Radical feminist Carla Lonzi is regarded as a founding mother of Italian feminism in the early 1970s. Italian feminists look at her diaries and pamphlets as historical testimony, or as tools of self-identification. Very little work engages Lonzi’s feminist thought in its critique of psychoanalytic constructs of female sexuality, such as the forced sexual coincidence between vaginal sexuality and masculine pleasure. While reappropriating the clitoris as the site of female autonomy, Lonzi invents the ‘donna clitoridea,’ whose authenticity opposes heteronormativity. (...) This article examines Lonzi’s theory of the clitoris and the donna clitoridea, arguing that Lonzi’s clitoris is not so much a site of pleasurable authenticity, but a phallic instrument of domination among women. (shrink)

BackgroundThe Patient Health Questionnaire-9 is the most well-known self-report measure to screen for depressive symptomatology, although discerning which is the factor structure that represents the best fit remains a challenge.ObjectiveThe aim of this study was to analyze the psychometric properties and factorial structure of the Spanish version of the PHQ-9 in a large sample of Ecuadorian college students.MethodsA total of 5,394 students from three Ecuadorian universities were surveyed using a computerized questionnaire within a 4-week assessment period. The PHQ-9 was tested (...) for factorial structure, reliability, and correlations with other mental health-related measures.ResultsThe hierarchical model that included a general factor and three nested factors had a better fit, and such a hierarchical structure remained invariant across sex and age. Total omega value was 0.90 for the total scale and hierarchical omega values were 0.68 for the general factor, as well as 0.34, 0.38, and 0.44 for the respective nested factors. Moreover, PHQ-9 scores were significantly higher among women, although effect sizes of comparison of those sex differences were very small. Finally, the PHQ-9 scores correlated with multiple mental health indicators.DiscussionThe Spanish version of the PHQ-9 showed good psychometric properties among Ecuadorian college students. The hierarchical structure showed the best fit for the data, including not only a dominant general factor, but also the somatic, cognitive/affective and concentration/motor subcomponents. In conclusion, the PHQ-9 tool seems to represent an easy-to-implement screening questionnaire to design preventive programs for those Ecuadorian college students at risk of developing depressive disorders. (shrink)

Patient registry data are increasingly used to generate real-world evidence (RWE) for medicines decision-making. This study aimed to identify stakeholders’ views on registries’ ethics practices and to explore potential differences across stakeholder groups. European regulators, Health Technology Assessors (HTA), payers, patients, academia, industry, and healthcare professionals (HCPs) were invited to complete an online survey (Dec 2024 – Jan 2025). It included questions regarding the importance of information on six ethics aspects of registries (5-point Likert scales), acceptability of industry funding for (...) registries (visual analogue scale: 0-100%), and preferences on informed consent (opt-in versus opt-out), data identifiability (anonymous collection/processing; identifiable collection/pseudonymized processing; identifiable collection/processing) and data sharing (federated analyses; transfer of anonymous data; transfer of pseudonymous data; open access anonymous data). Results are reported as frequencies, means (M), and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Stakeholder group differences were tested using Fisher’s exact, Kruskal-Wallis, and pairwise Dunn’s tests. There were 370 participants (129 regulators, 30 HTA/payers, 44 industry representatives, 39 patients, 128 academics/HCPs/others) from 31 countries, 56% were women, and on average 48 years old. Of the six ethics aspects, a registry’s use-and-access policy was considered most important (M: 4.2; 95% CI: 4.1-4.3) and information on funding sources least important (M: 3.9; 95% CI: 3.8-4.0). Among the stakeholder groups, industry representatives considered the highest proportion of registry funding from the pharmaceutical industry acceptable (65%), while HTA/payers provided the lowest proportion (41%). Participants preferred patient opt-out over opt-in consent for data collection and processing by registries (51%) and for data processing by external parties (61%). Compared to all other stakeholder groups, patients more often preferred opt-in consent for both types of data processing (76% and 73%, respectively). Collecting identifiable data and processing pseudonymized data was most preferred overall (65%), while regulators and patients more often favored anonymization than other stakeholders (respectively 34% and 35% versus ≤18%). Overall, anonymization was preferred for data sharing with external parties (34%). Participants generally viewed information on patient registries’ ethics aspects as important. There was a preference for pseudonymization of data used by registries and anonymization of data shared with external parties. Across stakeholder groups, preferences diverged most notably regarding industry funding and consent models. These differences will have to be addressed to work towards a multi-stakeholder consensus on patient registries’ best practices. (shrink)

In a now classic paper, Karen Carr argues that Kierkegaard is a religious “anti-rationalist”: He holds that reason and religious truth exist in necessary tension with one another. Carr maintains that this antagonism is not a matter of the logical incoherence of Christianity, but rather the fact that genuine submission to Christ precludes approaching him through demonstration. In this essay, we argue that while Kierkegaard is in fact an anti-rationalist, the literature has failed to appreciate the full strength of his (...) position. It is not just that reason and obedience are in tension; rather, Kierkegaard holds the stronger view that reason is actively offended by Christianity’s primary claims. Not only is reason incapable of generating any positive evidence for the truth of Christianity, more radically, it provides evidence against it. In order to make this case, we offer a close reading of Practice in Christianity, developing a typology of Kierkegaard’s account of Christ’s “offense.” Finally, having motivated Kierkegaard’s strong anti-rationalism, we consider why, on his account, anyone would want to be a Christian. (shrink)

This paper embraces the view that we have substantial knowledge of the future and investigates how such knowledge fundamentally differs from knowledge of the past and present. I argue for a new source of context-sensitivity with respect to knowledge attributions arising from presuppositions about reliable belief-forming processes. This context sensitivity has important consequences for knowledge of the future, as well as the appropriateness of assertions about the future. I argue that not only is knowledge of future events typically brought about (...) by fundamentally different processes from those that bring about knowledge of past events, but also that this is the case is often presupposed in attributing knowledge. I argue that this new source of context sensitivity naturally extends to explaining the recent puzzle of ‘easy foreknowledge’. (shrink)

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

Putting feelings into words, or “affect labeling,” can attenuate our emotional experiences. However, unlike explicit emotion regulation techniques, affect labeling may not even feel like a regulatory process as it occurs. Nevertheless, research investigating affect labeling has found it produces a pattern of effects like those seen during explicit emotion regulation, suggesting affect labeling is a form of implicit emotion regulation. In this review, we will outline research on affect labeling, comparing it to reappraisal, a form of explicit emotion regulation, (...) along four major domains of effects—experiential, autonomic, neural, and behavioral—that establish it as a form of implicit emotion regulation. This review will then speculate on possible mechanisms driving affect labeling effects and other remaining unanswered questions. (shrink)

Will it rain tomorrow? Will there be a sea battle tomorrow? Will my death be painful? Wondering about the future plays a central role in our cognitive lives. It is integral to our inquiries, our planning, our hopes, and our fears. The aim of this paper is to consider various accounts of future contingents and the implications that they have for wondering about the future. I argue that reflecting on the nature of wondering about the future supports an Ockhamist account (...) of future contingents according to which many of them are true. Alternative accounts which maintain that no future contingents are true, either by claiming that they are all false or by claiming that they are neither true nor false, face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. Reflecting on wondering in general, and wondering about the future in particular, suggests that in wondering how the future will go, we implicitly assume that there is a determinate fact of the matter. After presenting an attractive account of interrogative attitudes that has been recently proposed by Jane Friedman and outlining some norms governing wondering, I argue that all accounts of future contingents except Ockhamism face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

Ethical considerations: Equitable access to healthcare is a fundamental right recognized internationally. However, people without stable housing face multiple structural, administrative and relational barriers that limit this right, especially in European contexts such as Spain. Women experiencing homelessness also suffer specific forms of discrimination and violence that exacerbate their vulnerability. Objective To explore the experiences of people affected by homelessness in their interaction with health services in Spain, identifying barriers, experiences, and proposals for improvement from an ethical, gender, and comparative (...) European perspective. Methodology Qualitative phenomenological study based on semi-structured interviews with five homeless adults and a professional in the social and health care field. The selection was made by convenience sampling in a municipal homeless shelter. The thematic analysis followed Giorgi’s approach, with triangulation, independent coding, and feedback of preliminary results. Informed consent, anonymity, and compliance with the ethical principles established by the Declaration of Helsinki were guaranteed. Results Four central dimensions were identified structural and organizational barriers, such as lack of documentation or means of contact experiences of treatment, marked by stigma and unequal recognition coping strategies and proposals for improvement; and a European perspective, which highlights effective models such as Housing First. The gender dimension revealed specific needs in sexual and reproductive health and protection from violence. Conclusions Healthcare for people experiencing homelessness requires an ethical approach that incorporates distributive justice, the ethics of care, and a gender perspective. Nursing can play a key role in transforming the healthcare model towards one that is more inclusive, dignified, and focused on equity. This study reveals how relational injustice and epistemic exclusion shape the healthcare experiences of people affected by homelessness, challenging nurses to act as moral agents in restoring recognition and dignity. (shrink)

The notion of communication system as presented in many works in the humanities is rooted in engineering and the seminal work of Claude E. Shannon titled “A Mathematical Theory of Communication” - published in 1948. In all, the narrowness of a mathematical understanding of communication, as presented by Shannon, presents severe limitations but also, as it will be shown, possible openings, directions or bridges towards the non-mathematical. In particular, the analysis presented here depicts any notion of communication as being inseparable (...) from any noise. In fact, moving at or beyond the clearly defined mathematical limits that are explicit in Shannon’s theory means to invalidate the very possibility of a communication system at all. It is by looking at these limits, it is argued, that a discourse between a theory of communication and aesthetic theories of digital arts can be renewed. This is not least because in that dialogue might be found a plausible explanation for the ever-growing love of random functions and statistical modelling by many digital art practitioners. (shrink)

Carla Bagnoli argues that Kant’s conception of respect as a moral feeling is crucial to any constructivist theory of practical reason because it provides the only satisfactory account of how moral commands carry subjective authority—how they are experienced as binding by finite agents endowed with rationality. Without positing a moral feeling of respect, a constructivist theory can account for objective moral obligations, but it cannot explain why finite agents can take an interest in action. This account centered on the (...) moral feeling of respect is defended in contrast to the mechanisms of the “reflective endorsement” of moral ends or actions, which has been proposed by prominent Kantian constructivists. The theory of respect as a moral feeling is an integral and eliminable element of Kantian constructivism, whose absence compromises the constructivist account of practical reason and undermines its objectivist aspirations. (shrink)

The relation between rationality, morality, and agency is one of the most fundamental problems in philosophy. This volume explores Kant’s distinctive contribution to addressing it, arguing that the constitutive norms of rationality are also norms of self-constitution—that is, the principles by which rational agents govern themselves and regulate their relations to one another. How Kant defends this claim, and whether he succeeds in grounding the objectivity and authority of moral obligations, lies at the heart of a lively and expanding debate (...) that bridges moral philosophy, practical reason, and action theory. By bringing traditional exegesis into dialogue with cutting-edge work on constitutivism, autonomy, and practical knowledge, the essays collected here expose unresolved questions, refine contested distinctions, and introduce methodological tools that open new avenues for discussion. The main aim of the volume is to broaden its horizons—encouraging Kant scholars to engage more fully with contemporary meta-ethics and prompting theorists of normativity to reckon with both the resources and the limits of Kant’s approach. Contributors: Stefano Bacin, Carla Bagnoli, Jeremy D. Fix, Evgenia Mylonaki, Alexandra Mudd, Alexandra Newton, Thomas Pendlebury, Konstantin Pollok, Andrews Reath, Karl Schafer, Oliver Sensen, Jens Timmermann, and ArielZylbermann. (shrink)

It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commitments, Kantian constructivists place their theory “somewhere in the space between (...) realist and relativist accounts of ethics” (O’Neill 1988: 1). Furthermore, they argue that their practical conception of objectivity succeeds in making sense of certain features of morality, such as its categorical authority and its relation to rational agency, which escape rival theories (Korsgaard 1996b, Korsgaard 2003b). To this extent, constructivism claims a privileged place in meta-ethics. The legitimacy of this claim is widely challenged. Precisely because of its practical conception of objectivity, many – including some constructivists — regard constructivism as a first-order normative theory, rather than as a meta-ethical position, hence not on a par with realism. Some critics object that constructivism fails to offer a distinct meta-ethics because it is structurally incomplete and thus must be combined with a fully-fledged meta-ethics (Hussain and Shah 2006); others argue that it tacitly relies on realism (Timmons 2003; Shafer-Landau 2003; Larmore 2008). Thus far, the debate about the prospects of constructivism as a meta-ethical theory has been driven by the conviction that the case for or against constructivism depends on its ontological commitments. In this chapter, I propose a change in perspective. My aim is to defend constructivism as an objectivist account of practical knowledge. Its defining feature is the claim that practical knowledge is knowledge by principles. Its task is to establish a constitutive relation between knowledge of oneself as a practical subject and knowledge about what one ought to do. By focusing on the issue of practical knowledge I hope to show that the difficulty in situating Kantian constructivism firmly on the meta-ethical map, along with other meta-ethical theories, reflects ambiguities and oscillations about the practical significance of ethics. Even though the term is ambiguous, I retain the qualification “Kantian” for the constructivist theory I outline, and for two reasons. First, while the theory I outline differs from current agnostic or anti-realist variants, it is closer to its origins, since Kant treats practical reason as a cognitive capacity and takes moral judgments to be objective moral cognitions, which importantly differ from other sorts of rational cognitions because they bind us in the first person. Practical cognitions are common knowledge because they are such that all subjects endowed with rationality can arrive at them by reasoning and find them authoritative. Thus understood, Kantian constructivism carves a distinct logical space in the meta-ethical debate that other sorts of constructivism fail to identify. This is the second reason for keeping the qualification “Kantian”. On this formulation, constructivism is antagonistic to non-cognitivist theories denying that moral judgments have cognitive contents, because they deny that there is something to be known; but it is also a rival to cognitivist theories denying that knowledge can be practical in itself. How constructivism differs over the realist theories of practical reason is the least understood aspect of this debate. This essay aims to make the case that practical reason is both discursive and emotional. In contrast to foundational and anti-realist accounts of practical reasoning, it attempts to show that the moral feeling of respect plays a cognitive but non-evidential role in the account of the cognitive and practical powers of reason. The argument proceeds as follows. In section 1, I consider some prominent constructivist arguments against the model of applied knowledge and show that they are driven by non-cognitivist assumptions about the practicality of ethics and the legitimacy of epistemological claims. In section 2, I argue that these arguments do not succeed in disposing of the idea of practical knowledge as incoherent, because they trade on an ambiguity regarding the proper object of practical knowledge. To solve this ambiguity, I turn to Anscombe’s contrast between “practical” and “speculative” knowledge as models for understanding action. I thus suggest that Anscombe’s account of practical knowledge as knowledge of oneself as an agent is an important resource for Kantian constructivism. This finding prompts us to reset the current dispute about the ontological and epistemological commitments of Kantian constructivism, as illustrated in section 3. While constructivism does not postulate any moral ontology prior to reasoning, it attributes to reasoning the cognitive powers to establish a distinctive relation between the agent and her action. The task of sections 4-7 is to account for the distinctive features of Kantian constructivism understood as an objectivist account of practical knowledge. In section 4, I argue that in order for reasoning to accomplish its normative tasks, it should be conceived as a self-legislating activity. I respond to some objections to the idea of self-legislation as the form of rational willing by offering a dialogical view of practical reason. In section 5, I propose a non-standard interpretation of Kant’s argument of “the fact of reason” to show that the constructivist account of self-legislation does not build on realism about value, as its detractors claim. The “basis of construction” is the subjective experience of respect for the self-legislative capacity itself. This moral feeling conveys our awareness of rational agency and shows our responsiveness to the demands of practical reason. It is an emotional mode of practical knowledge of oneself as an agent (in the sense specified in section 2), but not as a mode of moral discernment. In section 6, I show how practical knowledge of oneself as an agent relates to practical knowledge about what one ought to do. I thus account for the relation between respect as emotional moral consciousness and respect as a deliberative constraint. Finally, in section 7, I reply to the objection of subjectivism. I explain how the complex sort of objectivity that Kantian constructivism affords is at the same time more ambitious and more modest than is generally assumed. (shrink)

Patrick Todd's The Open Future defends the view that all future contingent statements, like ‘It will rain tomorrow’, are false.1 Not only is ‘It will rain tomor.

This chapter provides a critical overview of various influential accounts of de se attitudes including those proposed by Frege, Lewis and Perry. It also addresses the charge that there is nothing distinctive about de se attitudes. The second half outlines a widely accepted and influential model of communication and various complications that arise in applying this model to the communication of de se thoughts. The final section provides an overview of the papers in this volume.

In Nothing to Come, Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz provide a sophisticated, compelling, and thoroughly defended account of the growing block theory. This note critically evaluates two aspects of this account. First, it evaluates Correia and Rosenkranz’s attempt at providing a grounding principle for future truths and argues that this principle fails to make progress in explaining why future truths are true. Second, it evaluates Correia and Rosenkranz’s construal of the open future arguing that the asymmetry in openness with respect (...) to the past and future is not plausibly understood in terms of determinism and indeterminism, and in the final section, it evaluates their claim that a growing block theorist is able to maintain that the future is open in a stronger sense than the block theorist. (shrink)

What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...) cases, de se puzzle cases cannot be resolved by objective information alone. Further, there seem to be pure cases of each puzzle: instances of the de se puzzle which do not have a Fregean structure, and instances of Frege’s puzzle, which do not involve de se attitudes. We conclude that the two puzzles are fundamentally different and that the traditional theory of attitudes needs to be amended. (shrink)

Constructivism in ethics is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, for example, truths about what we ought to do, they are in some sense determined by an idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement. As a “first-order moral account”--an account of which moral principles are correct-- constructivism is the view that the moral principles we ought to accept or follow are the ones that agents would agree to or endorse were they to engage in a hypothetical (...) or idealized process of rational deliberation. As a “metaethical account” – an account of whether there are any normative truths and, if so, what they are like – constructivism holds that there are normative truths. These truths are not fixed by facts that are independent of the practical standpoint, however characterized; rather, they are constituted by what agents would agree to under some specified conditions of choice. In working to provide a more precise definition of constructivism in metaethics, the focus of this entry, one faces two main difficulties. The first difficulty is that constructivism comes in several varieties, each of which claims a different niche within metaethics, and some claim no space at all. The second difficulty concerns where to place constructivism on the metaethical map in relation to realism and anti-realism. These are terms of art, and it is highly contested which views count as realist and which as antirealist. These two difficulties will be addressed in what follows by focusing on the distinctive questions that constructivist theories are designed to answer. Section §1 defines the scope of constructivism in ethics, in contrast to constructivism in political theory. Sections §§2-5 illustrate the main varieties of metaethical constructivism, which are designed to account for the nature of normative truths and practical reasons. Section §6 presents the main varieties of constructivist accounts of the justification of moral judgments of right and wrong. Section §7 discusses the metaethical status of constructivism, and its distinctive import. (shrink)

Este artículo examina la concepción de la verdad que Kant desarrolla en la Nova dilucidatio (1755), su primera obra propiamente filosófica. Se sostiene que, en este texto, Kant entiende la verdad fundamentalmente como identidad nocional entre sujeto y predicado, en continuidad con la tradición racionalista. Sin embargo, el principio de razón determinante introduce una dimensión adicional que vincula la estructura lógica de las proposiciones con la determinación real de las cosas. La verdad no depende únicamente de relaciones conceptuales, sino también (...) de una razón que explique por qué un predicado pertenece a un sujeto con exclusión de su opuesto. El análisis de este punto de partida permite comprender las tensiones teóricas que orientarán la evolución posterior del pensamiento kantiano. (shrink)

In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...) for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist’s objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences. (shrink)

One stark difference between the past and the future lies in our ability to shape the future in a way in which we are unable to shape the past. This paper investigates what kind of beliefs about the future serve as premises in our reasoning about how to act. If we think about belief in terms of agents representing the world, we cannot lose sight of the fact that agents are part of, and shape, the same world they represent. Beliefs (...) about the future appear to have a circularity about them: on the one hand, they serve as premises for deciding what we will do. On the other hand, what we decide we will do determines what we believe about the future. I argue that beliefs in future-directed counterfactuals play a central role in our practical reasoning and in how we conceptualize the actual future. I defend a robust distinction between future-directed counterfactuals and future-directed indicatives, and, contra Keith DeRose (2010), argue that it is future-directed counterfactuals that we use in deliberation about how to act. I argue that we construe the actual future in hypothetical terms and dependent on what we do now, in contrast to how we construe the actual past. This asymmetry in our belief content about the past versus the future fits well with an account of the open future in terms of counterfactual dependence. (shrink)

On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, (...) morality is the experience of being bound and necessitated, but also of being free and emancipated from inclinations. (shrink)

The most distinctive feature of Murdoch's philosophical project is her attempt to reclaim the exploration of moral life as a legitimate topic of philosophical investigation. In contrast to the predominant focus on action and decision, she argues that “what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” (AD 293).1 I shall argue that to (...) fully appreciate the novelty of this proposal we need to recognize some elements of continuity with analytic methods of philosophical inquiry and themes that belong to continental traditions. On Murdoch's view, the most important question facing moral philosophy is that of whether and how we can become better. In order to describe moral progress and failure, struggle and ascent, we need ethical concepts capable of capturing mental events such as change in mind, self-examination, and redescription. These concepts are presently unavailable, and this lack seriously undermines our attempts to understand the phenomena of morality. Because of this conceptual loss, we succumb to the mistaken idea that moral life coincides with its scattered outer manifestations, i.e. public acts. Instead, Murdoch urges us “the moral life […] is something that goes on continually, not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices” (SG 37).2 Murdoch's point is that we need to conceive the locus of agency more broadly if we want to understand the complicated machinery of action. But perhaps more importantly, she points out that we may be morally active while entertaining a contemplative attitude, which does not issue in action. The grain of moral life, she argues, is constituted by the.. (shrink)

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and (...) argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis’s theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. (shrink)

According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regret and explains its practical significance for the agent. My contention (...) is that agent-regret is a mode of valuing: a way in which the agent expresses and confers value. (shrink)

The paper focuses on and criticizes the jurisprudential approaches of the last twenty years, paying particular attention to the Anglo-Saxon recent trend and the essentialist turn in jurisprudence. Against the direction opened up by Hart, Dworkin and Rawls, contemporary jurisprudence has resumed to reduce law to its imperative and coercive dimension, and legal philosophy to a discipline fundamentally devoid of any practical relevance, including legal reasoning. Counteracting these new tendencies, the paper outlines a research agenda aimed at re-establishing the relevance (...) of jurisprudence in the realm of praxis. Starting from an idea of the practice of law as a self-reflexive exercise aimed at pragmatically defining the concept of law, as distinct from both artefacts and practices which do not raise definition issues, the author argues for the crucial function of legal philosophy in formulating an idea of law that can serve as a standard of correctness for legal reasoning. To this end, the author relies on the categories of Dworkin and Arendt, adding, at the close of the essay, the proposal to integrate this conceptual framework with a criterial or conventionalist concept of law. In this perspective law is seen as an interpretive concept, but it would be pragmatically oriented, though normatively anchored. (shrink)

When do objects at different times compose a further object? This is the question of diachronic composition. The universalist answers, ‘under any conditions whatsoever’. Others argue for restrictions on diachronic composition: composition occurs only when certain conditions are met. Recently, some philosophers have argued that restrictions on diachronic compositions are motivated by our best physical theories. In Persistence and Spacetime and elsewhere, Yuri Balashov argues that diachronic compositions are restricted in terms of causal connections between object stages. In a recent (...) article, Nikk Effingham argues that the standard objections to views that endorse restrictions on composition do not apply to a view that restricts composition according to compliance with the laws of nature. On the face of it, such restrictions on diachronic composition preserve our common-sense ontology while eliminating from it scientifically revisionary objects that travel faster than the speed of light. I argue that these attempts to restrict diachronic composition by appealing to either causal or nomological constraints face insurmountable difficulties within the context of special relativity. I discuss how the universalist should best respond to Hudson’s argument for superluminal objects, and in doing so, I present and defend a new sufficient condition for motion that does not entail that such objects are in superluminal motion. 1 Introduction2 Diachronic Composition3 Diachronic Composition and Superluminal Objects4 Restricting Diachronic Composition5 Causal and Nomological Restrictions on Composition in a Relativistic Context6 Superluminal Objects and Motion7 Conclusion. (shrink)

There are different ways in which imaginings can involve the first-person. I can imagine skiing down a mountain, looking down the slope, the wind whipping me in the face. I can also imagine myself skiing down a mountain from the outside, adopting the point of view of a spectator watching myself fly down the mountain. I can also imagine that I am someone else entirely, say Angela Merkel, skiing down a mountain. In this paper I develop and defend a new (...) account of the content of first-person imaginings. I first look at two existing accounts, one proposed by Francois Recanati (2007a, 2007b) and the other proposed by Dilip Ninan (2008), and I argue that they lack the resources to model the rich and distinct types of first-person imaginings that we can have. I then present and defend a new account that reconstrues the imagining from the inside vs. imagining from the outside distinction and can accommodate the various ways in which imaginings involve the first-person. (shrink)

Some philosophers object that Kant's respect cannot express mutual recognition because it is an attitude owed to persons in virtue of an abstract notion of autonomy and invite us to integrate the vocabulary of respect with other persons-concepts or to replace it with a social conception of recognition. This paper argues for a dialogical interpretation of respect as the key-mode of recognition of membership in the moral community. This interpretation highlights the relational and practical nature of respect, and accounts for (...) its governing role over other persons-regarding concepts. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to challenge this account of the nature of ethical judgments, and suggest that the reconciliation of their practicality and objectivity is not a genuine philosophical problem. The real issue is rather how to account for the fact that we consider our moral judgments important, authoritative, expressive of our moral personality and of our moral vision, and in this sense both objective and practical. The argument that supports this proposal is phe- nomenological. It starts with (...) the phenomenological consideration that the agent experiences ethical judg- ments as normative: they are conceived and experienced as authoritative and as such as to inform one’s life in a special way. To take phenomenology at face value is to make the experience of the agent intelligible. My conclusion will be that neither realism nor non- cognitivism in their crudest versions engage in the search for the intelligibility of our moral experience, and for that reason they are not appealing alternatives. In their softer and sophisticated versions, both realism and non-cognitivism purport to explain moral phenom- enology, but employ inadequate explanatory devices that seriously compromise their account. As I will argue, the phenomenological argument leads toward a construc- tivist account of ethical judgments. The conception of constructivism I advance is a form of cognitivist irrealism, thus opposed both to realism and non- cognitivism. Here is how my argument will proceed. In section 1, I characterize the debate on ethical objectivity as exploiting the realist image of discovery and the non- cognitivist image of invention. With Wiggins I argue that these alternative metaphors fail to account for moral phenomenology. In section 2, I examine Simon Blackburn’s non-cognitivist reply that utilizes the image of projection, and argue that while more sophisticated than the previous ones, this solution does not account for the authority of ethical judgments. In section 3, I take into consideration McDowell’s analogy between values and secondary qualities and the metaphor of vision. My claim is that his argument succeeds in ruling out realism and non-cognitivism on phenomenological grounds, but it is insufficient as an account of values. My point is not simply that the analogy with percep- tion is limited and incomplete, but that it is inadequate to account for the normative relations that the agent establishes with her surroundings. In section 4, I argue that the appeal to phenomenology supports construc- tivism about normative relations and expose its features. Finally, in section 5, I show the merits of construction as an explanatory device. (shrink)

In this paper, I ask feminist philosophers and science studies scholars to consider the goals of developing critical analyses of evolutionary psychology. These goals can include development of scholarship in feminist philosophy and science studies, mediation of the uptake of evolutionary psychology by other academic and lay communities, and improvement of the practices and products of evolutionary psychology itself. I evaluate ways that some practices of feminist philosophy and science studies facilitate or hinder meeting these goals, and consider the merits (...) of critical engagement with some of the scientists themselves. Finally, I describe a community of feminist evolutionary psychologists with whom it might be both fruitful and interesting to engage, and identify ways that these interactions may benefit the science and the study of the science. (shrink)

The number of women occupying male-dominated blue-collar jobs continues to be very low. This study examines segregation in the blue-collar trades, taking into consideration both structural and individual factors. Using nationally representative data for 25 countries, the study shows that segregation in the blue-collar sector does not vary with the strength of vocational education and training programs. At the individual level, findings reveal higher degrees of social reproduction among working-class families, but parental background alone does not fully account for the (...) gender composition of the sector in which children end up working. Overall, the findings point to the existence of a socializing mechanism that entrenches horizontal segregation in the blue-collar sector. The study indicates that to reduce segregation in the blue-collar fields, policies must address this prior mechanism, both at the structural and individual level. (shrink)

The article critically examines the issue of “constitutional identity” in the European Union through a methodological approach articulated in five decisions, which makes it possible to reach some substantive conclusions about what “constitutional identity” is and what it should be in the legal practice of European courts. European law is a peculiar creature, as it is the product of both case law and legal scholarship. Its teleological nature, oriented toward the efficiency of the single market, has led to a jurisprudential (...) evolution that is often creative, at times even contra legem, with profound effects on national legal systems and on the tradition of the ius privatum europaeum. In this context, the clause on national identity as constitutional identity set forth in Article 4(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon is interpreted as a principle that limits the expansion of the European economic constitution, acts as a brake on supremacy, and ultimately functions as a “reservation of interpretation”. (shrink)

Introduction to the special issue by editor Carla Fehr.

G. A. Cohen and J. Raz object that Constructivism is incoherent because it crucially deploys unconstructed elements in the structure of justification. This paper offers a response on behalf of constructivism, by reassessing the role of such unconstructed elements. First, it argues that a shared conception of rational agency works as a starting point for the justification, but it does not play a foundational role. Second, it accounts for the unconstructed norms that constrains the activity of construction as constitutive norms. (...) Finally, on this basis, it draws a contrast between constructivist and foundational methods of ethics, such as deontology and teleology. (shrink)

In the digital realm, noise is at once fought and sought, hated, and loved. We may wish to reduce noise in communications, but we require it to encrypt the very content we communicate. We may wish to reduce noise when recording sounds, but in fact noise is of paramount importance for the achievement of high-fidelity recordings. The catch is that noise is not always the unwanted, obscene, unpleasant, or unwelcome side of an otherwise coherent, pleasant, and delightful set of circumstances. (...) We need noise, badly. And we do so, not only when concerned with the efficiency of our technological instruments but also when concerned with the experience we derive from them. In today’s increasingly technological world, all efforts to minimise noise make our demand for it ever more pressing. The case of digital art practices is perhaps the most blatant example of how our (experiential) need for noise increases the more we try to suppress it. Odi et amo, noise. The main contribution of this chapter is not to argue whether a phenomenology of noise is possible or not. Rather, the aim is to illustrate how an adversarial stance towards noise leads to an impoverished experience. The case of digital technology will be our main guide. The claim is that if the inextricable relation between noise and experience is missed, excluded, or bypassed, then any phenomenology is impossible, let alone one about noise. (shrink)

Algunos poetas con obra en el Cancionero de Baena aluden con cierta frecuencia a la guerra de Troya, fundamentalmente mediante menciones a los principales personajes, generalmente con propósitos ligados a la instrucción moral. Entre las fuentes que manejaron para adquirir el conocimiento de esta temática se encontraban, seguramente, obras historiográficas. El propósito de este trabajo es establecer los conocimientos que manifiestan tener los poetas con anterioridad a 1432, determinar si pueden percibirse periodos o fases de interés en el uso de (...) esos motivos literarios, y considerar hasta qué punto estos conocimientos son habituales o más bien exclusivos de un grupo reducido de autores. Paralelamente este trabajo resultará en implicaciones sobre el conocimiento de la guerra de Troya entre las élites cortesanas (público de estas composiciones) en el primer tercio del XV. Para ello se repasan las menciones a los héroes griegos y troyanos y a las protagonistas femeninas, topónimos y gentilicios que aparecen en el Cancionero de Baena. Finalmente se abordará el problema de las correspondencias entre las etapas de interés por la materia de Troya en este cancionero y la lectura y reelaboración en nuevas versiones en prosa en castellano. (shrink)

Este artículo explora la centralidad de la novela de Marcel Proust À la Recherche du temps perdu en la crítica literaria de Walter Benjamin. Celebrando el centenario del Instituto de Investigación Social, reevalúa cómo Benjamin se relacionó con la obra de Proust y destaca la importancia del arte y la literatura para una Teoría Crítica radical. Para Benjamin, Proust es un escritor subversivo que trasciende la novela como género y subvierte la relación entre la novela y el tiempo a través (...) del recuerdo. La Recherche también es una fuerza poderosa para la teoría crítica de Benjamin. Por lo tanto, el artículo aborda además la presencia de temas proustianos en sus reflexiones sobre la historia y la revolución. (shrink)

Law seems to be irremediadibly connected to the experience of coercion and to a structure of hierarchy. This is so because it has traditionally been defined as a set of authoritative prescriptions, usually commands backed by the menace of a sanction, an evil eventually applied through the use of overwhelming violence. Law has also been related to some kind of structure or system which is intrinsically hierarchical, both in the sense of the hierarchy of people whose conduct is addressed by (...) the law and in the sense of the logical interdependence of the legal prescriptions themselves. The British legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart criticizes in his celabrated book The Concept of Law powerfully the command theory and also reshapes the theory of the hierarchical structure of rules. The paper will tries to follow Hart’s attack to the traditional imperativistic view and will then focus on his treatment of international law. The aim is to show on the one side how promising Hart’s approach could be, and on the other side how poor however his conceptualization of international law at the end of the day reveals to be. (shrink)

The Collapse of the Rule of Law. The Messina Earthquake and the State of Exception Messina, a Sicilian town, was devasteted by an earthquake in1908. It was an hecatomb. Stricken through this unfathomable disgrace Messina’s institutions and civil society collapsed and a sort of wild natural state replaced the rule of law. In this situation there was a first intervention of the Russian Czarist navy who came to help but immediately enforced cruel emergency measures. The Italian army followed and there (...) was a formal declaration of an ‘emergency situation.’ Around this event and the several exceptional measures taken by the government a debate took place about the legality of those exceptional measures. The article tries to reconstruct the historical context and the content of that debate and in a broader perspective thematizes how law (and morality) could be brought to meet the breaking of normality and ordinary life by an unexpected and catastrophic event. (shrink)