Our programmatic article on Homo heuristicus (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009) included a methodological section specifying three minimum criteria for testing heuristics: competitive tests, individual-level tests, and tests of adaptive selection of heuristics. Using Richter and Späth’s (2006) study on the recognition heuristic, we illustrated how violations of these criteria can lead to unsupported conclusions. In their comment, Hilbig and Richter conduct a reanalysis, but again without competitive testing. They neither test nor specify the compensatory model of inference they (...) argue for. Instead, they test whether participants use the recognition heuristic in an unrealistic 100% (or 96%) of cases, report that only some people exhibit this level of consistency, and conclude that most people would follow a compensatory strategy. We know of no model of judgment that predicts 96% correctly. The curious methodological practice of adopting an unrealistic measure of success to argue against a competing model, and to interpret such a finding as a triumph for a preferred but unspecified model, can only hinder progress. Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, and Gigerenzer (2010), in contrast, specified five compensatory models, compared them with the recognition heuristic, and found that the recognition heuristic predicted inferences most accurately. (shrink)

Many of the problems studied in cognitive science are inductive problems, requiring people to evaluate hypotheses in the light of data. The key to solving these problems successfully is having the right inductive biases—assumptions about the world that make it possible to choose between hypotheses that are equally consistent with the observed data. This article explores a novel experimental method for identifying the biases that guide human inductive inferences. The idea behind this method is simple: This article uses the responses (...) produced by a participant on one trial to generate the stimuli that either they or another participant will see on the next. A formal analysis of this “iterated learning” procedure, based on the assumption that the learners are Bayesian agents, predicts that it should reveal the inductive biases of these learners, as expressed in a prior probability distribution over hypotheses. This article presents a series of experiments using stimuli based on a well-studied set of category structures, demonstrating that iterated learning can be used to reveal the inductive biases of human learners. (shrink)

Sports referees are not always as unbiased or impartial as they ideally should be. Studies have shown, for example, that in their decisions, referees seem to be biased against people of different r...

This paper has two aims: first, to introduce a philosophical audience to research on implicit and explicit biases related to age; and second, to identify and explain ageist biases within social-scientific research. In the first case, evidence drawn from massive datasets, including both large language corpora and online tests with millions of participants, shows that implicit ageism has stayed remarkably persistent across time and space. This persistence stands in contrast to explicit ageism and other implicit biases, many of which have (...) declined dramatically in the 21st century. In the second case, however, researchers have been preoccupied with a small fraction of biases related to age: for example, against the old rather than the young, and against ‘old people’ in general rather than specific oppressed older subgroups. Claims about the all-around intransigence of ageism are thus oversimplified overgeneralizations, which fail to heed lessons from contextual, embodied, critical, and intersectional perspectives on the social mind and world. Stubbornly flawed assumptions and methods have prevented the social sciences from addressing core questions for intergenerational justice, including the systematic disempowerment of the young. Fortunately, there is nothing inevitable leading to these oversights; empirical developments in the 2020s suggest that these limitations can—and have begun to be—overcome. (shrink)

Meta-accuracy of first impressions on the Internet has the potential to shape subsequent interactions. Aiming to enhance understanding of the underlying perceptual dimensions, the contribution of social competence, and the existence of positive/negative bias in first impressions’ meta-accuracy online, we conducted a study in a simulated asynchronous social-media-type setting. Target participants uploaded a selfie, wrote a short description of themselves, provided estimates of how warm and competent they believed others would find them based on their selfies and texts, and completed (...) two social competence questionnaires. Perceiver participants assessed the warmth and competence of the selfies and texts as well. Meta-accuracy was measured as the absolute difference between metaperception and others’ perception. Through correlational analyses, we confirmed that meta-accuracy of first impressions on the Internet aligned with the universal dimensions of social cognition, found sporadic evidence for the positive association between meta-accuracy and social competence, and showed that meta-accuracy for specific Internet expressive means varied with varying proficiency in these means. Through t-tests, we demonstrated positive meta-accuracy bias for selfies along the warmth dimension and negative bias for text along the competence dimension. Overall, our results suggest the primacy of warmth and uniqueness of the male targets-female perceivers combination for meta-accuracy on the Internet. Our findings expand knowledge about first impressions’ meta-accuracy on the Internet. (shrink)

Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: the discovery of less-is-more effects; the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; the (...) development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an “adaptive toolbox;” and the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people’s adaptive use of heuristics. Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies. (shrink)

Most research on human parental investment has focused on overall parental effort or resource allocation, overlooking the fact that human investment spans a broad suite of material, instructional, and social forms of investment. This array of investment enables examination of how evolutionary processes have elaborated parental care into distinct domains. Where daughters and sons historically faced different recurrent adaptive problems, selection should have favoured biases in parental investment that cultivate in each offspring the competencies relevant to its sex-specific challenges (e.g., (...) navigating greater reproductive costs for daughters; navigating contest competition for sons). Likewise, mothers and fathers should differ in parental investment domains where their own evolutionary and life histories afforded greater sex-specific expertise. To test these hypotheses, we used linear mixed-effect models to analyse 105 adults’ (49.5% female) ratings of parental investment received across 73 behaviours organised into 13 domains. Results were largely consistent with predictions. Daughters received more parental investment in mating and relationship guidance, protection, and material support. Sons received greater parental investment in athletic training, permissiveness regarding sexual behaviour, and competitive encouragement. Mothers invested more than fathers in direct care, bonding, social and moral guidance, and discipline. Fathers invested more in athletics, and mechanical and practical skills. Domains linked to adaptive challenges common to both sexes (e.g., direct care) showed no offspring-sex differences in parental investment. The patterns accord with the evolutionary hypothesis that parental investment maps onto sex-differentiated adaptive problems. Discussion explores hypotheses about the interactions between socialisation practices of parents and sex-linked predispositions in offspring. (shrink)

Individuals’ propensity not to override the first answer that comes to mind is thought to be a crucial cause behind many failures in reasoning. In the present study, we aimed to explore the strategies used and the abilities employed when individuals solve the cognitive reflection test, the most widely used measure of this tendency. Alongside individual differences measures, protocol analysis was employed to unfold the steps of the reasoning process in solving the CRT. This exploration revealed that there are several (...) ways people solve or fail the test. Importantly, 77% of the cases in which reasoners gave the correct final answer in our protocol analysis, they started their response with the correct answer or with a line of thought which led to the correct answer. We also found that 39% of the incorrect responders reflected on their first response. The findings indicate that the suppression of the first answer may not be the only crucial feature of reflectivity in the CRT and that the lack of relevant knowledge is a prominent cause of the reasoning errors. Additionally, we confirmed that the CRT is a multi-faceted construct: both numeracy and reflectivity account for performance. The results can help to better apprehend the “whys and whens” of the decision errors in heuristics and biases tasks and to further refine existing explanatory models. (shrink)

This study looked for evidence of biases in the allocation and disengagement of attention in dysphoric individuals. Participants studied images for a recognition memory test while their eye fixations were tracked and recorded. Four image types were presented (depression-related, anxiety-related, positive, neutral) in each of two study conditions. For the simultaneous study condition, four images (one of each type) were presented simultaneously for 10 seconds, and the number of fixations and the total fixation time to each image was measured, similar (...) to the procedure used by Eizenman et al. (2003) and Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, and Wells (2008). For the sequential study condition, four images (one of each type) were presented consecutively, each for 4 seconds; to measure disengagement of attention an endogenous cuing procedure was used (Posner, 1980). Dysphoric individuals spent significantly less time attending to positive images than non-dysphoric individuals, but there were no group differences in attention to depression-related images. There was also no evidence of a dysphoria-related bias in initial shifts of attention. With respect to the disengagement of attention, dysphoric individuals were slower to disengage their attention from depression-related images. The recognition memory data showed that dysphoric individuals had poorer memory for emotional images, but there was no evidence of a conventional mood-congruent memory bias. Differences in the attentional and memory biases observed in depressed and dysphoric individuals are discussed. (shrink)

In this article, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian model of learning in a general type of artificial language‐learning experiment in which learners are exposed to a mixture of grammars representing the variation present in real learners’ input, particularly at times of language change. The modeling goal is to formalize and quantify hypothesized learning biases. The test case is an experiment (Culbertson, Smolensky, & Legendre, 2012) targeting the learning of word‐order patterns in the nominal domain. The model identifies internal biases of (...) the experimental participants, providing evidence that learners impose (possibly arbitrary) properties on the grammars they learn, potentially resulting in the cross‐linguistic regularities known as typological universals. Learners exposed to mixtures of artificial grammars tended to shift those mixtures in certain ways rather than others; the model reveals how learners’ inferences are systematically affected by specific prior biases. These biases are in line with a typological generalization—Greenberg's Universal 18—which bans a particular word‐order pattern relating nouns, adjectives, and numerals. (shrink)

Audiovisual communication is greatly contributing to the emerging research field of affective computing. The use of audiovisual stimuli within immersive virtual reality environments is providing very intense emotional reactions, which provoke spontaneous physical and physiological changes that can be assimilated into real responses. In order to ensure high-quality recognition, the artificial intelligence system must be trained with adequate data sets, including not only those gathered by smart sensors but also the tags related to the elicited emotion. Currently, there are very (...) few techniques available for the labeling of emotions. Among them, the Self-Assessment Manikin devised by Lang is one of the most popular. This study shows experimentally that the graphic proposal for the original SAM labelling system, as devised by Lang, is not neutral to gender and contains gender biases in its design and representation. Therefore, a new graphic design has been proposed and tested according to the guidelines of expert judges. The results of the experiment show an overall improvement in the labeling of emotions in the pleasure–arousal–dominance affective space, particularly, for women. This research proves the relevance of applying the gender perspective in the validation of tools used throughout the years. (shrink)

Adults with chronic pain interpret ambiguous information in a pain and illness related fashion. However, limitations have been highlighted with traditional experimental paradigms used to measure interpretation biases. Whilst ambiguous scenarios have been developed to measure interpretation biases in adolescents with pain, no scenario sets exist for use with adults. Therefore, the present study: sought to validate a range of ambiguous scenarios suitable for measuring interpretation biases in adults, whilst also allowing for two response formats ; and investigate paradigm efficacy, (...) by assessing the effects of recent pain experiences on task responding. A novel ambiguous scenarios task was administered to adults. Participants were presented with 62 ambiguous scenarios comprising 42 that could be interpreted in a pain/pain-illness or non-pain/non-pain illness manner: and 20 control scenarios. Participants generated their own solutions to each scenario, then rated how likely they would be to use two researcher-generated solutions to complete each scenario. Participants also rated their subjective experiences of pain in the last 3 months. Tests of reliability, including inter-rater agreement and internal consistency, produced two ambiguous scenario stimulus sets containing 18 and 20 scenarios, respectively. Further analyses revealed adults who reported more recent pain experiences were more likely to endorse the pain/pain-illness solutions in the Likelihood Ratings Task. This study provides two new stimulus sets for use with adults in pain research and/or interventions. Results also provide evidence for a negative endorsement bias in adults. (shrink)

A large campaign has sought to destigmatize psychiatric disorders by disseminating the view that they are in fact brain disorders. But when psychiatric disorders are associated with neurobiological correlates, laypeople's attitudes toward patients are harsher, and the prognoses seem poorer. Here, we ask whether these misconceptions could result from the essentialist presumption that brain disorders are innate. To this end, we invited laypeople to reason about psychiatric disorders that are diagnosed by either a brain or a behavioral test that were (...) strictly matched for their informative value. Participants viewed disorders as more likely to be innate and immutable when the diagnosis was supported by a brain test as compared to a behavioral test. These results show for the first time that people spontaneously essentialize psychiatric conditions that are linked to the brain, even when the brain probe offers no additional diagnostic or genetic information. This bias suggests that people consider the biological essence of living things as materially embodied. (shrink)

Often, when several norms are present and may be in conflict, individuals will display a self-serving bias, privileging the norm that best serves their interests. Xiao and Bicchieri (J Econ Psychol 31(3):456–470, 2010) tested the effects of inequality on reciprocating behavior in trust games and showed that—when inequality increases—reciprocity loses its appeal. They hypothesized that self-serving biases in choosing to privilege a particular social norm occur when the choice of that norm is publicly justifiable as reasonable, even if not optimal (...) for one of the parties. In line with the literature on motivated reasoning, this justification should find some degree of support among third parties. The results of our experimental survey of third parties support the hypothesis that biases are not always unilateral selfish assessments. Instead, they occur when the choice to favor a particular norm is supported by a shared sense that it is a reasonable and justifiable choice. (shrink)

Preregistration has been proposed as a useful method for making a publicly verifiable distinction between confirmatory hypothesis tests, which involve planned tests of ante hoc hypotheses, and exploratory hypothesis tests, which involve unplanned tests of post hoc hypotheses. This distinction is thought to be important because it has been proposed that confirmatory hypothesis tests provide more compelling results (less uncertain, less tentative, less open to bias) than exploratory hypothesis tests. In this article, we challenge this proposition and argue that there (...) are several advantages of exploratory hypothesis tests that can make their results more compelling than those of confirmatory hypothesis tests. We also consider some potential disadvantages of exploratory hypothesis tests and conclude that their advantages can outweigh the disadvantages. We conclude that exploratory hypothesis tests avoid researcher commitment and researcher prophecy biases, reduce the probability of data fraud, are more appropriate in the context of unplanned deviations, facilitate inference to the best explanation, and allow peer reviewers to make additional contributions at the data analysis stage. In contrast, confirmatory hypothesis tests may lead to an inappropriate level of confidence in research conclusions, less appropriate analyses in the context of unplanned deviations, and greater bias and errors in theoretical inferences. (shrink)

Mental arithmetic is characterised by a tendency to overestimate addition and to underestimate subtraction results: the operational momentum effect. Here, motivated by contentious explanations of this effect, we developed and tested an arithmetic heuristics and biases model that predicts reverse OM due to cognitive anchoring effects. Participants produced bi-directional lines with lengths corresponding to the results of arithmetic problems. In two experiments, we found regular OM with zero problems but reverse OM with non-zero problems. In a third experiment, we tested (...) the prediction of our model. Our results suggest the presence of at least three competing biases in mental arithmetic: a more-or-less heuristic, a sign-space association and an anchoring bias. We conclude that mental arithmetic exhibits shortcuts for decision-making similar to traditional domains of reasoning and problem-solving. (shrink)

The crisis of replication has led many to blame statistical significance tests for making it too easy to find impressive looking effects that do not replicate. However, the very fact it becomes difficult to replicate effects when features of the tests are tied down actually serves to vindicate statistical significance tests. While statistical significance tests, used correctly, serve to bound the probabilities of erroneous interpretations of data, this error control is nullified by data-dredging, multiple testing, and other biasing selection (...) effects. Arguments claiming to vitiate statistical significance tests attack straw person variants of tests that commit well-known fallacies and misinterpretations. There is a tension between popular calls for preregistration – arguably, one of the most promising ways to boost replication – and accounts that downplay error probabilities: Bayes Factors, Bayesian posteriors, likelihood ratios. By underscoring the importance of error control for well testedness, the replication crisis points to reformulating tests so as to avoid fallacies and report the extent of discrepancies that are and are not indicated with severity. (shrink)

The aim of the present research was to test whether involvement in a 14-days training program in the performing arts could reduce implicit biases. We asked healthy participants to complete an Implicit Association Test to assess biased attitudes to physical illness in two separate sessions, before and after the training program. Two separate control groups matched by age, gender and educational level completed the two IAT sessions, separated by same number of days, without being involved in the training program. (...) Results showed that participants who were involved in the training program reduced their implicit bias toward illness measured through IAT in the second session. This reduction in IAT measures was not observed in the control samples, despite the two IAT measures being matched in temporal delay with the experimental group. These findings suggest that an interventional program based on the performing arts could be effective in reducing levels of implicit biases among the general population. (shrink)

German nouns may alternate from singular to plural in two different ways. Some singular forms that end in a voiceless obstruent have a plural in which this obstruent is voiced. Another alternation concerns the vowel. Some singular forms with a back vowel have a plural form in which this back vowel is front. For each noun it has to be established individually whether it alternates or not. The voicing alternation is phonetically grounded, but the vowel alternation is not. Knowledge about (...) such alternations involves two things. First, it involves knowledge of which words alternate and which words do not and second, it involves the ability to extend the alternations to novel words. We studied the knowledge of which words alternate and the proportion to which they alternate in two corpus studies. We studied the knowledge of speakers concerning which words alternate and what generalizations can be based upon these words by means of a production study. The production study involved words and nonces. We asked twenty 5 year-olds, twenty 7 year-olds and tenth adults to produce the plural for a given singular word and a plural for a given singular nonce. In the corpus study we found that both alternations occur with the same frequency. In the production of alternations in words we found that participants in all age groups make few mistakes. With respect to the production of alternations in nonce words, we found that the proportion of voicing alternations decreases with age, while the proportion of vowel alternations increases. We explain this change in the ability to generalize the alternations to nonces on the basis of the confidence speakers can have in a generalization. Young children have a small lexicon and they can form relatively unreliable generalizations on lexical distributions, but they can have more confidence in their knowledge of phonetics. Adults have a large lexicon and can therefore confidently form based on their lexicon. (shrink)

A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics, probabilistic systems, belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way (...) to do so is to isolate a number of key principles of the system, and design experiments to gauge the extent to which participants do or do not follow them in reasoning tasks. Another way is to take relevant existing results and check whether a particular formal model predicts these results. The present investigation provides an illustration of the second kind of empirical testing by comparing two formal models for reasoning – namely the non-monotonic logic known as preferential logic; and a particular version of belief revision theories, screened belief revision – against the reasoning phenomenon known as belief bias in the psychology of reasoning literature: human reasoners typically seek to maintain the beliefs they already hold, and conversely to reject contradicting incoming information. The conclusion of our analysis will be that screened belief revision is more empirically adequate with respect to belief bias than preferential logic and non-monotonic logics in general, as what participants seem to be doing is above all a form of belief management on the basis of background knowledge. The upshot is thus that, while it may offer valuable insights into the nature of human reasoning, preferential logic is ultimately inadequate as a formal model of the phenomena in question. (shrink)

The endorsement of epistemically suspect (i.e., paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscientific) beliefs is widespread and has negative consequences. Therefore, it is important to understand the reasoning processes – such as lower analytic thinking and susceptibility to cognitive biases – that might lead to the adoption of such beliefs. In two studies, I constructed and tested a novel questionnaire on epistemically suspect beliefs (Study 1, N = 263), and used it to examine probabilistic reasoning biases and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning as (...) predictors of the endorsement of those beliefs, while accounting for analytic thinking and worldview variables (Study 2, N = 397). Probabilistic reasoning biases, analytic thinking, religious faith, and political liberalism consistently predicted various epistemically suspect beliefs, whereas the effect of syllogistic belief bias was largely restricted to pseudoscientific beliefs. Further research will be needed to examine the role the biased evaluation of evidence plays in the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs. (shrink)

Until recently, philosophers debating the rationality of time-biases have supposed that people exhibit a first-person hedonic bias toward the future, but that their non-hedonic and third-person preferences are time-neutral. Recent empirical work, however, suggests that our preferences are more nuanced. First, there is evidence that our third-person preferences exhibit time-neutrality only when the individual with respect to whom we have preferences—the preference target—is a random stranger about whom we know nothing; given access to some information about the preference target, third-person (...) preferences mirror first-person preferences. As a result, the simulation hypothesis has been proposed, according to which third-person preferences will mirror first-person preferences when we can simulate the mental states of the preference target. Second, there is evidence that we prefer negative hedonic events to be in our past (we are first-person negatively hedonically future-biased) only when we view future events as fixed and in no way under our control. By contrast, when we perceive it to be within our power to mitigate the badness of future events, we are first-person negatively hedonically past-biased. This is the mitigation hypothesis. We distinguish two versions of the mitigation hypothesis, the squirrelling version and the heuristic version. We ran a study which tested the simulation hypothesis, and which aimed to determine whether the squirrelling or the heuristic version of the mitigation hypothesis enjoys more empirical support. We found support for the heuristic version of the hypothesis, but no support for the squirrelling version. (shrink)

Certain recurrent features of language characterize the way a whole language system is structured. By contrast, others target specific categories of items within those wider systems. For example, languages tend to exhibit consistent order of heads and dependents across different phrases—a system‐wide regularity known as harmony. While this tendency is generally robust, some specific syntactic categories appear to deviate from the trend. We examine one such case, the order of adjectives and genitives, which do not exhibit a typological tendency for (...) consistent order with respect to the noun. Instead, adjectives tend to follow and genitives precede the noun. Across two silent gesture experiments, we test the hypothesis that these category‐specific ordering tendencies reflect cognitive biases that favor (i) conveying objects before properties that modify them, but (ii) conveying expressions of possession before possessors. While our hypothesis is thus that these biases are semantic in nature—they impact preferences for how concepts are ordered—the claim is that they may have downstream effects on conventionalized syntax by contributing to an over‐representation of postnominal adjectives and prenominal genitives. We find that these biases affect gesture order in contexts where no conventionalized system is in place. When a system is in place, participants learn that system, and category‐specific biases do not impact their learning. Our results suggest that different contexts reveal distinct types of cognitive biases; some are active during learning and others are active during language creation. (shrink)

From Curriculum Vitae parsing to web search and recommendation systems, Word2Vec and other word embedding techniques have an increasing presence in everyday interactions in human society. Biases, such as gender bias, have been thoroughly researched and evidenced to be present in word embeddings. Most of the research focuses on discovering and mitigating gender bias within the frames of the vector space itself. Nevertheless, whose bias is reflected in word embeddings has not yet been investigated. Besides discovering and mitigating gender bias, (...) it is also important to examine whether a feminine or a masculine-centric view is represented in the biases of word embeddings. This way, we will not only gain more insight into the origins of the before mentioned biases, but also present a novel approach to investigating biases in Natural Language Processing systems. Based on previous research in the social sciences and gender studies, we hypothesize that masculine-centric, otherwise known as androcentric, biases are dominant in word embeddings. To test this hypothesis we used the largest English word association test data set publicly available. We compare the distance of the responses of male and female participants to cue words in a word embedding vector space. We found that the word embedding is biased towards a masculine-centric viewpoint, predominantly reflecting the worldviews of the male participants in the word association test data set. Therefore, by conducting this research, we aimed to unravel another layer of bias to be considered when examining fairness in algorithms. (shrink)

The objective of this study was to jointly analyze the importance of cognitive and financial factors in the accuracy of profit forecasting by analysts. Data from publicly traded Brazilian companies in 2019 were obtained. We used text analysis to assess the cognitive biases from the qualitative reports of analysts. Further, we analyzed the data using statistical regression learning methods and statistical classification learning methods, such as Multiple Linear Regression, k-dependence Bayesian, and Random Forest. The Bayesian inference and classification methods allow (...) an expansion of the research line, especially in the area of machine learning, which can benefit from the examples of factors addressed in this research. The results indicated that, among cognitive biases, optimism had a negative relationship with forecasting accuracy while anchoring bias had a positive relationship. Commonality, to a lesser extent, also had a positive relationship with the analyst’s accuracy. Among financial factors, the most important aspects in the accuracy of analysts were volatility, indebtedness, and profitability. Age of the company, fair value, American Depositary Receipts, performance, and loss were still important but on a smaller scale. The results of the RF models showed a greater explanatory power. This research sheds light on the cognitive as well as financial aspects that influence the analyst’s accuracy, jointly using text analysis and machine learning methods, capable of improving the explanatory power of predictive models, together with the use of training models followed by testing. (shrink)

The present study describes the mechanism of need regulation, which accompanies the so-called “biased” decisions. We hypothesized an unconscious urge for psychological need satisfaction as the trigger for cognitive biases. In an experimental study (N = 106), participants had the opportunity to win money in a functionality test. In the test, they could either use the solution they had developed (sunk cost) or an alternative solution that offered a higher probability of winning. The selection of the sunk-cost option was (...) the most chosen option, supporting the hypothesis of this study. The reason behind the majority of participants choosing the sunk-cost option seemed to be the satisfaction of psychological needs, despite a reduced chance of winning money. An intervention, which aimed at triggering self-reflection, had no impact on the decision. The findings of this study contribute to the discussion on the reasons for cognitive biases and their formation in the human mind. Moreover, it discusses the application of the label “irrational” for biased decisions and proposes reasons for instrumental rationality, which exist at an unconscious, need-regulative level. (shrink)

The widespread use of online search engines to answer the general public’s needs for information has raised concerns about possible biases and the emerging of a ‘filter bubble’ in which users are isolated from attitude-discordant messages. Research is split between approaches that largely focus on the intrinsic limitations of search engines and approaches that investigate user search behavior. This work evaluates the findings and limitations of both approaches and advances a theoretical framework for empirical investigations of cognitive biases in online (...) search activities about health-related topics. We aim to investigate the interaction between the user and the search engine as a whole. Online search activity about health-related topics is considered as a hypothesis-testing process. Two questions emerge: whether the retrieved information provided by the search engines are fit to fulfill their role as evidence, and whether the use of this information by users is cognitively and epistemologically valid and unbiased. (shrink)

Extremists often aim to paint a biased picture of the world. Radical narratives, for instance, in forms of internet memes or posts, could thus potentially trigger cognitive biases in their users. These cognitive biases, in turn, might shape the users’ formation of extremist attitudes. To test this association, an online experiment (N=392) was conducted with three types of right-wing radical narratives (elite-critique, ingroup-outgroup, violence) in contrast to two control conditions (nonpolitical and neutral political control condition). We then measured the (...) impact of these narratives on the activation of three cognitive biases of relevance in the formation of extremist attitudes: the ingroup-outgroup bias, the negativity bias, and the just-world hypothesis. The results indicate that violence narratives seem to be particularly harmful as they heighten participants’ negativity bias and increase just-world views. Just-world views in turn show a positive relationship to extremist attitudes, which highlights the need of regulating violence invocations on social media. (shrink)

The LIGO-Virgo Collaboration achieved the first ‘direct detection’ of gravitational waves in 2015, opening a new “window” for observing the universe. Since this first detection (‘GW150914’), dozens of detections have followed, mostly produced by binary black hole mergers. However, the theory-ladenness of the LIGO-Virgo methods for observing these events leads to a potentially-vicious circularity, where general relativistic assumptions may serve to mask phenomena that are inconsistent with general relativity (GR). Under such circumstances, the fact that GR can ‘save the phenomena’ (...) may be an artifact of theory-laden methodology.This paper examines several ways that the LIGO-Virgo observations are used in theory and hypothesis testing, despite this circularity problem. First, despite the threat of vicious circularity, these experiments succeed in testing GR. Indeed, early tests of GR using GW150914 are best understood as a response to the threat of theory-ladenness and circularity. Each test searches for evidence that LIGO-Virgo’s theory-laden methods are biasing their overall conclusions. The failure to find evidence of this places constraints on deviations from the predictions of GR. Second, these observations provide a basis for studying astrophysical and cosmological processes, especially through analyses of populations of events. As gravitational-wave astrophysics transitions into mature science, constraints from early tests of GR provide a scaffolding for these population-based studies. I further characterize this transition in terms of its increasing connectedness to other parts of astrophysics and the prominence of reasoning about selection effects and other systematics in drawing inferences from observations.Overall, this paper analyses the ways that theory and hypothesis testing operate in gravitational-wave astrophysics as it gains maturity. In particular, I show how these tests build on one another in order to mitigate a circularity problem at the heart of the observations. (shrink)

The ecologist today finds scarce ground safe from controversy. Decisions must be made about what combination of data, goals, methods, and theories offers them the foundations and tools they need to construct and defend their research. When push comes to shove, ecologists often turn to philosophy to justify why it is their approach that is scientific. Karl Popper’s image of science as bold conjectures and heroic refutations is routinely enlisted to justify testing hypotheses over merely confirming them. One of (...) the most controversial theories in contemporary science is the Neutral Theory of Ecology. Its chief developer and proponent, Stephen Hubbell, presents the neutral theory as a bold conjecture that has so far escaped refutation. Critics of the neutral theory claim that it already stands refuted, despite what the dogmatic neutralists say. We see the controversy through a Popperian lens. But Popper’s is an impoverished philosophy of science that distorts contemporary ecology. -/- The controversy surrounding the neutral theory actually rests on a methodological fault. There is a strong but messy historical link between the concepts of being neutral and being null in biology, and Hubbell perpetuates this when he claims that the neutral theory is supplies the appropriate null for testing alternative theories. What method is being followed here? There are three contenders: -/- Null hypothesis testing tests for whether a there is a pattern to be explained. Null modeling tests for whether a process is causally relevant to a pattern. Baseline modeling apportions relative responsibility to multiple processes each relevant to a pattern. -/- Whether the neutral theory supplies an appropriate “null” depends upon whether null hypothesis, null modeling, or baseline model is intended. These methods prescribe distinct inference patterns. If they are null hypothesis testing or null modeling, the neutralists’s reasoning is invalid. If they are baseline modeling, the justification of a crucial assumption remains opaque. Either way, the neutral-null connection is being exploited rhetorically to privilege the neutral theory over its rivals. Clarifying the reasoning immunizes us against the rhetoric and foregrounds the underlying virtues of the neutralist approach to ecology. -/- The Popperian lens distorts theoretical development as dogmatism. Lakatos’s view of science as the development of research programmes clarifies the epistemology of the neutral theory. Focusing philosophical attention on the neutralist research programme illuminates (1) the synchronic uses of the neutral theory to make predictions and give descriptions and explanations; (2) its diachronic development in response to theoretical innovation and confrontation with data; (3) its complex relationships to alternative theories. For example, baseline modeling is now seen to be its primary explanatory heuristic. The justification for baseline modeling with the neutral theory, previously hidden from view, is seen in the logic of in the neutralist research programme. (shrink)

The aim of the research was to find out whether participants completing an SCM questionnaire to assess attitudes towards the Roma would give different answers in response to different sets of instructions. Three sets of instructions were tested using cognitive interviews: answer from your personal viewpoint, from the viewpoint of the majority of Slovaks, from the viewpoint of those close to you. The research sample comprised 24 respondents, of whom 12 were upper secondary school students and 12 working adults. Responses (...) from the personal viewpoint differed markedly from responses from the viewpoint of the majority of Slovaks, but were very similar to responses from the viewpoint of those close to the person. In the research, internal and external motivation to respond with/without prejudice was also investigated. Participants with internalised unbiased beliefs showed a preference for assessing the Roma minority from their own viewpoint, while participants with internalised biased beliefs thought the instructions were unimportant. (shrink)

Qualitative evidence concerning the relationship between QoL and a wide range of disabilities suggests that subjective judgments regarding other people’s QoL are wrong more often than not and that such judgments by medical practitioners in particular can be biased. Guided by their desire to do good and avoid harm, surgeons often rely on "the eyeball test" to decide whether a patient will or will not benefit from surgery. But the eyeball test can easily harbor a range of implicit judgments (...) and biases against patients with disabilities, including erroneous assumptions about QoL. We critique the use of the "eyeball" test and offer suggestions to reduce bias and ensure that patients’ values are more consistently prioritized in surgical decision-making. (shrink)

Decision-making capacity (DMC) is the gatekeeping element for a patient’s right to self-determination with regard to medical decisions. A DMC evaluation is not only conducted on descriptive grounds but is an inherently normative task including ethical reasoning. Therefore, it is dependent to a considerable extent on the values held by the clinicians involved in the DMC evaluation. Dealing with the question of how to reasonably support clinicians in arriving at a DMC judgment, a new tool is presented that fundamentally differs (...) from existing ones: the U-Doc. By putting greater emphasis on the judgmental process rather than on the measurement of mental abilities, the clinician as a decision-maker is brought into focus, rendering the tool more of an evaluation guide than a test instrument. In a qualitative study, the perceived benefits of and difficulties with the tool have been explored. The findings show on the one hand that the evaluation aid provides basic orientation, supports a holistic perspective on the patient, sensitizes for ethical considerations and personal biases, and helps to think through the decision, to argue, and to justify one’s judgment. On the other hand, the room for interpretation due to absent operationalisations, related ambiguities, and the confrontation with one’s own subjectivity may be experienced as unsettling. (shrink)

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) has been widely used in psychological experiments to assess one’s developmental level of moral reasoning in terms of postconventional reasoning. However, there have been concerns regarding whether the tool is biased across people with different genders and political and religious views. To address the limitations, in the present study, I tested the validity of the brief version of the test, that is, the behavioral DIT, in terms of the measurement invariance and differential item functioning (...) (DIF). I could not find any significant non-invariance at the test level or any item demonstrating practically significant DIF at the item level. The findings indicate that neither the test nor any of its items showed a significant bias toward any particular group. As a result, the collected validity evidence supports the use of test scores across different groups, enabling researchers who intend to examine participants’ moral reasoning development across heterogeneous groups to draw conclusions based on the scores. (shrink)

An extensive literature has demonstrated that encoding information in a self-referential manner enhances subsequent memory performance. This ‘self-reference effect’ is generally elicited in paradigms that require participants to evaluate the self-descriptiveness of personality characteristics. Extending work of this kind, the current research explored the possibility that explicit evaluative processing is not a necessary precondition for the emergence of this effect. Rather, responses to self cues may enhance item encoding even in the absence of explicit evaluative instructions. We explored this hypothesis (...) by testing memory for items encoded in either an evaluative or relational context. The relational context was achieved by requesting participants to report the spatial relationship between target stimuli, and visual or verbal referent cues. The results revealed a self-referent memory advantage, regardless of the encoding context or triggering cue. The theoretical implications of these findings are considered. (shrink)

Urine toxicology testing among birthing people in the United States remains a clinical practice often informed more by personal values and conscious and unconscious biases, than by medical evidence and ethical obligations. As empirical evidence addressing harms and benefits of toxicology testing in pregnancy grows, and national organizations are taking a moral stance around clinical practice, no published structure explicitly positions the evolving data within an ethical framework. We draw on a model of applied ethics to inform a (...) set of concrete recommendations about what clinicians ought to do with regards to the practice of urine toxicology testing of pregnant patients. These methods facilitate a relationship between empirical data regarding toxicology testing in pregnancy and ethical norms. Our findings serve as a practical guide for clinicians and policymakers seeking clinical guidance around urine toxicology testing in pregnancy as well as a model for future translation of theoretical approaches into clinical action. (shrink)

Background: The development of implicit tests for measuring biases and behavioral predispositions is a recent development within psychology. While such tests are usually researched within a social-cognitive paradigm, behavioral researchers have also begun to view these tests as potential tests of conditioning histories, including in the sexual domain. Objective: The objective of this paper is to illustrate the utility of a behavioral approach to implicit testing and means by which implicit tests can be built to the standards of behavioral (...) psychologists. Design: Research findings illustrating the short history of implicit testing within the experimental analysis of behavior are reviewed. Relevant parallel and overlapping research findings from the field of social cognition and on the Implicit Association Test are also outlined. Results: New preliminary data obtained with both normal and sex offender populations are described in order to illustrate how behavior-analytically conceived implicit tests may have potential as investigative tools for assessing histories of sexual arousal conditioning and derived stimulus associations. Conclusion: It is concluded that popular implicit tests are likely sensitive to conditioned and derived stimulus associations in the history of the test-taker rather than ‘unconscious cognitions’, per se. Keywords: implicit association test; function acquisition speed test; relational frame theory; stimulus equivalence; sex offenders; sexual interests (Published: 15 March 2012) Citation: Socioaffective Neuroscience & Psychology 2012, 2 : 17335 - DOI: 10.3402/snp.v2i0.17335. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that dominant conceptions of intelligence used in artificial intelligence (AI) are biased by normative assumptions that originate from the Global North, making it questionable if AI can be uncritically applied elsewhere without risking serious harm to vulnerable people. After the introduction in Sect. 1 we shortly present the history of IQ testing in Sect. 2, focusing on its multiple discriminatory biases. To determine how these biases came into existence, we define intelligence ontologically and (...) underline its constructed and culturally variable character. Turning to AI, specifically the Turing Test (TT), in Sect. 3, we critically examine its underlying intelligence conceptions. The test has been of central influence in AI research and remains an important point of orientation. We argue that both the test itself and how it is used in practice risk promoting a limited conception of intelligence which solely originated in the Global North. Hence, this conception should be critically assessed in relation to the different global contexts in which AI technologies are and will be used. In Sect. 4, we highlight how unequal power relations in AI research are a real threat, rather than just philosophical sophistry while considering the history of IQ testing and the TT’s practical biases. In the last section, we examine the limits of our account and identify fields for further investigation. Tracing colonial continuities in AI intelligence research, this paper points to a more diverse and historically aware approach to the design, development, and use of AI. (shrink)

Citing corporate concentration and lax enforcement since the Reagan era, the Biden administration has declared a new era of aggressive antitrust prosecution, bringing antimonopoly actions against tech giants such as Meta, Google, and Amazon. But what’s so bad about monopoly or corporate concentration? The standard answer appeals to economic consequences, such as higher prices or deadweight losses. This paper offers a different framework. It argues monopolizing can be a form of cheating, which is a wrong that attaches to means, not (...) just ends; an athlete who cheats but loses still does wrong. In particular, this paper argues that certain market-controlling strategies constitute a form of cheating I call ‘structural cheating,’ best illustrated by the metaphor of creating an unlevel playing field: rather than compete fairly on merits such as product quality and price, a firm that acquires rivals biases the market in its favor, thereby entrenching a dominant position that effectively forces would-be competitors to compete uphill. By framing (alleged) antitrust violations as cheating, while using the FTC’s lawsuit against Facebook (now Meta) as a test case, this paper provides a needed corrective to those citing market success as evidence of merit or skill. A further upshot is the structural cheating account better explains the distinctively problematic features of social media market concentration than Heath’s Market Failures Approach. More generally, this paper provides a normative lens for analyzing fair market competition and shows why it’s not only winning or losing that counts in capitalism, but how one plays the game. (shrink)

Perceptual grouping has traditionally been thought to be governed by innate, universal principles. However, recent work has found differences in Japanese and English speakers' non-linguistic perceptual grouping, implicating language in non-linguistic perceptual processes (Iversen, Patel, & Ohgushi, 2008). Two experiments test Japanese- and English-learning infants of 5-6 and 7-8 months of age to explore the development of grouping preferences. At 5-6 months, neither the Japanese nor the English infants revealed any systematic perceptual biases. However, by 7-8 months, the same age (...) as when linguistic phrasal grouping develops, infants developed non-linguistic grouping preferences consistent with their language's structure (and the grouping biases found in adulthood). These results reveal an early difference in non-linguistic perception between infants growing up in different language environments. The possibility that infants' linguistic phrasal grouping is bootstrapped by abstract perceptual principles is discussed. (shrink)

Significance testing is the primary method for establishing causal relationships in psychology. Meehl [1978, 1990a, 1990b] and Faust [1984] argue that significance tests and their interpretation are subject to actuarial and psychological biases, making continued adherence to these practices irrational, and even partially responsible for the slow progress of the ‘soft’ areas of psychology. I contend that familiar standards of testing and literature review, along with recently developed meta-analytic techniques, are able to correct the proposed actuarial and psychological (...) biases. In particular, psychologists embrace a principle of robustness which states that real psychological effects are (1) reproducible by similar methods, (2) detectable by diverse means, and (3) able to survive theoretical integration. By contrast, spurious significant findings perish under the strain of persistent tests of their robustness. The resulting vindication of significance testing confers on the world a role in determining the rationality of a method, and also affords us an explanation for the fast progress of ‘hard’ areas of psychology. *I would like to thank Dick Boyd and Phil Gasper for helpful comments on the ideas presented here. (shrink)

Persuasive design draws on our basic psychological makeup to build products that make our engagement with them habitual. It uses variable rewards, creates Fear of Missing Out, and leverages social approval to incrementally increase and maintain user engagement. Social media and networking platforms, video games, and slot machines are all examples of persuasive technologies. Recent attention has focused on the dangers of PD: It can deceptively prod users into forming habits that help the company’s bottom line but not the user’s (...) wellbeing. But PD is not inherently immoral. We can take advantage of our psychological biases to make beneficial changes in ways that enhance our agency rather than limit it. Knowing that a tool is persuasively designed is a consideration in favor of using it when we are trying to break bad habits, such as smoking. How are we to conceptually distinguish between ethical and unethical uses of PD? In this paper, I argue that unethical uses of PD betray or erode our trust. Annette Baier offers a moral test for trust: If gaining knowledge about what other parties do with our trust in them would lead us to stop trusting, then that trusting relationship is immoral. I apply this test to the case of PD. Using trust as a litmus test for ferreting out unethical PD has several advantages, one of which is that it reveals how the harm of unethical PD extends beyond the individual to her wider social network. I close the paper by investigating these cascading effects. (shrink)

This article discusses the need for more satisfactory implicit measures in consumer psychology and assesses the theoretical foundations, validity, and value of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) as a measure of implicit consumer social cognition. Study 1 demonstrates the IAT’s sensitivity to explicit individual differences in brand attitudes, ownership, and usage frequency, and shows their correlations with IAT-based measures of implicit brand attitudes and brand relationship strength. In Study 2, the contrast between explicit and implicit measures of attitude toward the (...) ad for sportswear advertisements portraying African American (Black) and European American (White) athlete–spokespersons revealed different patterns of responses to explicit and implicit measures in Black and White respondents. These were explained in terms of self-presentation biases and system justification theory. Overall, the results demonstrate that the IAT enhances our understanding of consumer responses, particularly when consumers are either unable or unwilling to identify the sources of influence on their behaviors or opinions. (shrink)

It is rather uncontroversial that gender should have no influence on treating others as equal epistemic agents. However, is this view reflected in practice? This paper aims to test whether the gender of the testifier and the accused of assault is related to the perception of a testimony’s reliability and the guilt of the potential perpetrator. Two experiments were conducted: the subjects (n = 361, 47% females, 53% males) assessed the reliability of the testifier in four scenarios of assault accusation, (...) in which the only difference was the gender of the people presented. During the study, we have observed dependencies of gender and ascription of reliability, but only marginal differences in guilt attribution. The results of our research may constitute an argument for the existence of different epistemic status endowed on people depending on their gender and existing gender stereotypes. Our results suggest that gender bias may be situated at a deeper level than the linguistically triggered representation. (shrink)

The accumulation and advancement of gender scholarship over past decades has led us to the point where gender scholars today can leverage our deep understanding of the reproduction of gender inequality to develop and test models of change. In this lecture, I present one such model designed to reduce the negative effects of stereotypic biases on women’s workplace outcomes. After synthesizing the literature on stereotyping and bias and showing the limits of past change efforts, I develop a “small wins” model (...) of change. Key to this model is that researchers work with teams of managers to produce concrete, implementable actions that produce visible results. I argue that small wins motivate further action and are the building blocks to larger organizational transformation. Preliminary results from several case studies show that this approach can produce important changes in the short run, such as reducing gender biases in workplace evaluations, and that these small wins can inspire longer run change, such as increases in the rate of hiring women. (shrink)