Luce and Krantz (1971) presented an axiom system for conditional expected utility. In this theory a conditional decision is a function whose domain is a non-null subevent and whose range is a subset of a set of consequences. Given a family of conditional decisions that is closed under unions of decisions whose domains are disjoint and under restrictions to non-null subevents, the second major primitive is an ordering of the family. Axioms were given that are adequate to (...) construct a numerical utility function over decisions and a probability function over events for which the conditional expectation of the utility is order preserving. Several of the axioms are quite complex and seem a bit artificial, and the proof is very long. Here the structure is modified by adding to the set of outcomes a concatenation operation, and the representation theorem is modified by requiring that the utility function be additive over this binary operation as well as exhibiting the expected utility property. The advantages of this pair of changes are, first, it exploits the obvious fact that the union of consequences is itself a consequence; second, it reduces the mathematical burden carried by the set theoretic structure of conditional decisions and, as a result, the axioms can be made much easier to understand; and third, it permits a considerably shorter proof because one can draw more readily on known results. The major drawback of this approach is, of course, that it is inconsistent with the evidence that utility is not additive over consequences - at least, not over increasing amounts of a single good (diminishing marginal utility). (shrink)

An expected utility model of individual choice is formulated which allows the decision maker to specify his available actions in the form of controls (partial contingency plans) and to simultaneously choose goals and controls in end-mean pairs. It is shown that the Savage expected utility model, the Marschak- Radner team model, the Bayesian statistical decision model, and the standard optimal control model can be viewed as special cases of this goal-control expected utility model.

The general question of defining the expectation value of an operator for a fixed value of another noncommuting observable is considered and explicit expressions are derived. Due to the noncommutivity of operators a unique definition is not possible, and we consider different possible expressions. Special cases which have previously been considered in the literature are shown to be derivable from the methods presented.

The Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is typically taken to highlight a tension between our intuition that certain conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero conditioning events are well defined and the mathematical definition of conditional probability by Bayes’ formula, which loses its meaning when the conditioning event has probability zero. We argue in this paper that the theory of conditional expectations is the proper mathematical device to conditionalize and that this theory allows conditionalization with respect to probability zero events. (...) The conditional probabilities on probability zero events in the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox also can be calculated using conditional expectations. The alleged clash arising from the fact that one obtains different values for the conditional probabilities on probability zero events depending on what conditional expectation one uses to calculate them is resolved by showing that the different conditional probabilities obtained using different conditional expectations cannot be interpreted as calculating in different parametrizations of the conditional probabilities of the same event with respect to the same conditioning conditions. We conclude that there is no clash between the correct intuition about what the conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero events are and the technically proper concept of conditionalization via conditional expectations—the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is just a pseudo-paradox. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to fill the gap in studying logics for biprobability structures. We introduce the logic equation image with two conditional expectation operators and prove the completeness theorem. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

The Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox is typically taken to highlight a tension between our intuition that certain conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero conditioning events are well defined and the mathematical definition of conditional probability by Bayes’ formula, which loses its meaning when the conditioning event has probability zero. We argue in this paper that the theory of conditional expectations is the proper mathematical device to conditionalize and that this theory allows conditionalization with respect to probability zero events. (...) The conditional probabilities on probability zero events in the Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox also can be calculated using conditional expectations. The alleged clash arising from the fact that one obtains different values for the conditional probabilities on probability zero events depending on what conditional expectation one uses to calculate them is resolved by showing that the different conditional probabilities obtained using different conditional expectations cannot be interpreted as calculating in different parametrizations of the conditional probabilities of the same event with respect to the same conditioning conditions. We conclude that there is no clash between the correct intuition about what the conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero events are and the technically proper concept of conditionalization via conditional expectations the Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox is just a pseudo-paradox. (shrink)

Reflection and martingale principles are central to models of rational learning. They can be justified in a variety of ways. In what follows we study martingale and reflection principles in the con...

We investigate the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general Bayesian learning” means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent performing the inference. States are linear functionals that encode probability measures by assigning expectation values to random variables via integrating them with respect to the (...) probability measure. If a state can be learned from another this way, then it is said to be Bayes accessible from the evidence. It is shown that the Bayes accessibility relation is reflexive, antisymmetric and non-transitive. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations includes both Bayes’ rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization. (shrink)

We investigate the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general Bayesian learning” means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent performing the inference. States are linear functionals that encode probability measures by assigning expectation values to random variables via integrating them with respect to the (...) probability measure. If a state can be learned from another this way, then it is said to be Bayes accessible from the evidence. It is shown that the Bayes accessibility relation is reflexive, antisymmetric and non-transitive. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations includes both Bayes’ rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization. (shrink)

Several fallacies of conditionalization are illustrated, using the two-envelope problem as a case in point.

Sequel to Armendt 1986, ‘A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.’ The representation theorem for causal decision theory is slightly revised, with the addition of a new restriction on lotteries and a new axiom (A7). The discussion gives some emphasis to the way in which appropriate K-partitions are characterized by relations found among the agent’s conditional preferences. The intended interpretation of conditional preference is one that embodies a sensitivity to the agent’s causal beliefs.

Human relationships are formed and maintained through interaction, yet it is consistently observed that even under identical interactional conditions, the outcomes of relationships—whether maintained, transformed, or broken—differ across individuals. Existing theories of relationships have primarily explained this phenomenon through emotional factors or interactional structures, but they have failed to sufficiently account for why the same structure produces different relational outcomes. To address this problem, this paper focuses on the idea that the outcomes of relationships are determined not by the interaction (...) structure itself, but by the internal conditions through which that structure is interpreted and processed by individuals. To this end, the paper distinguishes recognition from respect and analyzes respect as a non-automatic process that does not necessarily follow from recognition. It further introduces respect capacity as the ability to maintain the boundaries and rights of others, and systematically examines its components and variability. In addition, the paper formalizes the concept of expectation distortion by showing that expectations can be formed prior to interaction through projection processes and can be maintained and reinforced through cognitive distortion. Trust is defined not as an emotional state, but as the accumulated result of repeated choices, and is analyzed as a structure formed around predictability and the willingness to maintain the relationship, which can gradually collapse over time. Based on these discussions, the paper presents a sequential structure of recognition–respect–interaction–expectation–trust, emphasizing that this entire process is filtered through the internal conditions of individuals. Through this, it explains the mechanism by which relational outcomes diverge under identical interactional structures and proposes a theoretical framework for analyzing the formation, maintenance, and breakdown of human relationships at the level of individual differences. (shrink)

Davey suggests that increased resistance to extinction of CRs conditioned to fear-relevant stimuli may be due to more persistent expectancies of the UCS following these stimuli. However, this viewpoint is contradicted by existing empirical evidence that fear-relevant CRs survive an extinction trials series producing extinction of expectancies whereas CRs conditioned to non-fear-relevant CSs do not.

A plausible view in the literature on the epistemic condition of blameworthiness is the Reasonable Expectation View (RE). According to RE, whether ignorance excuses an agent from deserving blame is a matter of whether the agent could have reasonably been expected to have avoided or corrected the ignorance. This paper does not take up the task of defending this view, but instead examines what it implies for an interesting type of ignorance: moral or political ignorance rooted in myside bias. (...) With the prevalence of increasing political polarization, it is worth examining what a plausible view like RE implies about when, if ever, myside bias-based ignorance excuses the agent from blame—from deserving resentment or indignation. To assess this issue, the paper examines the empirical literature on what it takes to mitigate myside bias and then takes the United States as a case study to examine what RE implies for the actual non-ideal circumstances many agents are in. The paper argues that RE has two revisionary implications for our practice of blame. First, the paper argues that RE implies that political or moral ignorance rooted in myside bias is currently an excuse in a surprising number of cases. Second, our epistemic position to know whether a given instance of political or moral ignorance is excusing is often inadequate. (shrink)

During evaluative conditioning, a neutral conditional stimulus becomes pleasant or unpleasant after pairings with a positive/negative unconditional stimulus. Measures of US expectancy are...

Engineering and scientific education conditions us to expect everything, including intelligence, to have a simple, compact explanation. Accordingly, when people new to AI ask "What's AI all about," they seem to expect an answer that defines AI in terms of a few basic mathematical laws.

As a rapidly growing emerging capital market, China has attracted the attention of both investors and scholars. To alleviate the expectation of external users of listed companies’ financial statements to “discount” items in levels 2 and 3 of the fair value measurement, listed companies will treat these items as conditional conservatism. It refers to the conservatism of companies when confirming bad news of unrealized gains and losses sooner than confirming good news. A sample was selected for empirical analysis (...) to verify the existence of this relationship. The results are as follows: the higher the proportion of levels 2 and 3 fair value measurements, the stronger the conditional conservatism of the company’s profit and loss; the higher the proportion of cash holding of operating activities in a company’s operating profit and the higher the audit quality, the higher the proportion of levels 2 and 3 fair value hierarchy measurements, and the stronger the conditional conservatism of the company’s profit and loss; and the lesser the internal control defects in a company, the higher the proportion of levels 2 and 3 fair value hierarchy measurements, and the stronger the conditional conservatism of its profit and loss. The findings provide empirical evidence to identify listed companies adopting conditional conservatism to alleviate discounting expectations of fair value items of financial statements’ external users and provide a reference for improving the standards and regulation of listed companies. (shrink)

Legitimate expectations should be considered in the transition to a low-carbon society. After explaining under what conditions and circumstances expectations are legitimate, this paper shows that those expectations whose frustration undermines the ability to plan, infringes basic moral rights, or is extremely costly for its bearer might justify a deviation in the baseline of justice in favour of the expectation holder. People should be notified about the likely frustration of their expectations so that they can avoid the frustration of (...) their expectations, adapt their life plans and minimise costs. Since the frustration of legitimate expectations seems unavoidable in the transformation to a low-carbon society, priority should be given to the protection of the expectations of those who cannot be materially compensated. Still, if two groups are eligible for material compensation, we should give priority to protecting the expectation of those who cannot continue with the same life plan as before if their expectations are frustrated. (shrink)

This paper discusses how legitimate expectations should be treated during transitional processes. It examines whether the state may frustrate those expectations which, although legitimate at time T1, are no longer legitimate at time T2 due to changed circumstances. It also discusses the conditions under which those whose expectations may be frustrated during transitional processes should receive compensation. First, we argue that legitimate expectations reflect a legitimate interest in receiving the benefits of the basic structure of society. We then distinguish between (...) legitimate expectations that are protected by rights and those that are not. We argue that while the former type of legitimate expectation may be justifiably frustrated when doing so is necessary to achieve a more just society, the range of cases in which it is permissible to frustrate the latter type of expectation is broader. Finally, we argue that when someone is committed to a particular life plan based on an expectation that was legitimate at T1 but is no longer legitimate at T2 because of changed circumstances, the value of personal autonomy gives rise to a meta-expectation that people will be given some time to adjust their life plans to new circumstances. We also argue that the frustration of expectations that are no longer legitimate during transitions may still require compensation after the change in circumstances, if the agent responsible for creating the expectation frustrates it and the expectation holder has done nothing wrong in relying on it. (shrink)

Expected utility theory often falls silent, even in cases where the correct rankings of options seems obvious. For instance, it fails to compare the Pasadena game to the Altadena game, despite the latter turning out better in every state. Decision theorists have attempted to fill these silences by proposing various extensions to expected utility theory. As I show in this paper, such extensions often fall silent too, even in cases where the correct ranking is intuitively obvious. But we can extend (...) the theory further than has been done before—I offer a new extension, Invariant Value Theory, which deals neatly with those problem cases and also satisfies various desirable conditions. But other prima facie desirable conditions, including Independence, the theory violates. Is this a problem for the proposal? It may not be—in a new impossibility result, I show that no theory can satisfy Independence in full generality without violating several other conditions that together seem just as plausible. (shrink)

There is a broad consensus in the leading general literature on norms and norm-change that norms are conditional, and based on descriptive and normative expectations. Expectations are a sub-set of beliefs. Hence some primary barriers to norm-change arise from dynamics among beliefs, and between beliefs and preferences. However, the literature has under-examined the distinction between two such barriers, preference falsification and pluralistic ignorance. We clarify the implications of the distinction for two leading conceptual frameworks (due to Kuran and Bicchieri, (...) respectively), and ultimately for explicit models, of norms and norm change. We furthermore explain how, once this clarification is in place, the two models are naturally reconciled by interpreting the concepts of belief – and also preference – that they incorporate as based on attribution from Dennett’s intentional stance. (shrink)

Expected accuracy arguments have been used by several authors (Leitgeb and Pettigrew, and Greaves and Wallace) to support the diachronic principle of conditionalization, in updates where there are only finitely many possible propositions to learn. I show that these arguments can be extended to infinite cases, giving an argument not just for conditionalization but also for principles known as ‘conglomerability’ and ‘reflection’. This shows that the expected accuracy approach is stronger than has been realized. I also argue that we should (...) be careful to distinguish diachronic update principles from related synchronic principles for conditional probability. (shrink)

The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk (like Pascal's Mugging), and intolerably paradoxical in cases like the St. Petersburg and Pasadena games. In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, stochastic dominance reasoning can capture most of the plausible implications of expectational reasoning while avoiding most of its pitfalls. Specifically, given sufficient background uncertainty (...) about the choiceworthiness of one's options, many expectation-maximizing gambles that do not stochastically dominate their alternatives "in a vacuum" become stochastically dominant in virtue of that background uncertainty. But, even under these conditions, stochastic dominance will not require agents to accept options whose expectational superiority depends on sufficiently small probabilities of extreme payoffs. The sort of background uncertainty on which these results depend looks unavoidable for any agent who measures the choiceworthiness of her options in part by the total amount of value in the resulting world. At least for such agents, then, stochastic dominance offers a plausible general principle of choice under uncertainty that can explain more of the apparent rational constraints on such choices than has previously been recognized. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that a necessary condition on moral blameworthiness is that the wrongdoer can reasonably be expected to avoid the action for which she is blamed. Those who think so assume as a matter of course that the expectations at issue here are normative expectations that contrast with the non-normative or predictive expectations we form concerning the probable conduct of others, and they believe, or at least assume, that there is a clear-cut distinction between the two. In this paper (...) I put this widespread assumption under scrutiny and argue that it’s mistaken: although predictive and normative expectations are indeed distinct, there is no sharp separation between them. On the contrary, predictive expectations can have a substantial bearing on normative expectations in two related ways: they can recalibrate what is reasonable to expect of agents when responsibility attributions are at stake and they can help to uncover previously undetected excusing conditions. I illustrate my claims with the famous bystander effect from social psychology and show that it yields predictive expectations that affect normative expectations in these two ways. (shrink)

Standard theories of expected utility require that preferences are complete, and/or Archimedean. We present in this paper a theory of decision under uncertainty for both incomplete and non-Archimedean preferences. Without continuity assumptions, incomplete preferences on a lottery space reduce to an order-extension problem. It is well known that incomplete preferences can be extended to complete preferences in the full generality, but this result does not necessarily hold for incomplete preferences which satisfy the independence axiom, since it may obviously happen that (...) the extension does not satisfy the independence axiom. We show, for incomplete preferences on a mixture space, that an extension which satisfies the independence axiom exists. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for a preorder on a finite lottery space to be representable by a family of lexicographic von Neumann–Morgenstern Expected Utility functions. (shrink)

This note is a generalization and improved interpretation of the main result of Karni and Schmeidler. A decision-maker is supposed to possess a preference relation on acts and another preference relation on state-prize lotteries, both of which are assumed to satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms. In addition, the two preference relations restricted to a state of nature are assumed to agree. We show that these axioms are necessary and sufficient for the existence of subjective expected utility over acts with state-dependent (...) utility functions and a subjective probability measure. This subjective probability measure is unique when conditioned on the set of states of nature in which not all the prizes are equally desirable. (shrink)

Expectations play an important role in how people plan their lives and pursue their projects. People living in highly industrialized countries share a way of life that comes with high levels of emissions. Their expectations to be able to continue their projects imply their holding expectations to similarly high future levels of personal emissions. We argue that the frustration or undermining of these expectations would cause them significant harm. Further, the article investigates under what conditions people can be thought to (...) hold legitimate expectations, in particular about permissible levels of future emissions. We distinguish differing theories of understanding these conditions, namely authority-based and justice-based theories, that each allows us to systematically distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate expectations. Furthermore, with respect to individuals’ future permissible emissions we give several reasons for holding that such theories cannot identify a particular expectation to a specific level of personal emissions as the only legitimate one. Finally, we argue that the set of legitimate expectations that people hold with respect to a just and effective solution to climate change has normative significance in at least two ways: the differing but equally legitimate expectations ought to be taken into account when justifying what could count as such a solution and when determining the just way of arriving at and implementing such a solution. (shrink)

I introduce a mathematical account of expectation based on a qualitative criterion of coherence for qualitative comparisons between gambles (or random quantities). The qualitative comparisons may be interpreted as an agent’s comparative preference judgments over options or more directly as an agent’s comparative expectation judgments over random quantities. The criterion of coherence is reminiscent of de Finetti’s quantitative criterion of coherence for betting, yet it does not impose an Archimedean condition on an agent’s comparative judgments, it does not (...) require the binary relation reflecting an agent’s comparative judgments to be reflexive, complete or even transitive, and it applies to an absolutely arbitrary collection of gambles, free of structural conditions (e.g., closure, measurability, etc.). Moreover, unlike de Finetti’s criterion of coherence, the qualitative criterion respects the principle of weak dominance, a standard of rational decision making that obliges an agent to reject a gamble that is possibly worse and certainly no better than another gamble available for choice. Despite these weak assumptions, I establish a qualitative analogue of de Finetti’s Fundamental Theorem of Prevision, from which it follows that any coherent system of comparative expectations can be extended to a weakly ordered coherent system of comparative expectations over any collection of gambles containing the initial set of gambles of interest. The extended weakly ordered coherent system of comparative expectations satisfies familiar additivity and scale invariance postulates (i.e., independence) when the extended collection forms a linear space. In the course of these developments, I recast de Finetti’s quantitative account of coherent prevision in the qualitative framework adopted in this article. I show that comparative previsions satisfy qualitative analogues of de Finetti’s famous bookmaking theorem and his Fundamental Theorem of Prevision.The results of this article complement those of another article (Pedersen, Strictly coherent preferences, no holds barred, Manuscript, 2013). I explain how those results entail that any coherent weakly ordered system of comparative expectations over a unital linear space can be represented by an expectation function taking values in a (possibly non-Archimedean) totally ordered field extension of the system of real numbers. The ordered field extension consists of formal power series in a single infinitesimal, a natural and economical representation that provides a relief map tracing numerical non-Archimedean features to qualitative non-Archimedean features. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with how we ought to think about legitimate expectations in the non-ideal, ‘real’ world. In one (dominant) strand of contemporary theories of justice, justice requires not that each gets what she deserves, but that each gets that to which she is entitled in accordance with what Rawls calls ‘the public rules that specify the scheme of cooperation’. However, that is true only if those public rules are part of a fully just scheme and it is plausibly (...) the case that no such scheme obtains in the real world. Given that, and given the centrality of legitimate expectations to theories of justice, it is vital to think about the status of such expectations in non-ideal circumstances. Having explained the sense in which legitimate expectations have come to play a role often previously associated with desert, a brief argument in favour of an ‘expectations’ view of punishment is considered to show that the system to public rules that generates expectations must itself be (in some sense) just. This argument is illustrated by appeal to just punishment and the relevance of thinking about punishment and not merely distributive justice is defended. In the absence of justice, one possibility would be simply to declare that there are no legitimate expectations and so theories of justice provide no guidance as to who should get what in non-ideal conditions. However, this would be to render such theories more-or-less useless in practice. Through discussion of a series of vignettes, the paper offers an account of how we might think about the demands such expectations place on the systems that give rise to them even in cases where the system is unjust. (shrink)

Utility theories—both Expected Utility (EU) and non-Expected Utility (non-EU) theories—offer numericalized representations of classical principles meant for the regulation of choice under conditions of risk—a type of formal representation that reduces the representation of risk to a single number. I shall refer to these as risk-numericalizing theories of decision. I shall argue that risk-numericalizing theories (referring both to the representations and to the underlying axioms that render numericalization possible) are not satisfactory answers to the question: “How do I take the (...) (best) means to my ends?” In other words, they are inadequate or incomplete as instrumental theories. They are inadequate because they are poor answers to the question of what it is for an option to be instrumental towards an end. To say it another way, they do not offer a sufficiently rich account of what it is for something to be a means (an instrument) toward an end. (shrink)

We introduce a St. Petersburg-like game, which we call the ‘Pasadena game’, in which we toss a coin until it lands heads for the first time. Your pay-offs grow without bound, and alternate in sign (rewards alternate with penalties). The expectation of the game is a conditionally convergent series. As such, its terms can be rearranged to yield any sum whatsoever, including positive infinity and negative infinity. Thus, we can apparently make the game seem as desirable or undesirable as (...) we want, simply by reordering the pay-off table, yet the game remains unchanged throughout. Formally speaking, the expectation does not exist; but we contend that this presents a serious problem for decision theory, since it goes silent when we want it to speak. We argue that the Pasadena game is more paradoxical than the St. Petersburg game in several respects. We give a brief review of the relevant mathematics of infinite series. We then consider and rebut a number of replies to our paradox: that there is a privileged ordering to the expectation series; that decision theory should be restricted to finite state spaces; and that it should be restricted to bounded utility functions. We conclude that the paradox remains live. (shrink)

The elderly face very challenging situations due to their mental and physical conditions. Like the other country in the world, Bangladesh Government has enacted laws to protect the elderly rights. However, the law does not seem to represent what the elderly actually needs. Therefore, 385 elderly people, aged between 60 and 90 years were surveyed to understand their expectations from family, society, and government. There were 57.1% men and 42.9% women. Most of the elderly (80%) were educated. Just over half (...) (53.5%) had ordinary mental and physical health, while a quarter (31.4%) had good status. More than half (53%) of the participants required 2000–5000 BDTK (Bangladeshi Taka) equivalent to $20-50 to cover monthly treatment expenditures. The majority (67.3%) felt government Old Age Allowance should be increased to BDT 5,000 ($50). Of 13.8% of individuals experienced harsh discourse from family because of the cost of therapy. However, 16.9% of people choose not to respond to this question. More than half (57.4%) of the respondents’ thought caregivers were insufficient. One-third felt that legislation should be changed to take care of parents (33.5%) and One-third felt that children should take care of more (33.5%). Some (3.6%) thought that children should act as they did in their childhood respectively. Almost half (44.2%) of respondents did not know that the elderly should receive a separate senior citizen card for preferential treatment, yet 51.9% thought this. Some (44.7%) felt the elderly should get priority in any queue and discounts in Bus/Uber/Rickshaw. Results also showed that expectation is more than the service provided. Further, a one-stop elderly care clinic is required to provide integrated care and support for the quality of life of the elderly. (shrink)

Life history theory predicts that greater extrinsic mortality will lead to earlier and higher fertility. To test this prediction, I examine the relationship between life expectancy at birth and several proxies for life history traits (ages at first sex and first marriage, total fertility rate, and ideal number of children), measured for both men and women. Data on sexual behaviors come from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). Two separate samples are analyzed: a cross-sectional sample of 62 countries and a (...) panel sample that includes multiple cross-sectional panels from 48 countries. Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for potential confounding variables. The results provide only partial support for the predictions, with greater support among women than men. However, the prediction is not supported in sub-Saharan African countries, most likely owing to the nonequilibrium conditions observed in sub-Saharan Africa with respect to life expectancy. The applicability of the model to understanding HIV/AIDS risk behaviors is discussed. (shrink)

Predictive processing has begun to offer new insights into the nature of conscious experience—but the link is not straightforward. A wide variety of systems may be described as predictive machines, raising the question: what differentiates those for which it makes sense to talk about conscious experience? One possible answer lies in the involvement of a higher-order form of prediction error, termed expected free energy. In this paper we explore under what conditions the minimization of this new quantity might underpin conscious (...) experience. Our suggestion is that the minimisation of Expected Free Energy is not in itself sufficient for the occurrence of conscious experience. Instead, it is relevant only insofar as it helps deliver what Ward et al. ( 2011 ) have previously described as a _sense of our own poise over an action space_. Perceptual experience, we will argue, is nothing other than the process that puts current actions in contact with goals and intentions, enabling some creatures to know the space of options that their current situation makes available. This proposal fits with recent work suggesting a deep link between conscious contents and contents computed at an ‘intermediate’ level of processing, apt for controlling action. (shrink)

We introduce an expected-value theory of linguistic modality that makes reference to expected utility and a likelihood-based confirmation measure for deontics and epistemics, respectively. The account is a probabilistic semantics for deontics and epistemics, yet it proposes that deontics and epistemics share a common core modal semantics, as in traditional possible-worlds analysis of modality. We argue that this account is not only theoretically advantageous, but also has far-reaching empirical consequences. In particular, we predict modal versions of reasoning fallacies from the (...) heuristics and biases literature. Additionally, we derive the modal semantics in an entirely transparent manner, as it is based on the compositional semantics of Korean modal expressions that are morphosyntactically decomposed into a conditional and an evaluative predicate. (shrink)

There are all sorts of normative expectations in epistemology—expectations about the epistemic condition of other subjects—that would appear to be relevant to epistemic assessment in ways that do not conform to epistemic standards as traditionally understood. The expectations in question include expectations of inquiries pursued or completed, expectations of certain competences, professional expectations, expectations of having consulted with experts, institutional expectations, moral expectations, expectations of friends, and so forth. My goals in this paper are two. First, I aim to highlight (...) the prevalence of such expectations, and the range of distinct types of circumstance in which they arise. Second, I assess several responses to the allegation that normative epistemic expectations are relevant to epistemic assessment. These range from “explaining away” the appearances to trying to offer one or another positive account of their significance. The former sort of reaction comes at a greater cost than many appear to appreciate, given the prevalence of these expectations and the range of circumstances in which they arise. The latter sort of reaction comes at the cost of having to revise our account of epistemic assessment itself. My own favored view does so in terms of the doctrine of normative defeat; I present my reasons for preferring this view, though I cannot claim in this paper to vindicate it. (shrink)