Illusionists and a posteriori physicalists agree entirely on the metaphysical nature of reality — that all concrete entities are composed of fundamental physical entities. Despite this basic agreement on metaphysics, illusionists hold that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, whereas a posteriori physicalists hold that it does. One explanation for this disagreement would be that either the illusionists have too demanding a view about what consciousness requires, or the a posteriori physicalists have too tolerant a view. However, we will argue that (...) this divergence of opinion is merely an upshot of the semantic indeterminacy of the term 'conscious' and its cognates. We shall back up this diagnosis by showing how semantic indeterminacy of the kind in question is a pervasive feature of language. By illustrating this pattern with a range of historical examples, we shall show how the dispute between the illusionists and a posteriori physicalists is one instance of a common kind of terminological imprecision. The disagreement between them is thus not substantial. In effect, the two sides differ only about how to make an indeterminate term precise. The moral is that they should stop looking for arguments designed to settle the dispute in their favour. (shrink)

This book assesses the existentially relevant consequences of physicalism. It argues that accepting physicalism is the healthiest stance we can take in the face of an account of the self and world which offers no metaphysical assurances. Why should we care about physicalism? On one hand, the view seems to be inconsistent with things that many people find valuable, such as the existence of free will, God, the immortal soul, ultimate purpose, and natural laws like karma. On the other hand, (...) physicalism seems to have positive existential implications, such as supporting the unlimited potential of scientific understanding or the attitude that we need not fear supernatural powers or forces because they don't exist. This book argues that physicalism has several consequences that are of existential import. It begins by outlining the history of physicalism and explaining two popular ways of understanding it: the via negativa approach and the theory-based approach. The rest of Part 1 explores the existential consequences of these two versions of physicalism. Part 2 draws on Nietzsche to construct an argument about what attitude we ought to adopt toward physicalism. It argues that we ought to avoid nihilism and despair even when confronted with a picture of the universe which offers no metaphysical assurances. Finally, Part 3 is dedicated to how well physicalism deals with the hard problem of consciousness, mental causation, and multiple realization. The Hope and Horror of Physicalism will appeal to anyone interested in a contemporary approach to existential philosophy, as well as scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind and metaphysics. (shrink)

We establish a minimal, defect-free foundation for determinate existence and apply it to two problems: the structural impossibility of absolute non-existence, and the derivation of the fine-structure constant. Beginning from the single premise something exists determinately, we give a precise four-condition definition of "determinately": not vague, not self-contradictory, not flux, and—crucially—not vacuous. From this definition we prove that exactly three structural primitives are forced: a state space, a selective criterion, and an admissible transformation family. Two independent persistence conditions—Idempotent Closure (IC) (...) and Energetic Viability (EV)—are derived and shown to be necessary and sufficient for any form to persist determinately. The framework is machine-verified in Lean 4 (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19023530). -/- We apply the filter to its own limiting case: the Void. Absolute non-existence with total potentiality and total absence simultaneously contains a Globally Coupled Contradiction (GCC) and fails both IC and EV. Leibniz's question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" presupposes a coherent alternative that does not exist. Existence is structural residue; the first distinction is a logical fixed point guaranteed by Lawvere and Kleene independently. -/- Finally, we apply the filter to the electromagnetic vacuum in a consistent five-dimensional geometric framework. The EV condition forces a solvency equation whose unique solution is \alpha = \frac{9}{16\pi^4}\left(\frac{\pi^5}{120}\right)^{1/4} \approx 1/137.036, derived without assuming its value. The relative error against CODATA 2022 is 6 \times 10^{-7}. The filter does not merely permit or forbid—it is the difference between form and formlessness, where formlessness, as proved, was never an option. (shrink)

This paper establishes a single foundational result: persistence without contradiction is structurally non-negotiable. Any entity that persists as identifiable must satisfy two conditions: recursive closure (stable identity under re-application) and energetic viability (boundary maintenance without resource depletion). These are not philosophical preferences but eliminative constraints—forms violating them cannot persist. We prove the constraint applies to itself, that denial presupposes it, that no more primitive alternative exists, that the constraint operates via two independent filters (consistency and solvency), and that classical paradoxes (...) resolve by structural diagnosis. The argument precedes physics, mathematics, and logic as usually formulated. The result establishes structural bedrock. (shrink)

Russellian physicalism hopes to satisfy the motivating intuitions of physicalists and non-physicalists alike by offering an account of the fundamental nature of the physical world and suggesting that phenomenal consciousness is grounded in those fundamental physical properties. Mendelow has argued that Russellian physicalism as articulated by Pereboom turns out to make no progress toward answering anti-physicalist challenges on the grounds that the categorical properties posited by Russellian physicalists offer no explanatory help when it comes to the necessitation of phenomenal properties (...) by lower-level physical properties. I argue that Mendelow’s argument fails on the grounds that (i) the intrinsicality of categorical properties offers an answer to the structure and dynamics argument, (ii) Russellian physicalism offers a satisfactory explanation for our epistemic situation, (iii) the choice of categorical properties that Mendelow employs in his argument—absolutely intrinsic sphericity and absolutely intrinsic solidity—are misleading examples, and (iv) the notions of absolutely intrinsic solidity/sphericity are either incoherent, or these properties are not “qualitatively identical” to comparatively intrinsic solidity/sphericity. (shrink)

Russellian physicalism is a view on the nature of consciousness which promises to satisfy the demands of both traditional physicalists and non-physicalists. It does so by identifying subjective experience with physically acceptable categorical properties underlying structural and dispositional properties described by science. Though promising, the view faces at least two serious challenges: (i) it has been argued that science deals in both categorical and non-categorical properties, which would undercut the motivation behind Russellian physicalism, and (ii) it has been argued that (...) only nonphysicalist Russellian views—like panpsychism—are useful when it comes to explaining consciousness. I address these criticisms, arguing that there is no viable reason for maintaining that science deals in categorical properties of the sort which a Russellian physicalist is interested in, and that features of fully-physical categorical properties can be described which provide useful explanations for various essential features of subjective experience. These projects are connected: it turns out that when the explanatory relevance of Russellian physicalism is explained in detail, constraints are put the sort of categorical properties that Russellian physicalists can say are left out of science. Specifically, Russellian physicalists are forced to subscribe to the view that science leaves out any categorical properties whatsoever, as opposed to the view that some scientifically scrutable properties are categorical, but not the ones which Russellian physicalists are interested in. I hope that by addressing these criticisms of Russellian physicalism, and drawing logical connections between the responses, further appeal is added to a promising, but so far relatively unexplored, view. (shrink)

We prove that coherence under transformation is ontologically prior to persistence, re-identifiability, and the classical logical laws commonly treated as foundational. The argument proceeds from minimal meta-assumptions required for non-vacuous reference and does not presuppose classical logic as an ontological primitive. We show that (i) persistence entails re-identifiability, (ii) re-identifiability entails non-trivial invariant structure, and (iii) globally coupled contradiction eliminates such structure. From this it follows that contradiction cannot persist. Apparent counterexamples are classified exhaustively by a trilemma: partitioning, decay, or (...) misdescription. Identity and the Law of Identity emerge as stabilized consequences of successful coherence rather than its foundation. The result establishes coherence under transformation as ontological bedrock. (shrink)

Russellian physicalism has the promise of answering all the typical challenges that non-physicalists have issued against standard versions of physicalism, while not giving up physicalism's commitment to the non-existence of fundamental mentality. However, it has been argued that Russellian physicalism must endorse the existence of physically unacceptable protomental properties in order to address these challenges, which would mean giving up on a core physicalist tenet of keeping the fundamental realm untainted by a special relationship to mentality. Against this, I argue (...) that a plausible version of Russellian physicalism can be constructed, which does not posit fundamental properties that are at all protomental in any problematic sense, yet which can explain the existence of subjective experience. This non-protomental Russellian physicalism, which is the only properly-physical version of Russellian physicalism, offers a satisfying solution to the mind-body problem -- including an answer to the conceivability argument -- without sacrificing any of its physicalist credentials. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of determining the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and the brain. The problem is hard because there are strong independent arguments, respectively, pushing toward and against the view that consciousness is entirely physical. Physicalism is an elegant view of reality which seems to be the best metaphysics of science and is supported by the causal closure argument concerning the causal role of mentality in the physical world. Yet it seems that a complete scientific (...) account of consciousness, which would explain why it arises and allow anyone with enough scientific knowledge to infer all of its features, is impossible. Russellian physicalism has been proposed as a way out of this impasse. This view posits nonmental categorical properties which are both left out of science and which are necessary to ground consciousness and, in this way, seems to satisfy the motivations of both physicalists and nonphysicalists. If Russellian physicalism is coherent and can satisfy all serious nonphysicalist intuitions, then the hard problem is solved, since nonphysicalist options could be taken off the table in favor of only considering Russellian physicalism (which satisfies nonphysicalist intuitions) or some sort of physicalist error theory (which explains why nonphysicalist intuitions are misguided). Here, I will defend this position and argue that Russellian physicalism can satisfy all serious nonphysicalist intuitions, including intuitions underlying standard antiphysicalist epistemic arguments and intuitions underlying the “no-gap” argument concerning indeterminacy of consciousness. I will also argue that other nonphysicalist intuitions are not philosophically serious. (shrink)

Physicalism is thought to entail that mental properties supervene on microphysical properties, or in other words that all God had to do was to create the fundamental physical properties and the rest came along for free. In this paper, we question the all-god-had-to-do reflex.

Physicalism is frequently understood as the thesis that everything depends upon a fundamental physical level. This standard formulation of physicalism has a rarely noted and arguably unacceptable consequence—it makes physicalism come out false in worlds which have no fundamental level, for instance worlds containing things which can infinitely decompose into smaller and smaller parts. If physicalism is false, it should not be for this reason. Thus far, there is only one proposed solution to this problem, and it comes from the (...) so-called via negativa account of physicalism. Via negativa physicalism identifies the physical with the non-mental, such that if everything in the world ultimately depends only on non-mental things, then physicalism is true. To deal with the possibility of worlds without a fundamental level, this account says that physicalism is false in worlds with either a fundamental mental level or an infinite descent of mental levels. Here I argue that there could be a world with an infinite descent of all-mental levels, yet in which physicalism might plausibly be true—thus contradicting the sufficient-for-false condition meant to save physicalism from the threat of infinitely decomposable worlds. This leaves the need for a new dependence-based account of physicalism. (shrink)

Regardless of whatever else physicalism requires, nearly all philosophers agree that physicalism cannot be true in a world which contains fundamental mentality. I challenge this widely held attitude, and describe a world which is plausibly all-physical, yet which may contain fundamental mentality. This is a world in which priority monism is true—which is the view that the whole of the cosmos is fundamental, with dependence relations directed from the whole to the parts—and which contains only a single mental system, like (...) a brain or computer. Because some properties of the whole are fundamental under priority monism, it follows that that the mental properties of a cosmos-encompassing brain or computer system may be fundamental in a priority monist world. Yet such a world need not contain anything physically unacceptable: the mental properties of the cosmos-encompassing brain or computer can be characterized in a physicalism-friendly functionalist or identity-theoretic way. Thus, as I see it, physicalism need not be false in such a world. This constitutes a challenge to those who hold the view that physicalism is inconsistent with the existence of fundamental mentality. (shrink)

Russellian physicalism is a promising answer to the mind–body problem which attempts to satisfy the motivating epistemic and metaphysical concerns of non-physicalists with regards to consciousness, while also maintaining a physicalist commitment to the non-existence of fundamental mentality. Chan (_Philosophical Studies, 178_:2043–62, 2021) has recently described a challenge to Russellian physicalism he deems the ‘difference-maker problem’, which is a Russellian-physicalism-specific version of the more well-known ‘combination problem’ for Russellian monism generally. The problem is to determine how a relatively small set (...) of fundamental categorical property types can ground the large variety of phenomenal properties that exist. To answer this problem, a Russellian physicalist can say that there is strong emergence from fundamental categorical properties to phenomenal properties, or she can say that there is only weak emergence from fundamental categorical properties to phenomenal properties. Chan argues that neither of these routes are viable for Russellian physicalism. This paper constitutes a response to Chan, arguing that Russellian physicalists can embrace either weak or strong emergence to explain phenomenal variety. (shrink)

Though there is yet no consensus on the right way to understand ‘physicalism’, most philosophers agree that, regardless of whatever else is required, physicalism cannot be true if there exists fundamental mentality. I will follow Jessica Wilson (Philosophical Studies 131:61–99, 2006) in calling this the 'No Fundamental Mentality' (NFM) constraint on physicalism. Unfortunately for those who wish to constrain physicalism in this way, NFM admits of a counterexample: an artificially intelligent quantum computer which employs quantum properties as part of its (...) cognitive operations. If one of these quantum properties serves a proper functional role in the artificial intelligence, then that property counts as a mental under the physicalism-friendly theory of mentality called “realizer functionalism”, which says that a lower-order property is mental if it satisfies an appropriate higher-order functional description. Further, if this quantum property is both fundamental and mental, then NFM must rule that it is not physical. Yet the existence of such an artificially intelligent quantum computer, which possesses mental properties solely in virtue of the functional roles those properties play, is surely consistent with the truth of physicalism. This ought to motivate NFM proponents to reformulate their view. (shrink)

Considers four apparent problems of eternal life--is heaven a mystical or social reality, is it other-worldly or this-worldly, is it static or dynamic, is it boring?--and shows how the teachings of Thomas Aquinas support more satisfying solutions than many contemporary philosophical and theological approaches.

This paper responds to an argument from Botin which claims that Russellian physicalism is committed to the view that either (i) our phenomenal concepts do not reveal anything essential about phenomenal properties (following Goff, Botin calls this the ‘opaque’ account of phenomenal concepts), or that (ii) phenomenal concepts are capable of revealing at least some of the essence of phenomenal properties—making phenomenal concepts ‘translucent’ if some-but-not-all-revealing or ‘transparent’ if all-revealing—but this entails that phenomenal properties are fundamental, which violates physicalism. I (...) argue that Botin is wrong that Russellian physicalists are committed to the view that physical and phenomenal concepts must have similarly qualitative/phenomenal modes of presentation or contents, since Russellian physicalists assume that we do not possess concepts which specifically refer to non-phenomenal categorical properties. If we were to acquire concepts for non-phenomenal categorical properties, they would need to have categorical contents and modes of presentation, but need not have qualitative/phenomenal contents and modes of presentation. Given this, Russellian physicalists can embrace a translucent account of phenomenal concepts, and hold that our phenomenal concepts more-or-less accurately tell us about certain sorts of non-fundamental properties which are both physical and categorical. (shrink)

I do four things in responding to Patrick Toner’s incisive critique of my Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus (AST). First, I further motivate Aquinas’s position that Socrates exists in the post-mortem and ante-resurrection state by noting that Socrates’ situation is at least analogous to other states of affairs that would certainly count as atypical (although not impossible). Secondly, I offer a revised Thomistic account of artefact identity through time in light of Toner’s objections to Aquinas’srestrictive view. Unlike the restrictive (...) view, this revised account is compatible with common-sense intuitions. Thirdly, I show how my defense of Aquinas’s substance metaphysic in AST is useful for the purpose of constructing defeators for certain kinds of arguments for reductionism. Fourthly, I defend Aquinas’s views on the unity of substance against Toner’s suggestion that they are implausible on the grounds that they are in conflict with certain so-called “scientifically informed”common-sense beliefs. (shrink)

This paper responds to the various criticisms offered by Coleman, McClelland, McLaughlin and Morris which are targeted at my 2024 book.

I will argue for two related theses: (i) it is an interest-relative fact whether some metaphysical view counts as monist, and (ii) ‘monism’ can be given a schematic via negativa characterization which says that Φ monism which excludes some property type P in some world W iff only not-P properties are instantiated in W. Property type P can be fundamental, but this is not necessary. As a consequence, it only makes sense to think of monism relative to one or another (...) property type of interest. Classic examples are fundamental mental, normative or abstract properties, but one can imagine other sorts of monism that might be of philosophical interest (e.g. structural properties). Physics-based physicalism satisfies this schema, stipulating that physicalism is true so long as there are no fundamental properties which are not posited by our best physics (regardless of what “best physics” means). I will also argue that my understanding of monism has no supervenience requirement. (shrink)

In a recent paper, “Incompatiblism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe discuss and propose a novel solution to a problem posed for traditional Christian theism that they call the Problem of Heavenly Freedom. In short, Christian tradition contains what seems to be a contradiction, namely, the redeemed in heaven are free but nonetheless can’t sin. Pawl and Timpe’s solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is particularly attractive for two reasons: it shows great respect for (...) the Christian tradition’s teaching on heaven, and it entails that the redeemed in heaven act with morally weighty libertarian free will. Nonetheless, I think their solution can be improved upon. By drawing on some of the teachings of the Catholic tradition on heaven, particularly those of St. Thomas Aquinas, I raise three objections to Pawl and Timpe’s solution and introduce a modified version of their solution. In doing so, I have attempted to make their “best” solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom even better. (shrink)

In their writings on distributism, G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc offer many practical suggestions as to how we can work to bring about a more human economy. In this paper, I do two things. In the first part, I discuss four ways Chesterton and Belloc characterize distributism as a social doctrine. In the second and main part of the paper, I catalog the many ways that Chesterton and Belloc think we can, both individually and collectively, begin to act in (...) defiance of capitalist and socialist economic tyranny and, having restored something of a more human economy in a region, protect it. (shrink)

Many philosophers identify knowledge of subjective experience as our sole epistemic bedrock of absolute certainty. Illusionism is the view that subjective experience does not exist, and that our belief in the existence of subjective experience is due to a persistent cognitive or meta‐cognitive illusion of some sort. I argue that illusionism entails an absurd epistemic consequence: that our current epistemic situation is consistent with the possible truth of absolute nihilism, which is the view that nothing whatsoever exists. Since it is (...) epistemically impossible that absolute nihilism is true, and the only way to prevent this epistemic possibility is by denying illusionism, I hold that illusionism ought to be rejected. (shrink)

This unique collection presents texts in international relations from Ancient Greece to the First World War. Major writers such as Thucydides, Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant and John Stuart Mill are represented by extracts of their key works; less well-known international theorists including John of Paris, Cornelius van Bynkershoek and Friedrich List are also included. Fifty writers are anthologised in what is the largest such collection currently available. The texts, most of which are substantial extracts, are organised into broadly chronological (...) sections, each of which is headed by an introduction that places the work in its historical and philosophical context. Ideal for both students and scholars, the volume also includes biographies and guides to further reading. (shrink)

Extensional articulations of physicalism define what it means to be physical relative to the properties of a set of entities, such that physicalism is true if the fundamental properties which compose the entities in this set are the same sorts of fundamental properties which compose everything that exists. Here I present a novel problem for these articulations of physicalism: they are consistent with phenomenal idealism, which is the view that only phenomenal properties exist. Under this view, paradigm physical objects such (...) as tables and chairs are constructed out of more basic phenomenal properties. Since this view says that everything—including paradigm physical entities—is ultimately constituted by phenomenal properties, it follows that this view is consistent with extensional definitions of physicalism, since such definitions only require that there be no fundamental difference between paradigm physical entities and everything else. Yet a good definition of physicalism should not be consistent with phenomenal idealism. (shrink)

In Frogs Aristophanes presents the comic katabasis of Dionysus, whose quest is to bring back the recently deceased Euripides and restore him to the Athenian literary scene. In the prologue Dionysus and his slave, Xanthias, seek out Heracles and ask his advice about the journey below. After some comic play, as they consider various short-cuts, Heracles finally gives Dionysus a serious lesson in Underworld geography. The various items on this itinerary – Charon, terrifying beasts, filth and excrement, sinners, μσται – (...) are all encountered on Dionysus' journey, each transformed for humorous effect. Dionysus crosses the lake on Charon's barque, but is forced to row. At this point we have the introduction of the off-stage chorus that gives the play its name. In what appears to be a kind of false parodos Dionysus engages in a metrical tug-of-war with the frogs that finally spoils his rowing rhythm. After disembarking, he is joined by Xanthias, who was forced to walk around the lake, and they find themselves in the place of σκτος κα βρβορος, where they see the miscreants. In place of εις and θηρα μυρα δειτατα, our heroes are terrified by the figure of Empousa, who is seen by Xanthias alone. When Empousa is gone, there appears the chorus of initiates, whose song constitutes the parodos. (shrink)

Few think that Kant’s moral theory can provide a defensible view in the area of environmental ethics because of Kant’s well-known insistence that all nonhumans are mere means. An examination of the relevant arguments, however, shows that they do not entitle Kant to his position. Moreover, Kant’s own Formula of Universal Law generates at least one important and basic duty which is owed both to human beings and to nonhuman animals. The resulting Kantian theory not only is sounder and more (...) intuitive than the original, but also boasts some notable theoretical advantages over some of the most prominent views in environmental ethics. (shrink)

The original article has been corrected.

One important part of Aquinas’s theory of the nature of corruptible corporeal substances is his account of the individuation of such entities. In this paper, I examine an aspect of Aquinas’s account of individuation that has not received as much attention as some others, namely, how Aquinas applies his account of individuation specifically to cases involving non-living corporeal substances. I first offer an interpretation of a key passage in Aquinas’s corpus where he explains his theory of individuation. Second, I examine (...) a text where Aquinas applies his account of individuation to a case involving non-living substances. Finally, I raise a possible objection to what Aquinas says about the individuation of non-living substances and in answering the objection suggest that Aquinas holds the view that non-living substances enjoy a less perfect mode of individuality when compared to living substances. (shrink)

This paper looks at nine different ways of defining scientism in order to show that potential definitions of the term conform to a general pattern: a definition of scientism either is self-defeating or else cannot really count as a construal of scientism in the first place. Advocates for the experimental sciences would therefore be better off accepting a middle position—one might say a broadly Thomistic approach to science—between the extremes of scientism on the one hand and a religious fundamentalism that (...) ignores the important contributions of the experimental sciences on the other. Such a middle position recognizes both the intellectual significance and the inherent limitations of the scientific method employed within the experimental sciences. (shrink)

This paper looks at nine different ways of defining scientism in order to show that potential definitions of the term conform to a general pattern: a definition of scientism either is self-defeating or else cannot really count as a construal of scientism in the first place. Advocates for the experimental sciences would therefore be better off accepting a middle position—one might say a broadly Thomistic approach to science—between the extremes of scientism on the one hand and a religious fundamentalism that (...) ignores the important contributions of the experimental sciences on the other. Such a middle position recognizes both the intellectual significance and the inherent limitations of the scientific method employed within the experimental sciences. (shrink)

Coming out of mission efforts focused on evangelism, the rising Business as Mission movement stakes a claim to effective holistic mission by focusing on profit, evangelism, and development. Research indicates, however, that the development aspect of this `triple bottom line' is significantly weak. If, in fact, Business as Mission efforts were to incorporate the social and political dimensions of development, there would be great potential for a partnership with grassroots organizations to bring about deep-reaching social transformation.

This chapter outlines the utility for employing case study methodologies to provide sufficient external validity upon which to craft policy relevant to maintaining healthy democratic politics. The broader theoretical context is an investigation into the conditions that might structurally condition democracies to fail via democratic means. Venezuela’s democratic decline serves as the basis for the heuristic case study, wherein the objective is to identify the failures of the Venezuelan case in a larger framework that addresses the complexity of institutional design (...) in democratic political systems states broadly. Cases are selected based upon the objective of the researcher, and similarly, the case study methodology chosen rests firmly on their research goals. Lastly, the chapter outlines the research design necessary for satisfying broader inquiry within the more modest approach to how heuristic case studies can be used to inform both theory and policy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Kantian Gate Dating as Flow and Cultivated Spontaneity.

We generally think of the poetry of Anacreon as coming from an entirely different world from that of the iambists, but among the extant fragments there is some indication to the contrary. With fr. 44 Gentili = 432 PMG iamb. 5 West, an epodic passage, we find Anacreon closest in form to the iambists. Here is the text with the full context from the Etymologicum Magnum : τò δ κνύςα ώς λÉγι ‘Hgr;ρωδιανòς ν τ καθολικ, εί μν πί τοű υτοű, (...) συγκοπή στιν πò τοű κóνυςα, οίον “χαμαίςήλοιο κονύςης”. εί δ πί τού παρθαρμÉνου καί ρρυσωμνου, οÙ συγκοπή οτιν, λλ' πò τοű κνύω, ' οǘ κνύος θορá οȋον “κατà κνύος Ȅχευεν, φίλωτο δ κáρηνα”. γίνεται κνύςα, ώς παρà’ ΑνακρÉοντι ν ίáμβω κνυςή τις ñδη καί πÉπειρα γίνομαι σ διà μαργοσύνην. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas St. Thomas Aquinas was a Dominican priest and Scriptural theologian. He took seriously the medieval maxim that “grace perfects and builds on nature; it does not set it aside or destroy it.” Therefore, insofar as Thomas thought about philosophy as the discipline that investigates what we can know naturally about God and … Continue reading Thomas Aquinas →.

It is well known that in early Greek epic old age was something that could be scraped off a man, and it is the purpose of this note to explore the image and to suggest a possible origin. The idea is first attested in a counterfactual conditional sentence in Phoenix's speech atIl.9.445–6: ‘nor even if [a god] himself were to undertake to render me young and flourishing after scraping off old age …’ (οὐδ' εἴ κέν μοι ὑποσταίη αὐτός | γῆρας (...) ἀποξύσας θήσειν νέον ἡβώοντα …); in a description of Medea's magical rejuvenation of Aeson in theNostoi(fr. 7.2 Bernabé = 6.2 Davies, γῆρας ἀποξύσας); and in the account of Eos' botched attempt to make Tithonus immortal in theHomeric Hymn to Aphrodite(223–4):οὐδ' ἐνόησε μετὰ ϕρεσὶ πότνια Ἠώςἥβην αἰτῆσαι, ξῦσαί τ' ἄπο γῆρας ὀλοιόν.Nor did lady Dawn think in her mind to ask for youth and to scrape off ruinous old age.This language also occurs in Late Antiquity, and Andrew Faulkner in his commentary on theHymn(ad loc.) cites Greg. Nanz.Carm.1.2.2.483 (PG37.616) in the fourth centurya.d.and the much later Cometas,Anth. Pal.15.37.2. So far as the imagery implicit in these passages is concerned, S. D. Olson writes, ‘old age is imagined as a scurf or patina that can be scoured off a person’. Faulkner, however, prefers a more precise reference: ‘Griffin … relates it to the idea of old age as a skin that can be shed, as that of a snake’, and he helpfully cites Theodoros Prodromos,Carmina historica24.18, ἀπόξυσαι τὸ γῆρας ὥσπερ ὄϕις (‘to scrape off old age like a snake’). (shrink)