This research empirically investigates the static and dynamic impacts of firms' digital transformation on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance by employing data of listed Chinese companies from 2011 to 2020 via estimations of propensity score matching and difference in differences. First, we find that digital transformation does some good to improve firms' ESG, which is confirmed after conducting several robustness tests. Second, digital transformation benefits the three aspects of ESG (environmental performance, social responsibility, and governance), and its impact is (...) dynamic, promote ESG two years after the digital reform. Third, the impact of digital transformation on ESG is not constant among different firms. Specifically, digital transformation's impact on ESG is stronger among firms located in western or central regions of China and to those in polluting and competitive industries, as well as among non-stated-owned enterprises. (shrink)

Die ursprüngliche Sprache von Deweys Vorträgen war Englisch. Um die Botschaften für die chinesischen Zuhörer verständlich zu machen, mussten die Inhalte während seiner Rede in chinesischer Sprache fast simultan gedolmetscht werden. Dieser anspruchsvolle Job wurde meistens von Hu Shi und Liu Boming übernommen. Hu Shi hatte bei Dewey persönlich studiert und den Pragmatismus in China eingeführt und war ein kompetenter Übersetzer. Fast alle Vorlesungen in Peking und Umgebung wurden von Hu Shi persönlich gedolmetscht; für die Veranstaltungen im Süden war u. (...) a. Liu Boming verantwortlich. (shrink)

Im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert befand sich China in einer historischen Umbruchphase. Nach einer Serie von Kriegsniederlagen, aufgezwungenen ungleichen Verträgen, sowie der Errichtung von ausländischen Kolonien auf ihrem eigenen Territorium, verlor das Land seine Überlegenheit und Autonomie.

Diese Arbeit wirft neues Licht auf das Verhältnis zwischen dem späten Husserl und dem frühen Heidegger. Der Schwerpunkt liegt in den Rückbezügen auf die epistemische Position Husserls, die den Vergleich vorbereiten. Der Autor liefert vor allem in der Analyse des Evidenzproblems besondere Ansatzpunkte für weitere Untersuchungen. Grundlegend ist die Unterscheidung zwischen der auf das Ur-Ich bezogenen epistemischen Genesis und der auf das Vor-Ich bezogenen ontologischen Genesis, denen entsprechend zwei gegensätzliche Verhältnisse zwischen dem Zweitbewußtsein und dem kinästhetischen Bewußtsein entstehen. Konsequent gelangt (...) die Arbeit zum Resultat: Das Vor-Ich kann sich in der epistemischen Position Husserls zum Ur-Ich, aber in der ontologischen Position Heideggers zum Dasein entwickeln. (shrink)

Ben shu yi han si{692126}kai mi sen de fa lü li lun ji qi shi jian wei zhong xin lun shu le kai mi sen xiang guan fa lü li lun de yuan yuan, chuan tong ji qi shi jian te xing, lun shu le kai mi sen zuo wei " ao di li xian fa de she ji shi " dui yu ao di li fa lü li lun ji qi shi jian suo zuo chu de gong xian. tong (...) shi, kai mi sen de fa lü li lun zhi gen yu xi fang de fa zhi li nian yi ji de yi zhi de fa lü li shi chuan tong, 1848 nian ge ming qi jian chan sheng de zhu duo xian fa yi ji ao xiong di guo de di guo fa yuan chuan tong wei kai mi sen de fa lü li lun dian ding ji chu, jiang kai mi sen de li lun ji qi shi jian zhi yu fa zhi li shi he de yi zhi fa lü li shi fa zhan de da huan jing zhong yu yi shen shi, ke yi geng hao di li jie kai mi sen de li lun ji qi shi jian de yi yi yu jia zhi. (shrink)

Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案] lists a “Case Studies from Taizhou” [Taizhou xue’an 泰州学案], and now whenever general works of research on Ming Dynasty academic studies discuss anything concerning Wang Gen or people from Taizhou, they are called the “Taizhou School” (Taizhou xuepai 泰州学派).

本书精选了六位哲学家的哲学思想, 分别是:康德, 黑格尔, 叔本华, 尼采, 维根斯坦, 傅柯.

This article presents the first Russian translation and a philosophical analysis of two key works by Wang Gen 王艮 (1483–1541): “Interpretation of the Return to Primordiality” (Fu-chu shuo 復初說) and “Interpretation of the Heavenly Principles and Good Know­ledge” (Tian-li liang-zhi shuo 天理良知說). These texts articulate Wang Gen’s under­standing of tian-li 天理 («heavenly principles») and liang-zhi 良知 («good knowledge»), while also reflecting the intellectual debates of his time and key events in his life and scholarly circle. The first one (...) was written as an instructional text for Wang Gen’s friend Zou Shouyi, who had established the Fu-chu shu-yuan 復初書院 (Book Yard / Academy of the Return to the Primordiality). The second one, meanwhile, engages with the fa­mous dispute between Wang Gen’s teacher, Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529), and the philosopher Zhan Ruoshui 湛若水 (1466–1560) concerning the latter’s thesis state­ment sui-chu ti-ren tian-li 隨處體認天理 (“[in] any place, essentially recognize heavenly principles”). Through these works, Wang Gen advances his distinctive philosophical fo­cus on the shen 身 (“corporeal self” or “individual”) and a practice-oriented ethics rooted in innate moral knowledge. He argues that liang-zhi – accessible to all through deductive reasoning – can be “illuminated” (ming 明) by returning to one’s original state prior to actions which are not good. Beyond textual analysis, this study situates the “Interpreta­tions” within their biographical and intellectual context, identifying and explicating their numerous allusions to classical Neo-Confucian sources. (shrink)

This paper examines a dilemma within the Confucian tradition wherein one is forced to choose between upholding moral virtue and preserving one's own life. The mainstream view valorises and exalts the act of sacrificing one's life in order to uphold moral virtue. There are many supporters of this view, spanning across different periods, including but not limited to Confucius, Mencius, the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, and so on. There is, however, an opposing voice within the Confucian tradition. Wang Gen, (...) a Neo-Confucian thinker and founder of the Taizhou School of thought, opposes the mainstream position by arguing for the primacy of life and against the glorification of these acts of sacrifice. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to trace the development of the mainstream view within the Confucian tradition. The second aim investigates how Wang Gen argues against the mainstream position whilst situating himself within the Confucian tradition. (shrink)

Li Zhi is the strangest and most unique figure in the history of Ming Dynasty thought. His thought embodies the trend of the times among intellectuals living under the repression of traditional ideas, calling for a return to a true self and to give human nature back its freedom. His thought is filled with contradictions between new and old, ideal and actual, individual freedom and social restrictions, Confucianism and Buddhism, heroes and hermits, etc. His thought was a result of a (...) further development against the background of late Ming Dynasty society of the Taizhou 泰州 learning originated by Wang Gen 王艮 as explicated and developed by Wang Bi 王襞 and Luo Rufang 罗汝芳, with its fundamental spirit of self-confidence and independence, relying on nothing, facing the life of the lower classes, and not talking hollowly about mind and inner nature. From a broader perspective, it offers a portrait of Chinese intellectuals yearning for a social atmosphere that would be more open, more liberal, and richer with individual spirit, demanding the breaking of social and cultural restrictions (mainly a vulgarised, bureaucratised Confucianism). (shrink)

Zest for both system and objectivity is the formal logician's original sin. He pays for it by constant frustrations and by living ofttimes the life of an intellectual outcaste. The task of squeezing a large body of stubborn facts into a more or less rigid system can be a painful one, especially since the facts of mathematics are among the most stubborn of all facts. Moreover, the more general and abstract we get, the farther removed we are from the raw (...) mathematical experience. As intuition ceases to operate effectively, we fall into many unexpected traps. The formal logician gets little sympathy for his frustrations. He is regarded as too rigid by his philosophical colleagues and too speculative by his mathematical friends. The life of an intellectual outcaste may be a result partly of temperament and partly of the youthfulness of the logic profession. The unfortunate lack of wide appeal of logic may, however, be prolonged partly on account of the fact that very little of the well-established techniques of mathematics seems applicable to the treatment of serious problems of logic. The axiomatic method is well suited to provide results which are both exact and systematic. How attractive would it be if we could get an axiom system in which all the axioms and deductions were intuitively clear and all theorems of mathematics were provable? Such a system would undoubtedly satisfy Descartes who admits solely intuition and deduction, which are, for him, the only “mental operations by which we are able, wholly without fear of illusion, to arrive at the knowledge of things.” Indeed, according to Descartes, intuition and deduction “are the most certain routes to knowledge, and the mind should admit no others. All the rest should be rejected as suspect of error and dangerous.”. (shrink)

The essay centers on Gödel's views on the place of our intuitive concept of time in philosophy and in physics. It presents my interpretation of his work on the theory of relativity, his observations on the relationship between Einstein's theory and Kantian philosophy, as well as some of the scattered remarks in his conversations with me in the seventies — namely, those on the philosophies of Leibniz, Hegel and Husserl — as a successor of Kant — in relation to their (...) conceptions of time. (shrink)

I propose to sketch my views on several aspects of the philosophy of mathematics that I take to be especially relevant to philosophy as a whole. The relevance of my discussion would, I think, become more evident, if the reader keeps in mind the function of (the philosophy of) mathematics in philosophy in providing us with more transparent aspects of general issues. I shall consider: (1) three familiar examples; (2) logic and our conceptual frame; (3) communal agreement and objective certainty; (...) (4) the transcommunal universality of mathematics; (5) the big jump to the potential infinite; (6) the reconciliation of local creation with the hypothesis of discovery; (7) Platonism as realism plus conceptualism; (8) foundational studies and mathematical practice; and (9) the decomposition of philosophical disagreements. The views of Gödel and Wittgenstein are emphasized in order to add specificity to the discussions. (shrink)

This essay discusses a number of questions which arise from attempts to reduce the mental to the physical or the mental and the physical to the computational. It makes, in an organized way, several basic distinctions between different kinds of accounts of the mind. It reconstructs and elaborates many discussions between Gödel and the author on the nature of the human mind, with special emphasis on its mathematical capabilities.

The traditional Christian version of the Golden Rule, some modern philosophical reformulations, and the Confucian version are compared. It is argued that the Confucian version, in contrast with its Western parallels, is based on shu as bodily or somatic interpersonal care and love, and thus should be understood first of all as a human "way" rather than as a divine rule, a way grounded in the human heart and a way for the human community.

The radical forms of naturalistic epistemology look more like revolutionary manifestos than a reasonable alternatives. A modest form of naturalism is worth promoting. This modest form can cooperate with hermeneutics to solve epistemic problems, and therefore wins the title of cooperative naturalism, and benefits from the hermeneutic account of experience. Cooperative naturalism somewhat bridges the gap between analytic and continental philosophy.

In mathematics we have demonstrably insoluble problems, one example being that of trisecting an arbitrary angle in elementary geometry. Every now and then, we encounter engineers and others who offer solutions of the insoluble and make some stir. To those who feel convinced of the demonstration of insolubility, these claimed solutions do not seem to deserve any serious considerations. In fact, such solutions have long since ceased to attract attention from mathematicians.The situation in philosophy seems different. Here we do not (...) possess demonstrations as clear and distinct as in mathematics. For example, it has been a fashion among philosophers for two centuries or so to answer Hume's scepticism concerning induction. Although, presumably, there never has been any answer or solution which is as widely accepted among philosophers as Hume's sceptical argument, yet philosophers continue to enjoy elaborating arguments for and against Hume's scepticism. And people who feel convinced by Hume's resaoning often find it difficult to understand why philosophers persist in trying to contradict Hume flatly instead of seeking for some more devious way out. (shrink)

This is a philosophical investigation of the linguistic strategy of Chinese Chan Buddhism. First, it examines the underlying structure of Chan communication, which determines the Chan pragmatics of 'never tell too plainly'. The examination of the structural features of Chan communication reveals what the Chan 'special transmission' means. The Chan definition of communication is very different from the Aristotelian conception of communication in the West. The Aristotelian hierarchy of speaker over listener, or the direct over indirect, is absent is Chan (...) communication. Communication in the Chan context is interactive, open-ended and determined by its existentio-practical concern. Second, this essay investigates the different types of the Chan strategies of indirect communication, such as the use of paradoxical, tautological and poetic language, which best demonstrate the principle of 'never tell too plainly'. The whole study indicates that Chan Buddhism provides the resources for our contemporary inquiry into the issue of indirect communication. (shrink)

Wang Tingxiang est l'un des grands penseurs et poètes des Ming. Il développe une pensée du qi, énergie-souffle qui est pour lui le seul fondement du monde phénoménal. Il relie la question de la nature de l'homme au qi, dont la qualité détermine son orientation morale. Cet ouvrage propose une étude critique de sa biographie et de sa philosophie qui remet en question certaines thèses avancées par les néo-confucéens des Song, notamment Zhu Xi (1130-1200)"--Page 4 of cover.

Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) was a Neo-Confucian philosopher of the Ming Era, whose thoughts have had a profound influence in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. This translation contains sixty-seven letters, thirty-one more than previously translated, which help reveal the philosophy of the great Chinese thinker. Included are a preface with background information, critical annotations and references, bibliography, and a glossary of Chinese and Japanese words. The book is an important contribution to the literature of Chinese philosophy, knowledge of which assists (...) our understanding of China yesterday and today. (shrink)

This book argues that our success in navigating the social world depends heavily on scripts. Scripts play a central role in our ability to understand social interactions shaped by different contextual factors. -/- In philosophy of social cognition, scholars have asked what mechanisms we employ when interacting with other people or when cognizing about other people. Recent approaches acknowledge that social cognition and interaction depends heavily on contextual, cultural, and social factors that contribute to the way individuals make sense of (...) the social interactions they take part in. This book offers the first integrative account of scripts in social cognition and interaction. It argues that we need to make contextual factors and social identity central when trying to explain how social interaction works, and that this is possible via scripts. Additionally, scripts can help us understand bias and injustice in social interaction. The author’s approach combines several different areas of philosophy—– philosophy of mind, social epistemology, feminist philosophy—as well as sociology and psychology to show why paying attention to injustice in interaction is much needed in social cognition research, and in philosophy of mind more generally. -/- Scripts and Social Cognition: How we Interact with Others will appeal to scholars and graduate students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, social epistemology, social ontology, sociology, and social psychology. (shrink)