Feminist transitional justice has greatly contributed to the study of justice in the ruins of war, notably around prosecuting wartime rape. At the same time, scholars have observed limitations to this research agenda such as externally-driven definitions gendered harms and how to address them. This paper explores two novel areas for feminist TJ research: ‘everyday gendered harms’ and customary justice. Based on a three month field study of baraza, a customary justice mechanism in parts of South Kivu, Democratic Republic of (...) Congo, I explore three cases of ‘everyday’ harms against women: domestic violence, polygynous relationships and witchcraft. Through a substantive examination of these baraza cases, I highlight how studying the contextualised functioning of customary justice mechanisms provides new insights into different areas of feminist TJ scholarship, including women’s participation in the transition, justice for harms against women, and advancing gender equality. Additionally, this paper adds to the broader TJ literature by engaging with local TJ needs as they pertain to people’s everyday life in transition. (shrink)

& A college development officer is offered a generous gift by a donor whose identity would embarrass the institution. Should the development officer accept? & A volunteer lies about his level of giving, but classmates believe him and match his "gift." Should donors be told the truth? & A development officer must explain to a donor the difference between naming an endowed chair and selecting the person to fill the chair. Where is the line between reasonable donor expectations and intrusion? (...) "There was a time, barely a generation ago, when most college fund raising was a placid, back-porch operation... That pattern, like so much in higher education, began to change dramatically... On the heels of all this change comes this splendid volume by Deni Elliot. The new fund-raising environment raises a host of ethical questions that were largely unknown or unrecognized by earlier generations of fund raisers... The great value of this book is that it provides some clear-eyed guidance through the ethical thicket that is modern higher education fund raising. The great charm of the book is that it provides this important service with such eloquence and good taste... Anyone involved in modern fund raising will find something of value in this book." -- G. Calvin MacKenzie, Academe "This volume provides college and university development officers and administrators practical help with recognizing difficult ethical situations and discerning the correct ethical response. It can also serve as a guide for donors who wonder what's reasonable for them to expect from fund raisers." -- Resources in Education Contributors: Allen Buchanan, James A. Donahue, Marilyn Batt Dunn, Deni Elliott, Bernard Gert, Judith M. Gooch, Bruce R. Hopkins, Frank Logan, Mary Lou Siebert, Holly Smith, and Eric B. Wentworth. (shrink)

As we navigate post-pandemic educational recovery and future-oriented design, the Handbook of Research in Online Learning: Insights and Advances emerges as a scholarly authority to illuminate existing questions and catalyze conversations on imperative transformations in education. Tailored for researchers, designers, educators, administrators, and stakeholders, this handbook delves into the nuanced landscape of online learning. Curated by leading experts, each chapter provides a deep exploration of critical online teaching and learning dimensions. Whether you're navigating the complexities of instructional design, exploring the (...) impact of digital learning on diverse student populations, or delving into the transformative potential of AI, each chapter illuminates critical aspects of online education. It merges current significant works with unpublished manuscripts, embodying the interdisciplinary essence of online learning research. Grounded in diverse theoretical frameworks and research methods, it offers theoretical insights and actionable guidance for cutting-edge educational methodologies. This handbook is not just a compendium; it's an indispensable guide for shaping the future of education. Contributors are: Michael Ahlf, Stephen Allen, Tonya Amankwatia, Fatih Ari, Ismahan Arslan-Ari, Michael K. Barbour, Gail Alleyne Bayne, Karen Bellnier, M. Aaron Bond, Victoria Brown, George Bradford, William Cain, Sumie Chan, Lauren Cifuentes, Laura DaVinci, Gina Deckard, Shernette Dunn, Anne Fensie, Holly Fiock, Sara Flowers, Carla Karen Fortune, Theodore Frick, Michael M. Grant, Alexis Guethler, Dan He, Atsusi "2c" Hirumi, Charles B. Hodges, Stephanie Hostetter, Michael Houdyshell, Fethi A. Inan, Frank Jamison, Amir Kalan, Meryl Krieger, Jessica Lantz, Mary Lefaiver, Juhong Christie Liu, Noble Lo, Barbara Lockee, Fatemeh Marzban, Trey Martindale, Sara McNeil, Laura McNeill, Stephanie Moore, Martha Lorena Obermeier, Larisa Olesova, Jennifer Jihae Park, Sanghoon Park, Yujin Park, AnthTony Pina, Drew Polly, Yingxiao Qian, Thomas Reeves, Christiane Reilly, Jennifer Richardson, Aubrey Rogowski, Leanne Rutherford, Kay Seo, Sanga Song, Edwin Teye Sosi, Stefan Stenbom, Sharon Stidham, David Tai, Hengtao Tang, Torrey Trust, Shannon Tucker, Denis Unal, Lucas Vasconcelos, Charles Xiaoxue Wang, Florence Williams, Ying Xie and Fan Xu. (shrink)

This study provides a comprehensive reinterpretation of the meaning of Locke's political thought. John Dunn restores Locke's ideas to their exact context, and so stresses the historical question of what Locke in the Two Treatises of Government was intending to claim. By adopting this approach, he reveals the predominantly theological character of all Locke's thinking about politics and provides a convincing analysis of the development of Locke's thought. In a polemical concluding section, John Dunn argues that liberal and (...) Marxist interpretations of Locke's politics have failed to grasp his meaning. Locke emerges as not merely a contributor to the development of English constitutional thought, or as a reflector of socio-economic change in seventeenth-century England, but as essentially a Calvinist natural theologian. (shrink)

This paper articulates an account of causation as a collection of information-theoretic relationships between patterns instantiated in the causal nexus. I draw on Dennett’s account of real patterns to characterize potential causal relata as patterns with specific identification criteria and noise tolerance levels, and actual causal relata as those patterns instantiated at some spatiotemporal location in the rich causal nexus as originally developed by Salmon. I develop a representation framework using phase space to precisely characterize causal relata, including their degree (...) of counterfactual robustness, causal profiles, causal connectivity, and privileged grain size. By doing so, I show how the philosophical notion of causation can be rendered in a format that is amenable for direct application of mathematical techniques from information theory such that the resulting informational measures are causal informational measures. This account provides a metaphysics of causation that supports interventionist semantics and causal modeling and discovery techniques. (shrink)

This paper explores allowing truth value assignments to be undetermined or "partial" and overdetermined or "inconsistent", thus returning to an investigation of the four-valued semantics that I initiated in the sixties. I examine some natural consequence relations and show how they are related to existing logics, including ukasiewicz's three-valued logic, Kleene's three-valued logic, Anderson and Belnap's relevant entailments, Priest's "Logic of Paradox", and the first-degree fragment of the Dunn-McCall system "R-mingle". None of these systems have nested implications, and I (...) investigate twelve natural extensions containing nested implications, all of which can be viewed as coming from natural variations on Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic. Many of these logics exist antecedently in the literature, in particular Nelson 's "constructible falsity". (shrink)

Arnon Avron has written: “Dunn-McCall logic RM is by far the best understood and the most well-behaved in the family of logics developed by the school of Anderson and Belnap.” I agree. There is the famous saying: “Do not let the perfect become the enemy of the good.” I might say: “good enough.” In this spirit, I will examine the logic R-Mingle, exploring how it is only a “semi-relevant logic” but still a paraconsistent logic. I shall discuss the history (...) of RM, and compare RM to Anderson and Belnap’s system R of relevant implication and to classical two-valued logic. There is a “consumer’s guide,” evaluating these logics as “tools,” in the light of my recent work on “Humans as Rational Toolmaking Animals.”. (shrink)

Within the cognitive sciences, most researchers assume that it is the job of linguists to investigate how language is represented, and that they do so largely by building theories based on explicit judgments about patterns of acceptability – whereas it is the task of psychologists to determine how language is processed, and that in doing so, they do not typically question the linguists' representational assumptions. We challenge this division of labor by arguing that structural priming provides an implicit method of (...) investigating linguistic representations that should end the current reliance on acceptability judgments. Moreover, structural priming has now reached sufficient methodological maturity to provide substantial evidence about such representations. We argue that evidence from speakers' tendency to repeat their own and others' structural choices supports a linguistic architecture involving a single shallow level of syntax connected to a semantic level containing information about quantification, thematic relations, and information structure, as well as to a phonological level. Many of the linguistic distinctions often used to support complex (or multilevel) syntactic structure are instead captured by semantics; however, the syntactic level includes some specification of “missing” elements that are not realized at the phonological level. We also show that structural priming provides evidence about the consistency of representations across languages and about language development. In sum, we propose that structural priming provides a new basis for understanding the nature of language. (shrink)

We study an application of gaggle theory to unary negative modal operators. First we treat negation as impossibility and get a minimal logic system Ki that has a perp semantics. Dunn 's kite of different negations can be dealt with in the extensions of this basic logic Ki. Next we treat negation as “unnecessity” and use a characteristic semantics for different negations in a kite which is dual to Dunn 's original one. Ku is the minimal logic that (...) has a characteristic semantics. We also show that Shramko's falsification logic FL can be incorporated into some extension of this basic logic Ku. Finally, we unite the two basic logics Ki and Ku together to get a negative modal logic K-, which is dual to the positive modal logic K+ in [7]. Shramko has suggested an extension of Dunn 's kite and also a dual version in [12]. He also suggested combining them into a “united” kite. We give a united semantics for this united kite of negations. (shrink)

I give a kind of intellectual history of the so-called “Belnap-Dunn Four-valued Logic,” examining its evolution: the 4-element De Morgan lattice of Antonio Monteiro, and related work of Bialynicki – Birula and Helena Rasiowa, and John Kalman; Timothy Smiley’s 4-element matrix for Belnap’s Tautological Entailment; Dunn’s interpretation in terms of “aboutness;” Bas van Fraassen’s semantics for Tautological Entailment using “facts;” and Dunn’s interpretation in terms of how a sentence can be assigned both true and false, or neither (...) true nor false, as well as the usual two values simply true, or simply false. Of course I discuss Nuel Belnap’s viewing the four values as elements in a “bi-lattice” and his famous use of this interpretation for “How a Computer Should think.” I also examine relationships to Richard Routley and Valerie Routley’s “star semantics.” Moreover, I discuss extension of the 4-valued semantics to the whole system R (allowing nested relevant implications), focusing especially on Edwin Mares’ work.I then examine later adaptations and extensions of the Four-valued Logic, including work by Yaroslav Shramko, Tatsutoshi Takenaka, Dunn, Heinrich Wansing, and Hitoshi Omori on “trilattices.” I also explain my recent extension to an infinite valued “Opinion Tetrahedron” (extending Audun Jøsang’s Opinion Triangle) which has the four values as its apexes.I end by acknowledging that ideas involving the 4-values date back to classical Indian logic (Sanjay’s “Four Corners”), prior to the sixth century B.C.E. (shrink)

In this timely and important work, eminent political theorist John Dunn argues that democracy is not synonymous with good government. The author explores the labyrinthine reality behind the basic concept of democracy, demonstrating how the political system that people in the West generally view as straightforward and obvious is, in fact, deeply unclear and, in many cases, dysfunctional. Consisting of four thought-provoking lectures, Dunn’s book sketches the path by which democracy became the only form of government with moral (...) legitimacy, analyzes the contradictions and pitfalls of modern American democracy, and challenges the academic world to take responsibility for giving the world a more coherent understanding of this widely misrepresented political institution. Suggesting that the supposedly ideal marriage of liberal economics with liberal democracy can neither ensure its continuance nor even address the problems of contemporary life, this courageous analysis attempts to show how we came to be so gripped by democracy’s spell and why we must now learn to break it. (shrink)

This book by leading international scholars in the fields of history, philosophy and politics restores the subject to a place at the very centre of political theory and practice.

Institutional Review Boards have substantial power and authority over research with human subjects, and in turn, their decisions have substantial implications for those subjects, investigators, and the public at large. However, there is little transparency about IRB processes and decisions. This article provides the first comprehensive taxonomy of what transparency means for IRBs — answering the questions “to whom, about what, and by what mechanisms?” It also explains why the status quo of nontransparency is problematic, and presents arguments for greater (...) transparency from the perspective of a variety of stakeholders. IRB transparency will make boards more accountable, improve the quality of their decision-making, facilitate consistency in board decisions, permit empirical study of IRBs, promote research efficiency, and advance trust in the research enterprise, among a variety of other benefits. Regulators should promote IRB transparency, IRBs themselves should commit to sharing as much information as they can within the confines of confidentiality requirements, and investigators can endeavor to take matters into their own hands by sharing IRB correspondence and IRB-approved protocols and consent materials. (shrink)

This chapter offers a overview of Shadworth Hodgson's account of experience as fundamentally temporal, an account that was deeply influential on thinkers such as William James and which prefigures the phenomenology of Husserl in many ways. I highlight eight key features that are characteristic of Hodgson's account, and how they hang together to provide a coherent overall picture of experience and knowledge. Hodgson's account is then compared to Husserl's, and I argue that Hodgson's account offers a better target for projects (...) such as neurophenomenology than does Husserl's. Hodgson's account is historically important as a culmination of a certain trajectory of British Empiricist thought. It offers a substantive alternative for how to think about temporality and experience in contemporary discussions, not just of the present moment but of the relationship between experience and knowledge more broadly. (shrink)

One of the main motivations for compositional nihilism, the view that there are no composite material objects, concerns the many puzzles and problems associated with them. Nihilists claim that eliminating composites provides a unified solution to a slew of varied, difficult problems. However, numerous philosophers have questioned whether this is really so. While nihilists clearly avoid the usual, composite-featuring formulations of the puzzles, the concern is that the commitments that generate the problems are not eliminated along with composites. If this (...) is correct, it severely undercuts the motivation for the view. However, I argue that it is not correct. The aim of this paper is to explain exactly how and why eliminating composites dissolves substantive metaphysical puzzles. More generally, I aim to clarify the nihilist’s ontological commitments and the scope of the paraphrase strategy she employs. (shrink)

In this collection of recent essays (several appearing in English for the first time), John Dunn brings his characteristically acute and penetrative insight to a wide range of political issues. In the first essay, 'The history of political theory', Professor Dunn argues for the importance of a historical perspective in the study of political thought. Other pieces engage with central concepts of political philosophy such as obligation, trust, freedom of conscience and property. A group of studies tackle specific (...) contemporary problems and future dangers, for example racism and the dilemma of humanitarian intervention. The volume as a whole articulates the many dangers, but also the huge importance of, contemporary politics, and provides a representative collection of work by one of the most astute political commentators writing today. (shrink)

Significant to Dunn's critique of poststructuralist and postmodern theories is his application of George Herbert Mead as a means of theorizing identity and difference. The focus on postmodernity, rather than postmodernism grounds his analysis of identity and difference both materially and socially.

Structural priming offers a powerful method for experimentally investigating the mental representation of linguistic structure. We clarify the nature of our proposal, justify the versatility of priming, consider alternative approaches, and discuss how our specific account can be extended to new questions as part of an interdisciplinary programme integrating linguistics and psychology as part of the cognitive sciences of language.

The revised Common Rule includes a new option for the conduct of secondary research with identifiable data and biospecimens: regulatory broad consent. Motivated by concerns regarding autonomy and trust in the research enterprise, regulators had initially proposed broad consent in a manner that would have rendered it the exclusive approach to secondary research with all biospecimens, regardless of identifiability. Based on public comments from both researchers and patients concerned that this approach would hinder important medical advances, however, regulators decided to (...) largely preserve the status quo approach to secondary research with biospecimens and data. The Final Rule therefore allows such research to proceed without specific informed consent in a number of circumstances, but it also offers regulatory broad consent as a new, optional pathway for secondary research with identifiable data and biospecimens. In this article, we describe the parameters of regulatory broad consent under the new rule, explain why researchers and research institutions are unlikely to utilize it, outline recommendations for regulatory broad consent issued by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections, and sketch an empirical research agenda for the sorts of questions about regulatory broad consent that remain to be answered as the research community embarks on Final Rule implementation. (shrink)

College students from small, medium, and large institutions with either a modified or no honor code were presented with cheating scenarios and asked to rate how dishonest they perceived the behavior to be and the likelihood that they would report it. No main effects were found for institution size or type of honor code. Student–faculty ratio was not correlated with responses to the cheating scenarios. Students from modified honor code schools perceived more severe punishments for cheating and understood the reporting (...) process better than students from non–honor code schools. Implications for modified honor code systems are discussed. (shrink)

In this book James D. G. Dunn explores the nature of the religious experiences that were at the forefront of emerging Christianity.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Since 2011, the research community had waited with bated breath as regulators contemplated for the first time bringing secondary research with nonidentifiable biospecimens under the Common Rule and dramatically tightening the criteria for waiving consent to biospecimen research. After considerable pushback from both researchers and patients and amid rumors of intractable disagreement among Common Rule agencies, the Final Rule published on the last day of President Obama's administration left out these troubling changes, and there was a collective sigh of relief. (...) Relief is appropriate, but celebration premature: researchers have little reason to avail themselves of the new broad consent option offered in the Final Rule, and the question of whether biospecimens ought to be treated as inherently identifiable has merely been postponed. (shrink)

John Locke (1632-1704) one of the greatest English philosophers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, argued in his masterpiece, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, that our knowledge is founded in experience and reaches us principally through our senses; but its message has been curiously misunderstood. In this book John Dunn shows how Locke arrived at his theory of knowledge, and how his exposition of the liberal values of toleration and responsible government formed the backbone of enlightened European (...) thought of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

Cyborg and prosthetic technologies frame prominent posthumanist approaches to understanding the nature of race. But these frameworks struggle to accommodate the phenomena of racial passing and racial travel, and their posthumanist orientation blurs useful distinctions between racialized humans and their social contexts. We advocate, instead, a humanist approach to race, understanding racial hierarchy as an industrial technology. Our approach accommodates racial passing and travel. It integrates a wide array of research across disciplines. It also helpfully distinguishes among grounds of racialization (...) and conditions facilitating impacts of such racialization. (shrink)

The right to withdraw from research without penalty is well established around the world. However, it has been challenged in some corners of bioethics based on concerns about various harms—to participants, to scientific integrity, and to research bystanders—that may stem from withdrawal. These concerns have become particularly salient in emerging debates about the ethics of controlled human infection (CHI) studies in which participants are intentionally infected with pathogens, often in inpatient settings with extensive follow‐up. In this article, I provide support (...) for preserving the right to withdraw from research without penalty and demonstrate that it is also typically justified in the specific context of CHI studies. The right is well aligned with individual freedoms outside the research setting, where autonomous individuals are permitted to engage in behaviors that will foreseeably cause them harm; where they cannot be compelled to satisfy contracts for their services, nor penalized for failure to do so; and where their behavior is not constrained by public health authorities except in extreme circumstances. These freedoms are supported by U.S. law, as well as by ethical analysis that is more globally relevant. The problems associated with the right to withdraw, however, remain. The best approach to addressing them is not to restrict the right but rather to avoid initiating research when withdrawal would be especially problematic. If research proceeds, steps can still be taken to minimize participant withdrawal without infringing the right. Investigators can avoid participant surprise through informed consent focused on a study’s most burdensome aspects and promote study completion through financial incentives. Should participants nonetheless seek to withdraw, investigators may attempt to persuade them not to do so by encouraging consideration of the range of potential harms that may result. Researchers conducting CHI studies and other research from which withdrawal might be especially problematic should prepare for the possibility of participant withdrawal, respect participant requests to withdraw without penalty, and incorporate various measures to avoid such requests. (shrink)

In this essay I show that Kant intended his anthropology lectures and book, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, to be a Klugheitslehre (theory of prudence). The essay draws on many quotes from these sources to show that Kant wanted to develop a theory of how to use other people for one’s own ends. Although so much of the lectures and book are in conversation with Baumgarten’s empirical psychology, there are enough references to Klugheit (prudence) and klug (clever) action (...) to support this thesis. Prudence is a skill that human beings should develop and hence is not excluded from human life even though it is not the basis of morality. The purpose of Klugheit is to achieve happiness but the means to that happiness involves using other people for one’s own ends. In order to use others as a means to one’s own ends, a person must in someway satisfy the inclinations of the other person so that they cooperate in one’s ends. However it is also possible to dominate another person and use them as well if they are dominated by a passion but this is not prudent since it does not achieve happiness except in the case of a husband and wife. Kant’s distinction between Weltklugheit and Privatklugheit also appears to be confirmed in that he advances the idea that sociable means of gaining the cooperation of others (Privatklugheit) leads to the lasting happiness of a person and to the development of civilization. (shrink)

In both the Phaedrus and Statesman dialogues, the dialectician's method of division is likened to the butchery of sacrificial animals. Interpreting the significance of this metaphor by analyzing ancient Greek sacrificial practice, this essay argues that, despite the ubiquity of the method of division in these later dialogues, Plato is there stressing the logical priority of the method of collection, division's dialectical twin. Although Plato prioritizes the method of collection, the author further argues that, through a kind of 'domestication' of (...) natural kinds, collection renders natural kinds knowable only by constructing them as implicitly divisible. As a result, the method of collection reflects not the wholeness of being but a constructed unity, the internal multiplicity of which makes possible each subsequent division. (shrink)

Prominent philosophers have argued that contradictions contain either too much or too little information to be useful. We dispute this with what we call the “Paradox of the Two Firefighters.” Suppose you are awakened in your hotel room by a fire alarm. You open the door. You see three possible ways out: left, right, straight ahead. You see two firefighters. One says there is exactly one safe route and it is to your left. The other says there is exactly one (...) safe route and it is to your right. While the two firemen are giving you contradictory information, they are also both giving you the perhaps useful information that there is a safe way out and it is not straight ahead. We give two analyses. The first uses the “Opinion Tetrahedron,” introduced by Dunn as a generalization of Audun Jøsang’s “Opinion Triangle.” The Opinion Tetrahedron in effect embeds the values of the “Belnap-Dunn 4-valued Logic” into a context of subjective probability generalized to allow for degrees of belief, disbelief, and two kinds of uncertainty—that in which the reasoner has too little information and that in which the reasoner has too much information. Jøsang had only a single value for uncertainty. We also present an alternative solution, again based on subjective probability but of a more standard type. This solution builds upon “linear opinion pooling.” Kiefer had already developed apparatus for assessing risk using expert opinion, and this influences the second solution. Finally, we discuss how these solutions might apply to “Big Data” and the World Wide Web. (shrink)

Most scholars agree that Socrates’ arguments in the course of his refutation of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic are at best weak and at worse fallacious. Some interpreters have used this logical inadequacy to argue that Socrates’ aim is psychotherapeutic rather than cognitive, but this does not address why Thrasymachus feels shamed. I argue in this article that Thrasymachus blushes not simply because his explicit propositions are contradictory but because two principles of his sophistic ēthos—that his skill requires knowledge and that (...) his skill achieves victory in logoi—are fundamentally at odds. My claim that Socrates’ elenchus of Thrasymachus appeals to a principle of ethical consistency has the specific advantage of reconciling the otherwise opposed views of Socratic elenchus as exclusively ‘logical’ or ‘psychotherapeutic’. (shrink)

In Living with Uncertainty Michael Zimmerman argues against the Objective view and for the Prospective view of morality. He claims that the conscientious agent would always choose the act that maximizes projected value, and that this is incompatible with Objectivism. Peter Graham defends Objectivism against Zimmerman’s attack. He argues that a conscientious agent must balance fulfilling obligations against avoiding the worst wrong-doings, and that this stance is consistent with Objectivism and with the agent’s choosing an act she believes to be (...) Objectively wrong. In Ignorance and Moral Obligation Zimmerman argues that Graham’s “Objectivism” is only terminologically distinct from his Prospectivism. I argue that Graham faces a dilemma: if his theory delivers different prescriptions from Zimmerman’s, those prescriptions are implausible. On the other hand, if his theory avoids such implausible recommendations, it now generates exactly the same recommendations as Zimmerman’s theory, and so does not constitute a serious challenge to it. (shrink)

Why does democracy—as a word and as an idea—loom so large in the political imagination, though it has so often been misused and misunderstood? Setting the People Free starts by tracing the roots of democracy from an improvised remedy for a local Greek difficulty 2,500 years ago, through its near extinction, to its rebirth amid the struggles of the French Revolution. Celebrated political theorist John Dunn then charts the slow but insistent metamorphosis of democracy over the next 150 years (...) and its apparently overwhelming triumph since 1945. He examines the differences and the extraordinary continuities that modern democratic states share with their Greek antecedents and explains why democracy evokes intellectual and moral scorn for some, and vital allegiance from others. Now with a new preface and conclusion that ground this landmark work firmly in the present, Setting the People Free is a unique and brilliant account of an extraordinary idea. (shrink)

This chapter examines the relationship between laws and mechanisms as approaches to characterising generalizations and explanations in science. I give an overview of recent historical discussions where laws failed to satisfy stringent logical criteria, opening the way for mechanisms to be investigated as a way to explain regularities in nature. This followed by a critical discussion of contemporary debates about the role of laws versus mechanisms in describing versus explaining regularities. I conclude by offering new arguments for two roles for (...) laws that mechanisms cannot subsume, one epistemically optimistic and one pessimistic, both broadly Humean. Do note that this piece is not primarily Hume exegesis; it is more of a riff in the key of Hume. (shrink)

Meta-laws, including conservation laws, are laws about the form of more specific, phenomenological, laws. Lange distinguishes between meta-laws as coincidences, where the meta-law happens to hold because the more specific laws hold, and meta-laws as constraints to which subsumed laws must conform. He defends this distinction as a genuine metaphysical possibility, such that metaphysics alone ought not to rule one way or another, leaving it an open question for physics. Lange’s distinction marks a genuine difference in how a given meta-law (...) can be used in explanations. Yet, I argue, it is not simply an empirical matter as to whether a given conservation law is a constraint or a coincidence. There is no set matter of fact about the world that determines this, and physics alone will not be able to return a determinate verdict on a law-by-law basis, even while there is a genuine difference between any given law as constraint and as coincidence. Rather, the difference marks different ways of treating the same law in a theoretical setting: by shifting the explanatory context, treating the same law as part of a different mathematical structure, it can be a genuine constraint and a genuine coincidence. The difference between constraint and coincidence relates to the way in which we use a law in specific theoretical and explanatory settings. Because the same law can appear in multiple contexts, it can be used in these genuinely different ways, without itself ‘‘really’’ being either one or the other as some atomistic empirical fact. Conservation laws as constraints and conservation laws as coincidences are both genuine theoretical roles that the same law can play. I conclude by considering how this pragmatist construal of constraints versus coincidences reveals how two parts of Lange’s work in this section of the book are unexpectedly independent of one another. (shrink)

Free riding occurs in the practical domain when some action is rational for each group member to perform but such that when everyone performs that action, it is worse overall for everyone. Dunn argues that some surprising empirical evidence about group problem-solving reveals that groups will often face cases where it is epistemically best for each individual to believe one thing, even though this is ultimately epistemically worse for the group that each member believes in this way. Dunn’s (...) work is thus an extension of work on the division of cognitive labor and ways that group inquiry might differ from individual inquiry. (shrink)

The issues of medical ethics, from moral quandaries of euthanasia and the morality of killing to political dilemmas like fair healthcare distribution, are rarely out of today's media. This area of ethics covers a wide range of issues, from mental health to reproductive medicine, as well as including management issues such as resource allocation, and has proven to hold enduring interest for the general public as well as the medical practitioner. This Very Short Introduction provides an invaluable tool with which (...) to think about the ethical values that lie at the heart of medicine. This new edition explores the ethical reasoning we can use to approach medical ethics, introducing the most important 'tools' of ethical reasoning, and discussing how argument, thought experiments, and intuition can be combined in the consideration of medical ethics. Considering its practical application, Tony Hope and Michael Dunn explore how medical ethics supports health professionals through the growing use of ethics expertise in clinical settings. They also contemplate the increasingly important place of medical ethics in the wider social context, particularly in this age of globalization, not only in healthcare practice, but also policy, discussions in the media, pressure group and activism settings, and in legal judgments. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)

Ruba and Repacholi review an important debate in the emotion development literature: whether infants can perceive and understand facial configurations as instances of discrete emotion catego...

Recently two distinct forms of rule-utilitarianism have been introduced that differ on how to measure the consequences of rules. Brad Hooker advocates fixed-rate rule-utilitarianism, while Michael Ridge advocates variable-rate rule-utilitarianism. I argue that both of these are inferior to a new proposal, optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism. According to optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism, an ideal code is the code whose optimum acceptance level is no lower than that of any alternative code. I then argue that all three forms of rule-utilitarianism fall prey to two fatal (...) problems that leave us without any viable form of rule-utilitarianism. (shrink)

We often act in ways that create duties for ourselves: we adopt a child and become obligated to raise and educate her. We also sometimes act in ways that eliminate duties: we get divorced, and no longer have a duty to support our now ex-spouse. When is it morally permissible to create or to eliminate a duty? These questions have almost wholly evaded philosophical attention. In this paper we develop answers to these questions by arguing in favor of the asymmetric (...) approach to deontic value. This approach holds that we must assign zero deontic value to fulfilling a duty, while assigning negative deontic value to violating that duty. Taking the opposing more natural symmetric approach, which holds that fulfilling duties has positive deontic value, leads to perverse recommendations about when to create or eliminate duties. A formal proof supporting the asymmetric approach is offered. We further show that moral theories require a consequentialist component to explain why we sometimes have duties to create or maintain duties. (shrink)

When research poses risks to non‐participant bystanders, it is not always practicable to obtain their consent. One approach to assessing how much research risk may be imposed on nonconsenting bystanders is to examine analogous circumstances, including risk thresholds deemed acceptable for nonconsenting research participants and for nonconsensual risks imposed outside the research setting. For nonconsenting participants, US research regulations typically limit risks to those deemed to be “minimal.” Outside the research context, US tort law tolerates a more flexible “reasonable” risk (...) threshold. This article advances a preliminary case that nonconsenting participants and nonconsenting bystanders exposed to similar research risks may be entitled to the same level of protection, but that risks generated by research may not be special in kind. Thus, limiting research risks to those that are “reasonable,” rather than demanding that they be held to the “minimal” standard, may be the best approach for both nonconsenting participants and nonconsenting bystanders. Further work is needed to establish whether the descriptive standards used to support the analogies relied on here are normatively justifiable, as well as the extent to which the minimal risk standard and the reasonable risk standard would lead to meaningfully different outcomes in practice. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page 1-4.

This paper concerns the role of examples (paradeigmata) as propaedeutic to philosophical inquiry, in light of the methodological digression of Plato’s Statesman. Consistent with scholarship on Aristotle’s view of example, scholars of Plato’s work have privileged the logic of example over their rhetorical appeal to the soul of the learner. Following a small but significant trend in recent rhetorical scholarship that emphasizes the affective nature of examples, this essay assesses the psychagogic potential of paradeigmata, following the discussion of example in (...) Plato’s Statesman. I argue that, by creating an expectation for finding similarities, the use of examples in philosophical pedagogy cultivates in the soul of the learner a desire to discern the intelligible principles the ground experiential knowledge. Thus, examples not only serve as practice at the dialectician’s method of abstraction, but also cultivate a dialectical ethos, characterized by the desire to know the logoi of all things. (shrink)

Dunn, Geoffrey D As with last year's reflections, it is my intention to give a distinctly patristic flavour to what I write, drawing upon the rich tradition of the church in the youthful flush of its earliest centuries, a time also of great challenge, to see the enduring relevance and beauty of the insights of the earliest Christian preachers, commentators and authors.