For most theorists, paradigm cases of direct blame consist in the feeling and expression of resentment. It has thus seemed natural for these theorists to begin by presenting, and leaning on, an analysis of resentment. But it turns out there are numerous conflicting analyses of it, and these disagreements ramify when theorists use resentment to tell us about the nature of both blame and its resolution in forgiveness. Resentment cannot bear such theoretical weight. So instead of starting at the (...) front end of the blaming exchange with an analysis of resentment, this chapter starts at the back end with an account of what it takes to be successfully _forgiven_. This approach promises to yield several more determinate conclusions about (a) when the withdrawal of blame and forgiveness are appropriate and why; (b) the nature of the hard feelings that paradigm forgiveness withdraws; (c) why judgment is superfluous to this blaming and forgiving exchange; and (d) why resentment has been the wrong core blaming component to lean on all along. (shrink)

In the wake of the nonideal theory turn in political philosophy, few have paused to ask: Is nonideal theory a form of ideology? And perhaps even fewer have paused to ask: Is the debate between ideal/nonideal theorists itself a form of ideology? To the first question, I argue that nonideal theory is ideological in virtue of the fact that it rules out more utopian ways of theorizing by methodological fiat, and in so doing, risks entrenching an unjust status quo. To (...) the second question, I argue that the debate between ideal/nonideal theorists is itself a form of ideology, one which serves to reinforce the status quo by convincing political philosophers/theorists that the most pressing problems are problems about what we should think about what we are doing. But this is false. An upshot of my argument is that we ought to abandon the ideal/nonideal theory debate and address the pressing problems of political philosophy head-on in pluralist fashion, oscillating back and forth between these two modes of theorizing without a decision procedure to tell us when we should take up one perspective or the other. (shrink)

A story does more than recount events; it recounts events in a way that renders them intelligible, thus conveying not just information but also understanding. We might therefore be tempted to describe narrative as a genre of explanation. When the police invite a suspect to “tell his story,” they are asking him to explain the blood on his shirt or his absence from home on the night of the murder; and whether he is judged to have a “good story” (...) will depend on its adequacy as an explanation. Can we account for the explanatory force of narrative with the models of explanation available in the philosophy of science? Or does narrative convey a different kind of understanding, which requires a different model and perhaps even a term other than ‘explanation’? (shrink)

Stephen, Bloom, and Molly apprentice themselves in an experimental spirit to diverse figures from history and legend, figures whose importance to them is something they understand very imperfectly so far. They must speak and act before mixed audiences of fellow Dubliners with diverse senses of history, diverse reasons for minding their business, and diverse claims to understand them better than they understand themselves. So they make ongoing efforts to anticipate the interpretations others might give their sayings and doings, embracing welcome (...) ones while fending off unwelcome ones. To tell their stories, Joyce must break with Flaubert and let the perspectives of diverse characters contest one another within the confines of individual scenes, invoking a character’s distinctive perspective by means of his or her distinctive voice. Two resources he relies on for this purpose are _virtual backtalk_ and what Hugh Kenner called _the Uncle Charles Principle._. (shrink)

Mou Zongsan’s 牟宗三 use of autonomy to reinterpret the history of Ruist ethics has been both profoundly influential and controversial in East Asian scholarship. In this paper, I examine why Mou felt autonomy was indispensable to morality, and how he transformed the concept of autonomy into something very different from how Kant understood it. Mou understood autonomy to mean the true self, identified as the fundamental mind or human nature in itself, acting in a manner free from sensible influence, though (...) not necessarily determined by reason. After examining Mou’s conception of autonomy, I turn to how he argues that intellectual intuition can provide knowledge of autonomy. Four aspects of intellectual intuition are especially crucial: (1) pleasure in moral action; (2) reflective verification of the fundamental mind; (3) giving rise to moral action; (4) unity with all existents. I analyze each of these, and illustrate how Mou provides no certain method of confirming intellectual intuition. Intellectual intuition is supposed to provide knowledge of autonomy, but an agent can’t reliably tell if they’ve experienced it. That leaves autonomy still uncertain. (shrink)

In the twentieth century one interpretative perspective is curiously and strikingly absent: spatiality of narrative. Philosophical thought saw fundamental ontology as founded on temporality with space as decoration. Johannine inquiry has tended to follow in philosophy's temporal footsteps. However, it is plausible to assume that New Testament writers were spatially oriented while modern interpreters have been ensconced in temporal consciousness. Furthermore, as anthropology has long recognized, conceptions of space and place are central to any culture's sense of self. The undue (...) hermeneutic privileging of linearity and causality may have forced biblical texts into a temporal mode of reading that their original authors may not have intended. In understanding biblical worlds it is necessary to again explore spatiality. This essay will introduce textured spatiality as it applies to John 9. It will briefly review temporal thought and consciousness and explain how visual imagery is an essential component to the transmission and preservation of tradition. Textuality will also be used to tell the tale of the man born blind. Using the nature of Shabbat as a pivot, and a narrative juxtaposition of two contrasting Sabbath spaces, the paper will point to a possible Urcarnivalesque element in the chapter. (shrink)

In this book Chris Jenks looks at what the ways in which we construct our image of childhood can tell us about ourselves. After a general discussion of the social construction of childhood, the book is structured around three examples of the way the image of the child is played out in society: the history of childhood from medieval times through the enlightenment 'discovery' of childhood to the present the mythology and reality of child abuse and society's response to (...) it the 'death' of childhood in cases such as the James Bulger murder in which the child itself becomes the perpetrator of evil. Part of the highly successful _Key Ideas_ series, this book gives students a concise, provocative insight into some of the controlling concepts of our culture. (shrink)

I begin by reviewing some conflicting views on what empathy is, how it can occur, and if it is even possible: the scholars mainly discussed are Currie, Carroll, Walton, and Oatley. I conclude that something called empathy does indeed occur – readers tell us that is does – but that it involves psychological processes that involve some properties of feeling: its precognitive, rapid onset; its prototypical aspects; and its powers to modify or qualify other feelings. I discuss some neuropsychological (...) evidence, in particular insights from accounts of mirror neurons, including the process of simulation that seems to underlie empathy, and the question of agency. I focus on empathy and the body, with empirical evidence from readers of a short story. If empathy occurs at the bodily level, it is possible that in amplifying such meanings feeling evokes the reader’s identity, memory, and valuations. I conclude by proposing that empathy is an aspect of our larger capacity for animism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Reason 1: It's a Lie, and Lying is Wrong Reason 2: Santa Doesn't Have Your Best Interests in Mind Reason 3: The Damage to Credulity Having Faith in Santa Cut It Out, Wrap It Up.

Scientists aim to remediate artifacts in their experimental datasets. However, the remediation of one artifact can result in another. Why might this happen, and what does this consequence tell us about how we should account for artifacts and their control? In this paper, I explore a case in functional neuroimaging where remediation appears to have caused this problem. I argue that remediation amounts to a change to an experimental arrangement. These changes need not be surgical, and the arrangement need (...) not satisfy the criterion of causal modularity. Thus, remediation can affect more than just the factor responsible for the artifact. However, if researchers can determine the consequences of their remediation, they can make adjustments that control for the present artifact as well as for previously controlled ones. Current philosophical accounts of artifacts and the factors responsible for them cannot adequately address this issue, as they do not account for what is needed for artifact remediation (and specifically correction). I support my argument by paralleling it with ongoing concerns regarding the transparency of complex computational systems, as near future remediation across the experimental life sciences will likely make greater use of AI tools to correct for artifacts. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists routinely explore questions surrounding reasoning, inquiry, and bias, though typically in disciplinary isolation. What is the source of our intellectual errors? When can we trust information others tell us? This volume brings together researchers from across the two disciplines to present ideas and insights for addressing the challenges of knowing well in a complicated world in four parts: how to best describe the conceptual and empirical terrain of reason and bias; how reasoning and bias influence basic (...) perception of the physical world; how to assess knowledge and expertise in ourselves and others; and how people approach reasoning and knowledge among and about groups. Together, the chapters show what philosophers and psychologists can do together when they shine light on the challenges of reaching the truth and avoiding errors. Reason, Bias, and Inquiry is a multidisciplinary meditation for readers who are awash in information but are uncertain how to manage it to make informed decisions. (shrink)

Rupert Read and David Burnham on what philosophy can tell us about dealing with uncertainty, systemic risk, and potential catastrophe.

Rupert Read and David Burnham on what philosophy can tell us about dealing with uncertainty, systemic risk, and potential catastrophe.

While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science—and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principle areas covered are: The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially dispositions, (...) or are some categorical and others dispositional? Realism in mathematics and its relation to science: What does a naturalistic commitment of scientific realism tell us about our commitments to mathematical entities? Can this question be framed in something other than a Quinean philosophy? Dispositions and their relation to causation: Can we generate an account of causation that takes dispositionality as fundamental? And if we take dispositions as fundamental (and hence not having a categorical causal basis), what is the ontological ground of dispositions? Pandispositionalism: Could all properties be dispositional in nature? Natural kinds: Are there natural kinds, and if so what account of their nature should we give? For example, do they have essences? Here we consider how these issues may be illuminated by considering examples from reals science, in particular biochemistry and neurobiology. (shrink)

Over the past half-century, modelling has come to play an increasingly important role in cancer research. These representational tools frame perceptions of malignant disease, guide public health responses, and help determine which interventions are necessary. But what makes a cancer model a model? What authority do they have? What stories do they tell? And how do they shape our understanding of disease and bodies? To shed light on these questions, this article explores the long history of cancer modelling in (...) sub-Saharan Africa: a place where malignant disease has often been imagined as different, and where experimentation and improvisation in cancer research and treatment has been rife. Drawing on archival and ethnographic sources, we examine modelling strategies that health professionals have used to generate information about cancer in Africa from the mid 20th century to the present day. Focusing on three different case studies – anatomical models of Burkitt's lymphoma patients, diagnostic models for Kaposi sarcoma, and statistical models of the African smoking and lung cancer epidemic – we meditate on the multiplicity of models and modelling by identifying the epistemic strands that hold these representations together, as well as what sets them apart. In addition to contributing to discussions of how cancer research has taken shape beyond the Anglo-American realm, our article helps expand and complicate our understandings of what a disease model is. (shrink)

Some series can go on indefinitely, others cannot, and epistemologists want to know in which class to place epistemic chains. Is it sensible or nonsensical to speak of a proposition or belief that is justified by another proposition or belief, ad infinitum? In large part the answer depends on what we mean by “justification.” Epistemologists have failed to find a definition on which everybody agrees, and some have even advised us to stop looking altogether. In spite of this, the present (...) essay submits a few candidate definitions. It argues that, although not giving the final word, these candidates tell us something about the possibility of infinite epistemic chains. And it shows that they can short-circuit a debate about doxastic justification. (shrink)

By many accounts, HBO’s The Wire was and remains the greatest and most important television drama of all time. Conceived by writers David Simon and ex-Baltimore homicide detective Ed Burns, this five-season, sixty-episode tour de force has raised the bar for compelling, intelligent television production. With each season addressing a different arena of life in the city of Baltimore, and each season’s narratives tapping into those from previous seasons, The Wire was able to reveal the overlapping, criss-crossing, and colliding (...) realities that shape—if not control—the people, institutions, and culture of the modern American city. The Wire and Philosophy celebrates this show’s realism as well as its intellectual and philosophical clarity. Selected philosophers who are fans of The Wire tap into these conflicts and interconnections to expose the underlying philosophical issues and assumptions and pursue questions, such as, Can cops really tell whether they are smarter than their perps? Or do they fall victim to intellectual vanity? Do individuals really have free will to resist the temptations—of gangs, of drugs, or corruption—that surround them? Is David Simon a modern-day Marx who sees capitalism leading ultimately to its own collapse, or is Baltimore’s story uniquely its own? (shrink)

Social choice theory and theories of deliberative discourse have deeply impacted on the way political scientists understand the dynamics of democratic politics and decision-making. _Deliberation, Social Choice and Absolutist Democracy_ addresses the dispute between these competing schools of thought. Deliberative democracy and social choice theorists offer the two dominant and competing conceptions of participation in contemporary democratic theory. With the former holding that theories of discourse tell us that through the democratic process we can arrive at consensus, rational outcomes (...) and even principles of justice, while the latter suggest that fair and equal participation is more likely to lead to instability and irrational outcomes. With an in-depth examination of social choice theory and deliberative democracy, David van Mill: presents two case studies on the American Continental Congress 1774-1789 provides an assessment of the types of institutions that will promote radical democracy and create stable outcomes with the minimum sacrifice of the freedom and equality of participants defends a more radical idea of absolutist democracy, gleaned from the writings of Hobbes, against the claims made in favour of limited constitutional government. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of political theory, particularly those with an interest in democracy and social choice theory. (shrink)

This paper proffers an account of why interdisciplinary research on, inter alia, the nature of time can be fruitful even if the disciplines in question have different explanatory pro-jects. We suggest that the special sciences perform a subject setting role for lower-level disciplines such as physics. In essence, they tell us where, amongst a theory of the physical world, we should expect to locate phenomena such as temporality; they tell us what it would take for there to be (...) time. Physical theory tells us whether there is anything like that in the world and what its hidden nature is. Only working in tandem can physics and the special sciences locate and describe the phenomenon that is time. (shrink)

Far more telling than mere biography, this collection of the extant letters exchanged between philosopher Jacques Maritain and social activist Saul Alinsky reveals a deep and intimate friendship, however unexpected and unlikely. Indeed, to all who knew or knew of them the dignified, prominent philosopher and the earthy, truculent genius of social reform seemed antithetical to one another in almost every way. The Maritain-Alinsky correspondence began in 1945, shortly after they met, and continued until Alinsky's death in 1972. The tone (...) and content of the letters vary widely, ranging from expressions of mutual admiration and friendship, to details of the triumphs and tragedies of their personal lives, to anguished considerations of death and immortality. In their letters Maritain and Alinsky offer each other personal expressions of strong mutual support - as well as judicious warnings and slightly apprehensive distancing - for the different works each had undertaken at various times in his respective careers. They also discuss the Catholic church, taking ironic jibes at clerical pomposity and exchanging praise of the socially aware. Though it is difficult to tell whether either man had a significant influence on the thought and work of the other, their correspondence attests that the philosopher and the provocateur, so different in personality, educational backgrounds, demeanor, and intellectual affinities, enjoyed a surprisingly intimate and extraordinary friendship. With context and interpretation of the letters provided by the editor, this intriguing collection of lively, moving letters not only reveals the depths of a most improbable friendship, it also goes far in exposing thehumanity behind the personas. (shrink)

Which role do concepts play in a person's actions? Do concepts underwrite the very idea of agency in somebody's acting? Or is the appeal to concepts in action a problematic form of over-intellectualization which obstructs a proper picture of genuine agency? Within the large and complicated terrain of these questions, the debate about know-how has been of special interest in recent years. In this paper, I shall try to spell out what know-how can tell us about the role of (...) concepts in action. I will argue that the fact that people possess and exercise know-how is indeed suited to deliver a number of important insights as to where and how concepts play a role in action. But I shall argue that these insights are limited in that they fail to cover the whole realm of relevant phenomena. (shrink)

I argue that skeptical theism does not imply skepticism about theologically indispensable propositions. I distinguish metaphorical truth and belief from “ordinary” or cognitive truth and belief. I then argue that the belief that theologically indispensable propositions like “Jesus is the Son of God” are true belongs to the former, metaphorical kind of belief. I therefore argue that God cannot tell us that they are true without commanding us to do something that is either moral or immoral. If then He (...) loves us in the “parental” sense, and it is detrimental to our well-being to do something immoral, I argue that He cannot tell us that such a proposition is true unless it is. (shrink)

What can _South Park_ tell us about Socrates and the nature of evil? How does _The Office_ help us to understand Sartre and existentialist ethics? Can _Battlestar Galactica_ shed light on the existence of God? _Introducing Philosophy Through Pop Culture_ uses popular culture to illustrate important philosophical concepts and the work of the major philosophers With examples from film, television, and music including _South Park_, _The Matrix_, _X-Men_, _Batman_, _Harry Potter, Metallica_ and _Lost,_ even the most abstract and complex (...) philosophical ideas become easier to grasp Features key essays from across the Blackwell _Philosophy and Pop Culture_ series, as well as helpful editorial material and a glossary of philosophical terms From metaphysics to epistemology; from ethics to the meaning of life, this unique introduction makes philosophy as engaging as popular culture itself Supplementary website available with teaching guides, sample materials and links to further resources at _www.pop-philosophy.org_. (shrink)

After the thinking of his time has passed, what can Spinoza still tell us today? In this essay, I will take Spinoza’s ethics out of the metaphysics in which his thinking was formed, deconstructing his notions of substance, human body, God, and intellectual love, in order to redeem their use and promise for everyday life. This essay is therefore an attempt to rethink in fundamental ways how Spinoza’s ethics could be detached and freed from his problematic ontology, so as (...) to continue addressing us living today in a world that increasingly functions without reference to God. What might make his ethics, thus unbound, still relevant? (shrink)

This paper considers ways in which rulers can respond to, generate, or exploit fear of COVID-19 infection for various ends, and in particular distinguishes between ‘fear-invoking’ and ‘fear-minimising’ strategies. It examines historical precedent for executive overreach in crises and then moves on to look in more detail at some specific areas where fear is being mobilised or generated: in ways that lead to the suspension of civil liberties; that foster discrimination against minorities; and that boost the personality cult of leaders (...) and limit criticism or competition. Finally, in the Appendix, we present empirical work, based on the results of an original survey in Brazil, that provides support for the conjectures in the previous sections. While it is too early to tell what the longer-term outcomes of the changes we note will be, our purpose here is simply to identify some warning signs that threaten the key institutions and values of democracy. (shrink)

What has compelled Jews in the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, and abroad to promote a positive image of Ottomans and Turks while they deny the Armenian genocide and the existence of anti-Semitism in Turkey? The dominant historical narrative is that Jews expelled from Spain in 1492 were embraced by the Ottoman Empire, and then later, protected from the Nazis during WWII. If we believe that Turks and Jews have lived in harmony for so long, then it is hard for us to (...) accept that the Turks could have committed genocide against the Armenians. In this article, the author confronts these convictions and circumstances to reflect on what moral responsibility the descendants of the victims of one genocide have to the descendants of victims of another. Baer delves into the history of Muslim-Jewish relations in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey to tease out the origin of these many tangled truths. He aims to bring about reconciliation between Jews, Muslims, and Christians, not only to face inconvenient historical facts, but to confront it and come to terms with it. By looking at the complexities of interreligious relations, Holocaust denial, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and confronting some long-standing historical stereotypes, the author sets out to tell a new history that goes against Turkish antisemitism and admits to the Armenian genocide. (shrink)

The public often believes that parents have a right to make medical decisions about their child. The idea that, in respect of children, doctors should do what parents tell them to do is problematic on the face of it. The effect of such a claim would be that a doctor who acted deliberately to harm a child would be making a morally correct decision, providing only that it is what the child’s parents said they wanted. That is so obviously (...) nonsense that it cannot be what people who claim it actually mean. In this paper, I suggest that the claim actually represents either or both of two misunderstandings. It can be a result of wrongly appealing to the principle of respect for autonomy, or a belief that doctors are not committed to acting in the interests of the child. In this paper, I show that, while neither belief is entirely justified, there are elements of truth in both. I argue that if ethically correct decisions are those that are directed to improving the quality of a child’s existence, then neither parents nor doctors are in a position to make ethically correct decisions about a child except in discussion with one another. Where such discussion is not possible, I suggest there should be a national Children’s Interests Panel to agree on the child’s interests. The panel should include, but not be limited to, paediatricians and lawyers and its decisions should be legally binding on all parties. (shrink)

Our understanding and praxis of spiritual formation is only as sound as our theology of the Holy Spirit. Unfortunately, there is a common shortcoming that leaves our theology of the Spirit less than fully capable of rendering an adequate account of the Holy Spirit's agency in transforming a person into the likeness of Christ. Theology of the Holy Spirit commonly emphasizes victorious and genteel themes while failing to articulate adequately that the Spirit is a direct agent in transformative suffering. Some (...) of the Comforter's most important sanctifying work is exceedingly discomforting. This article focuses on these less palatable aspects of the Spirit's work in an attempt to tell a fuller story about the Spirit. By adding often-neglected dimensions and textures to our theology of the third Person, we are more capable of articulating the full range of the Spirit's role in formation. (shrink)

The management literature is not short of tools for helping people to make wiser decisions. This paper outlines another tool so it must be asked how can it justify itself given the substantial work that is already done. We suggest that many tools either fail to properly integrate, or simply lack an analysis of (i) showinghow emotions help or hinder solving the problem, (ii) the role of creative and critical thinking and (Hi), working out what values are at issue in (...) the problem. These three categories can be integrated into a decision-making procedure through an analysis of the stages of decision making While the emphasis that is laid on these stages will differ depending upon the problem, we suggest that wise decision making requires (i) gaining an adequate understanding of the situation, (ii) working out what matters, (Hi) generating options, (iv) selecting an option on the basis of what matters and (v) carrying out the option. As practical philosophers we must ask how each of these stages can be adequately carried out, and here we seek to show how philosophy, and other disciplines, can help for the three areas we identify above as lacunae. In looking at the role of emotions we base our analysis on the Aristotelian and Stoic notion that the core of emotions is that they are judgements. This analysis allows us to make sense of both the rationalist view that emotions are a hindrance, and the romantic notion that emotions are a help. Wise decision making involves unpacking emotions to see what they can reliably tell us about the situation, our values, potential options and how they can motivate us. We suggest ways this task can be achieved. Critical thinking needs to be employed throughout the decision-making procedure so that we fairly andadequately understand the situation and assess potential values and options. We outline some key skills and interventions that can be employed. Critical thinking needs material to work on so we suggest how creative thinking can be used to reframe the situation, and generate potential values and options. The driving force of making a decision is, or at least should be, the values we wish to realise with our decision; what we think matters. Some decisions are purely prudential and here we draw upon ideas of Nozick, Griffin, Aristotle and Epicurus to suggest ways the decision maker can evaluate their prudential values. For ethical decisions ideas from Mill, Kant and others can help us think through what we wish to achieve. We end with a case study to illustrate how the procedure works in practice. (shrink)

Physical pain has no voice, but when it at last finds a voice, it begins to tell a story, and the story that it tells is about the inseparability of these three subjects, their embeddedness in one another. (Scarry, BP, 3).

Vision, more than any other sense, dominates our mental life. Our visual experience is just so rich, so detailed, that we can hardly distinguish that experience from the world itself. Even when we just think about the world and don't look at it directly, we can't help but 'imagine' what it looks like. We think of 'seeing' as being a conscious activity--we direct our eyes, we choose what we look at, we register what we are seeing. The series of events (...) described in this book radically altered this attitude towards vision. This book describes one of the most extraordinary neurological cases of recent years--one that profoundly changed scientific views on consciousness. It is the story of Dee Fletcher--a woman recently blinded--who became the subject of a series of scientific studies. As events unfolded, Milner and Goodale found that Dee wasn't in fact blind--she just didn't know that she could see. Taking us on a journey into the unconscious brain, the two scientists who made this incredible discovery tell the amazing story of their work, and the surprising conclusion they were forced to reach. Written to be accessible to students and popular science readers, this book is a fascinating illustration of the power of the 'unconscious' mind. (shrink)

This contribution is a criticism of some points David Carr brings forward both in his 1991 book (Educating the Virtues) but even more so in his 1996 article in this journal (After Kohlberg: Some Implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the Theory of Moral Education and Development). With the help of a virtue approach Carr tries to solve the moral objectivism-moral relativism dilemma and the deontologism-consequentialism dilemma in ethics. I will argue that his attempt, though very interesting, suffers (...) from some serious flaws and that, either, Carr's position is much closer to a Kantian approach than Carr thinks, or Carr's position needs a good deal of clarification. (shrink)

From the bestselling coauthor of Wittgenstein's Poker, a fascinating tour through the history of moral philosophy A runaway train is racing toward five men who are tied to the track. Unless the train is stopped, it will inevitably kill all five men. You are standing on a footbridge looking down on the unfolding disaster. However, a fat man, a stranger, is standing next to you: if you push him off the bridge, he will topple onto the line and, although he (...) will die, his chunky body will stop the train, saving five lives. Would you kill the fat man? The question may seem bizarre. But it's one variation of a puzzle that has baffled moral philosophers for almost half a century and that more recently has come to preoccupy neuroscientists, psychologists, and other thinkers as well. In this book, David Edmonds, coauthor of the bestselling Wittgenstein's Poker, tells the riveting story of why and how philosophers have struggled with this ethical dilemma, sometimes called the trolley problem. In the process, he provides an entertaining and informative tour through the history of moral philosophy. Most people feel it's wrong to kill the fat man. But why? After all, in taking one life you could save five. As Edmonds shows, answering the question is far more complex—and important—than it first appears. In fact, how we answer it tells us a great deal about right and wrong. (shrink)

“Tell me," Wittgenstein once asked a friend, "why do people always say, it was natural for man to assume that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth was rotating?" His friend replied, "Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going round the Earth." Wittgenstein replied, "Well, what would it have looked like if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?” What would it have looked like if we looked at (...) all sciences from the viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s philosophy? Wittgenstein is undoubtedly one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His complex body of work has been analysed by numerous scholars, from mathematicians and physicists, to philosophers, linguists, and beyond. This volume brings together some of his central perspectives as applied to the modern sciences and studies the influence they may have on the thought processes underlying science and on the world view it engenders. The contributions stem from leading scholars in philosophy, mathematics, physics, economics, psychology and human sciences; all of them have written in an accessible style that demands little specialist knowledge, whilst clearly portraying and discussing the deep issues at hand. (shrink)

This essay explores the nature of teaching, the relationship between teacher and student, and the scope and limits of new learning technologies. Teaching, whatever else it might be, involves the imparting of knowledge. To illuminate this, I turn to the epistemology of testimony and consider Anscombe's idea of trusting another for the truth, a notion that conveys something of the second-personal dimension of teaching and learning. But the teacher asks her students to believe, not her, but ‘what is known’. She (...) speaks for the discipline (or ‘as the science’ as Rödl puts it). To develop this idea and counter potential misunderstandings, I argue that someone who speaks for a discipline must be open to criticism, responsive to those who seek understanding, and willing to think on their feet in ways that exhibits a range of intellectual virtues. If students are to acquire the power to speak as the discipline themselves, they must be initiated into it as a living practice, not just guided through it as if in a museum. I argue that, while new technologies can enhance learning in a variety of ways, the requisite engagement is difficult to engender in online courses, which threaten or distort the essentially second-personal, dialogical character of teaching and learning. The humanity of the relation of teacher and learner is precious because it encapsulates what it is to love knowledge as it finds expression in the person of another. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EkVnrpWtNnQ. (shrink)

Consider the following two (hypothetical) generic causal claims: “Living in a neighborhood with many families with children increases purchases of bicycles” and “living in an affluent neighborhood with many families with children increases purchases of bicycles.” These claims not only differ in what they suggest about how bicycle ownership is distributed across different neighborhoods (i.e., “the data”), but also have the potential to communicate something about the speakers’ values: namely, the prominence they accord to affluence in representing and making decisions (...) about the social world. Here, we examine the relationship between the level of granularity with which a cause is described in a generic causal claim (e.g., neighborhood vs. affluent neighborhood) and the value of the information contained in the causal model that generates that claim. We argue that listeners who know any two of the following can make reliable inferences about the third: 1) the level of granularity at which a speaker makes a generic causal claim, 2) the speaker’s values, and 3) the data available to the speaker. We present results of four experiments (N=1,323) in the domain of social categories that provide evidence in keeping with these predictions. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What Role for Philosophy? Wittgenstein and Davidson Wittgenstein and Davidson Contrasted McDowell The Idea of Bildung Understanding the Bildungsprozess The Conceptual and the Practical Conclusion.

This paper explores what computational methodologies can tell us about philosophical education, particularly in the context of artificial intelligence (AI) ethics. Taking the readings on our AI ethics and responsible AI syllabi as a corpus of AI ethics literature, we conduct an analysis of the content of these courses through a variety of methods: word frequency analysis, term frequency–inverse document frequency (TF–IDF) scoring, document vectorization via SciBERT, clustering via k-means, and topic modelling using latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA). We reflect (...) on the findings of these analyses, and more broadly on what computational approaches can offer to the practice of philosophical education. Finally, we compare our approach to previous computational approaches in philosophy, and more broadly in the digital humanities. This project offers a proof of concept for how contemporary natural-language processing techniques can be used to support philosophical pedagogy: not only to reflect critically on what we teach, but to discover new materials, explore conceptual gaps, and make our courses more accessible to students from a range of disciplinary backgrounds. (shrink)

This volume contains the editions of polemical texts by Erasmus against Martin Luther and Pierre Cousturier, of his defence against attacks on his oration on matrimony (and celibacy), and of his immensely popular ‘pocket’ edition of the _Disticha Catonis_.

This is an excerpt from the contentThere has been increasing interest in recent years in dual process theories of human thought. This special issue of Mind and Society reflects this interest, some criticisms of these theories, and the major topics that have been discussed and debated as a result. There is the basic topic of how the postulated dual processes should be defined in the first place. Do these processes have essential defining features that can be distinguished from less central (...) correlates? Can decoupling, metarepresentation, or working memory be used for making the essential distinction?There are questions about how these dual processes work and interact. What do dual process theories tell us about different modes of thought and insight in problem solving? One topic that could throw light on these questions is creative thinking. It deals with novelties and yet can be rule following. It can be an aspect of hypothetical thinking, but how far it is a conscious or unconscious process is still unknown. There is th. (shrink)

Many of us learned that slavery began in the English North American colonies in1619 when twenty Africans were purchased from the crew of a Dutch ship that had stopped at Jamestown for provisions. Colonial records do not tell us the fate of the Africans who arrived in Jamestown’s early years. This paper uses legislative and judicial records to reconstruct that history. The institution was not imported from England, under whose laws (which governed its colonies) one person could not own (...) another. Chattel slavery was created by the colonial elite who decided to make their very profitable tobacco industry even more profitable by using slaves instead of contract labor. Colonial records reveal that unlawful enslavement was officially tolerated for decades; that it was incrementally regulated to meet slave-owners’ felt needs; and that it was not legally authorized until late in the seventeenth or early in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

The second chapter begins by engaging with some of the most prominent anti-gothic gothic fiction created over the past century: paranoid psycho-geographical fantasy in poems by Iain Sinclair, novels by Peter Ackroyd, essays by Stewart Home and graphic novels by Alan Moore. The potential for such provocative misreadings of the English baroque is shown to have a basis in the architecture itself, and it is suggested that the scope for uncanny sensations opened up by the structures might have much to (...) tell us about the post-modernist baroque revival, the fiction of Sinclair and Moore having as much to do with the Thatcherite renovation of the metropolis as anything in the theory and practice of Nicholas Hawksmoor. (shrink)

What is it to make a sincere promise? It is commonly believed that a sincere promisor must intend to do what he is promising to do. But a promisor need not communicate the intention of doing what he is promising to do. For example, a promisor can sincerely promise in anticipation of being released from their promise and without forming any intention to perform. A sincere promisor is rather one who intends to change the normative situation in a certain way, (...) namely by undertaking the obligation of doing what he is promising to do. In this respect sincerity in promising is like sincerity in the exercise of other normative powers like command, a parallel suggested by the authority interest theory. Finally, the fact that it is often difficult to tell when someone has promised to perform, rather than merely expressed the intention so to do, does not undermine the importance of the distinction between communicating a promise and a mere intention. (shrink)

By its very nature, much of teamwork is distributed across, and not stored within, interdependent people working toward a common goal. In this light, we advocate a systems perspective on teamwork that is based on general coordination principles that are not limited to cognitive, motor, and physiological levels of explanation within the individual. In this article, we present a framework for understanding and modeling teams as dynamical systems and review our empirical findings on teams as dynamical systems. We proceed by (...) (a) considering the question of why study teams as dynamical systems, (b) considering the meaning of dynamical systems concepts (attractors; perturbation; synchronization; fractals) in the context of teams, (c) describe empirical studies of team coordination dynamics at the perceptual-motor, cognitive-behavioral, and cognitive-neurophysiological levels of analysis, and (d) consider the theoretical and practical implications of this approach, including new kinds of explanations of human performance and real-time analysis and performance modeling. Throughout our discussion of the topics we consider how to describe teamwork using equations and/or modeling techniques that describe the dynamics. Finally, we consider what dynamical equations and models do and do not tell us about human performance in teams and suggest future research directions in this area. (shrink)

In this essay I will examine why the truth is so important to human communication in general, the types of truth, and why truth is only a relative value. After those introductory points, I will sketch the ways in which the truth is overridden or trumped by other concerns in the clinical setting. I will then discuss cases that fall into five distinct categories. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of truth telling and its primacy among secondary goods in the healthcare (...) professional-patient relationship. (shrink)