Meddlesome blame and negotiating standing

Noûs 59 (2):495-516 (2025)
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Abstract

Blaming others for things that are not our business can attract charges of meddling and corresponding dismissals of blame. Such charges are contentious because the content and applicability conditions of anti‐meddling norms can be difficult to specify. An unappreciated reason they can be contentious is that it is often not settled in advance whether some wrongdoing is or is not the business of a would‐be blamer. Rather than pointing out violation of a pre‐established anti‐meddling norm, charges of meddling may sometimes be aiming to put such a norm in place. Grounds of anti‐meddling norms, including privacy, intimacy, and respect for victims, support giving those involved significant latitude to set their own boundaries on appropriate blame. This brings out the more general point that norms of blame, including standing norms, are often up for negotiation, and dismissals of blame can be moves in such a negotiation of trying to establish boundaries on blame, rather than merely pointing out violations of pre‐established boundaries.

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Justin Snedegar
University of Virginia

Citations of this work

You Don't Have to be Better to Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel J. Miller - 2026 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
The permissibility of blaming arbitrarily.Kenneth Silver - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Wrongs Without Rights?Anni A. Räty - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
Politics and Foreign Donations.Andreas Bengtson & Dick Timmer - 2026 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 31 (2):265-295.
Blame.Neal Tognazzini & Justin Coates - 2012 - In Ed Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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