Aristotle famously observed: That you are pale is true because you are pale—but not vice versa. This insight plays an important role in contemporary debates about truth by expressing truth’s dependency on being. However, how to account for this insight remains controversial. This paper employs the logic of grounding to derive Aristotle’s insight rigorously. The derivation requires a specific truth theory as its starting point. Here, Wolfgang Künne’s Modest Conception of Truth is chosen, but it can also (...) be adapted to other theories of truth. As a by-product, this analysis uncovers a previously unnoticed problem in Künne’s theory—one for which I also propose a solution. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 565-577, June 2022.

The study of insight in problem solving and creative thinking has seen an upsurge of interest in the last 30 years. Current theorising concerning insight has taken one of two tacks. The special-process view, which grew out of the Gestalt psychologists’ theorising about insight, proposes that insight is the result of a dedicated set of processes that is activated by the individual's reaching impasse while trying to deal with a problematic situation. In contrast, the business-as-usual view (...) argues that insight is brought about by the same processes that underlie ordinary thinking . Although those two views are typically treated as being in opposition, it has recently been proposed that a complete understanding of insight will require bringing together aspects of both views. The present paper carries that proposal further. Critical analysis of those two viewpoints demonstrates that each has a positive contribution to make to our understanding of insight, but also is.. (shrink)

The first two parts of Objectivity and Insight explore the prospects for objectivity on the standard ontological conception, and find that they are not good. In Part I, under the heading of subject-driven scepticism, Sacks addresses the problem of securing epistemic reach that extends beyond subjective content. In so doing, he considers models of mind proposed by Locke, Hume, Kant, James, and Bergson. Part II, under the heading of world-driven scepticism, discusses the scope for universality of normative structure-a problem (...) which survives even after the assumption of an epistemologically significant breach between subject and object has been rejected. In the third part of the book Sacks introduces an alternative conception of objectivity, and shows that there is good reason to accept it. This conception turns on an insight which is taken to be implicit in transcendental idealism, and responsible for its abiding appeal; but Sacks's articulation of that insight is neither idealist nor metaphysical. (shrink)

Do artists have control over their ideas for new artworks? This is often treated as a question about spontaneity, or the experience of control: does the event of having an idea for a new artwork occur unexpectedly and without foresight? I suggest another way of interpreting the question—one that has mostly been neglected by philosophers, and that is not settled by claims about spontaneity. According to that interpretation, the question is about agency: are the events of having ideas for new (...) artworks exercises of mental agency? I argue that the answer is no. I apply the results of this argument to questions about what is and is not intentional in the creative process. I conclude by examining another type of control artists might exercise over their creative mental events, which I call ‘facilitation’. (shrink)

Despite the foment of the last two decades, philosophical ethics has fallen on hard times. While an increasing number of universalistic moral theories in the Kantian tradition limit themselves to questions of social and political justice, neo-Aristotelian theories of the good, like that of Bernard Williams, question the very possibility and desirability of a philosophical ethics. Viewed against this landscape, the program of discourse or communicative ethics, initiated by Karl Otto-Apel and then developed by Jürgen Habermas, is marked by its (...) optimism. Although sharing a great deal with the Rawlsian tradition, discourse ethicists insist that justice is not “the chief virtue of social institutions” alone, but the privileged domain of the moral as such. And although agreeing with neo-Aristotelians’ skepticism—later repeated by Hegel against Kant—about decontextualized ethical theory, discourse ethicists nonetheless believe that an abstract formulation of the moral point of view that would be context-sensitive is still possible. (shrink)

The Geography of Insight argues that the issues of the humanities and sciences are different in kind and that inquiries into these issues also have different characteristics as do the resulting insights. These differences constitute an intellectual geography of the humanities and sciences: a mapping of key features of the two domains.

This study investigated the roles of the executive functions of inhibition and switching, and of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities, in insight and non-insight tasks. A total of 18 insight tasks, 10 non-insight tasks, and measures of individual differences in working memory capacities, switching, and inhibition were administered to 120 participants. Performance on insight problems was not linked with executive functions of inhibition or switching but was linked positively to measures of verbal and visuo-spatial (...) working memory capacities. Non-insight task performance was positively linked to the executive function of switching (but not to inhibition) and to verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities. These patterns regarding executive functions were maintained when the insight and non-insight composites were split into verbal and spatial insight and non-insight composite scores. The results are discussed in relation to dual processing accounts of thinking. (shrink)

Thanks to Barton Palmer and John McMillan for these thoughtful commentaries. We found much to agree with and it is striking how so many of the issues relating to decision-making capacity assessment find resonances outside of an English jurisdiction. California and New Zealand are clearly grappling with a very similar set of issues and the commentaries speak to the international nature of these discussions.We will pick up on some main points the commentaries raise.As Palmer notes, DMC law is vulnerable to (...) the criticism that it does not attend to the authenticity of a decision. In ordinary language, this is the idea that someone is deciding while “not their self” or that it is the “illness speaking.” There is a... (shrink)

Aristotle maintains that defining nous requires first defining its activity, which requires first having considered its objects, intelligible beings. This chapter is about the nature of these objects: what about them makes them intelligible? My principal proposals will be that what makes them intelligible is that they are separate or unmixed, and that because, insofar as they are intelligible, they are, in their essence, activity. I am not unaware that this makes it sound as though Aristotle takes intelligibility to consist (...) in some kind of nous. But he himself virtually says as much, when he claims that nous is the form of its objects (lit. εἶδος εἰδῶν); besides it is a result he is committed to by the doctrines that nous is intelligible and that there is something that intelligible objects all are in common; for the alternative, as he himself says, is to suppose that nous “will have something mixed-in, which makes it intelligible just like the rest.” The challenge, then, is not to steer clear of this result, but to make sense of it. My proposal will be that the key lies in realizing that and why Aristotle thinks intelligibility is a creature of nous. (shrink)

Hegel uses the term Einsicht (‘insight’) throughout several key subsections of Chapter Six of the Phenomenology of Spirit (notably in ‘Faith and Pure Insight’ and ‘The Struggle of the Enlightenment with Superstition’). Nowhere else in his work does the term enjoy such a sustained treatment. Commentators generally accept Hegel’s use of the term in the Phenomenology as simply referring to the type of counter-religious reasoning found in the French Enlightenment. I show how Hegel derives the term, through the (...) lens of Kant’s essay, ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ from the Pantheismusstreit, the philosophical debate between Mendelssohn and Jacobi about knowledge of God. The Aufklärung provenance of Einsicht shows how a deep complicity between faith and reason, in the form of immediate knowing, leads beyond the Terror to a happier outcome in the Morality section. Finally, passing reference to Einsicht in the Vorbegriff of the Encyclopaedia Logic confirms its role in the ethical and political vocation of Hegel’s Science. (shrink)

Charity governance is undergoing a crisis of confidence. In this paper, we suggest an alternative approach to how governance could be perceived and conceptualized by considering the ethical notions of governance embedded in religious enquiry, with a specific focus on the Islamic perspective of governance. We firstly develop an ethical framework for charity governance, utilizing insight from the Islamic perspective. Secondly, we undertake an empirical study to assess the experience of governance within Islamic charity organizations. Our theoretical framework provides (...) a comprehensive approach to viewing organizational governance with an emphasis on governance as a mechanism for working towards social justice and the public good. However, our empirical findings reveal an ‘ethical gap’ between the ideals of the Islamic Ethical Framework and the reality of governance practice within Muslim charity organizations. We consider the implications of these findings and outline avenues for future research. (shrink)

For me, personally, Wittgenstein’s philosophy poses the greatest challenge: if he is right, the sort of philosophy I am attempting to do is impossible. Wittgenstein argued powerfully that there can be no such thing as a general philosophical theory of language, mind, consciousness, society, and so on. I wanted and still do want to do precisely that: to present a general philosophical theory of language, mind, consciousness, society, and so on.

The Mo-ho chih-kuan (Great cessation-and-contemplation) by T’ien-t’ai Chih-i (538–597) is among the most influential treatises in the long history of Buddhist scholarship. It is known for its brilliant insights and its systematic and comprehensive treatment of the Buddhist tradition. Clear Serenity, Quiet Insight is the first complete, fully annotated translation of this prodigious work by one of today’s foremost scholars on T’ien-t’ai (Tendai) Buddhism. -/- The extensive annotation accompanying the translation (Volumes 1 and 2) will help readers understand the (...) original text and implications of crucial passages and ideas, as well as the place the Mo-ho chih-kuan occupies in the development of Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Japanese Buddhism and its critical importance for figures such as Nichiren, who considered Chih-i the “great master” and quoted profusely from the text in his own writings. Volume 3 contains ample supplementary materials, including translations of related texts, a comprehensive glossary, and lists of Chinese terms and explanations of various sources. (shrink)

Great ideas often develop gradually after studying a problem at length--but not always. Sometimes, an insight hits like a bolt from the blue. For Archimedes, clarity struck while he was taking a bath. For Gustav Mahler, it came as the blades of his oars touched the water. And for Albert Einstein, it emerged while he was talking to a friend. Why do these moments of insight strike so suddenly? Why do they so often come to us when we (...) are focused on something completely unrelated? And when great ideas "come to" us, where do they come from? In Aha!: The Moments of Insight that Shape Our World, philosopher William B. Irvine, author of A Guide to the Good Life and On Desire, explores these epiphanies, from the minor insights that strike us all daily, to the major realizations that alter the course of history. Focusing on aha moments as they take place in five different domains--religion, morality, science, math, and art--Irvine provides case studies that shed light on the different ways epiphanies happen in the different domains, and on their differing social impact. Along the way, he describes some of the great aha moments in history, from ancient times to the present day.We like to think that our greatest thoughts are the product of our conscious mind. Irvine demonstrates, though, that it is our unconscious mind that is the source of our most significant insights, and that the role the conscious mind plays in eliciting these insights is to try, unsuccessfully, to solve certain problems. Only if the conscious mind is willing to do this--and thereby experience considerable frustration--is the unconscious mind likely to reward it with a breakthrough insight-that the conscious mind will then take credit for.Irvine explores not only the neuroscience of aha moments but also their personal and social ramifications. How does a person respond to having a breakthrough insight that goes against a dominant paradigm? And how does the world respond when she shares that insight? Irvine shows that in many cases, what is most remarkable about those who have had the great insights of human history is not their but their courage and perseverance in fighting for the world to accept those insights.Aha! is a must-read for cognitive scientists, intellectual historians, philosophers, and anyone who has ever been blown away by the ideas that enlighten us when we least expect it. (shrink)

Analogical cognition, extensively researched by Dedre Gentner and her colleagues over the past thirty five years, has been described as the core of human cognition, and it characterizes our use of many words. This research provides significant insight into the nature of word meaning, but it has been ignored by linguists and philosophers of language. I discuss some of the implications of the research for our account of word meaning. In particular, I argue that the research points to, and (...) helps account for, a key explanatory role that linguistic meaning must play. The research also shows how words contribute to thought as opposed to merely being a means of conveying thought. (shrink)

The transformation of phenomenology that Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka carried out is centred on two major themes. The first is the theme of phenomenological vision, which allows philosophy to go beyond Descartes’ dualism; the second is the concept of transcendental subjectivity: reality may appear only to a constituent ego, which can perceive it. These two themes are her important legacy, which Tymieniecka received from Husserl but which she took one step further. This author thinks that the contemporary world is determined by the (...) power of technology, which has enslaved people. This is the ideological structure of our times. If philosophy wants to achieve the manifestation of the logos of life, it has to address the great topics of life, the world, nature, and the cosmos. This is the mission of phenomenology today. (shrink)

Theorists commonly maintain that addiction involves compulsion or diminished self-control. Some enactivist theorists have conceptualized this disruption to autonomous agency in terms of embodied habits that become overly rigid, so that an agent enacts this pattern of behavior even in circumstances that call for the activation of a very different set of habits. What is more, because addiction crowds out other goals and priorities, agents may become more one-dimensional and begin to lose a hold on values and commitments that are (...) important to them. Rather than engaging in self-regulation to balance competing priorities and gain a better understanding of how different aspects of their identity relate to one another, agent’s lives become dominated by addictive behavior. I argue that enactivist notions of habit and self-equilibration can help to make sense of how the disruptions to autonomous agency characteristic of addiction are linked to diminished self-insight. (shrink)

Sartre’s discussion of «being-with-others» in Part Three of Being and Nothingness is extraordinarily rich and highly original. At its core, I argue, lies an insight into the aporetic character of intersubjectivity – «the scandal of the plurality of consciousnesses», as Sartre puts it – which emerges most clearly in his critique of Hegel’s theory of intersubjectivity. My aim in this paper is to isolate this thesis of Sartre’s and spell out his grounds for it. I argue furthermore that Hegel’s (...) conception of intersubjectivity corresponds to that of natural consciousness, such that, in rejecting Hegel, Sartre is also impugning the reality of a conception integral to ordinary thought. I suggest that Sartre’s insight also holds the key to his distinctive approach to social and political theory in the Critique of Dialectical Reason. (shrink)

Theorists commonly maintain that addiction involves compulsion or diminished self-control. Some enactivist theorists have conceptualized this disruption to autonomous agency in terms of embodied habits that become overly rigid, so that an agent enacts this pattern of behavior even in circumstances that call for the activation of a very different set of habits. What is more, because addiction crowds out other goals and priorities, agents may become more one-dimensional and begin to lose a hold on values and commitments that are (...) important to them. Rather than engaging in self-regulation to balance competing priorities and gain a better understanding of how different aspects of their identity relate to one another, agent’s lives become dominated by addictive behavior. I argue that enactivist notions of habit and self-equilibration can help to make sense of how the disruptions to autonomous agency characteristic of addiction are linked to diminished self-insight. (shrink)

I come before you as a philosophical inquirer addressing a general audience of thoughtful people. This definition of my office implies from the outset very notable limitations. As a philosophical inquirer I am not here to preach to you, but to appeal to your own thoughtfulness. Again, since my inquiry concerns the Sources of Religious Insight, you will understand, I hope, that I shall not undertake to present to you any extended system of religious doctrine.-Josiah Royce.

My comment makes a point out ofRousseau's original insight: that education forsocial participation ought to start within thestudent's lifeworld, and not, as in our days, with the immediatedemands of modern, time-ridden consumerculture. When time is turned into a commodityand place is turned into a transit point forpeople constantly on the move, presence in acommon lifeworld is lost. I take issue with thedominant thinking of education in terms of timeand efficiency, and suggest that we startthinking of education more in terms (...) of placeand presence. I propose that modern thinkers ofeducation – of which I mention a few here –contributed significantly to the pedagogy ofplace or presence. I don't see time as a stringmade up of past-present-future, but rather asan expanding mental and pragmatic universe ofhere-and-nows. The term kairos catchesthis presence as the capacity for doing theright thing at the right moment, that is, themoment when the past has prepared the ground sothat the future can come as a gift. Thisconception is, I think, an important ground forthe idea of an education for citizenship. (shrink)

The consensus today is that both Newton and Leibniz created calculus independently. Yet, this was not so clear at the beginning of the eighteenth century. A bitter controversy took place at that time, which came to be known as the ‘calculus war’, probably the greatest clash in the history of science. While it is accepted that the debate started when Fatio de Duillier publicly accused Leibniz of plagiarism in 1699, earlier evidence of its origins can be found in an exchange (...) of letters between Leibniz and Huygens. (shrink)

Edith Stein’s study of empathy has much to offer to the current growth of research into empathy. This article first summarizes her phenomenological account of the complex layers involved in...

A mistaken view of Africana philosophy is that it is parasitic on Western philosophy, and that it is so in a way that limits its legitimacy as an area of thought. This misconception is often alluded to, although not intended, in the phrase “philosophy and the black experience” or “philosophy and the Africana experience”.

One novel example and/or perspective in support of “Why the learning account fails” is the impressive ability of humans to recognize and memorize facial features and accurately and reliably connect those to related identities. Furthermore, neuroimaging analysis presents an example in support of the crucial role of standardization in the lack of adoption of ideography.

According to insight-oriented psychotherapies, the change clients undergo during therapy results from insights gained into the "true" nature of the self, which entail greater self-knowledge and self-understanding. In this paper, I question such claims through a critical examination of the epistemological and metaphysical values underlying such forms of therapy. I claim that such psychotherapeutic practices are engaged in a process that subtly "absorbs" clients into the therapist's philosophical framework which is characterized by a certain problematic conception of subjectivity, knowledge, (...) and reality. Through mechanisms which are intrinsic to the therapeutic encounter, such as suggestion and power, such therapies construct and reconfigure clients along the lines of socially accepted norms and values. Consequently, insight-oriented psychotherapy results in a deceptive form of social control. (shrink)

This chapter discusses moral reasoning. It presents a situation wherein morality lies outside the scope of empirical science. It notes that science itself rests on intuitions about the justification of empirical conclusions. It explains that human's social emotions are especially refined and elaborate. Many of human feelings are intensely social, as with guilt and resentment, with shame and disdain. It adds that humans are beings with language, and make judgments that are expressed with language. It discusses that moral questions are (...) planning questions of a particular kind, questions of how to feel about things, where the feelings in questions are the moral sentiments. It emphasizes that not only do humans think about how things are, but they also act and feel. It also explains how moral intuition works and how plans require intuition. (shrink)