One recurrent objection to the idea that the right kind of reasons for or against an attitude are object-given reasons for or against that attitude is that object-given reasons for or against belief and disbelief are incapable of explaining certain features of epistemic normativity. Prohibitive balancing, the behaviour of bare statistical evidence, information about future or easily available evidence, pragmatic and moral encroachment, as well as higher-order defeaters, are all said to be inexplicable in terms of those object-given reasons. In (...) this paper, I provide a rebuttal to all these challenges by drawing attention to the object-given reasons for and against the third doxastic state, namely the suspension of judgement. First, I introduce an original picture of how suspension relates to belief and disbelief – as ways of being decided – which yields a novel weighing model of the corresponding reasons. Second, I demonstrate that this new take on doxastic deliberation can accommodate all five features of epistemic normativity. Finally, I extend the weighing model to cover practical deliberation and the suspension of intentions. The resulting theory provides an explanation of why epistemic and practical normativity differ in certain respects in terms of a significant difference between doxastic and conative suspension. (shrink)

This paper defends three theses on the normativity of the suspension of judgment. First, even if beliefs have to fit the truth and disbelief the false, suspension can still have satisfiable fittingness conditions. Second, combining this view with specific theses on the link between fittingness and normative reasons in favour of attitudes commits one to the existence of reasons to suspend judgement, which are neither reasons to believe nor reasons to disbelieve. These independent reasons, in turn, generate a form of (...) epistemic permissivism. Finally, I argue that there are different routes to derive this commitment to independent reasons for suspending judgement. Not only fittingness-centred approaches to epistemic normativity but also many analyses in terms of reasons are committed to this form of epistemic permissivism. (shrink)

Essays discuss reason and understanding, interpretation, language, meaning, the human sciences, social sciences, and general hermeneutic theory.

Proponents of zetetic encroachment claim that certain zetetic or inquiry-related considerations can have a bearing on the epistemic rationality of one’s belief formation. Since facts about the interestingness or importance of a topic can be the right kind of reasons for inquisitive attitudes, such as curiosity, and inquisitive attitudes are ways to suspend judgement, these facts also amount to reasons against believing. This mechanism is said to explain several contentious phenomena in epistemology, such as the occurrence of pragmatic encroachment. In (...) this paper, I provide two lines of reasoning against zetetic encroachment. First, on any contrastivist understanding of epistemic reasons, the case in favour of zetetic encroachment loses all its motivational force. Second, the thesis of zetetic encroachment is incompatible with the most promising way to understand degrees of inquisitive attitudes. (shrink)

Distinguishing between authoritative and formal normativity is a staple component in the metanormative literature. Norms such as morality and prudence count as genuinely, or authoritatively, normative, while those norms concocted on the spot are only formally normative. In this paper, I question the common reliance on a monolithic divide between these two kinds of normativity. First, I argue that the same kind of skepticism that plagues the adjacent concept of an ought simpliciter applies equally to a definition of ‘authoritativeness’. Second, (...) I point out the limits of primitivist responses to this challenge of developing a proper definition. Due to the abundance of intuitive differences between paradigmatic instances of authoritative and formal normativity, glossing at intuition is insufficient to demarcate authoritative normativity. Finally, I provide some motivation for abandoning the dualist orthodoxy and eschewing a monolithic understanding of the authoritative–formal divide, in favor of a form of metanormative pluralism: there are multiple dimensions along which one might describe norms as being either authoritative or formal. (shrink)

It has been argued that multidimensionalism about normative support is a promising theory of the latitude exemplified by practical norms governing actions. One might, thus, suspect that a similar form of multidimensionalism might be an adequate explanation of the kind of latitude exemplified in one’s doxastic attitudes and provide further resources to epistemic permissivists regarding epistemic norms governing beliefs. In this paper, I raise some concerns regarding this contention. First, I provide a general theory of how multidimensionalism about normative support (...) can be applied to the so-called right kind of reasons for attitudes, given that the former is commonly coated in contrastivist terms. Second, I offer a theory of how right kind of reasons for intentions could have different dimensions of strength, depending on how they relate to the fittingness and unfittingness of the attitudes in question. Finally, I show that this straightforward way to allow for multiple dimensions of normative strength of right kind of reasons does not translate well to the case of doxastic attitudes. (shrink)

van Fraassen's constructivist empiricist account of theories makes an epistemic distinction between entities that can and cannot be observed with the naked eye. A belief about the correctness of a theoretical description of an entity that is observable with the naked eye can be warranted by a theory. In contrast, no theory can warrant a belief about the correctness of a description of an unobservable entity. I argue that we ought to instead adopt a view that takes account of the (...) fact that some entities that cannot be observed with the naked eye can nevertheless be observed on the basis of the same physical principle as those entities that can be. This suggests that there is a distinction different from van Fraassen's that might do the work van Fraassen intends his to do, but a distinction that is principled. Understanding why this is so suggests that his distinction is grounded merely in human chauvinism. (shrink)

Many scholars maintain that the kind of ‘ought’ which the subject is after in deliberation is constrained by the subject’s perspective or by what is feasible for that subject. One principle invoked in support of this position refers to a special guidance-giving feature of the deliberative ought. While being a promising way to support the perspectivist and feasibilist verdicts, this appeal to guidance has been subject to detrimental counterexamples: cases in which the subject is ignorant of their own inability to (...) intend the best-looking course of action. This paper provides a novel response in defence of the guidance thesis, which builds on the connection of the deliberative ought and deliberative questions. An overlooked issue in the literature concerns the presuppositions raised by the central deliberative question. I provide the first attempt at analysing these presuppositions and argue that, in cases in which these presuppositions are not satisfied, there is no particular option the subject deliberatively ought to do. Finally, I show that the supposed counterexamples are such instances of presupposition failure. (shrink)

Over the past years, proponents of pragmatic encroachment have been challenged to provide a plausible demarcation of the kind of practical factors that are supposed to encroach on the epistemic assessment of one’s belief formation. In this paper, I provide a defence of pragmatic encroachment against these challenges by relying on the following principle: the practical factors of a situation relevant for pragmatic encroachment are those which, on their own, rationalise the subject asking the question, ‘What if I am wrong (...) in believing p?’. This principle follows from an independently motivated account of how the mechanism underlying the phenomenon of pragmatic encroachment might work. That is, the principle tracks the practical factors that enable epistemic reasons to suspend judgement on whether p rather than to believe p. While this question is rationalised by Pascalian factors, an extension of encroachment to direct threats and incentives to believe is unwarranted. Furthermore, I show that even if one assumes that not only the downsides of falsely believing but also the upsides of truly believing can be epistemically significant, one can retain a limited set of encroaching factors. (shrink)

As scholars have commonly observed, a central difference between epistemic and practical normativity is the fact that the reasons of the former kind balance prohibitively, while reasons of the latter kind do so permissively. To explain the prohibition to believe or disbelieve in the face of tied evidence, several scholars have appealed to normative reasons in favour of a third doxastic option, the suspension of judgement. However, the question remains as to what happens if these latter reasons are defeated. In (...) such cases, one seems to be stuck in an impasse: either one is forced into an epistemic dilemma– where neither of one’s doxastic options seems permissible– or one must relax the prohibitive balancing principle– where there might be, after all, situations in which believing in the face of tied evidence is rationally permissible. In this paper, I discuss different ways to derive this puzzle of defeated suspension, as well as the most common strategy in responding to it. I argue that an appeal to undefeated reasons to suspend judgement comes with significant downsides and, thus, one should seek a different response: in extreme forms of the puzzle of defeated suspension, a form of higher-order suspension becomes rational. If one treats higher-order suspension as an additional doxastic option, one can avoid the puzzle in its entirety. Furthermore, an analogue puzzle of higher-order doubt merits the same treatment. (shrink)

According to insulationism, a common take on epistemic value, being of epistemic value does not entail being of value simpliciter. In this paper, I explore one version of insulationism which has so far received little attention in the literature. On this view, epistemic value does not entail value simpliciter because it is a form of attributive goodness, that is, being good as a member of a particular kind. While having a significant advantage over some other formulations of insulationism, I argue (...) that the attributive goodness view of epistemic value should be rejected. On the one hand, shifting to a discussion of attributive goodness comes with several contentious commitments, as well as implausible upshots for epistemic axiology. On the other hand, I demonstrate that one can strengthen other forms of insulationism in such a way that the supposed advantage of the attributive goodness view diminishes. (shrink)

Achieving a good clinical trial design increases the likelihood that a trial will take place as planned, including that data will be obtained from a sufficient number of participants, and the total number of participants will be the minimal required to gain the knowledge sought. A good trial design also increases the likelihood that the knowledge sought by the experiment will be forthcoming. Achieving such a design is more than good sense—it is ethically required in experiments when participants are at (...) risk of harm. This paper argues that doing a power analysis effectively contributes to ensuring that a trial design is good. The ethical importance of good trial design has long been recognized for trials in which there is risk of serious harm to participants. However, whether the quality of a trial design, when the risk to participants is only minimal, is an ethical issue is rarely discussed. This paper argues that even in cases when the risk is minimal, the quality of the trial design is an ethical issue, and that this is reflected in the emphasis the Belmont Report places on the importance of the benefit of knowledge gained by society. The paper also argues that good trial design is required for true informed consent. (shrink)

Studying teaching behavior in controlled conditions is difficult. It seems intuitive that a human learner might have trouble reliably recreating response patterns over and over in interaction. A robot would be the perfect tool to study teaching behavior because its actions can be well controlled and described. However, due to the interactive nature of teaching, developing such a robot is not an easy task. As we will show in this review, respective studies require certain robot appearances and behaviors. These mainly (...) should induce teaching behavior in humans, be interactive, match the study design, and be realizable in terms of effort. We discuss how remote controlling of the robot or simulating robot capabilities is used as an option. With this review, we introduce the field of research on studying human teaching behavior with robots as a tool in the experimental design. We will provide a structured overview of existing work, and identify main challenges of employing robots in such studies. (shrink)

The aim of the present study is to evaluate the postmodern belief that selves are narrative constructions. Four theories, varying in degree of anti-realism, are presented and discussed. It is concluded that an attractive feature of the narrative approach is that it explains how we achieve a sense of unity. But the main idea, that selves are constituted or created by stories is problematic, like identifying footprints on the beach with the feet that made them.

Scientific knowledge should not only be true, it should be as objective as possible. It should refer to a reality independent of any subject. What can we use as a criterion of objectivity? Intersubjectivity (i.e., intersubjective understandability and intersubjective testability) is necessary, but not sufficient. Other criteria are: independence of reference system, independence of method, non-conventionality. Is there some common trait? Yes, there is: invariance under some specified transformations. Thus, we say: A proposition is objective only if its truth is (...) invariant against a change in the conditions under which it was formulated. We give illustrations from geometry, perception, neurobiology, relativity theory, and quantum theory. Such an objectivist position has many advantages. (shrink)

A valid and convenient method to measure nonhuman animal attitudes contributes to feasible survey studies and the evaluation of educational programs. There are established scales for measuring animal attitudes but only some have acceptable psychometric properties: others address only a small fraction of the constructs, and some are overly long. We therefore aimed to develop a short, practicable measurement of animal attitudes that contains the constructs developed previously. Two studies were conducted: in the first one, 127 items were subjected to (...) an exploratory factor analysis, which extracted 51 items in 10 factors. The scale was reduced to 20 items retaining all of the initial constructs with 13 positive and 7 negative items, which were subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis in study 2. Correlations with personality, meat consumption, age, and gender provide evidence for validity. We suggest using this short, unidimensional Composite Respect for Animals Scale covering a broad construct. (shrink)

Eine "rein" philosophische - Ethik lässt zu viele Probleme ungelöst. Oie wenigen formalnen Bedingungen, die sich transzendentalphilosophisch, transzendéntalpragmatisch oder konstruktivistisch gewinnen lassen, reichen bei weitem nicht aus, um uns zu praktischen Handlungsanweisungen zu verhelfen. In die ser Situationistes wohl einen Versucht wert, sich auf die anthropologischen und damit letztlich biologischen Grundlagen der Ethik zu besinnen, lässtsich der "Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie" eine "Evolutionäre Ethik” an die Seitestellen? Oder ist ein solches Unternehmen von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt? In diesem Beitrag werden Absichtund Besonderheit (...) des evolutionären Ansatzes charakterisiert, wird der mögliche Beitrag der Soziöbiologie zur Ethik skizziert und werden die Einwände geprüft, die gegen eine solche Evolutionäre Ethik vorgerbracht werden (obwohl sie noch gar nicht existiert). (shrink)

This book comprises a series of essays exploring the transformative insights of Fichte, Herder, Humboldt and the Romantics into the seminal role of language and imagination in shaping human experience and art, including how language, self-consciousness and understanding arise through speech. Along with topics concerning the literary work of art, the philosophy of history, German humanities, philology, and semiotics, the author also discusses the place of phenomenology and the concept of interpretation in literary theory. In highlighting ideas from A. W. (...) Vico, F. Schlegel, Novalis, Germaine de Staël, and Schleiermacher, the author also elucidates romantic poetics, translation, discourse and cultural transfer themes. Das vorliegende Werk umfasst eine Reihe hermeneutischer Abhandlungen des Autors, in deren Fokus die Deutung der Sprachauffassungen Fichtes, Herders, Humboldts und der Romantiker steht. Der Autor untersucht dabei die Formierung von Erfahrung und Kunst durch Sprache und Einbildungskraft sowie die Entstehung von Sprache, Selbstbewusstsein und Verstehen in der Rede. Desgleichen behandelt er Semiotik, Philologie und Philosophie der Geschichte, sowie die Rolle der Phänomenologie und des Interpretationsbegriffs in der Literaturkritik. Im Besonderen hebt der Autor die Auffassungen von Vico, A.W. und F. Schlegel, Novalis, Germaine de Staël, F. Schleiermacher hervor und beleuchtet Übersetzungs-, Diskurs- und Kulturtransfertheorien sowie die Poetik der Romantiker. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to find a satisfactory way of understanding what traits are. As a starting point, two recent accounts of the nature of traits, the act frequency approach and the intention frequency approach, are presented and discussed. The act frequency approach is criticized for taking all traits to be behavioral dispositions, and for not offering any explanation of behavior. The intention frequency approach is criticized for being equally one-sided in regarding all traits as mental frequency (...) dispositions. It is claimed that some traits are purely behavioral, that some are behavioral and mental, and that some are purely mental. Finally, it is argued that mental phenomena like beliefs and desires, the phenomena that make up reasons for and explain actions, are not frequency dispositions. They are dispositional properties of another kind, namely abilities, capacities or powers. (shrink)