Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection

Philosophy of Science 80 (1):119-142 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Expected accuracy arguments have been used by several authors (Leitgeb and Pettigrew, and Greaves and Wallace) to support the diachronic principle of conditionalization, in updates where there are only finitely many possible propositions to learn. I show that these arguments can be extended to infinite cases, giving an argument not just for conditionalization but also for principles known as ‘conglomerability’ and ‘reflection’. This shows that the expected accuracy approach is stronger than has been realized. I also argue that we should be careful to distinguish diachronic update principles from related synchronic principles for conditional probability.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-01-30

Downloads
354 (#130,686)

6 months
47 (#180,662)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kenny Easwaran
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
Inquiry beyond knowledge.Bob Beddor - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):330-356.
The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.

View all 79 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235–256.
The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.
What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.

View all 22 references / Add more references