This paper argues that there are two importantly distinct normative relations that can be referred to using phrases like ‘X is obligated to Y,’ ‘Y has a right against X,’ or ‘X wronged Y.’ When we say that I am obligated to you not to read your diary, one thing we might mean is that I am subject to a deontological constraint against reading your diary that gives me a non‐instrumental, agent‐relative reason not to do so, and which you are (...) typically in a unique position to waive with consent. I call this first relation the constraint relation. A second thing we might mean is that you are in a position to fittingly hold me personally accountable for reading your diary by demanding that I not read your diary, resenting me if I do so without excuse, and deciding whether to forgive me for this afterwards. I call this second relation the accountability relation. Though these two kinds of directed obligation often coincide, I argue that they are extensionally dissociable and play different normative roles. We cannot provide an adequate theory of ‘obligation to’ until we recognize that this phrase denotes not one relation, but two. (shrink)

I argue for adopting a conception of obligation that is broader than the conception commonly adopted by moral philosophers. According to this broader conception, the crucial marks of an obligatory action are, first, that the reasons for the obliged party to perform the action include an exclusionary reason and, second, that the obliged party is the appropriate target of blaming reactive attitudes, if they inexcusably fail to perform the obligatory action. An obligation is directed if the exclusionary reason depends (...) on the relationship between the obliged person and the person to whom they owe the obligatory action, and the latter person is positioned to personally blame the obligated person for inexcusably failing to perform the obligatory action. Some direc- ted obligations are not owed as a matter of right, and the person to whom the obligatory action is owed is the only person positioned to blame nonperformance. Other directed obligations are owed as a matter of right, and people who are not part of the relationship grounding the obligation nevertheless are also positioned to (impersonally) blame non-performance. Only the rights-based form of directed obligation has received signifi- cant attention from moral philosophers, yet the former—which is at the heart of what I call “personal bonds”—is a pervasive and significant theme of our ordinary interpersonal lives. (shrink)

In this paper we develop a new methodology for normative theorising, which we call Directed Reflective Equilibrium. Directed Reflective Equilibrium is based on a taxonomy that distinguishes between a number of different functions of hypothetical cases, including two dimensions that we call representation and elicitation. Like its predecessor, Directed Reflective Equilibrium accepts that neither intuitions nor basic principles are immune to revision and that our commitments on various levels of philosophical enquiry should be brought into equilibrium. However, (...) it also offers guidance about how different types of cases ought to be sequenced to achieve this result. We argue that this ‘directional’ approach improves, in various ways, upon the non-directional approach of traditional Reflective Equilibrium. (shrink)

This study examined how artificial intelligence (AI) utilisation and self-directed learning (SDRL) influenced research productivity among postgraduate students in public universities in Cross River State, Nigeria. A predictive correlational design was adopted to address four research questions. The population comprised 6,522 postgraduate students from two universities, and a sample of 450 was drawn using stratified random sampling to ensure fair representation across gender, degree levels, and age groups. Data were collected using a validated questionnaire that measured AI utilisation, SDRL, (...) and research productivity, with high internal reliability (α > .80). Data were analysed using simple and hierarchical regression models. Findings revealed that AI utilisation significantly predicted SDRL (β = .32, p < .001) and research productivity (β = .23, p < .001). SDRL exerted a stronger influence on research productivity (β = .51, p < .001) and fully mediated the relationship between AI utilisation and productivity. The study concluded that AI tools contribute to higher research productivity mainly by fostering independent learning habits and motivation for self-directed inquiry. It was recommended that postgraduate curricula incorporate AI literacy, mentorship, and digital learning environments that encourage autonomy and sustained scholarly engagement. (shrink)

Standard dual-process models in the action domain postulate that stimulus-driven processes are responsible for suboptimal behavior because they take them to be rigid and automatic and therefore the default. We propose an alternative dual-process model in which goal-directed processes are the default instead. We then transfer the dual- process logic from the action domain to the emotion domain. This reveals that emotional behavior is often attributed to stimulus-driven processes. Our alternative model submits that goal-directed processes could be the (...) primary determinant of emotional behavior instead. We evaluate the type of empirical evidence required for validating our model and we consider implications of our model for behavior change, encouraging strategies focused on the expectancies and values of action outcomes. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is a class of attitudes that have questions (rather than propositions or something else) as contents.

One stark difference between the past and the future lies in our ability to shape the future in a way in which we are unable to shape the past. This paper investigates what kind of beliefs about the future serve as premises in our reasoning about how to act. If we think about belief in terms of agents representing the world, we cannot lose sight of the fact that agents are part of, and shape, the same world they represent. Beliefs (...) about the future appear to have a circularity about them: on the one hand, they serve as premises for deciding what we will do. On the other hand, what we decide we will do determines what we believe about the future. I argue that beliefs in future-directed counterfactuals play a central role in our practical reasoning and in how we conceptualize the actual future. I defend a robust distinction between future-directed counterfactuals and future-directed indicatives, and, contra Keith DeRose (2010), argue that it is future-directed counterfactuals that we use in deliberation about how to act. I argue that we construe the actual future in hypothetical terms and dependent on what we do now, in contrast to how we construe the actual past. This asymmetry in our belief content about the past versus the future fits well with an account of the open future in terms of counterfactual dependence. (shrink)

Agnes Moors’ claim that the processes underlying emotional behavior and those driving non-emotional instrumental behavior are predominantly goal-directed leads her to the eliminativist conclusion that there is no solid mechanistic distinction between emotional and non-emotional episodes—and, thus, that emotions do not qualify as scientifically fruitful concepts. Here, I introduce a distinction between two types of goal-directed processes and discuss the sense of value that I consider relevant to emotional goals. On that basis, I reexamine whether the path to (...) eliminativism is actually unescapable. (shrink)

In this reply paper, I address three objections that were raised against the goal-directed theory of emotions (Moors 2022). The first objection questions the appropriateness of aligning all emotions, including positive ones, with decision-making processes. The second objection challenges the theory’s ability to account for the valence aspect of all positive and negative emotions, highlighting two sets of counterexamples. The third objection asserts that the theory fails to give a satisfactory account of the irrational flavor of certain emotions, in (...) particular recalcitrant ones. (shrink)

In their recent ‘The ethical case for non-directed postmortem sperm donation’, Hodson and Parker outline and defend the concept of voluntary non-directed postmortem sperm donation, the idea that men should be able to register their desire to donate their sperm after death for use by strangers since this would offer a potential means of increasing the quantity and heterogeneity of donor sperm. In this response, we raise some concerns about their proposal, focusing in particular on the fact that (...) current methodologies do not make for a reliable way of ensuring that sperm retrieved postmortem has a good chance of leading to conception, which is in turn likely to make potential recipients reluctant to use such sperm. These concerns add to the ethical doubts that attend aspects of the proposal, making the prospect of implementation of such a policy unlikely at best. (shrink)

What is it for a duty or obligation to be directed? Thinking about paradigmatic cases such as the obligations generated by promises will take us only so far in answering this question. This paper starts by surveying several approaches for understanding directed duties, as well as the challenges they face. It turns out that shared agency features something similar to the directedness of duties. This suggests an account of directedness in terms of shared agency – specifically, in terms (...) of the so-called practical intimacy that holds between individuals when they act together. The final section addresses a challenge to the shared agency approach posed by legal wronging in tort law. (shrink)

A prominent hypothesis holds that by speaking to infants in infant‐directed speech (IDS) as opposed to adult‐directed speech (ADS), parents help them learn phonetic categories. Specifically, two characteristics of IDS have been claimed to facilitate learning: hyperarticulation, which makes the categories more separable, and variability, which makes the generalization more robust. Here, we test the separability and robustness of vowel category learning on acoustic representations of speech uttered by Japanese adults in ADS, IDS (addressed to 18‐ to 24‐month (...) olds), or read speech (RS). Separability is determined by means of a distance measure computed between the five short vowel categories of Japanese, while robustness is assessed by testing the ability of six different machine learning algorithms trained to classify vowels to generalize on stimuli spoken by a novel speaker in ADS. Using two different speech representations, we find that hyperarticulated speech, in the case of RS, can yield better separability, and that increased between‐speaker variability in ADS can yield, for some algorithms, more robust categories. However, these conclusions do not apply to IDS, which turned out to yield neither more separable nor more robust categories compared to ADS inputs. We discuss the usefulness of machine learning algorithms run on real data to test hypotheses about the functional role of IDS. (shrink)

The difficulty in finding well‐matched kidneys for transplantation into black Americans is compounded by the disproportionately low rate of black donation. A program of directed donation that privileged black‐to‐black transplant could ease the chronic shortage of organs.

In a recent article in this journal, Patrick Lee has attempted to defend what has been called the strict account of intention (often defended by advocates of the new natural law). In the process, he criticized what might be called the identity account of intention. Lee’s article serves as an occasion to develop some thoughts about intention, in particular, the idea that intention concerns directed actions. This paper rejects two misperceptions of directed actions (within intention): first, directed (...) actions must be distinguished from actions as executed; second, they must be distinguished from mere physical activity that results in multiple effects by happenstance (rather than by direction). Several aspects of Lee’s account are called into question, including his use of conceptual identity and his use of counterfactuals. The importance of concrete identity (as opposed to Lee’s conceptual identity) is emphasized for cases such as the craniotomy and the zookeeper case. (shrink)

In this paper, we outline a theory of the nature of self-directed agents. What is distinctive about self-directed agents is their ability to anticipate interaction processes and to evaluate their performance, and thus their sensitivity to context. They can improve performance relative to goals, and can, in certain instances, construct new goals. We contrast self-directedness with reactive action processes that are not modifiable by the agent, though they may be modified by supra-agent processes such as populational adaptation or (...) external design.Self-directedness lies at the nexus of issues concerning the evolution and nature of intentionality, intelligence, and agency. It provides some insight into the evolution of intelligence because it helps explain how organisms are able to manage variable interaction processes, e.g., a hunting strategy that varies with prey type, ground condition, and hunger level. Simple self-directed organisms like bumblebees manage variability in one or a few dimensions. (shrink)

Uterus transplantation (UTx) is highly anticipated for the benefits that it might bring to individuals wanting to carry a pregnancy in order to reproduce who do not have a functioning uterus. The surgery—now having been performed successfully in several countries around the world—remains experimental. However, UTx is at some point expected to become a routine treatment for people without a uterus and considering themselves in need of one: women with absolute uterine factor infertility; transgender women; and even cisgender men who (...) wish to gestate. Given the unique benefits UTx offers, uteri are likely to be ‘in demand’, and such demand, we suggest, will feasibly outstrip supply. Therefore, allocation of those uteri available for transplant may become a pressing issue. In this paper, we consider one aspect of organ allocation—the preferences of donors in making a directed or conditional donation of their uterus. To what extent, in the context of uterus donation, would such donations be ethically permissible? (shrink)

Collecting information that one expects to be useful is a powerful way to facilitate learning. However, relatively little is known about how people decide which information is worth sampling over the course of learning. We describe several alternative models of how people might decide to collect a piece of information inspired by “active learning” research in machine learning. We additionally provide a theoretical analysis demonstrating the situations under which these models are empirically distinguishable, and we report a novel empirical study (...) that exploits these insights. Our model-based analysis of participants' information gathering decisions reveals that people prefer to select items which resolve uncertainty between two possibilities at a time rather than items that have high uncertainty across all relevant possibilities simultaneously. Rather than adhering to strictly normative or confirmatory conceptions of information search, people appear to prefer a “local” sampling strategy, which may reflect cognitive constraints on the process of information gathering. (shrink)

The chapter develops a theory of blame’s nature and norms by reference to a conversational theory of moral responsibility. According to this theory, blame can be accounted for in terms of its communicative role in an interpersonal exchange between members of a moral community. The view the chapter defends is Strawsonian insofar as a distinctive class of emotions plays a pivotal role. Ultimately the chapter offers an account of blame that makes room for the thesis that blame is _deserved_ by (...) one who is blameworthy. (shrink)

Decision theorists disagree about how instrumentally rational agents, i.e., agents trying to achieve some goal, should behave in so-called Newcomb-like problems, with the main contenders being causal and evidential decision theory. Since the main goal of artificial intelligence research is to create machines that make instrumentally rational decisions, the disagreement pertains to this field. In addition to the more philosophical question of what the right decision theory is, the goal of AI poses the question of how to implement any given (...) decision theory in an AI. For example, how would one go about building an AI whose behavior matches evidential decision theory’s recommendations? Conversely, we can ask which decision theories describe the behavior of any existing AI design. In this paper, we study what decision theory an approval-directed agent, i.e., an agent whose goal it is to maximize the score it receives from an overseer, implements. If we assume that the overseer rewards the agent based on the expected value of some von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, then such an approval-directed agent is guided by two decision theories: the one used by the agent to decide which action to choose in order to maximize the reward and the one used by the overseer to compute the expected utility of a chosen action. We show which of these two decision theories describes the agent’s behavior in which situations. (shrink)

This work presents a formal architectural model for complex systems based on a directed object–relation graph. In contrast to diagram-centric approaches, architecture is defined independently of representation, notation, or tooling. Objects and directed relations constitute the complete ontological core, while diagrams and viewpoints are treated as computable projections derived through canonical graph operators. -/- The paper introduces formal definitions of reachability, path analysis, and structural vulnerability as intrinsic architectural properties. Minimality and irreducibility of the object–relation model are established (...) with respect to canonical architectural views, demonstrating that storing diagrams as primary architectural artifacts introduces no additional structural information. -/- Grounded in the principles of the Architecture of Complex Systems (ACS), the proposed model enables invariant architectural reasoning across representations and supports rigorous analysis of architectural structure prior to implementation. A reference implementation illustrates the feasibility of executing architectural operators directly at the data layer, independent of visualization mechanisms. (shrink)

This essay advances and defends two claims: (a) that rights cannot be inalienable and (b) that even if they could be, this would not be morally justifiable.

Since the discovery and implication of N-ethylmaleimide-sensitive factor -attachment protein receptor proteins in membrane fusion almost two decades ago, there have been significant efforts to understand their involvement at the molecular level. In the current study, we report for the first time the molecular interaction between full-length recombinant t-SNAREs and v-SNARE present in opposing liposomes, leading to the assembly of a t-/v-SNARE ring complex. Using high-resolution electron microscopy, the electron density maps and 3D topography of the membrane-directed SNARE ring (...) complex was determined at nanometre resolution. Similar to the t-/v-SNARE ring complex formed when 50 nm v-SNARE liposomes meet a t-SNARE-reconstituted planer membrane, SNARE rings are also formed when 50 nm diameter isolated synaptic vesicles meet a t-SNARE-reconstituted planer lipid membrane. Furthermore, the mathematical prediction of the SNARE ring complex size with reasonable accuracy, and the possible mechanism of membrane-directed t-/v-SNARE ring complex assembly, was determined from the study. Therefore in the present study, using both lipososome-reconstituted recombinant t-/v-SNARE proteins, and native v-SNARE present in isolated SV membrane, the membrane-directed molecular assembly of the neuronal SNARE complex was determined for the first time and its size mathematically predicted. These results provide a new molecular understanding of the universal machinery and mechanism of membrane fusion in cells, having fundamental implications in human health and disease. © 2011 The Authors Journal of Cellular and Molecular Medicine © 2011 Foundation for Cellular and Molecular Medicine/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (shrink)

In this paper, we outline a theory of the nature of self-directed agents. What is distinctive about self-directed agents is their ability to anticipate interaction processes and to evaluate their performance, and thus their sensitivity to context. They can improve performance relative to goals, and can, in certain instances, construct new goals. We contrast self-directedness with reactive action processes that are not modifiable by the agent, though they may be modified by supra-agent processes such as populational adaptation or (...) external design. (shrink)

Argues for a constraint on a proper theory of motivation – namely, that proper motivational explanations of goal‐directed actions are causal explanations. The chapter criticizes the thesis that acceptable teleological explanations of actions are not causal explanations and it offers a solution to a problem that deviant causal chains pose for a causal theory of action.

Acoustical changes in the prosody of mothers’ speech to infants are distinct and near universal. However, less is known about the visible properties of mothers’ infant-directed speech, and their relation to speech acoustics. Mothers’ head movements were tracked as they interacted with their infants using ID speech, and compared to movements accompanying their adult-directed speech. Movement measures along three dimensions of head translation, and three axes of head rotation were calculated. Overall, more head movement was found for ID (...) than AD speech, suggesting that mothers exaggerate their visual prosody in a manner analogous to the acoustical exaggerations in their speech. Regression analyses examined the relation between changing head position and changing acoustical pitch over time. Head movements and voice pitch were more strongly related in ID speech than in AD speech. When these relations were examined across time windows of different durations, stronger relations were observed for shorter time windows. However, the particular form of these more local relations did not extend or generalize to longer time windows. This suggests that the multimodal correspondences in speech prosody are variable in form, and occur within limited time spans. (shrink)

Rowan Cruft offers an addressive account of directed duties and claim-rights. He claims that the direction of a duty is constituted by two requirements of address between the parties: the right holder must conceive of the action as `to be done to me’ and the duty bearer must conceive of it as to be ‘done to you’. Cruft also argues against accounts of direction and claim-rights that reduce the relation between the parties to nonrelational facts. One such reductive account (...) is the justificatory interest theory. Cruft argues that social authorities can create conventional claim-rights freely, without any constraint imposed by the right holder’s interests. I raise an antecedence objection against the addressive theory as an account of direction. I then argue against Cruft’s claim that conventional claim-rights can be created independently of the right holder’s interests. I conclude that scepticism about the viability of a nonreductive theory of direction is warranted. (shrink)

Perhaps the central question in action theory is this: what ingredient of bodily action is missing in mere behavior? But what is an analogous question for mental action? I ask this: what ingredient of active, goal-directed thought is missing in mind-wandering? My answer: attentional guidance. Attention is guided when you would feel pulled back from distractions. In contrast, mind-wandering drifts between topics unchecked. My unique starting point motivates new accounts of four central topics about mental action. First, its causal (...) basis. Mind-wandering is a case study that allows us to tease apart two causes of mental action––guidance and motivation. Second, its experiential character. Goals are rarely the objects of awareness; rather, goals are “phenomenological frames” that carve experience into felt distractions and relevant information. Third, its scope. Intentional mind-wandering is a limit case of action where one actively cultivates passivity. Fourth, my theory offers a novel response to mental action skeptics like Strawson. (shrink)

Clinical populations sometimes demonstrate difficulties forgetting stimuli related to their trauma-related disorder, perhaps because their intense personal connection to these stimuli produce deficits in the inhibitory control abilities necessary for forgetting. The present work examined this possibility for people who have high levels of traits implicated in borderline personality disorder (BPD). In two well-powered studies, we found no evidence for deficits in forgetting specific to BPD traits, even for people with clinically significant levels of the traits, contrary to previous studies. (...) The present experiments updated the designs from earlier experiments to employ the most contemporary methods to examine directed forgetting recommended by recent reviews. With these improved methods, Study 1 found that participants showed significant directed forgetting for BPD-related words independent of their level of BPD traits, perhaps because the BPD-related words were so strongly associated with one another. Study 2 found that when we removed the strong relatedness between the stimuli, forgetting of BPD-relevant words was significant and did not interact with BPD symptomology. We concluded that in contrast to people with PTSD who show specific inhibitory deficits for trauma-related works, people with BPD show normal, intact inhibitory control even for words that they should find threatening. (shrink)

There is much dispute about what we owe the children we are responsible for creating. Some argue that so long as we provide offspring with lives worth living we do no wrong. Others argue that our procreative obligations are weightier and oblige us to provide (or attempt to provide) our offspring with a reasonable opportunity to thrive, or meet some other standard beyond merely providing a life worth living. Our practices and intuitions on this matter are inconsistent. For example, gamete (...) donors who intentionally participate in the project of creating a child are thought to have few obligations to their offspring, but those who create a child accidentally are thought to have weighty obligations. Furthermore, a justification for why we are obliged to provide offspring with more than a life worth living has been elusive. To resolve this puzzle I argue that an under-theorized element of morality, the directed duty of care, explains why we owe our offspring more than a life worth living. (shrink)

This paper discusses a new aporia, the aporia of future directed beliefs. This aporia contains three propositions: (1) It is possible that there is someone who is infallible that believes something about the future that is not historically settled, (2) it is necessary that someone is infallible if and only if it is necessary that everything she believes is true, and (3) it is necessary that all our beliefs are historically settled. Every claim in this set is intuitively plausible, (...) and there are interesting arguments for or against each of them. Nevertheless, {(1), (2), (3)} entails a contradiction. Consequently, at least one of the sentences in this set must be false. I consider some possible solutions to the problem and discuss some arguments for and against these solutions. Five solutions, in particular, stand out. Three solutions reject (1), one solution rejects (2), and one solution rejects (3). No solution is without problems, and it is not obvious which one we should choose. Yet, we have to give up at least one sentence in {(1), (2), (3)}. This is the nature of an aporia. (shrink)