rashfall, Ross, Scheler and Hartmann though it avoids altogether dogmatic intuitive methods. It argues that an organised framework of ends of action follows from the attitude underlying our moral pronouncements, and that this framework, while allowing personal elaboration, is (...) not a matter for individual decision. The relations connecting our fundamental value-judgements with one another, and the frames of mind behind them, are not rigorously deductive but are sufficiently compelling to be called logical. Something of a ‘transcendental deduction’ of a well-ordered family for our basic heads of valuation is both possible and necessary. The work is further critical of the notion of obligation which has been extended far beyond legal contracts and understandings. The book also contains a chapter on religion. (shrink)

"What is value, moral or otherwise? What has positive value and what negative? Axiological ethics or moral value theory is concerned with such questions. In this monograph the author considers the writings of some of the most important exponents of axiological ethics, namely Brentano, Meinong, G. E. Moore, Hastings Rashdall, W. D. Ross, Scheler and Hartmann. He expounds their views clearly and sympathetically but not uncritically, and adds his own opinions about value theory. The reader will find this study full (...) of interest. It contributes to scholarship; is it widely known, for instance, how Scheler anticipated and criticised emotivists? Again, this study makes unpopular claims and argues for them cogently; it is the case, for example, that pp much attention has been lavished on the early chapters of Moore's Principia Ethica, which discuss the naturalistic fallacy, and too little on later chapters, which make Moore 'one of the prime founders of axiology'? In the last chapter Professor Findlay makes his own suggestions toward a theory of value and the reader has to consider the question: Is there a gap in modern moral philosophy which these suggestions help to fill?"-Publisher. (shrink)

More than one third of the human brain is devoted to the processes of seeing - vision is after all the main way in which we gather information about the world. But human vision is a dynamic process during which the eyes continually sample the environment. Where most books on vision consider it as a passive activity, this book is unique in focusing on vision as an 'active' process. It goes beyond most accounts of vision where the focus is on (...) seeing, to provide an integrated account of seeing AND looking. The book starts by pointing out the weaknesses in our traditional approaches to vision and the reason we need this new approach. It then gives a thorough description of basic details of the visual and oculomotor systems necessary to understand active vision. The book goes on to show how this approach can give a new perspective on visual attention, and how the approach has progressed in the areas of visual orienting, reading, visual search, scene perception and neuropsychology. Finally, the book summarises progress by showing how this approach sheds new light on the old problem of how we maintain perception of a stable visual world. Written by two leading vision scientists, this book will be valuable for vision researchers and psychology students, from undergraduate level upwards. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The question of when a person is culpable for taking an unjustified risk of harm has long been controversial in Anglo-American criminal law doctrine and theory. This survey of the approaches adopted in England and Wales, Canada, Australia, the United States, New Zealand and Scotland argues that they are converging, to differing extents, around a 'Standard Account' of culpable unjustified risk-taking. This Standard Account distinguishes between awareness-based culpability and inadvertence-based culpability for unjustified risk-taking. With reference to criminal law theory and (...) philosophical literature, the author argues that, when explained appropriately, the Standard Account is defensible and practical. Defending the Standard Account involves analysing in depth a number of controversial matters, including the meaning of advertence/awareness, the role of attitudes such as indifference in culpable risk-taking, and the question of whether negligence should be used in the criminal law. (shrink)

The first full exploration of the political thought of Jan Patocka, student of Husserl and Heidegger and mentor to Václav Havel.

During active vision, the eyes continually scan the visual environment using saccadic scanning movements. This target article presents an information processing model for the control of these movements, with some close parallels to established physiological processes in the oculomotor system. Two separate pathways are concerned with the spatial and the temporal programming of the movement. In the temporal pathway there is spatially distributed coding and the saccade target is selected from a Both pathways descend through a hierarchy of levels, the (...) lower ones operating automatically. Visual onsets have automatic access to the eye control system via the lower levels. Various centres in each pathway are interconnected via reciprocal inhibition. The model accounts for a number of well-established phenomena in target-elicited saccades: the gap effect, express saccades, the remote distractor effect, and the global effect. High-level control of the pathways in tasks such as visual search and reading is discussed; it operates through spatial selection and search selection, which generally combine in an automated way. The model is examined in relation to data from patients with unilateral neglect. (shrink)

Recklessness involves unreasonable/unjustified risk-taking. The argument here is that recklessness in the criminal law is best understood as nevertheless containing an element of reasonableness. To be reckless, on this view, the defendant must reasonably believe that she is exposing others to a risk of harm. If the defendant’s belief about the risk being imposed by her conduct is unreasonable, she should not be considered reckless. This point is most important in relation to offences of endangerment where recklessness sets the outer (...) limits of criminal liability. (shrink)

Existing justifications for exclusionary rules and stays of proceedings in response to pre-trial wrongdoing by police officers and prosecutors are often thought to be counter-productive or disproportionate in their consequences. This article begins to explore whether the concept of standing to blame can provide a fresh justification for such responses. It focuses on a vice related to standing—hypocrisy—and a related vice concerning inconsistent blame. It takes seriously the point that criminal justice agencies, although all part of the State, are in (...) real terms separated from each other, and analyses the so-called separation thesis (or theses). It concludes that hypocrisy and inconsistent blame arguments could plausibly justify exclusion and stays only in relation to lower-level offending, and even there only indirectly. This is in the sense that exclusion and stays are expressions of judicial frustration with other bodies for their failure to take pre-trial wrongdoing seriously. (shrink)

J.N. Findlay, distinguished scholar and acknowledged expert on Plato, argues persuasively for a new interpretation of the Platonic writings. He believes that Plato's Unwritten Doctrines were present in the background of all the great philosopher's mature written work. With the use of Aristotelian and other writings on these reported doctrines he demonstrates that they admit of an intelligible elucidation and they direct indispensable light upon the full meaning of the written Dialogues. The author emphasizes the valuable use of Platonic (...) notions and methods by the Neoplatonists and the Schoolmen as well as by such modern thinkers as Husserl and Russell. He also censures, as a great misinterpretation, the widespread Aristotelian view of Platonism as a two-world theory, and argues that, for Plato, the Ideas and their Principles alone have full reality, everything else being logically parasitic upon them. The work also includes two important Appendices, the first providing translations of the Aristotelian and other ancient material regarding Plato's oral teaching, the second criticizing and refuting the views of Harold F. Cherniss on the same material. (shrink)

First published in 1967, The Transcendence of the Cave is the second in a series of Gifford Lectures on philosophical issues, and continues the themes of the first series entitled The Discipline of the Cave. In the opening chapters, J N Findlay sketches an ontology, an axiology and a theology which are ‘phenomenological’ in the sense of Husserl, as they attempt to show that a ‘firmament’ of logical and other values emerges out of the contingencies of first order liking (...) and interest. The synthesis of these values in an object having many paradoxical, mystical-religious properties is also a necessary outcome of this ‘logic’. In the later chapters, the author attempts to construct an orderly picture of other worldly experiences and their objects based solely on the premise that these experiences must be such as to resolve the many philosophical surds that plague us in this life. (shrink)

The origin of McLuhan’s notion of acoustic space is described. It is shown that his definition of acoustic space as having its center everywhere and its margin nowhere can be traced back to the Christian mystics of the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance dating as far back as the 12th Century.

A central preoccupation that constantly arises in Australian culture is the question of who ‘we’ are and where ‘we’ belong. So much is evident in independent women's fashion magazine Russh, the focus of this article, in which pride and uncertainty about Australian identity (and fashionability) are representationally resolved through a sensual, girlish and white fashionable ideal. By closely analysing magazine issues selected from its archive, this article charts the ways that Russh imagines Australian fashion as both imbricated with global flows (...) as well as reaching from the periphery towards where fashion really originates. It then reads the fashionable femininity represented in the magazine in light of settler colonial fantasies that imagine the actualisation of national character amongst the Australian landscape – a landscape in which white presence is positioned as originary. This fashionable ideal symbolically rejects cosmopolitanism through her ‘return to the bush’ whilst embodying fashion itself, thus reconciling the tension between far and near. As such, Russh can be read as actively reinforcing a hegemonic Australian imaginary that elides the diversity of contemporary Australian culture/s whilst escaping censure, because as a niche fashion magazine peopled with dreamy protagonists, its content is situated firmly within the realm of fashion's fantasy. (shrink)

First published in 1966, _The Discipline of the Cave_ is the first series of a course of Gifford lectures on philosophical issues.. J N Findlay’s lectures use the image of the Cave to show how familiarity is full of restrictions, and involves puzzles and discrepancies unable to be resolved or removed. Such philosophical perplexities may be a result of the misunderstanding and abuse of ordinary ways of thinking and speaking. They may also be a way of ‘drawing us towards (...) being’, providing proof of the absurdity of ordinary thought, speech and experience unless modified and added to in ways which may point beyond it. What may be called a mystical and otherworldly element may need to be introduced into or rendered explicit in all our experience in order to give a viable sense to the most commonplace human utterances and activities. (shrink)

I am both happy and honoured to have been asked to give this lecture on mysticism in memory of Leo Robertson, of whom I have many very pleasant memories. It was a delight to be wafted off to the Saville Club after a lecture here, and to discuss mysticism and philosophy on one of its many sofas. I am very sorry that this particular pleasure will not recur. Leo Robertson belonged to an old-fashioned climate of thought in which an interest (...) in mysticism was respectable, and a long stay in the East had confirmed him in these leanings. I myself have always been constitutionally mystical, feeling that certain kinds of rapture, concerned with work, beauty, love and a few other things, are the only things absolutely worth having. I dropped my mysticism for a long period, partly on account of certain disillusioning experiences in my ’twenties, and partly out of deference to the dry methods and doctrine that prevailed in British philosophy. Latterly, however, increasing age has restored many of my illusions and made me generally more tender-minded; also, seeing the completely nugatory accomplishments of purely unmystical analysis, I have found myself reverting increasingly to my original mysticism. It was very refreshing to talk to a philosopher like Leo Robertson who took mysticism with the complete seriousness I think it deserves—as one of the truly fundamental human attitudes—but who also thought of it as supplementing and completing, rather than as undermining and nullifying, what other less rarefied thinkers do. It was also refreshing to hear all his talk about an earlier Cambridge, where he knew Wittgenstein in the full brilliance of his personal beauty as well as of his intelligence, and also knew Moore in the golden period of his dialectic, before he became so very preoccupied with the minutiae of the English language. Leo Robertson was a complete and rounded philosopher rather than a hamstrung one, and knowing him has been a factor in strengthening my resolve to be a complete and rounded thinker too. (shrink)

The present article is an attempt to set forth and examine the conclusions of what is perhaps Husserl’s finest piece of philosophical investigation, and one of the finest pieces in the whole history of philosophy: the investigation of the consciousness of time, with its extraordinary combination of an unchanging form with an absolute flux of which it is none other than the very form itself. This investigation puts Husserl on a level with the wisest heads on the matter, with Aristotle (...) in Books IV and VI of the Physics, with Augustine in Book X of the Confessions, and with Kant, whose whole Critique of Pure Reason may be said to be an examination of what is necessary to temporal experience. In Husserl’s work we have, we may say, the greatest of recent philosophers tackling the greatest of philosophical problems, one in which contradiction is always appearing in novel forms, to be evaded only by the naïve superficiality of a Minkowski or a Grünbaum, or by such infinitely useful subtlety as Husserl himself practises. As Husserl himself put it near the beginning of his 1905 Lectures. (shrink)

Philosophical themes as diverse as language, value, mind and God are among the topics discussed in this book, originally published in 1963. Considerably influential, there are contributions on Time, Camrbidge Philosophy, Doedelian Sentences, Morality by Convention and the Non-Existence of God. They reflect a gradual move from a position where the influence of Wittgenstein is paramount, to a position where there is considerable criticism of linguistic philosophy and a growing interest in the approaches of Hegel and the phenomenologists.