For many, blame is a morally appropriate response only when the blamer has _standing_ to blame. This chapter calls this the standard account, and this chapter argues that it should be rejected. Defenders of the standard account have articulated several conditions that a person must meet in order to have standing. This chapter considers arguments given in support of each condition and show that these arguments are vulnerable to objections. Despite the criticisms, this chapter acknowledges that there is (...) a kernel of truth in the standard account: blame is _positional_; that is, blame’s moral propriety sometimes depends on the relationship between the blamer and the target. However, the standard account fails to adequately capture the positionality of blame. Despite what some philosophers suggest, the ethics of blame is not exhausted by considerations of fittingness and standing. As critics, targets, and third parties, we have special responsibilities, and this chapter closes by describing these responsibilities. (shrink)

Deep learning AI systems have proven a wide capacity to take over human-related activities such as car driving, medical diagnosing, or elderly care, often displaying behaviour with unpredictable consequences, including negative ones. This has raised the question whether highly autonomous AI may qualify as morally responsible agents. In this article, we develop a set of four conditions that an entity needs to meet in order to be ascribed moral responsibility, by drawing on Aristotelian ethics and contemporary philosophical research. We encode (...) these conditions and generate a flowchart that we call the Moral Responsibility Test. This test can be used as a tool both to evaluate whether an entity is a morally responsible agent and to inform human moral decision-making over the influencing variables of the context of action. We apply the test to the case of Artificial Moral Advisors and conclude that this form of AI cannot qualify as morally responsible agents. We further discuss the implications for the use of AMAs as moral enhancement and show that using AMAs to offload human responsibility is inadequate. We argue instead that AMAs could morally enhance users if they are interpreted as enablers for moral knowledge of the contextual variables surrounding human moral decision-making, with the implication that such a use might actually enlarge human moral responsibility. (shrink)

The idea that demands are a key constituent of any analysis of the negative reactive attitudes is rarely challenged, enjoying a freedom from scrutiny uncommon in philosophy. In this paper I press on this orthodox view, arguing that there are broadly speaking, three ways in which the term ‘demand’ is used in discussions of the negative reactive attitudes and that each is problematic.

Functionalist accounts of blame have been rising in popularity. Proponents of the approach claim that, by defining blame in terms of its function or functions, their account has the advantage of being able to accommodate a wide range of attitudes and activities as blame; but their opponents question the extensional and explanatory adequacy of such accounts. This paper contributes to this burgeoning literature by presenting new challenges to the existing functionalist accounts. The fundamental problem, I shall argue, (...) lies in the fact that they all focus on using functions to define blame as a type of practice, but this strategy fails to pick out a unique moral-psychological type and does not offer a complete set of extension-determining criteria for the concept of blame. This amounts to a serious theoretical disadvantage. I consider various responses to the challenges throughout the paper, concluding that the best reply available to the functionalist theorist involves using functions to directly define blame tokens. (shrink)

The idea that one can blamelessly violate a norm is central to ethics and epistemology. The paper examines the prospects for an account of blameless norm violation applicable both to norms governing action and norms governing belief. In doing so, I remain neutral on just what are the norms governing action and belief. I examine three leading suggestions for understanding blameless violation of a norm which is not overridden by another norm: doxastic accounts; epistemic accounts; and appeal to expected value. (...) We see that all of these accounts face problems when understood as accounts of blameless norm violation applicable to both belief and action. This leaves a variety of options including seeking an alternative account of blameless norm violation common to belief and action; concluding that we cannot determine the correct account of blameless norm violation independently of what are the norms of belief; and abandoning the project of finding a common account of blameless norm violation common to ethics and epistemology. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept derivative blameworthiness for ignorant conduct – the idea that the blameworthiness for one’s ignorance can ‘transfer’ to blameworthiness for one’s subsequent ignorant conduct. In this chapter we ask the question what it actually means that blameworthiness would transfer, and explore four distinct views and their merits. On views (I) and (II), one’s overall degree of blameworthiness is determined by factors relevant to one’s ignorance and/or one’s subsequent conduct, and transfer only involves an increase in scope. On views (...) (III) and (IV), one’s overall degree of blameworthiness is determined by factors relevant to one’s ignorance as well as one’s subsequent conduct, and transfer might not only entail an increase in scope, but also in degree. (shrink)

Constitutivists about moral norms are often suspected of providing an overly “self-centered” account of morality which does not take seriously enough morality’s interpersonal nature. This worry see...

Most philosophers believe that wrongdoers sometimes deserve to be punished by long prison sentences. They also believe that such punishments are justified by their consequences: they deter crime and incapacitate potential offenders. In this article, I argue that both these claims are false. No one deserves to be punished, I argue, because our actions are shot through with direct or indirect luck. I also argue that there are good reasons to think that punishing fewer people and much less harshly will (...) have better social consequences, at a reduced overall cost, then the long prison sentences that are usually seen as required for social protection. (shrink)

Harsh blame can be socially destructive. This article examines how harsh blame can be “civilized.” A core construct here is the historicist narrative, which is a story-like account of how a person came to be the sort of person she is. We argue that historicist narratives regarding immoral actors can temper blame and that this happens via a novel mechanism. To illuminate that mechanism, we offer a novel theoretical perspective on lay beliefs about free will. We distinguish (...) 2 senses of free will: (a) Freedom of action, which portrays the will as a dynamic choice-making mechanism and concerns whether the actor can exert volitional control via that mechanism at the time of action, and (b) Control of self-formation, which portrays the will as an enduring disposition (e.g., persistent desire to humiliate) and refers to whether the actor is truly the source of that disposition. Six experiments show that historicist narratives have no effect on perceived freedom of action, but rather temper blame by reducing perceived self-formative control. We also provide evidence against several additional theoretically derived alternative mediators (e.g., intentionality, perceived suffering). Further underlining the need to distinguish free will concepts, we show that biological narratives—unlike historicist narratives—temper blame via reductions in perceived freedom of action. Finally, to illuminate the meaning of “civilized” blame,” we show that historicist narratives specifically reduce the urge to inflict spiteful punishments on offenders, but leave intact the urge to nonviolently guide the offender toward moral improvement. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Times of Existential Discomfort are these, where man is still seeking for a spiritual path, between sacred and profane. What's the role of philosophy in this search, does she require some means that are in others hands? In th hands of powered people, between economic powershi and aesthetic extravaganza?

ABSTRACTThe judgment of blame was studied in a group of 28 teenagers, 14 with Asperger syndrome and 14 typically developed. Teenagers in each group were matched by age, cognitive development and academic level. They were presented with 12 short vignettes in which they had to judge an action according to the intent of the actor, the consequences of the action and the seriousness of the situation. Results showed a significant difference in the patterns of judgment of both groups. The (...) AS group judged the action according to the physical consequence of the action more than the intent of the actor; the opposite was observed with the control group. In addition, the AS teenagers were less capable than the control group of grading injury to a person when apportioning blame especially when they were not familiar with the social situations. This result suggests that the judgement of the seriousness of the outcome of the social interactio... (shrink)

The Limits of Blame, by KellyErin I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. Pp. 221.

Following the media attention given to Exxon and Dow-Corning after their controversial handling of the Valdez oil spill and unsafe silicone breast implant incidents, this research investigates the basic question, what do you say when you have made a mistake? It provides a review of the literature on response process, event and impression management, and utilizes the PR Newswire database to explore the attributions and disclosure provided for these events.

From a moral-philosophical standpoint, the convergence and strengthening of two interlocking ideological developments since the mapping of the human genome in 2001 would seem significant and thus call for vigilance. One of these stems from advances in biogenetic technology and brain research; the other posits evolutionary biology as the comprehensive explanation and origin of the human moral impulse as well as the universe. Both conceptual frameworks are rooted in the assumptions of metaphysical materialism. Whether human morality can be plausibly ascribed (...) to biology—regardless of its support from neuroscience, genomic technology or evolutionary psychology—and whether physical science per se is adequate to make metaphysical pronouncements will require a reasoned response in the second decade of the twenty-first century. At stake is no less than “civil society” itself and whether human beings in fact can be held responsible for their actions. (shrink)

Women's underrepresentation in leadership positions in scientific and business life has been explained in organizational theory from several perspectives, all of which agree that women nowadays are highly qualified for leadership posts. Women are a relatively new phenomenon in this particuler sphere of work life. But long-term figurational approaches provide an explanation for the persistence of women's underrepresentation. Being an outsider in leadership positions implies ambiguity and an ambivalent fluctuation between stigmatization and counter-stigmatization. The present study uses Norbert Elias's Established (...) and Outsiders model to understand the complex polyphony in the movement of ascending and descending groups in leading positions, which are traditionally constructed as a `Man's World'. Referring to 18th-century books on etiquette through to present-day career guides, the author traces behavioural codes in gender and business life. (shrink)

The word "blame" and the concept of blame are commonly used by both laymen and philosophers. The latter refer to it frequently in the controversies surrounding desert and in controversies surrounding determinism. Some of the brouhaha in each of the above controversies is generated because the disputants use the word "blame" in different ways. One who attacks blame may, in reality, be attacking the practice of settled disapproval; on the other hand, a disputant who defends (...) class='Hi'>blame may merely be defending blame-as-holding-morally responsible. Hence, the two disputants "never meet." Worse, they seem unable to see why they never meet. Since they both write and speak the same word , they assume that they are speaking the same thing. ;We show that such an assumption is unwarranted. We show that the concept of blame variously refers to: causal identification, juding , holding morally responsible, and disapproval . Sudden disapproval means disapproval felt; settled disapproval means disapproval expressed. ;To show that blaming is not the same as condemning, censuring, rebuking, etc., we analyze blame vis-a-vis cognate concepts. Then, to show the wide range of understandings concerning blame, we outline and describe eight representative and historical views. Some of these views become especially prominent in our analysis of desert blame v. utilitarian blame and in our analysis of determinism vis-a-vis blame. ;One's "attitude of blaming" does not convey a singular, easy-to-identify attitude or series of responses. To show this, we spell out the differences in blaming-attitudes. We suggest that popular blame seems to be a blaming-attitude which allows or encourages expressions of condemnation. For this type of blame, there is no justification, we argue. In, "P blames A for untoward act X," P may feel disapproval toward act X, thus feel disapproval toward A because of X. This is non-controversial. Yet, how one expresses that blaming-attitude is significant. ; P may control and channel his feelings of disapproval and express them in such a way as to seek proper redress and ultimately help A. This, we argue, is an appropriate blaming-attitude. Or, P may use the occasion of untoward act X to unleash vengeance and hate on A. Such an action, we argue, is no part of blaming; it has nothing to do with holding a person morally responsible or with voluntariness and free-will. Such an action, we argue, would be better labelled as "condemning." ;We show how these blame distinctions relate to the issue of desert and to the issue of determinism. We show that attempts to relate determinism to any kind of blaming activity are difficult because the thesis of determinism is ambiguous. We also show that, all problems considered, desert blame is to be preferred over utilitarian blame. (shrink)

Drawing on insights from conversation analysis, discursive psychology and social psychology, this article describes some interactional features of two celebrity TV confessionals and the resources used by the TV interviewers and celebrity guests to attribute, accept or deny responsibility for their transgressions. The analytic interest lies in how confessions are locally and interactionally managed, that is, how ‘doing confessing’ is achieved in the television interview context. We show how the host’s opening turn constrains the celebrity guest’s contribution and secures overt (...) admission of guilt, while simultaneously inviting the celebrity guest to tell their side of the story. We also show how celebrity guests produce descriptions which minimize the extent and severity of their transgressions, reduce agency and transform the character of their transgression. In doing so, we argue that celebrity interviewees can convey mitigations and extenuations which diminish the extent of their responsibility – calling into question the very nature of their confession. We propose that our findings demonstrate the hybrid nature of interviewing in the celebrity TV confessional and contribute to our understanding of how ‘doing confessing’ in the public eye is discursively and interactionally negotiated. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a formalisation of the main ideas of the work of Van de Poel on responsibility. Using the basic concepts through which the meanings of responsibility are defined, we construct a logic which enables to express sentences like “individual i is accountable for φ”, “individual i is blameworthy for φ” and “individual i has the obligation to see to it that φ”. This formalization clarifies the definitions of responsibility given by Van de Poel and highlights their (...) differences and similarities. It also helps to assess the consistency of the formalisation of responsibility, not only by showing that definitions are not inconsistent, but also by providing a formal demonstration of the relation between three main meanings of responsibility. The formal account can be used to derive new properties of the concepts. With the help of the formalisation, we detect the occurrence of the problem of many hands by defining a logical framework for reasoning about collective and individual responsibility. This logic extends the Coalition Epistemic Dynamic Logic by adding a notion of group knowledge, agent ability and knowing how to its semantics. (shrink)

My dissertation develops a novel response to global skepticism about responsibility—the view that no one is fit to be held responsible for anything. Though P.F. Strawson offered a highly influential account of holding and being responsible, his argument is widely considered to fail as a response to global skepticism. The primary worry is that he only describes our practice of holding responsible but does not justify it. I propose an unorthodox Strawson-style account of holding and being responsible and employ that (...) account to offer an argument against global skepticism which not only describes but also justifies our practice of holding individuals responsible. A key innovation of my account is that it rejects the Humean idea that evaluative beliefs cannot motivate absent aid from independent desire. Rejecting that idea allows us to preserve the beauty of Strawson’s original reactive attitudes account, which cites specific emotions as the only attitudes involved in holding responsible. I go on to develop the moral psychology at work which allows me to support the idea that holding responsible involves more than emotional responses to an individual’s behavior. This also grounds support for the idea that the community of morally responsible agents is likely wider than traditionally thought. Furthermore, I immunize my account and argument to well-entrenched concerns for Strawson-style views. Often I achieve this immunity by adopting views that are thought to be incompatible with a Strawson-style argument. These views are typically embraced by skeptics or other anti-Strawsonian theorists. For instance, contrary to tradition, I show that a Strawson-style argument can be founded on the idea that experiencing individuals as natural, mechanistic beings is compatible with the attitudes involved in holding an individual responsible. I go on to show that the theses I argue for together with others allow us to accurately describe and justify our practice of holding individuals responsible. Adviser: Mark van Roojen. (shrink)

In this article, I defend luck at the expense of risk. Or, more precisely, I try to make a distinction that gives both concepts fair treatment. I start by making it clear that luck stands in opposition to control and not to causation. Both luck and risk are related to causal uncertainty. But it is warranted to talk about risk only when the uncertainty involved is brought under control, as it is in some familiar forms of fair gambling such as (...) dicing and roulette. Life is however not a fair gamble. We rarely have the kind of control over the preconditions of life that we have over the preconditions of say dicing. Luck therefore has profound influence on our lives and our health. This means that the standard conception of responsibility - that is, that we stand responsible only for consequences that we control - breaks down far more often than what is usually acknowledged. I therefore end the article by arguing that the standard conception of responsibility ought to be supplemented with a different conception that I have called "responsibility because of social involvement.". (shrink)

This book is about our practice of criticizing one another for epistemic failings. We clearly evaluate and critique one another for forming unjustified beliefs, harbouring biases, and pursuing faulty methods of inquiry. But what is the nature of this criticism? Does it ever rise to the level of blame? The question is puzzling because there are competing sources of pressure in our intuitions about “epistemic blame”, ones not easy to reconcile. The more blame-like a response is, the (...) less at home in the epistemic domain it seems — but the more at home in the epistemic domain a response is, the less blame-like it seems. These competing sources of pressure constitute a puzzle about epistemic blame. The most promising solution to this puzzle focuses on the interpersonal side of epistemic normativity. Members of an epistemic community stand in an “epistemic relationship”, and epistemic blame is a way of modifying this relationship. Understanding epistemic blame as a distinctive kind of relationship modification locates a response that is both robustly blame-like, and entirely at home in the epistemic domain. Epistemic relationships can also illuminate a unique set of issues in the ethics of epistemic blame, ones that mirror corresponding issues in the ethics of moral blame. The book examines the scope of appropriate epistemic blame, standing to epistemically blame, and the value of epistemic blame in our social and political lives. Throughout the investigation, a better understanding of the parallels and points of interaction between the epistemic and other normative domains emerges. (shrink)

Blaming others for things that are not our business can attract charges of meddling and corresponding dismissals of blame. Such charges are contentious because the content and applicability conditions of anti‐meddling norms can be difficult to specify. An unappreciated reason they can be contentious is that it is often not settled in advance whether some wrongdoing is or is not the business of a would‐be blamer. Rather than pointing out violation of a pre‐established anti‐meddling norm, charges of meddling may (...) sometimes be aiming to put such a norm in place. Grounds of anti‐meddling norms, including privacy, intimacy, and respect for victims, support giving those involved significant latitude to set their own boundaries on appropriate blame. This brings out the more general point that norms of blame, including standing norms, are often up for negotiation, and dismissals of blame can be moves in such a negotiation of trying to establish boundaries on blame, rather than merely pointing out violations of pre‐established boundaries. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical overview of recent work on epistemic blame. The paper identifies key features of the concept of epistemic blame and discusses two ways of motivating the importance of this concept. Four different approaches to the nature of epistemic blame are examined. Central issues surrounding the ethics and value of epistemic blame are identified and briefly explored. In addition to providing an overview of the state of the art of this growing but controversial (...) field, the paper highlights areas where future work is needed. (shrink)

When someone blames you, you might accept the blame or you might reject it, challenging the blamer’s interpretation of the facts or providing a justification or excuse. Either way, there are opportunities for edifying moral discussion and moral repair. But another common, and less constructive, response is to simply dismiss the blame, refusing to engage with the blamer. Even if you agree that you are blameworthy, you may refuse to engage with the blame—and, specifically, with blame (...) coming from this particular person. This is a common response if the blamer is being hypocritical or meddlesome in blaming the wrongdoer. This paper aims to make sense of this kind of response: What are we doing when we dismiss blame? A common thought is that we dismiss demands issued by blame, but we still must identify the content of the relevant demands. My proposal is that when we dismiss blame, we dismiss a demand to respond to the blame with a second-personal expression of remorse to the blamer. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new theory of the nature of hypocritical blame and why it is objectionable, arguing that hypocritical blame is a form of dishonest signaling. Blaming provides very important benefits: through its ability to signal our commitments to norms and unwillingness to tolerate norm violations, it greatly contributes to valuable norm-following. Hypocritical blamers, however, are insufficiently committed to the norms or values they blame others for violating. As allowing their blame to pass unchecked threatens (...) the signaling system, our strong interest in maintaining valuable norm-following by tracking who has what commitments justifies objecting to hypocritical blame. This theory has a number of strengths over competing accounts: it delivers intuitive verdicts about when blame is objectionable across a range of cases, it is a naturalistic explanation, it is consistent with a leading theory of the nature of blame, it explains why hypocritical pronouncements that don’t feature blame are similiarly objectionable, it does not rely on contentious analyses of the nature of ‘standing’, and it preserves the common intuition that hypocrites are in some way dishonest. (shrink)

Blaming (construed broadly to include both blaming-attitudes and blaming-actions) is a puzzling phenomenon. Even when we grant that someone is blameworthy, we can still sensibly wonder whether we ought to blame him. We sometimes choose to forgive and show mercy, even when it is not asked for. We are naturally led to wonder why we shouldn’t always do this. Wouldn’t it be a better to wholly reject the punitive practices of blame, especially in light of their often undesirable (...) effects, and embrace an ethic of unrelenting forgiveness and mercy? In this paper I seek to address these questions by offering an account of blame that provides a rationale for thinking that to wholly forswear blaming blameworthy agents would be deeply mistaken. This is because, as I will argue, blaming is a way of valuing, it is “a mode of valuation.” I will argue that among the minimal standards of respect generated by valuable objects, notably persons, is the requirement to redress disvalue with blame. It is not just that blame is something additional we are required to do in properly valuing, but rather blame is part of what that it is to properly value. Blaming, given the existence of blameworthy agents, is mode of valuation required by the standards of minimal respect. To forswear blame would be to fail value what we ought to value. (shrink)

Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive functions (...) of blame. The new challenge is that skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or less inappropriate) to respond with this kind of disappointment to people’s conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. The paper argues that current blame-skeptical views fail to meet this challenge. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)