This companion volume focuses on the application and practical ramifications of Indian ethics. Here Indian dharma ethics is moved from its preeminent religious origins and classical metaethical proclivity to, what Kant would call, practical reason–or in Aristotle’s poignant terms, ēhikos and phronēis–and in more modern parlance normative ethics. Our study examines a wide range of social and normative challenges facing people in such diverse areas as women’s rights, infant ethics, politics, law, justice, bioethics and ecology. As a contemporary volume, it (...) builds linkages between existing theories and emerging moral issues, problems and questions in today’s India in the global arena. The volume brings together contributions from some 40 philosophers and contemporary thinkers on practical ethics, exploring both the scope and boundaries or limits of ethics as applied to everyday and real-life concerns and socio-economic challenges facing India in the context of a troubled globalizing world. As such, this collection draws on multiple forms of writing and research, including narrative ethics, interviews, critical case studies and textual analyses. The book will be of interest to scholars, researchers and students of Indian philosophy, Indian ethics, women and infant issues, social justice, environmental ethics, bioethics, animal ethics and cross-cultural responses to dominant Western moral thought. It will also be useful to researchers working on the intersection of Gandhi, sustainability, ecology, theology, feminism, comparative philosophy and dharma studies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diasporic Impulses:Sikh Philosophy as an AssemblageArvind-Pal S. Mandair (bio)Let me begin this response by thanking the editors of Philosophy East and West for generously allowing space for this review forum on my recent book, Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (Bloomsbury, 2022), and thanking the reviewers Monika-Kirloskar Steinbach, Ananda Abeysekara, and Jeffery Long for their careful readings of this work. "Sikh Philosophy" names the modern academic (...) discourse that crystallized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a result of the encounter between modern Western philosophy and gurmat, a mode of thought-praxis deriving from and associated with Sikhi (lit. "the path of learning"), a spiritual-philosophical tradition hailing from India, which most readers may only have encountered through the modern knowledge system's categorization of it as the religion known as Sikhism. To avoid complicating the discussion, I will be referring interchangeably to gurmat and Sikh philosophy, even though they represent quite different entities. Gurmat represents a tradition of thought-praxis that goes back to Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhi, whereas Sikh philosophy is a modern formation that emerged from the encounter between gurmat and European thought, which is why I prefer to regard it as an assemblage. The book examines some of the key concepts of Sikh philosophy and how they inform its vision of life, what they tell us about the nature of reality, and whether it is possible to discern a distinct logic, epistemology, and ontology based on the principles of gurmat. In their reviews, Kirloskar-Steinbach, Abeysekara, and Long have provided critical readings and insightful questions, which I address below.Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach asks about the relationship between Sikh philosophy and Indian philosophy, noting that my book does not explicitly engage Indian philosophy. Specifically, she raises two questions: (1) whether Sikh philosophy should or potentially could be part of the broader field of Indian philosophy, and (2) whether I would be inclined to contribute to that field, particularly in light of recent efforts to diversify philosophical practices within Indian philosophy by scholars like Jonardon Ganeri in his Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy (2017) and Purushottama Bilimoria and Amy Rayner in their History of Indian Philosophy (2018). My immediate response would be "yes," but with an important caveat. In that vein, I applaud Ganeri's and Bilimoria/Rayner's efforts to open up philosophical inquiry within Indian traditions and take them beyond darśanic framings that narrowly positioned different thought-practices of South Asia either within or [End Page 364] in relation to the Brahmanical/Vedic/Sanskritic paradigm. Ganeri's "multiperspectival" narrative about practices might well enable discussions about Sikh philosophy to flourish, given that the lexicon of gurmat (the teaching, logic, practice of the Guru) is replete with concepts that have cognate terms in the main Hindu philosophical schools including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta; the Jain and Buddhist traditions; and perhaps most importantly, within the Islamic, especially Sufi, traditions. It is the seeming parity between cognate terms such as the Punjabi dharam (Skt. dharma), karam (Skt. karma), yoga, śabad (Skt. śabda), guru, hukam, and many more, which has given rise to the misperception that Sikh philosophy is a purely syncretic thought system parasitic on earlier Indic systems. A similar misperception might be that Sikhi is more primarily a mode of lived praxis or dharam than it is a philosophy (Bhogal 2018) and therefore has less to do with thought than with spiritual attainment. But this approach is far too narrow in that it opposes "philosophy"/"thought" to spiritual praxis without asking whether there might be a broader definition of thinking at play within Sikhi or gurmat. Such an approach fails to extricate itself from the legacy of imperial categorizations of Indic traditions as essentially religious and therefore unrelated to what is called "thinking." By doing so, it falls prey to another misconception many have, that the closest Indians have come to philosophical thought are the darśanic schools, not realizing that most Indian philosophers and thinkers were at the same time devotees and spiritual adepts who developed rigorous modes of discipline and practice.Having said this, I would premise any... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sikh Philosophy as a Philosophy-of-PracticeMonika Kirloskar-Steinbach (bio)Some recent publications on Indian philosophy argue that the colonial narrative about the philosophical traditions from the subcontinent was erroneous. It wrongly suggested that the erstwhile Brahmanic thought embodied by the darśanas was an exhaustive representation of philosophical activity on the subcontinent and that this activity came to a grinding halt with the onset of European modernity. In an attempt at rectifying this (...) story, one path proposed by philosopher Vrinda Dalmiya (Dalmiya 2016, p. 125) is to cognize and fix the "epistemophilic excesses" in the field, that is, the obsessive compulsion in conventional academic philosophy to engage in theory for theory's sake. In the study of Indian philosophy, this malady manifests as the practice of channeling philosophical analysis solely through a darśanic framing. This monofocal lens, however, is unable to reflect either the diversity of practices on the ground or values like intellectual freedom that drive some such practices.Arvind-Pal Mandair's Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (Bloomsbury, 2022), discussed here in this forum, speaks to these concerns and offers a possible way forward. Sikh Philosophy advocates a liminal perspective from which to engage with the set of philosophical practices that emanated on the subcontinent around the figure of Guru Nanak (1469–1539) and the teachings of the Sikh gurus (gurmat). In the first part of my response, I will bring into this conversation Mandair's philosophical orientation to ask whether and how he would contribute to that debate. In the second part, I will project the haumai—one concept doing much of the work in Sikh Philosophy—as one viable path that may be able to contribute to the correction of the epistemophilia currently afflicting a judicious study of world-philosophical traditions.In my limited understanding, Mandair's rendition of the haumai may serve as one component that could be implemented fruitfully in broadening the perspective on Indian philosophy. Mandair observes that a postcolonial sensibility demands a philosophical orientation that does not continue its proprietary attitude toward philosophical positions. I share his view. Instead of parading these positions as possessions that embellish one's academic finesse, they should be considered as ways of navigating life adequately. In doing so, however, the making of such navigational routes may profit from a deliberate reflection on them from different standpoints. [End Page 348]Halting Exclusivist Historiographical Trends in PhilosophyTwo recent handbooks on Indian philosophy reflect the growing awareness that changes in the field's self-understanding are imperative, should imperialist and colonial historiographies that affect this understanding be upturned. Jonardon Ganeri's editorial introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy—"Why Indian Philosophy? Why Now?"—argues that students of Indian philosophy should overcome the routinized fixation on the classical darśanas. In developing their accounts, they should factor in the "regionality, vernaculars, subaltern communities, [and] eccentrics" through which "scholarly networks, nodes of philosophical activity, transnational encounters, and contexts of philosophical invention" arose on the subcontinent (Ganeri 2017, p. 2). This broader approach would, in his view, not only be viable in halting the elitist and exclusivist historiography that was the default mode in the recent colonial past. In addition, it would be better equipped to grasp the richness of practices on the ground.Accordingly, his Handbook departs from the handbook genre on one core point: instead of delivering a supposedly comprehensive study of positions that would be indispensable to the reader to understand the intricacies of the field marked out as Indian philosophy, this Handbook chooses to narrate one multi-perspectival story about practices on the subcontinent that were philosophically motivated and are worthy of study today. It suggests through this move that there are other such possible stories that can be narrated. Relatedly, Purushottama Bilimoria and Amy Rayner's History of Indian Philosophy strives as well to make a case to go beyond the darśanic mold. It includes a variety of philosophical positions located on its peripheries. For example, Sikh philosophy, which notably is not included in the Ganeri volume, is incorporated here as a tradition that engaged darśanic practices. Balbinder Singh Bhogal, the author of... (shrink)

The History of Indian Philosophy consists of fifty-eight chapters, written by specialists across a diverse range of general and particularized topics on Indic philosophical traditions. The editorial credit for this extensive volume also belongs to a number of associate editors, including Amy Rayner, John Powers, Christopher Chapple, Stephen Phillips, and Richard King. There is, however, a shift evident in the methodological approach of this volume as compared to earlier orientalist and historical accounts. As Bilimoria notes in his preface, the (...) editors have endeavored not only “to bring out the historical development of philosophical ideas within particular schools or against other critical systems, but also... their interaction with broader cultural, social and paradigm shifts within Indian civilization that may have influenced or thwarted the optimal achievement in the area”. (shrink)

Eric Rayner, a psychoanalyst in private practice, has written the first clear introduction to Matte-Blanco's key concepts for psychotherapists and psychoanalysts. While Matte-Blanco's theories on the structure of the unconscious and the way in which it operates are generally recognized to be the most original since those of Freud, many people find his use of terminology from mathematics and logic difficult to understand. In this book, Rayner sets out the central ideas and then shows, with examples, how they (...) relate to clinical practice. He also describes how the ideas are related to those of people in other disciplines--mathematics, logic, psychology (specifically Piaget), and anthropology, among others. Drawing on the work of a group of people who have been inspired by Matte-Blanco's thinking to extend their own ideas and test them out in the consulting room, this book reveals the significance of Matte-Blanco's thought for future research. (shrink)

Diagonal relationships in the periodic table were recognized by both Mendeléev and Newlands. More appropriately called isodiagonal relationships, the same three examples of lithium with magnesium, beryllium with aluminum, and boron with silicon, are commonly cited. Here, these three pairs of elements are discussed in detail, together with evidence of isodiagonal linkages elsewhere in the periodic table. General criteria for defining isodiagonality are proposed.

The issues the commentators have raised and which we address, include: the debate over how attention is allocated during reading; our distinction between early and late stages of lexical processing; our assumptions about saccadic programming; the determinants of skipping and refixations; and the role that higher-level linguistic processing may play in influencing eye movements during reading. In addition, we provide a discussion of model development and principles for evaluating and comparing models. Although we acknowledge that E-Z Reader is incomplete, we (...) maintain that it provides a good framework for systematically trying to understand how the cognitive, perceptual, and motor systems influence the eyes during reading. (shrink)

This is a slightly edited version of a talk given by Mrs Claire Rayner, a journalist and broadcaster, to a conference on human sexuality held under the auspices of the London Medical Group in the spring of this year. Mrs Rayner's lively presentation conveys the problems and anxieties which people face in this area, even in this so-called `permissive' age.

Despite Foucault’s claim in his final interview that his ‘whole philosophical development’ was determined by his reading of Heidegger, to date little has been published exploring the relationship between these thinkers. Undoubtedly, the primary reason for this silence is the seeming impossibility of reconciling Foucault and Heidegger’s work. Indeed, in key respects, we could hardly imagine two more different philosophers. Heidegger seeks to recover a primordial sense of being that he believes has been lost through the history of the West. (...) Foucault pursues an entirely contrary trajectory, calling into question both the primordial status of forms of thought and experience, and the transcendental closure of philosophical-historical narratives. Heidegger’s work is focused on a single question (the question of being), developing a single way into this question. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Heidegger and the History of Truth Foucault and the History of Truth: First Pass Foucault and the History of Truth: Second Pass References.

This contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium “Fuzzy Studies” argues that the inclusion of space in form brings varying degrees of fuzziness and fluidity to all natural identities. Such inclusion is vital to evolutionary creativity, from subatomic to cosmic scales of natural energy flow. Examples abound throughout the natural world of indeterminate forms and processes unclassifiable under any of the discrete categories that are preferred and imposed by definitive theoretical models. Here, the much-neglected kingdom of the fungi is used to (...) illustrate the workings of a logic of fluid boundaries. (shrink)

Ce dossier porte sur une thématique qui n’a pas encore été abordée centralement dans la revue et qui l’est de manière dispersée en sociologie politique autour de problématiques distinctes que l’on se propose ici de rapprocher. Partant d’une conception large de la notion de démocratie comme se rapportant à un ensemble d’activités fondées simultanément sur la souveraineté populaire et l’État de droit et spécifiquement dédiées au gouvernement de la société, deux dimensions doivent être soulignées. D’une part, ces activités se déploient (...) dans des institutions particulières, soit des organes de l’État (parlement, gouvernement, tribunaux) dans lesquels s’exerce un pouvoir de décision susceptible d’orienter l’action publique menée dans l’ensemble de la société. D’autre part, elles s’inscrivent dans une compétition réglée, dont l’enjeu est précisément la conquête des pouvoirs d’État que détiennent ces autorités politiques. Comme tel, l’espace politique démocratique manifeste une ambivalence... (shrink)

Corporate sustainability can be defined as organizations’ commitment to profitability, environment, and social well-being. This study uses a transactional culture analysis of CS reporting practices to explain why some Indian organizations conform to voluntary CS reporting guidelines and others do not. The literature contains two different perspectives on culture, defined broadly as a set of values that guide people’s behavior at a given time. Most past studies typically use national culture to explain differences in CS practices across nations. This concept (...) embeds corporate cultures within the larger national culture, neglecting intranation diversity. Conversely, according to the transactional culture approach used in this study, cultures are plural and independent of geoethnic boundaries, and emerge through social transactions. TCA encourages multilevel explorations of complex social phenomena. Since CS reporting preferences are the outcome of ongoing transactions among organizational stakeholders across different levels, TCA is more appropriate for this study. Since this application requires an understanding of social accountability, the authors use Mary Douglas’s Cultural Framework, a transactional framework of social accountability. A qualitative exploration of six Indian organizations using DCF reveals different dominant forms of social accountability in these organizations: either alone or as paired hybrids. Consequently, each organization prioritizes different stakeholders and reacts differently to voluntary CS reporting guidelines. Identifying the dominant form or forms of social accountability in their organizations and understanding their underlying reasons for resisting voluntary CS guidelines enables managers to secure better collaboration for their CS initiatives. (shrink)

Chinese readers' eye movements were simulated in the context of the E-Z Reader model, which was developed to account for the eye movements of readers of English. Despite obvious differences between English and Chinese, the model did a fairly good job of simulating the eye movements of Chinese readers. The successful simulation suggests that the control of eye movements in reading Chinese is similar to that in an alphabetic language such as English.

À partir d’une étude de cas portant sur le « scandale des fiches », qui mit en cause les pratiques de surveillance de la police politique suisse, nous montrons que, contrairement à ce qu’affirment nombre de travaux, l’ampleur du scandale ne peut-être déduite de celle de l’indignation pas plus que cette dernière ne peut être rapportée à la gravité supposée de transgressions. Un scandale n’émerge que si des acteurs, à partir de leur évaluation de la situation et de leurs perceptions (...) du possible, s’autorisent à exprimer publiquement une indignation, qu’elle soit feinte ou sincère, et parviennent à imposer une qualification déviante des pratiques concernées entraînant des mobilisations dans plusieurs espaces sociaux. En déplaçant la focale sur la dynamique émergente de mobilisations multisectorielles, nous plaidons pour une approche relationnelle et processuelle de la dimension émotionnelle du scandale, inséparable de sa dimension cognitive. (shrink)

À partir d’une étude de cas portant sur le « scandale des fiches », qui mit en cause les pratiques de surveillance de la police politique suisse, nous montrons que, contrairement à ce qu’affirment nombre de travaux, l’ampleur du scandale ne peut-être déduite de celle de l’indignation pas plus que cette dernière ne peut être rapportée à la gravité supposée de transgressions. Un scandale n’émerge que si des acteurs, à partir de leur évaluation de la situation et de leurs perceptions (...) du possible, s’autorisent à exprimer publiquement une indignation, qu’elle soit feinte ou sincère, et parviennent à imposer une qualification déviante des pratiques concernées entraînant des mobilisations dans plusieurs espaces sociaux. En déplaçant la focale sur la dynamique émergente de mobilisations multisectorielles, nous plaidons pour une approche relationnelle et processuelle de la dimension émotionnelle du scandale, inséparable de sa dimension cognitive. (shrink)

Attempts to resolve the question of Foucault's relationship to Heidegger usually look for points of substantive correlation between them: the coincidence of being and power, the meaning of truth, technology, ethics, and so on. Taking seriously Foucault's claim in his final interview that he uses Heidegger as an 'instrument of thought', this paper looks for a correlation in practice. The argument focuses on a structural isomorphism between Heidegger's concept of the fourfold event (Ereignis) of being and later Foucault's critique of (...) 'problematization' (problématique). This isomorphism, I argue, indicates a covert philosophical confrontation between Foucault and Heidegger, which was determinative for Foucault in the period of the turn to ethics (1976-84). This is a confrontation over the meaning of the 'event of thought'. Such an interpretation not only permits a literal reading of Foucault's comments regarding Heidegger in his final interview, but also casts the developments in Foucault's later work in a fascinating new light. Foucault's critique of problematization, on this view, is founded in an historicized version of Heideggerian 'other' thinking, and pivots on a ontologically tempered enactment of the Heideggerian turn (Kehre). (shrink)

As part of a series of contributions on patterns in the periodic table, the relationships among the transition metals are examined here in a systematic manner. It is concluded that the traditional method of categorizing transition elements by group or by period is not as valid as by using combinations thereof. From chemical similarities, it is proposed that the transition metals be considered as the [V–Cr–Mn] triad; the [Fe–Co–Ni–Cu] tetrad; the [Ti–Zr–Hf–Nb–Ta] pentad; the [Mo–W–Tc–Re] tetrad; and the [Ru–Os–Rh–Ir–Pd–Pt–Au] heptad. Silver (...) does not fit neatly in anywhere and is better linked with thallium. (shrink)