Empleando procedimientos de la lógica simbólica, se intenta contribuir a una mejor comprensión del ejercicio dialéctico llevado a cabo en el Parménides. La interpretación de las formas del ser y el no ser a partir de la oposición entre el objeto de conocimiento y el pensamiento acerca del mismo, abre la puerta a una manera original de enfocar el problema de la verdad en Platón. Puede resultar interesante, asimismo, la solución que se propone a la aporía planteada en Parménides 132b-c, (...) relativa a la confusión del pensamiento o el no ser con otras formas. (shrink)

Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human (...) being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly proposed as scalable solutions to the global mental health crisis. But their deployment in psychiatric contexts raises a distinctive ethical concern: the problem of atypicality. Because LLMs generate outputs based on population-level statistical regularities, their responses—while typically appropriate for general users—may be dangerously inappropriate when interpreted by psychiatric patients, who often exhibit atypical cognitive or interpretive patterns. We argue that standard mitigation strategies, such as prompt engineering or fine-tuning, are insufficient to resolve this structural (...) risk. Instead, we propose dynamic contextual certification (DCC): a staged, reversible and context-sensitive framework for deploying LLMs in psychiatry, inspired by clinical translation and dynamic safety models from artificial intelligence governance. DCC reframes chatbot deployment as an ongoing epistemic and ethical process that prioritises interpretive safety over static performance benchmarks. Atypicality, we argue, cannot be eliminated—but it can, and must, be proactively managed. (shrink)

This study investigates the effectiveness of pedagogical practices used to teach business ethics. The business community has greatly increased its demands for better ethics education in business programs. Educators have generally agreed that the ethical principles of business people have declined. It is important, then, to examine how common methods of instruction used in business ethics could contribute to the development of higher levels of moral judgment competence for students. To determine the effectiveness of these methods, moral judgment competence levels (...) for undergraduate and graduate students from three institutions were measured and compared based upon the pedagogical method used in a business class. Significant differences were found for moral reasoning and moral competence scores depending on the method used for ethics instruction. Students in classes with more highly integrated ethics coverage scored higher in moral reasoning and moral competence. (shrink)

This book forms an important part of the current revival of the debate around the category of historical epistemology. The term "historical epistemology" designates a methodology or research program aimed at building a historically informed theory of knowledge and/or a history of science and technology that enhances its epistemological aspects. This book offers an original panorama of the French debate surrounding the emergence and consolidation of the intellectual program of historical epistemology over a period ranging from the end of the (...) 19th century to the second half of the 20th century. The first section of this book sets out to reconstruct sociologically and historically the processes of circulation of ideas - both nationally and internationally - that constituted the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the very idea of historical epistemology in the French intellectual context. The second section aims instead to highlight the main theoretical positions - both epistemological and historiographical - that would make it possible to trace a relative unity of intent among the authors who make up the canon of historical epistemology (in their oppositional relationship to other intellectual trends). Particular attention is also paid to defining a "minor canon" of this tradition, represented by what is known as "mathematical thought". The third part of the volume focuses instead on reconstructing the anthropological, sociological and political perspectives underlying the methodology employed by authors belonging to historical epistemology. The three parts combined make for a uniquely broad yet focused book that is of interest to historians, philosophers and scientists alike. (shrink)

Relying on some auxiliary assumptions, usually considered mild, Bell’s theorem proves that no local theory can reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. In this work, we introduce a fully local, superdeterministic model that by explicitly violating ‘settings independence’—one of these auxiliary assumptions, requiring statistical independence between measurement settings and systems to be measured—is able to reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. Moreover, we show that contrary to widespread expectations, our model can break settings independence without an initial state (...) that is too complex to handle, without visibly losing all explanatory power, and without outright nullifying all of experimental science. Still, we argue that our model is unnecessarily complicated and does not offer true advantages over its non-local competitors. We conclude that while our model does not appear to be a viable contender to its non-local counterparts, it provides the ideal framework to advance the debate over violations of statistical independence via the superdeterministic route. (shrink)

Various writers have attempted to use the sender–receiver formalism to account for the representational capacities of biological systems. This article has two goals. First, I argue that the sender–receiver approach to representation cannot be complete. The mammalian circadian system represents the time of day, yet it does not control circadian behaviours by producing signals with time of day content. Informative signalling need not be the basis of our most basic representational capacities. Second, I argue that representational capacities are primarily about (...) control, and only when specific conditions obtain does this control require informative signalling. (shrink)

A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects, to determine whether some components are more impaired than others.We developed a Theory of Mind Assessment Scale and administered it to 22 persons with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and (...) a matching control group. Th.o.m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview which allows a multi-component measurement of ToM. Both groups were also administered a few existing ToM tasks and the schizophrenic subjects were administered the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale and the WAIS-R.The schizophrenic persons performed worse than control at all the ToM measurements; however, these deficits appeared to be differently distributed among different components of ToM.Our conclusion is that ToM deficits are not unitary in schizophrenia, which also testifies to the importance of a complete and articulated investigation of ToM. (shrink)

Western cultures typically conceive of time as being linearly structured. This linear structure consists of at least three features: the world appears to contain a single timeline; this timeline exhibits various causal, practical, and epistemic asymmetries; and the present moment occupies a special place on this timeline. Many researchers have argued that this naïve conception of time as linearly structured depends on our capacity for episodic memory, since it is only through episodic recollection that we experience time as linearly structured. (...) This chapter begins by surveying some of the arguments for the conclusion that it is only in episodic recollection that we experience time as linearly structured. The chapter then points to findings that reveal an alternative connection between memory and our experience of linear time. Perception itself, and the short-term memory systems perception employs, furnishes us with experiences of linear time, independently of episodic memory. (shrink)

A central debate in the current philosophical literature on temporal experience is over the following question: do temporal experiences themselves have a temporal structure that mirrors their temporal contents? Extensionalists argue that experiences do have a temporal structure that mirrors their temporal contents. Atomists insist that experiences don’t have a temporal structure that mirrors their contents. In this paper, I argue that this debate is misguided. Both atomism and extensionalism, considered as general theories of temporal experience, are false, since temporal (...) experience is not a single undifferentiated phenomena as both theories require. I argue for this conclusion in two steps. First, I show that introspection cannot settle the debate. Second, I argue that the neuroscientific evidence is best read as revealing a host of mechanisms involved in temporal perception - some admitting of an extensionalist interpretation while others admitting only of an atomistic interpretation. As a result, neither side of the debate wins. (shrink)

In the provocative discussions comprising this collection, scholars Ronald A. Bosco and Joel Myerson and Buddhist leader Daisaku Ikeda explore the multifaceted, enduring legacy of Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman. In the process they challenge and inspire the reader to do as these great figures once did—to look deep inside oneself to discover potential for growth, to encounter the natural world with reverence and delight, and to express themselves with poetry and imagination. With great appreciation for the timeless and universal (...) relevance of the American Renaissance, Bosco, Myerson, and Ikeda encourage each person to lead lives of greatness and to do nothing less than create Waldens of their own. (shrink)

This note replies to a comment by Daniel Hausman on our paper ‘Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics’. We clarify our characterisation of behavioural welfare economics and acknowledge that Hausman does fully endorse this approach. However, we argue that Hausman’s response to our critique, like behavioural welfare economics itself, implicitly uses a model of an inner rational agent.

_Abstract_: The aim of this paper is to challenge Michael Smith’s influential “fetishism charge” against motivational externalism – the view that moral judgments motivate only in the presence of a distinct conative state. Smith argues that externalists must explain the reliable connection between moral judgment and moral motivation by attributing to the morally good agent a de dicto desire to “do whatever is right”, a desire he regards as morally defective or fetishistic. On the other hand, the virtuous agent, according (...) to Smith, responds directly to the right-making features of actions, such as charity, kindness, or fairness. If the externalist is indeed committed to portraying good agents as moved primarily by the abstract status of rightness, then externalism yields an implausible moral psychology and should be rejected. I argue that Smith’s central assumption – what I call the fetishist platitude, the claim that de dicto motivation is intuitively vicious – is far less secure than he suggests. After outlining the internalism/externalism debate and surveying responses to Smith from Svavarsdottir, Olson, Dreier, Miller, and others, I offer two novel objections. First, I show that in non-moral normative domains (such as prudence or health), de dicto motivation is not normally regarded as fetishistic; thus, Smith’s purported conceptual truth about virtue cannot be taken for granted. Second, I present cases in which a de dicto moral motivation is precisely what enables an agent to act rightly in the face of conflicting non-moral reasons. In such scenarios, it is counterintuitive to describe the agent as vicious or morally flawed. Taken together, these objections weaken Smith’s claim that de dicto motivation is inherently defective and therefore challenge his reductio of externalism. If de dicto motivation can be permissible – or even admirable – then externalists can avoid the fetishism charge without losing a plausible account of moral psychology. _Keywords_: Moral Motivation; Fetichism; Externalism; Internalism; De Dicto _ La motivazione “de dicto” è manifestamente inutile? _ _Riassunto_: L o scopo di questo articolo è mettere in discussione l’influente “accusa di feticismo” di Michael Smith contro l’esternalismo motivazionale — la posizione secondo cui i giudizi morali motivano solo in presenza di un preciso stato conativo. Smith sostiene che gli esternalisti devono spiegare la connessione affidabile esistente tra giudizio morale e motivazione morale, attribuendo all’agente moralmente buono un desiderio di “fare ciò che è giusto” _de dicto_, desiderio che egli considera moralmente difettoso o feticista. L’agente virtuoso, ribadisce Smith, risponde direttamente alle caratteristiche che rendono giuste le azioni, come, per esempio, la bontà, la gentilezza o l’equità. L’esternalismo dovrebbe quindi essere respinto, poiché richiede di rappresentare l’agente moralmente buono come mosso principalmente dallo status astratto del bene, descrivendo una psicologia morale inverosimile. Sostengo che l’assunto centrale di Smith – ciò che chiamo la “banalità feticista”, ovvero l’affermazione che la motivazione _de dicto_ è intuitivamente viziosa – sia molto meno ovvio di quanto egli suggerisca. Dopo aver delineato il dibattito tra internalismo ed esternalismo e aver esaminato le risposte a Smith di Svavarsdottir, Olson, Dreier, Miller e altri, propongo due obiezioni originali. In primo luogo, discuto come, nei domini normativi non morali (come la prudenza o la salute individuale), la motivazione _de dicto_ non è normalmente considerata feticista. In secondo luogo, presento casi in cui una motivazione morale _de dicto_ è esattamente ciò che consente a un agente di agire moralmente, quando vi è un conflitto di motivazioni non morali. In tali scenari, è controintuitivo descrivere l'agente come vizioso o moralmente imperfetto. _Parole chiave_: Motivazione Morale; Feticismo; Esternalismo; Internalismo; De Dicto. (shrink)

While we perceive events in our environment through multiple sensory systems, we nevertheless perceive all of these events as occupying a single unified timeline. Time, as we perceive it, is unified. I argue that existing accounts of the perceived unity of time fail. Instead, the perceived unity of time must be constructed by integrating our initially fragmented timekeeping capacities. However, existing accounts of multimodal integration do not tell us how this might occur. Something new is needed. I finish the paper (...) by articulating the hurdles that must be overcome to provide an account of the perceived unity of time. (shrink)

It’s often claimed in the philosophical and scientific literature on temporal representation that there is no such thing as a genuine sensory system for time. In this paper, I argue for the opposite—many animals, including all mammals, possess a genuine sensory system for time based in the circadian system. In arguing for this conclusion, I develop a semantics and meta-semantics for explaining how the endogenous rhythms of the circadian system provide organisms with a direct information link to the temporal structure (...) of their environment. In doing so, I highlight the role of sensory systems in an information processing architecture. (shrink)

We argue that animals are not cognitively stuck in time. Evidence pertaining to multisensory temporal order perception strongly suggests that animals can represent at least some temporal relations of perceived events.

The historiographical literature dedicated to historical epistemology tends to adopt a normative approach. On the contrary, this chapter proposes a description of the uses that have been made of the label “French historical epistemology [épistémologie historique]” (FHE) in the French context in relation to the sociocultural context from which it emerged. This reconstruction brings its canonization process to light. The first section takes the reader inside the field of historical epistemology and provides some preliminary definitions. The second section details how (...) a broad discussion developed around the legacy of positivism in the transitional period between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, resulting in various intellectual tensions that led to the formation of a polarized intellectual space within which FHE developed. I describe the international circulation of ideas that generated the emergence of different intellectual reactions to positivism and how these factors were correlated with the institutionalization dynamics for the philosophy of science in various national contexts. The third section reconstructs the emergence of the label “épistémologie historique” in France and how this term was used from the early twentieth century until the 1970s. The fourth section argues that the success of FHE can be tracked to the French political-cultural climate of the 1970s. This section also analyzes how the “major canon” of this tradition, consisting of Bachelard, Canguilhem, and Foucault, emerged. In the last section, I show how the crystallization of this “major canon” gradually obscured the key role played by French mathematical thought, which I therefore propose as a “minor canon” of FHE. (shrink)

While much is known about the prevalence and impact of incivility in the workplace, relatively less is known about those who instigate workplace incivility. This research aims to investigate incivility instigation through a moral lens by examining the roles of other-condemning moral emotions (contempt, disgust, and anger) and appraisals of coworkers’ morality as predictors of this behavior at work. In Study 1, we used structural equation modeling to analyze two waves of self-report data collected from a sample of 447 full-time (...) United States (U.S.) working adults. Findings from this study indicate that appraising coworkers as low in morality elicited feelings of contempt, disgust, and anger. However, only contempt predicted incivility instigation and mediated the relationship between appraising coworkers as low in morality and instigating incivility. In Study 2, we collected self-report data from a sample of 309 full-time U.S. workers using a critical incident technique. Structural equation modeling was used to analyze the data. Results from Study 2 replicated the association between low morality appraisals and contempt, anger, and disgust found in Study 1. However, anger predicted incivility instigation and mediated the relationship between appraising coworkers as low in morality and instigating incivility. Additionally, contempt and perceived civility norms had an interactive effect on instigated incivility. These studies provide insight into the roles of contempt, disgust, and anger in predicting incivility instigation, suggesting that employees may engage in incivility to condemn others who engage in moral transgressions. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Memories often come with a feeling of pastness. The events we remember strike us as having occurred in our past. What accounts for this feeling of pastness? In his recent book, Memory: A self-referential account, Jordi Fernández argues that the feeling of pastness cannot be grounded in an explicit representation of the pastness of the remembered event. Instead, he argues that the feeling of pastness is grounded in the self-referential causal content of memory. In this paper, I argue that this (...) account falls short. The representation of causal origin does not by itself ground a feeling of pastness. Instead, I argue that we can salvage the temporal localization account of the feeling of pastness by describing a form of egocentric temporal representation that avoids Fernández’s criticisms. (shrink)

This article delves into Blaise Pascal’s religious philosophy, focusing on his use of the phrase “Scio cui credidi” (I know whom I have believed) to explore his understanding of faith. It analyzes Pascal’s “Memorial” and the “Summary of the Life of Jesus Christ”, highlighting how Christ is central to Pascal’s belief system. The discussion reveals the transformational nature of Pascal’s faith, particularly after his mystical experience on November 23, 1654. This experience is crucial in understanding his shift from a philosophical (...) to a deeply personal, Christ-centered faith. The article underscores Pascal’s journey from a scientific and philosophical perspective to an intimate, emotional resonance with Christian faith, demonstrating how his personal encounters with the divine profoundly shaped his religious perspective. (shrink)

This article aims to clarify facts and contribute reasons that could lead one to consider the possibility of the existence of natural dispositions which, in that case, should be considered as ethical precursors. Given that the neuroethics proposal focuses attention and studies on the human brain in order to carry out the search of those natural dispositions, this text suggest an initial question: is it possible to go beyond the brain in that search? Or even better, before it? In this (...) regard, Baruch Spinoza proposes lines of reflection in his Ethics which appear susceptible to be taken into account and that, interestingly, connect with the recent works of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. (shrink)

Réunit des textes d'auteurs français des XVIIe et XVIIIe s. évoquant Saint-Augustin.

This article examines religious socialism as an American social movement. It focuses on the most recent iteration of this tradition, the Religion and Socialism Commission, formed in the 1970s as a subgroup of the Democratic Socialists of America. Drawing on concepts from social movement theory such as frame alignment and political opportunity structure, it argues that the Religion and Socialism Commission ultimately failed in its attempt to transition from an organization into a social movement. It then considers various possibilities for (...) the future of religious socialism in the United States, given new variables such as a changing political opportunity structure and the rise of social media. (shrink)