Biological evolution provides a creative fount of complex and subtle adaptations, often surprising the scientists who discover them. However, because evolution is an algorithmic process that transcends the substrate in which it occurs, evolution’s creativity is not limited to nature. Indeed, many researchers in the field of digital evolution have observed their evolving algorithms and organisms subverting their intentions, exposing unrecognized bugs in their code, producing unexpected adaptations, or exhibiting outcomes uncannily convergent with ones in nature. Such stories routinely reveal (...) creativity by evolution in these digital worlds, but they rarely fit into the standard scientific narrative. Instead they are often treated as mere obstacles to be overcome, rather than results that warrant study in their own right. The stories themselves are traded among researchers through oral tradition, but that mode of information transmission is inefficient and prone to error and outright loss. Moreover, the fact that these stories tend to be shared only among practitioners means that many natural scientists do not realize how interesting and lifelike digital organisms are and how natural their evolution can be. To our knowledge, no collection of such anecdotes has been published before. This paper is the crowd-sourced product of researchers in the fields of artificial life and evolutionary computation who have provided first-hand accounts of such cases. It thus serves as a written, fact-checked collection of scientifically important and even entertaining stories. In doing so we also present here substantial evidence that the existence and importance of evolutionary surprises extends beyond the natural world, and may indeed be a universal property of all complex evolving systems. (shrink)

Modern environmentalism has come to realize that many of its key concerns "wilderness" and "nature" among them are contested territory, viewed differently by different people. Understanding nature requires science and ecology, to be sure, but it also requires a sensitivity tom, history, culture, and narrative. Thus, understanding nature is a fundamentally hermeneutic task.

This paper explores the mereology of structural universals, using the structural richness of a non-classical mereology without unique fusions. The paper focuses on a problem posed by David Lewis, who using the example of methane, and assuming classical mereology, argues against any purely mereological theory of structural universals. The problem is that being a methane molecule would have to contain being a hydrogen atom four times over, but mereology does not have the concept of the same part occurring several times. (...) This paper takes up the challenge by providing mereological analysis of three operations sufficient for a theory of structural universals: Reflexive binding, i.e. identifying two of the places of a universal; Existential binding, i.e. the language-independent correlate of an existential quantification; and Conjunction. (shrink)

This paper concerns the structure of any spatially extended things, including regions of space or spacetime. I shall use intuitions about the quantity of extended things to argue for a dichotomy: either a given finite extended thing is point-free gunk, that is, it has no points as parts, or it is made of grit, that is there are only finitely many points.

There is an ongoing debate in philosophy of mind and epistemology about whether perceptual experience only represents those “thin” features of our environment that are apprehended by our senses, or whether, in addition to these, at least some perceptual experiences represent more complex, “thick” properties. My aim in this paper is to articulate an important difference between thin and thick properties, and thus to diagnose a key intuitive resistance many proponents of the thin view feel towards the thick view. My (...) diagnosis then provides us with a novel and compelling argument against the thick view. In what follows, first I consider two unsuccessful versions of an alternative strategy against the thick view found in the literature. Next, I present my own argument. The argument involves proposing two constraints on the phenomenal contents of perceptual experience, which I call the Presentation Principle and the Containment Principle, and then reasoning from these principles to a conclusion that is fatal to the thick view—an outcome that I call the problem of Phenomenal Explosion. I conclude by responding to several objections. (shrink)

As part of his Constructive Empiricism, Van Fraassen commends agnosticism about the existence of the unobservable entities posited by the physical sciences. This position of Scientific Agnosticism is compatible with the acceptance, in his sense, of Science. For to accept Science is, he says, to accept it as empirically adequate, but to refrain from deciding between the realistically interpreted theory and the as-if variant, according to which the observations are as if the theory is correct but the theory is not (...) correct. My purpose in this paper is to argue, against van Fraassen, that we—or at least most of us—should embrace Scientific Realism not Scientific Agnosticism. (shrink)

Between innocence and commitment: speculation and experience -- Reasonable commitment -- Some comparisons -- Commitment to reason and to scientific realism -- Humanist commitment -- Humanism and the cosmic agent -- Commitment to God -- Corollaries.

In this book Timothy O’Connor combines an investigation of modal epistemology with a fresh look at the traditional contingency version of the cosmological argument. The connection between the two parts is that he defends the practice of hypothesizing necessities for explanatory purposes, resisting those accounts that link possibility too closely to conceivability. This provides the context in which he asks the existence question, ‘Why do the particular contingent objects there are exist and undergo the events they do?’. Wisely avoiding the (...) Principle of Sufficient Reason he argues that the existence question is answered by, and only by, positing a necessary being that is a se in the sense of not depending on any other being.Another important feature of O’Connor's treatment is that he does not accept the difficult scholastic doctrine of divine simplicity, instead relying on the weaker thesis that the essential divine attributes are mutually entailing. Yet again he resists the thesis of the immutability of God, allowing that a necessary being can have accidental attributes and hence can change by acquiring knowledge of the free acts and/or random events that occur. In addition he combines the cosmological argument with the argument from fine-tuning so that the latter is used to support the thesis that the …. (shrink)

The student as consumer has emerged as a common motif and point of contestation in educational philosophy over the past two decades, as part of the critique of the neoliberal educational re...

Typical structural universals are not just the mereological sum of their constituents. Hence, there is the Structure Problem of explaining this non-mereological structure. The Instantiation Problem is that the predicate "U is instantiated by x, y, etc., in that order" is ill-suited to be a primitive, unanalyzed predicate. The proposed solution to these problems is based on the observation that if universal U is said to supervene upon universals V, W, etc., then it is the instantiation of U that supervenes (...) on the instantiation of V, W, etc. Assuming there are few subvenient universals, which is admittedly a speculation, their instantiation may be explained in ways that would be uneconomic if there were too many. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against Realism about Possible Worlds by showing how it leads to a counter-intuitive scepticism about the rationality of Occam’s razor. This can be thought of as a transcendental argument from Logic to Metaphysics. It should be contrasted with a straightforward application of Logic to Metaphysics, as when we apply Occam’s razor to reject a category of entities which we judge to be redundant.

In this paper, I present a piece of natural theology, whose pro tanto conclusion is the existence of god-the-artist, that is a lower case “g” god, a creator who creates for the sake of beauty, but who is not worthy of worship, a god who can be admired but should not be loved. I then consider some only partially successful responses to this dismal conclusion. Finally, I show to reconcile the idea of a god motivated by love of beauty with (...) the religious tradition of an upper case “G” God, who is not merely to be worshiped but loves us and invites a loving response. (shrink)

In this paper I have had two aims. One was to describe a number of pantheist or near pantheist religious attitudes, including the influence of many worlds theories. The other was to indicate some of the ways we might arrive at Pantheism.One final remark: when assessing religious positions the intellectual grounds for accepting or rejecting them should, I suggest, be whether they make sense of things, that is, enable us to understand. The ways to Pantheism, or to near Pantheism, should (...) therefore be interpreted as part of a comparison between ways of understanding. (shrink)

Przypadek czy sprawczość? Odpowiedź na „Divine Providence and Chance in the World” Dariusz Łukasiewicz wyróżnia sześć pojęć przypadku, spośród których jedne są spójne z ludzką wolnością rozumianą po libertariańsku, a inne nie. W tym eseju argumentuję na dwa sposoby, że teiści powinni odrzucić przypadek ontologiczny i odwołać się zamiast tego do nieredukowalnej sprawczości w odniesieniu do zdarzeń, które nie są opatrznościowo wyznaczone przez Boga. Moje argumenty zależą od jednoznacznego rozumienia twierdzeń, że Bóg jest kochającym sprawcą oraz że istoty ludzkie, w (...) swoim najlepszym zachowaniu, są kochającymi sprawcami. Łukasiewicz zakłada milcząco, że takie twierdzenia cechuje niewłaściwy antropomorfizm. Opowiadam się za antropocentryzmem i będę bronić jednoznaczności. (shrink)

In his “Are Properties, Particular, Universal, or Neither?” Javier Cumpa argues that science not metaphysics explains how properties are instantiated. I accept this conclusion provided physics can be stated using rather few primitive predicates. In addition, he uses his scientific theory of instantiation to argue for Neutralism, his thesis that the “tie” between properties and their instances implies neither that properties are particular nor that they are universals. Neutralism, I claim, is a thesis that realist about universals have independent reason (...) to accept and their opponents have reason to reject. So, neutralism is not neutral on the topic of whether properties are universals. Nor is Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation as naturalistic as he claims. I argue that although compatible with Ontological Naturalism, his theory provides a precedent for the non-naturalistic emergence of mental properties. Finally, I argue that because his theory requires a simple physics it presupposes a more rationalist epistemology than that of Methodological Naturalism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the problems solved by universals require not merely that we know they exist but that we know them by acquaintance. I begin by explicating this thesis of acquaintance with universals. I then show how it solves some familiar problems. After that I reply to the objection that something weaker will do such as David Lewis' distinction between natural and artificial classes of possibilia.

This book analyzes the nature and functions of horror films from the vantage of a theoretical reconstruction of George Santayana’s account of beauty. This neo-Santayanan framework forms the conceptual backdrop for a new model of horror’s aesthetic enjoyment, the nature of which is detailed through the examination of plot, cinematic, and visual devices distinctive of the popular genre. According to this model, the audience derives pleasure from the films through confronting the aversive scenarios they communicate and rationalizing a denial of (...) their personal applicability. The films then come to embody these acts of self-assertion and intellectual overcoming and become objects of pride. How horror films can acquire necropolitical functions within the context of abusive systems of power is also clarified. These functions, which exploit the power of anti-tragedy, downward social comparison, or vicarious emotion, work to remediate aggressive, ascetic, or revolutionary impulses in ways that are not injurious to the status quo. This book champions horror as a source of self-empowerment and unmitigated beauty, but also attests to the potential social harms of the genre. (shrink)

A controversy in political philosophy and applied ethics concerns the validity of duty‐imposing powers, that is, rights entitling one person to impose new duties on others without their consent. Many philosophers have criticized as unplausible any such moral right, in particular that of appropriating private property unilaterally. Some, finding duty‐imposing powers weird, unfamiliar or baseless, have argued that principles of justified acquisition should be rejected; others have required them to satisfy exacting criteria. I investigate the many ways in which we (...) regularly impose duties on one another without prior consent. I show that doing so is not weird, and I offer criteria which demarcate the reasonable from the worrisome aspects of duty‐imposing powers. (shrink)

There is a tension in Santayana's ontological system, one that is generated by the interactions of his doctrine of existence, doctrine of systematization, and critical agnosticism on the infinity of material substance. From and, in conjunction with what will be called the expansionist postulate, an infinite material expansion is generated, one that is in conflict with. This tension is remediated by a coherentist proposal regarding Santayanan existence, the relevant feature of which is that existents at distinct orders of organization are (...) in symmetrical dependence relations. "Metaphysical coherentism," which has recently been described as "one of the least explored areas in contemporary... (shrink)

David Armstrong in his A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility proposes that non-actual possibilities may be treated as fictions grounded in instantiated universals. In this paper, I first provide some objections to his theory. Then I make the case for Foundational Nominalism, the Armstrong inspired thesis that the whole of ontology supervenes on particulars described much as in the Quinean Nominalism that Armstrong rejected as an ontological ostrich. Finally, I argue that Foundational Nominalism permits a fictional theory of possibilities similar to (...) Brian Skyrms’ Tractarian Nominalism. (shrink)

The recent debate in philosophy of mind over whether thought has its own distinctive phenomenology, so-called cognitive phenomenology, has led to a sharp division between proponents and skeptics of CP. This paper critically examines an ambitious argument against the existence of CP, which is based on a particular view of the temporal structure of thought. The argument, roughly, is that experiences, those mental entities that have phenomenology, persist as processes, while thoughts, on the other hand, are non-processive states or events. (...) So no thoughts are experiences. The present paper attacks the claim that thoughts never temporally unfold as processes. (shrink)

Using the example of a small oak savanna located in Iowa, I begin by presenting some of the problems that confront us in attempting to describe nature. Finding ourselves in a paradox in an attempt to model nature, I then suggest that modeling nature through the use of the concept of “emplacement” offers us the best way forward. To better define “emplacement,” the argument then turns to an exposition of Paul Ricoeur’s idea of “emplotment.” I conclude by detailing how one (...) might use “emplacement” to construct a model of a specific place of nature. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBy the Many Categories problem, I mean the prima facie violation of Ockham’s Razor by realists about universals: there is, it might seem, just too much variety. Thus, David Armstrong posits both properties and relations. He also theorises about determinates of determinables. Another influential realist, E. J. Lowe distinguishes non-substantial from substantial universals. Yet again, both Armstrong and Lowe include in their ontology abstract particulars in addition to universals. My aim in this paper is to offer a unification of these (...) categories using an operator-theory. First, I show how operators provide a theory of abstract particulars of relations and of impure relational properties. Then, using impure relational properties I derive the Fregeanion Principle. After some metaphysics of mathematics, I provide a theory of determinables. Finally, I consider kinds and substances. (shrink)

In ‘The Tollgate Principles for the Governance of Geoengineering’, Stephen M. Gardiner and Augustin Fragnière develop a holistic framework for geoengineering governance, pointing out the importance...

The entropic state that engulfed the East Coast of Australia in the first eight months of 2020 followed thirty years of uninterrupted economic growth and 10 years of tenuous federal governments divided on the question of climate change. The twin geophysical crises of catastrophic bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic have led to a public reckoning around our guardianship of the environment, as well as our relationship with science and indigenous knowledge. Congruent with this was the rapid transformation of both schools (...) and universities to online learning, causing the most significant rupture to the traditional ‘grammar of schooling’ for decades. This unprecedented conflation of crises has resulted in the unusual situation where education can be radically transformed, as the material conditions that usually remain latent (thus negating the possibility for change) suddenly exist. As a result, there has been an increased openness to pedagogies of potentiality, as schools and universities resist the urge to ‘return to normal’. Amongst these pedagogies, the philosophy of Bernard Stiegler is unique in its direct response to the entropic state with a counter-impulse, negantropy, which seeks to harness our technological capacity under an ethos of care and unite it with our existential purpose to flourish and thrive. This paper will consider the possibilities of Stiegler’s utopian call for action in relation to the Australian context, as schools and universities reconceptualise the sharing of knowledge and the purpose of education that seeks to rectify the gaps of the past. (shrink)

This paper is about two questions in contemporary philosophy of mind, which I call the Scope Question and the Marks Question. The Scope Question is this: What kinds of mental states (events or processes) have phenomenal character, and how many different kinds of phenomenal character are there? The Marks Question is this: What are the distinguishing “marks” of the phenomenal, in virtue of which a mental state, event, or process counts as being phenomenally conscious? To make progress on these questions (...) and explore the relationship between the two, I narrow my focus to a particular instance of each, viz. the (scope) question of whether thoughts possess their own phenomenal character and the (marks) question of whether all phenomenal character is presentational. First, I argue that a phenomenology of entertaining thought content, if it exists, is non-presentational. I then argue from the fact that every genuine phenomenal property can be thought about using a phenomenal concept, to the conclusion that all phenomenology is presentational. One implication is that a (standard form of) transparent, proprietary phenomenology of thought does not exist. (shrink)

This essay investigates the correlation between theological investigations of culture and those of the natural world. A fruitful question emerges when reflecting on how theological thinking resides between these subjects: how does our theological reflection on art meaningfully inform our consideration of nature? The path to exploring this question takes the form of questioning three different works of art: Willem Moreelse’s A Portrait of a Scholar, Francis Bacon’s Landscape,and Joseph Beuys’ Lightning with Stag in Its Glare. Exploring the interconnection between (...) these works, a hermeneutical mediation between art, place, and the spiritual is suggested. (shrink)

Defining and identifying causal intervention effects for transmissible infectious disease outcomes is challenging because a treatment – such as a vaccine – given to one individual may affect the infection outcomes of others. Epidemiologists have proposed causal estimands to quantify effects of interventions under contagion using a two-person partnership model. These simple conceptual models have helped researchers develop causal estimands relevant to clinical evaluation of vaccine effects. However, many of these partnership models are formulated under structural assumptions that preclude realistic (...) infectious disease transmission dynamics, limiting their conceptual usefulness in defining and identifying causal treatment effects in empirical intervention trials. In this paper, we propose causal intervention effects in two-person partnerships under arbitrary infectious disease transmission dynamics, and give nonparametric identification results showing how effects can be estimated in empirical trials using time-to-infection or binary outcome data. The key insight is that contagion is a causal phenomenon that induces conditional independencies on infection outcomes that can be exploited for the identification of clinically meaningful causal estimands. These new estimands are compared to existing quantities, and results are illustrated using a realistic simulation of an HIV vaccine trial. (shrink)

This paper revisits how late 20th-century attempts to account for conceptual and other difficult art-work by defining the concept ‘art’ have failed to offer a useful strategy for educators seeking a non-instrumental justification for teaching the arts. It is suggested that this theoretical ground is nonetheless instructive and provides useful background in searching for a viable approach to justification. It is claimed that, though definition may fail and grand theories not coalesce, one would be wise to emulate Passmore (1954, 1990) (...) who argues for an aesthetic approach to works of art and who proceeds like the fox, from a specific work that becomes more complex through analysis. His approach is employed in describing a performance series by the Cellist of Sarajevo, which raises further questions regarding what it means to start from a specific art-work and how doing so exemplifies Fleming’s (2006) suggestion that in justifying the arts we connect them to our ethical lives. Passmore’s strategy is then extended to the aesthetic experience of reading this essay and the paper concludes with the author’s personal anecdote in response to Higgins’ (2008) call for genuinely aesthetic defences of aesthetic education. (shrink)

As a treatment of radical evil, philosophical engagement with the Holocaust must negotiate a breach of intelligibility and of our moral world so great that canonical moral frameworks cannot compass it. Accordingly, the role of the philosopher in relation to Holocaust studies is not one of dispassionate reflection, and it calls for careful consideration. The author argues that as scholars, teachers, and citizens, philosophers treating the Holocaust have a duty to philosophize in a manner that advances the cause of humanitarianism. (...) The author argues that the best way to do so is by philosophizing historically and illustrates what this means for the above three offices of the philosopher. The author first considers postmodernist approaches to history which are found lacking insofar as they may be used to bolster the claims of Holocaust deniers and revisionists. Instead, the author advocates a “social realist” stance on history, whereby philosophers can make explicit reference to the concrete events that comprise the historical context of the Holocaust and allow the events to speak for themselves. This allows the philosopher’s work to remain accessible to a broad audience as well as providing a stable moral framework which avoids morally ambiguous or morally neutral judgments of the Holocaust. (shrink)