There is by now broad consensus in the critical literature that neoliberalism and social conservatism have frequently coexisted in practice. Yet the alt-right fits none of the previously identified alliances: this is not the neoliberal neoconservatism of the Reagan and Bush years, nor the neoliberal communitarianism of the Third Way, nor even a form of neoliberal authoritarianism. Instead, the alt-right claims intellectual descent from economic libertarianism, on the one hand, and paleo- (as opposed to neo-) conservatism on the (...) other. This paper traces the contours of this ‘paleolibertarian’ alliance, first by following the volatile political trajectory of Murray Rothbard, the foremost philosopher of American libertarianism, and, second, by uncovering precedents in the longer history of the American far right. It will be argued that paleoconservatism makes for a uniquely powerful ally because it offers a workable response to libertarianism’s intrinsic contradictions. (shrink)

Sketched out against the backdrop of the far-right’s response to the Anthropocenic COVID-19 pandemic, this essay analyses Schild & Vrienden’s [Shield & Friends’] memetic activism. Part of the global far right, Schild & Vrienden (or S&V) positions itself as a Belgian Flemish alt-right youth movement out to culturally – or metapolitically – alter society (Pano 2018; Maly 2019). Digital meme-making is one of S&V’s most notorious metapolitical strategies. Arguing that digital memes that are spread and reworked by (...) social media users have ‘making live and letting die’-powers (Lykke 2019) and are thus an important part of the far right and the alt-right’s investment in a dehumanising bio-/necropolitics, this chapter investigates S&V’s memetic activism before, during, and after the pandemic. This is done to gain a better understanding of their white supremacist and anti-LGBTQIA politics. The research presented in this essay furthermore contributes to memetic theory, Queer Death Studies (Radomska et al. 2019, 2020; MacCormack et al. 2021), and critical theory by zooming in on the affective hauntings of the ‘Kongo’ memetic assemblage, alt-right memes’ microspectropolitics, and memes’ queer(ing) potential via the posthumanising post-representational perspectives of Baradian (2007, 2010) agential realism and Deleuzoguattarian (2005) micropolitics. (shrink)

In this article, I channel the autobiography of Black Panther cofounder Huey P. Newton, entitled Revolutionary Suicide, against the misogyny of the alt-right movement today. Both Newton and the alt-right have been powerfully influenced by Nietzsche, but one way of grasping the central difference between them is by comparing their conceptions of Dionysus. While the alt-right sticks closer to Nietzsche’s conception, which minimizes the god’s androgyny, Newton’s thought resonates with that androgyny, thereby bringing him closer to the (...) most influential Dionysus scholar since Nietzsche, Walter Otto. I therefore turn to the latter’s Dionysus: Myth and Cult, whose analyses I synthesize into the following image inspired by the god’s closest animal familiar: the dancingly-graceful panther as aqueous-androgynous soul-hunter. Reimagining Newton’s Black Panther in this way, finally, can help us overcome the alt-right. (shrink)

In this article we examine the way in which the American Alt-Right movement has made Friedrich Nietzsche its most influential philosopher. The authors ascribed to the Alt-Right evidence a strong liking for the German philosopher's ideas, which resonate forcefully in many their principal policies: specifically, the characterisation of our contemporaneity as “decadent”, the comparison between “superior men” and the project to construct a “white ethnostate”, and the advocacy of Christianity, as opposed to Christianism, as an identity structure for (...) defining white civilisation. Having trawled the main Alt-Right forums of ideological expression and analysed the key writings of their theorists, references and spokespersons, we aim to present a systematic explanation of how this advocacy has been built on certain Nietzschean themes. We also argue that this is a partial, superficial and contradictory reading of Nietzsche, as well as a narrow and distorted interpretation. (shrink)

Drawing on research from digital media studies, political theory and rhetoric, this article explores online radical conservative and reactionary ‘ideological entrepreneurs’. It argues that online media are uniting an ‘ideological family’ around concepts of natural inequality and hostility to those who deny them. Placing this phenomenon in context, the article shows how online culture reinvigorates well-established discourses of opposition to bureaucrats, intellectuals and experts of all kinds, rejecting one version of the neoliberal state and of its personnel, a ‘new class’ (...) understood to dominate through discursive, cultural power and imagined through the figures of the ‘Social Justice Warrior’ and the ‘Cultural Marxist’. In competing for a share of the marketplace of ideas, these ideological entrepreneurs promise insights – the revelations of the ‘red pill’ – critiquing ‘actually-existing’ neoliberalism yet insisting on the ‘rationality’ of governance through markets and promising adherents techniques for achieving success as liberated entrepreneurial selves. (shrink)

The alt-right claims it responsibly advocates for its positions while the Ku Klux Klan was “ad-hoc.” This allows them to accept the philosophy of white nationalism while rejecting comparisons with prior white nationalist organizations. I confront this by comparing the methodologies of alt-right trolls and the KKK. After studying each movement’s genesis in pranks done for amusement, I demonstrate that each uses threats to police behavior, encourages comradery around ethnic heritage, and manipulates politics to exclude voices from public (...) deliberation. Differences between alt-right trolls and the KKK originate in the technologies they use, not out of a concern for responsible advocacy. (shrink)

William Remley traces the ascent of the alt-right movement to its prominent place in American politics. Social Dominance Theory and the philosophical work of Sartre and Nietzsche are used to look at how group formation and hierarchies have given rise to the authoritarian leadership and the anti-foreign sentiment that rules American politics today.

What is the growing appeal of the “Alt-Right” (Alternative Right), a white-supremacist and anti-feminist movement, for young, primarily male, Millennials in the United States? In this chapter, I outline how the Alt-Right uses laughter in its culture industry on the internet to recruit new members to its right extremist ideas. I also explain how laughter connects Alt-Right extremism with Trumpism. Throughout the chapter, I draw on Theodor W. Adorno’s critical theorizing of laughter fabricated by the (...) culture industry to establish the theoretical framework, which I ground with in-depth interviews with Alt-Right members. (shrink)

Since the 2010s, popular YouTube channels have used derogatory humour at the expense of gendered and racialised others. Founded upon the perception of an influx of ‘wokeness’ in comedy, these videos mock the mythologised ‘unfunny, angry SJW’ and teach the audience to laugh at enemies of the alt-right. Although empirical research has analysed the algorithmic radicalisation of viewers, few have addressed the role of cultural discourses in disseminating alt-right ideology through online media. Here, the right-wing ‘pipeline’ is (...) understood as a tool of radicalisation that weaponises laughter as a tool of regulations and oppression. This paper analyzes the production of derogatory laughter by studying a network of North American content creators including Russell Peters, Lilly Singh, Jordan Peterson, Steven Crowder, and Matt Walsh, using critical tools from psychoanalysis, social psychology, and critical humour studies. Contrary to the alt-right rhetoric that ‘edgy’ humour is harmless, this paper posits derogatory humour as a tool of marginalisation and domination that reinforces white supremacist and cisnormative patriarchal value systems. (shrink)

The core aim of this chapter is to arrive at an understanding of the growing appeal of the “Alt-Right” (Alternative Right), a white-supremacist movement, for young, mostly male, millennials in the United States. It draws on Theodor W. Adorno’s critical theorizing of laughter fabricated by the culture industry to outline the ways in which the Alt-Right uses humor and jokes in its culture industry on the internet to recruit new members to its extremist ideas. It also explains (...) the ways in which humor and jokes connect Alt-Right extremism with Trumpism. To ground the theoretical elaborations with empirical examples, the chapter draws on published in-depth interviews with Alt-Right members. (shrink)

The alt-right is an online subculture marked by its devotion to the execution of a racist, misogynistic, and xenophobic politics through trolling, pranking, meme-making, and mass murder. It is this devotion to far-right politics through the discordant conjunction of humor and suicidal violence this article seeks to explain by situating the movement for the first time within its constitutive online relationships. This article adds to the existing literature by viewing the online relationships of the alt-right through the (...) genealogy of propaganda. Through situating the alt-right alongside the genealogy of propaganda, the article offers new insights into the social isolation, increasingly extreme social and political positions, nihilism, and violence that have emerged within the alt-right. The article concludes by applying the lessons of the alt-right for online organizing across the political spectrum and argues that a class-based politics of the left is an important part of countering the rise of the alt-right. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The use of social media by extreme right groups and the self-proclaimed formation of the ‘alt-right’ in recent years have been linked to the rise in US white nationalism. Against a backdrop of widespread concern regarding the growing nature of the ‘alt-right’ phenomenon, this article responds to the pressing need to understand its appeal. Specifically, we examine the discursive means by which a hitherto unexamined US ‘alt-right’ group, the Traditionalist Worker Party, constructs its group identity (...) and ideology online. Corpus assisted discourse analysis of this group’s blog reveals that the Traditionalist Worker Party regularly mobilises five discourses in order to assert subject positions of victimhood for its members, alongside recurrent use of explicit out-grouping strategies. The out-groups are blamed for a general malaise – an uncertain, chaotic reality that can and must be changed through affiliation with the Traditionalist Worker Party. The study also shows that the Traditionalist Worker Party constructs itself a highly entitative group as a means to enhancing its recruitment appeal. (shrink)

This edited collection uses critical theory in order to understand the rise of the Alt-Right and the election of Donald Trump—and, in doing so, to assert the necessity and value of various disciplines within the humanities. While neoliberal mainstream culture has expressed shock at the seemingly expeditious rise of the Alt-Right movement and the outcome of the 2016 United States presidential election, a rich tradition of theory may not only explain the occurrence of this “phenomenon,” but may also (...) chart an alternative understanding of the movement, revealing the persistence of right-wing populism throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Though the humanities have seen themselves undervalued and under attack in recent years, the historical and cultural contextualization of the current moment via theory is a means of reaffirming the value of the humanities in teaching the ever-important and multifaceted skill of critical literacy. This book re-affirms the humanities, particularly the study of literature, theory, and philosophy, through questions such as how the humanities can help us understand the here and now. (shrink)

In Far-Right Revisionism and the End of History: Alt/Histories, historians, sociologists, neuroscientists, lawyers, cultural critics, and literary and media scholars come together to offer an interconnected and comparative collection for understanding how contemporary far-right, neo-fascist, Alt-Right, Identitarian, and New Right movements have proposed revisions and counter-narratives to accepted understandings of history, fact and narrative. The innovative essays found here bring forward urgent questions to diverse public, academic, and politically-minded audiences interested in how historical understandings of race, (...) gender, class, nationalism, religion, law, technology and the sciences have been distorted by these far-right movements. If scholars of the last twenty years, like Francis Fukuyama, believed that neoliberalism marked an "end of history," this volume shows how the far right is effectively threatening democracy and its institutions through the dissemination of alt-facts and histories. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the Alt-Right needs to be taken seriously by the liberal establishment, the general public, and leftist cultural elites for five main reasons: 1) its ‘right-wing Gramscianism’ borrows from the French New Right ( Nouvelle Droite – ND) and the French and pan-European Identitarian movement. This means that it is engaged in the continuation of a larger Euro-American metapolitical struggle to change hearts and minds on issues related to white nationalism, anti-Semitism, and (...) racialism; 2) it is indebted to the metapolitical evolution of sectors of the violent neo-Nazi and earlier white nationalist movements in the USA; 3) this metapolitical orientation uses the mass media, the internet, and social media in general to reach and influence the masses of Americans; 4) the ‘cultural war’ means that the Alt-Right’s spokesman Richard Spencer, French ND leader Alain de Benoist, and other intellectuals see themselves as a type of Leninist vanguard on the radical right, which borrows from left-wing authors such as Antonio Gramsci and their positions in order to win the metapolitical struggle against ‘dominant’ liberal and left-wing political and cultural elites; and 5) this ‘cultural war’ is intellectually and philosophically sophisticated because it understands the crucial role of culture in destabilizing liberal society and makes use of important philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Carl Schmitt, Julius Evola and others in order to give credence to its revolutionary, racialist, and anti-liberal ideals. (shrink)

The key to understanding the Alt-Right is understanding the theories that comprise it, and no theory is more significant than the NeoReactionary movement. The use of affect theory, postmodern critiques of modernity, and a fixation on critiquing regimes of truth are fundamental to NeoReaction and what separates it from other Far-Right theory. The project of NRx is to usher in a dark enlightenment with a dogmatic anti-humanities and anti-liberal ideology. An investigation of NRx requires a cross-disciplinary understanding of (...) politics that draws less upon social scientific empirical facts and more upon a historical, aesthetic, and philosophical approach. The NeoReactionaries argue for a reversal of the liberal enlightenment project, stressing that the most significant political freedom is the freedom to opt out of a system. The movement opposes the “Cathedral”, the superstructure of cultural capital within universities, the media, and bureaucracy, which it views as not only hegemonic and inefficient, but also the primary reason for the decline of Western civilization, as it has embraced liberal humanism. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to problematize, from a sociopolitical and psychoanalytic point of view, the current rise of the new rights, especially in Latin America. Although this extremist renaissance is loosely and indicatively referred to as fascism, we believe that, after careful analysis, today’s far-rights are not simple repetitions of the fascisms of the s. XX. It is about an unprecedented governmentality and ideology that, on the one hand, is not reduced to neoliberalism and, on the other hand, (...) surpasses the European-Anglo-Saxon alt-right and contemporary libertarianism. We give it the particular name of liber-fascism, to the extent that it brings a new mode of political subjectivation: the defender of himself. We divide the text into two sections. In the first, we discuss the sociopolitical particularities of liber-fascism: the emergence of a social ontology of the defender of himself that conceives of the capitalist market as an instance to be defended using false news, conspiracy theories and, of course, organized violence. In the second, we clarify the functioning of the liber-fascist unconscious by analyzing the peculiarity of its fantasy: it is an ideology that, in its relationship with others, uses violence no longer as a simple means, but as a vehicle for jouissance. (shrink)

Why have so many people responded to the insecurity, exploitation, alienation, and isolation of precarity capitalism by supporting the far right? In this timely book, Claudia Leeb argues that psychoanalytic and feminist critical theory illuminates how economic and psychological factors interact to produce this extreme political shift. Contesting the Far Right examines right-wing recruitment tactics in the United States and Austria, where people discontented with the status quo have turned to far-right parties and movements that further (...) cement capitalism’s adverse effects. Leeb contends that Freudian psychoanalytic theory and early Frankfurt School Critical Theory provide analytical tools to explain this apparent contradiction in psychological terms. Living under precarity capitalism generates feelings of failure and anxiety, which people experience as non-wholeness, because it has become difficult if not impossible to live up to the fetish of economic, interpersonal, and bodily success, and the far right preys on such feelings. Its psychologically oriented propaganda tactics produce the illusion of wholeness and a positive sense of self while leaving the socioeconomic conditions that cause people’s suffering intact. At the same time, they remove the inhibitions that keep people’s repressed aggression and racist and sexist attitudes in check. To demonstrate the workings of this process, Leeb compares cases including Trump and the alt-right in the United States and the Freedom Party and the identitarian movement in Austria. At once theoretically rich and politically engaged, this book also offers ways to resist the far right and counter the psychological appeal of its propaganda techniques. (shrink)

Leon Battista Alberti′s short fable collection Apologi Centum (1437) marks a radical departure from the medieval understanding of the genre as well as from the newly discovered Greek collections of 'truly Aesopian′ fables. It defines the genre in a new way, and becomes a model in its own right for the following generations of Renaissance fabulists. The extreme conciseness of his Apologi, Alberti claims, inevitably makes them obscure and hard to understand – the very contrary of the easy schooltexts (...) fables are usually meant to be. This paper studies Alberti′s claim to novelty and the way he puts it into practice, naming and exemplifying a number of techniques by which he succeeds in creating pregnant, riddling fables for the educated, intelligent reader. (shrink)

A review of Enda Brophy's study of call centre work in global capitalism. Language put to work. Published in 2018.

This study examines the appropriation of religious symbols by the Nordic Alt-Right over the last decade, focusing on their use for völkisch identity construction around whiteness. It locates this signification historically, both before and during the Third Reich, to reveal a complex genealogy complicated by racial ideals, nationalistic agendas and magical thinking. Analysis centres around a selection of symbols – ranging from various Norse runes to the Valknut, the Sonnenrad and the swastika – used both explicitly and in more (...) private contexts by members of the Nordic Alt-Right, with special attention focused on two groups that are active today, the Nordic Resistance Movement and the Soldiers of Odin. This opens a discussion on the semiotic range of appropriation itself, in order to expose how it is operative in different ways and on different levels, not only in terms of cultural borrowing or contestations of meaning but as an appropriation of ideological frames and systems of belief. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the ‘It's OK to be White’ Senate motion made by Australian far-right politician Pauline Hanson in 2018. Deliberately innocuous, the ‘It's OK to be white’ slogan was designed by online white supremacist groups with the intention of ‘triggering liberals’ and provoking outrage. Drawing on critical discourse analysis, I demonstrate that Hanson's ‘It's OK to be white’ motion was an act of calculated ambivalence, which served to address multiple audiences simultaneously. I argue that the motion provided (...) Hanson with a novel way to discuss so-called ‘anti-white’ or ‘reverse’ racism which succeeded in generating the desired controversy and media attention. I further argue that the success of the motion exposed the Australian media's illiteracy on contemporary alt-right/white supremacist tactics and discourses. I also critically examine the implications of the motion and Hanson's promotion of white victimhood narratives. Despite its innocuous framing, the ‘It's OK to be white’ motion represented the successful co-optation of a racist white supremacist political project, the implications of which should not be understated. This research furthers our understanding of the strategies and tactics employed by the far-right, as well as the interrelationship between the populist radical right and online white supremacist groups. (shrink)

Several scholars have noted parallels between the online communicative tactics of the American alt-right and those of industrial musicians in the 1970s and 1980s. This article explores these connections further by analysing the informational media that industrial musicians developed. Between the mid-1980s and 1990s, these zines, handbooks, and websites made a strenuous break with the values of democracy, egalitarianism, and grassroots authenticity that were the default ideological ‘mode’ of DIY. Where the Californian ideology would centre the summer of love (...) and the politics of the New Left, the zines ambiguously celebrated the nihilistic, authoritarian, and occult vectors of psychedelia – tendencies that have been associated with the late 1960s fate of the counterculture rather than its earlier heyday. The article tracks these themes from Vague magazine and Rapid Eye, to the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit in the 1990s, to neoreaction and the Dark Enlightenment, asking whether communicational utopianism should be considered a blip rather than the internet’s default state. (shrink)

[Updated 2/23/21: complete chapter scan] In this chapter I sketch a rightist approach to monumentary policy in a diverse polity beleaguered by old ethnic grievances. I begin by noting the importance of tribalism, memorialization, and social trust. I then suggest a policy which 1) gradually narrows the gap between peoples in the heritage landscape, 2) conserves all but the most offensive of the least beloved racist monuments, 3) avoids recrimination (i.e., “keeps it positive”) and eschews ideological commentary in new monuments (...) or revisions to old ones, 4) as much as politically feasible, recognizes only the offense of willing tribemates, and 5) responds to aesthetic and other “irrational” offenses more than to “objective” historical or philosophical critiques. (shrink)

The Euro-American far-right represents a highly diverse political movement comprising numerous ideological tendencies. It includes the European New Right, the US ‘alt-right’ and ‘alt-lite’, far-right accelerationism, traditionalism, and new forms of political misogyny. Despite the diversity in ideas and activities, this article argues that an overarching theme of the ‘fear of white extinction’ travels across and animates each major contemporary far-right tendency. The article explores a variety of older and contemporary metaphysical themes that are deployed (...) in contemporary fascism. These include new configurations of racism, occultist ideas of nature and vitalism, the rendering of culture and civilization in ‘biocultural’ and ‘anthropological’ terms, and ideas about cosmic destiny. The article considers how older ideas from Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Hans Günther, Ludwig Klages, Arnold Gehlen and others are mobilized in contemporary fascism to generate a critique of liberal modernity, one which leads remorselessly to a logic of white supremacy and apocalyptic violence. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger hold firmly entrenched places within the canon of modern philosophy. And rightly so: both are penetrating critics of liberal modernity. Yet we need to ask ourselves whether, as academics teaching these thinkers, we are doing full justice to the more disturbing aspects of their thought. They don’t simply interrogate the axioms of modern life as a subject for intellectual reflection; they have a praxis-oriented project to demolish the post-1789 moral-political dispensation that we tend to take (...) for granted and replace it with a new radically illiberal and anti-egalitarian dispensation. The task of reconsidering the perils of going too easy on these thinkers, or giving them the benefit of the doubt, is made more urgent by the apparent return of fascist or ‘fascoid’ modes of politics, and in particular, the emergence of a far-right intelligentsia all too keen to appropriate these thinkers for far-right purposes. (shrink)

Exploring online criticisms of the ‘take the knee’ protest during ‘Euro 2020’, this article examines how alt- and far-right conspiracies were both constructed and communicated via the social media platform, Twitter. By providing a novel exploration of alt-right conspiracies during an international football tournament, a qualitative thematic analysis of 1,388 original tweets relating to Euro 2020 was undertaken. The findings reveal how, in criticisms levelled at both ‘wokeism’ and the Black Lives Matter movement, antiwhite criticisms of the ‘take (...) the knee’ protest were embroiled in alt-right conspiracies that exposed an assumed Cultural Marxist, ‘woke agenda’ in the tournament’s organization and mainstream media coverage. In conclusion, it is argued that conspiratorial discourses, associated with the alt-right, provided a framework through which the protest could be understood. This emphasises how the significance of conspiracy functions to promote the wider dissemination of alt-right ideology across popular cultural contexts, such as sport. (shrink)

This article examines the puzzling phenomenon that many Chinese liberal intellectuals fervently idolize Donald Trump and embrace the alt-right ideologies he epitomizes. Rejecting ‘pure tactic’ and ‘neoliberal affinity’ explanations, it argues that the Trumpian metamorphosis of Chinese liberal intellectuals is precipitated by their ‘beacon complex’, which has ‘political’ and ‘civilizational’ components. Political beaconism grows from the traumatizing lived experience of Maoist totalitarianism, sanitizes the West and particularly the United States as politically near-perfect, and gives rise to both a neoliberal (...) affinity and a latent hostility toward baizuo. Civilizational beaconism, sharing with its nationalistic counterpart -- civilizational vindicativism -- the heritages of scientific racism and social Darwinism imported in late-Qing, renders the Chinese liberal intelligentsia receptive to anti-immigrant and Islamophobic paranoia, exacerbates its anti-baizuo sentiments, and catalyzes its Trumpian convergence with Chinese non-liberals. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy in the ideology of what the author calls the “Nationalist International,” a loosely affiliated international network of “New” Right, nationalist, alt-right, and neo-fascist groups. The author argues that thought leaders of this movement, from the relatively obscure to politicians and organizers in major political parties, such as Steve Bannon in the MAGA movement in the United States or Marc Jongen of Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, have drawn upon Heidegger (...) to articulate their principles and aims. More openly neo-fascist thinkers, such as Greg Johnson in the United States and Aleksandr Dugin in Russia, have produced sophisticated readings of Heidegger to support their causes. Such figures use Heidegger’s critique of Plato, as the onset of a metaphysical nihilism that culminates in modernity, to condemn liberalism as a facet of a rootless universalism that deprives a people of its history and identity. The repudiation of classical liberal democracy in many militant alt-right organizations and online communities played a role in assault on Congress on January 6, 2021 and Donald Trump’s attempted coup that day. The conclusion addresses the question of how educators and others can engage a new generation vulnerable to radicalization and argues for a form of “absolute welcome” as a response to increasing polarization. (shrink)

MacDonald argues that a suite of genetic and cultural adaptations among Jews constitutes a “group evolutionary strategy.” Their supposed genetic adaptations include, most notably, high intelligence, conscientiousness, and ethnocentrism. According to this thesis, several major intellectual and political movements, such as Boasian anthropology, Freudian psychoanalysis, and multiculturalism, were consciously or unconsciously designed by Jews to promote collectivism and group continuity among themselves in Israel and the diaspora and undermine the cohesion of gentile populations, thus increasing the competitive advantage of Jews (...) and weakening organized gentile resistance. By developing and promoting these movements, Jews supposedly played a necessary role in the ascendancy of liberalism and multiculturalism in the West. While not achieving widespread acceptance among evolutionary scientists, this theory has been enormously influential in the burgeoning political movement known as the “alt-right.” Examination of MacDonald’s argument suggests that he relies on systematically misrepresented sources and cherry-picked facts. It is argued here that the evidence favors what is termed the “default hypothesis”: Because of their above-average intelligence and concentration in influential urban areas, Jews in recent history have been overrepresented in all major intellectual and political movements, including conservative movements, that were not overtly anti-Semitic. (shrink)

This article investigates Aleksandr Dugin’s intellectual trajectory from his earlier neo-Eurasianist paradigm to his more recent articulation of a loosely configured multipolarist discourse that resonates with, and is increasingly entangled in, the ideological constellation of the American Alt-right and the broader Trumpist galaxy. Through an inductive and deductive qualitative thematic analysis of Dugin’s published works and social media interventions, the study contends that his recent thought represents not merely a reconfiguration of geopolitical orientation but a profound epistemic rupture—namely, the (...) abandonment of neo-Eurasianist geopolitics in favour of an ideational and transnational conservative imaginary aimed at the construction of a broad anti-liberal front. Dugin’s reconfiguration privileges symbolic and normative dichotomies—such as traditionalism and conservatism versus liberal globalism—over material or strategic geopolitics, thereby enacting a process of de-Eurasianisation and, to a significant extent, de-geopoliticisation within his conceptual framework. The article situates this ideological recalibration within the broader contestations of the liberal international order, underscoring its affinities with American Trumpism, its performative enactment of a transnational conservative project, and its departure from Dugin’s earlier neo-Eurasianist framework. (shrink)

With increasing influence of illiberalism, freedom should not be considered or interpreted lightly. Post-truth contexts provide grounds for alt-right movements to capture and pervert notions of freedom of speech, making universities battlefields of politicised emotions and expressions. In societies facing these pressures around the world, academic freedom has never been challenged as much as it is today. As Peters and colleagues note, conceptualisations of ‘facts’ and ‘evidences’ are politically, socially, and epistemically reconstructed in post-truth contexts. At the same time, (...) with intelligence commodified, reified or marginalised, freedom of speech and of mobility can entail fights for entitlements, or escapes from local responsibilities. The decline and corruptions of democratic free speech and academic freedom, or the absence of forces to defend them, are thus serious challenges. These challenges grow as the competition of ideas, sometimes under the rubric of academic freedom, often implies the power struggle and questioning of statuses in the so-called ‘marketplace of ideas’. Competition as a value invoked in some conceptualisations of freedom, becomes more important than human dignity, which was originally supposed to expand and strengthen under democratic conceptions of freedom in higher education. What had been happening to freedoms, of speech, teaching, and learning, across different subject positions and cultures of higher education, remains largely underexplored, as alt-right movements, neoliberalism and illiberalism, and post-truthism values and orientations expand. (shrink)

This book is designed as a timely analysis of the rise of post-modern conservatism in many Western countries across the globe. It provides a theoretical overview of post-modernism, why post-modern conservatism emerged, what distinguishes it from other variants of conservatism and differing political doctrines, and how post-modern conservatism governs in practice. First developing a unique genealogy of conservative thought, arguing that the historicist and irrationalist strains of conservatism were ripe for mutation into post-modern form under the right social and (...) cultural conditions, then providing a new unique theoretical framework to describe the conditions for the emergence of post-modern conservatism, The Rise of Post-modern Conservatism applies its theoretical framework to a concrete analysis of the politics of the day. Ultimately, it aims to help us understand the emergence and rise of identity oriented alt right movements and their “populist” spokesmen particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland, and now Italy. (shrink)

This book argues that whenever we are talking about cancel culture, identity politics, political correctness, antisemitism, conspiracy theories, or the alt-Right, we are dealing with a culture war, which often pits two sides against each other in a split world of good and evil. These political representations rely on a set of unconscious processes best understand through psychoanalysis. As this book argues, if you want to comprehend the rhetoric of the Right, the Left, conservatives, and centrists, it is (...) necessary to see how these ideologies rely on unacknowledged defense mechanisms, fantasies, fears, and desires. In fact, if we do not employ psychoanalytic concepts to examine our political investments, we will be unable to get to the root causes driving these social productions. Each chapter of this book looks at a specific writer‘s or politician’s take on contemporary culture wars. One of the reoccurring themes concerns the way free speech has been weaponized by different ideological formations, and this battle over free expression is often centered on the role that universities play in balancing the demands among competing social interests. This book will not only clarify what universities should be, but it will also help us to move beyond our polarized political world. (shrink)

After summarising the book, the conclusion clarifies why its two main weaknesses—undertheorisation of racism and sexism—can be dealt with a further application of the conceptual framework already developed in the work. Moreover, the conclusion stresses the importance of this framework for our times mainly threatened by the rising alt-right and ecological crisis by proposing a revolution for living that may revitalise the left and spark deep motivational forces for a living in which people are, finally, allowed to be who (...) they are amid a world that is no longer alienated by domination. In comparison to this revolution for living, the hateful parochialism of the alt-right could pale as much as the liberal cynicism of contemplative non-intervention. (shrink)

The normative ideals of democracy, trust and respect are under threat from the forces of populism and extremism. I argue for a recalibration of some basic ideas in the moral and social domains in which each person sees her/himself as one among others. I defend 0093The Principle of Personal Worth0094 which asserts that persons are more valuable than non-persons such as nations, religions, ethnicities, tribes, gangs, and cultures. The 0091collectivist0092 mentality denied by this principle is often held up against a (...) strongly (individualist) or atomistic one. However, these two extremes are not the only possibilities.Collectivism and identity politics link our identities to those associations and institutions with which we identify. This link is based on a confusion between qualitative and quantitative identity. Our actual (numerical) identities are determined by a combination of semantic (conceptual) and deictic (referential) factors, not by our qualitative associations.The Alt-Right combines extremes of individualism and collectivism by way of self-serving narratives that simultaneously elevate the individual over the State, and promote the agendas of specific religious, ethnic, gender and sexuality groups. These impoverished narratives support an impoverished sense of community which functions as an echo chamber for its own ideas, while rejecting those coming from beyond its boundaries. Ultimately, the task of repairing and reconstructing such narratives lies in formal education. Teachers and students need to enact forms of discourse and community which are intellectually, ethically and affectively powerful, both as tools for better teaching and learning, and as preparation for living worthwhile lives. (shrink)

The present article examines the contemporary stakes and “application” of The Differend with particular attention to neo-fascist denialism, trolling, and alt-right “free speech” discourse. This entails investigating the text’s own rhetorical performance as well as the shifting attitudes towards the sophistic tradition in The Differend and its precursor text, “On the Force of the Weak.” The article thus also takes up in detail three examples of the characteristic sophistic form of the dilemma or double-bind, two of which are drawn (...) from Lyotard: the Holocaust denialist Robert Faurisson’s infamous dilemma of “the witness to the gas-chambers”; the canonical ancient dilemma through which Protagoras wins his fee from his student Euathlus despite seemingly never having helped him win a dispute; and “if you can speak, you can breathe,” the contemporary denialist’s rejoinder to “I can’t breathe.” Lyotard’s arguments are briefly compared to those of other thinkers (Cassin, Rancière, Moten). (shrink)

This paper examines how Gilles Deleuze addresses, and fail to address, the darker strata in Nietzsche’s work which has enabled his work to be claimed by almost every far-right European political movement since the 1890s to the Alt-Right today. Part I argues that four rhetorical strategies are present which serve to domesticate Nietzsche’s ideas concerning class and caste, race and sexuality, and his opposition to forms of liberalism, democracy, feminism and socialism: avoiding directly political subjects which Nietzsche returned (...) to; catachrestic use of political words to describe ostensibly supra- or non-political data; denials of Nietzsche’s rightist positions, followed by justifications which, upon analysis, do not support the denials but ‘change the subject’; openly erroneous misrepresentations of divisive subjects, led by Nietzsche on war. Part II looks at how these sophistical strategies are played out in two key passages in Nietzsche and Philosophy, concerning the second ‘selection’ in the eternal recurrence, with its ‘annihilation of all parasitical and degenerate elements’. Closing remarks address the situation today, and the paradoxes and limitations of Left Nietzscheanism in the academy. (shrink)

The social group named after the various discourses of individuals who define themselves as the champions of the men's rights movement on social media is called the “Manosphere” in the literature. “Oneitis”, a concept in the jargon of the manosphere, basically refers to a disease state used to represent situations in which a man invests excessive attention in a woman who is not equally interested in him. For the Red Pill movement, the most influential group in the manosphere, oneitis is (...) criticized as a pattern of behavior that should be avoided by men. Red Pill philosophy is also often associated with alt-right ideologies due to its anti-feminist and pragmatic views. Red Pill thought can therefore often be seen as contrasting with Woke Culture, a counter-cultural movement that advocates the constant practice of vigilance against political discourses that oppress certain social groups through structural mechanisms of oppression such as racism, anti-blackness, and anti-feminism. In this paper, I argue that the concept of oneitis, when suspended from its anti-feminist and commodifying contexts, can in fact be read as a critique of a conception of love that is deeply rooted in traditional gender roles that are often criticized from perspectives such as feminism or Woke Culture. When the liberation from oneitis is considered independently of the manosphere framework, it can be read as a critique of coercive social practices in terms of romantic relationships. (shrink)

As an idea, transhumanism has received increasing attention in recent years and across numerous domains. Despite presidential candidates such as Zoltan Istvan, who ran on an explicitly Transhumanist platform in 2016 but later dropped out to endorse Hillary Clinton, transhumanism has taken root more recently in the conspiratorial imaginations of the dark web. Given the philosophy’s central emphasis on technology as an inherent good, imaginations in supposed alt-right internet circles have criticised it as an ideological gateway to global, fully-automated (...) Communism. This is not to say that such discussions on transhumanism are exclusively siloed and on the margins of society. Related discussions are happening at various well-known institutions and research centres such as the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, a non-profit think tank dedicated to techno-progressivism where I have been managing director for half a decade. What I mean to say here is that transhumanism is not monolithic. It is best described as multi-faceted and existing in different instantiations across multiple domains. James Michael MacFarlane’s recent book, Transhumanism as a New Social Movement: The Techno- Imagination, is an attempt to trace the history, meaning, and practices that characterise this variegated term. (shrink)

The present article examines the contemporary stakes and “application” of The Differend with particular attention to neo-fascist denialism, trolling, and alt-right “free speech” discourse. This entails investigating the text’s own rhetorical performance as well as the shifting attitudes towards the sophistic tradition in The Differend and its precursor text, “On the Force of the Weak.” The article thus also takes up in detail three examples of the characteristic sophistic form of the dilemma or double-bind, two of which are drawn (...) from Lyotard: the Holocaust denialist Robert Faurisson’s infamous dilemma of “the witness to the gas-chambers”; the canonical ancient dilemma through which Protagoras wins his fee from his student Euathlus despite seemingly never having helped him win a dispute; and “if you can speak, you can breathe,” the contemporary denialist’s rejoinder to “I can’t breathe.” Lyotard’s arguments are briefly compared to those of other thinkers. (shrink)

The twenty-first century's shifting intellectual framework is accompanied by shifts in the character of current dystopian fiction. Contemporary society is now characterized by globalization in which privatization, consumerism, and neoliberal politics prevail. We are witness to a faltering Western progressivism, massive economic recessions, the expansion of alt-right ideologies, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian incursion into Ukraine, and the war in Gaza. Thus, neoliberalism plays a key role in the depiction of current fictional dystopias that commonly reflect society and are (...) known to instill authority through ideological and social domination.In their interview with Rocío Carrasco, Larissa Lai and Sherryl Vint... Read More. (shrink)

After Brexit became a reality in the UK and Trump became a reality in the United States, many thought that this was perhaps the last stand of those who thought of themselves as white and entitled to their land, calling it their country. Others living in their country may be citizens of that country, but it did not mean it was theirs as well. It belonged to those of white origin. And this “fact” would embolden those who wanted to “take (...) back” their country and protect its sovereignty. -/- Initially, I too, thought this was a sign that this nationalist thinking was becoming a part of history and, while it may create havoc on its way out, it was nonetheless on its way out. I thought this, at least, until I read an article in the New York Times by Jesse Singal titled “Undercover with the Alt-Right.”. (shrink)

This chapter provides a critical overview of antifeminist mobilizations and feminist responses between 2010 and 2021. We first outline the broader scene of reactionary opposition to feminism and LGBT+ rights, encompassing the Greek Orthodox Church, the political and cultural right, and emerging actors such as alt-right figures and “men’s rights” groups. We then examine two key cases of late antifeminist intervention: the 2021 “mandatory joint custody” law and the ultimately canceled “First Fertility Conference” in 2021. What singles out (...) these antifeminist assaults is that they are strategic endeavors which take aim at established feminist conquests. In the second case, a swarm of uncoordinated yet swift and diffuse resistances attained their objective, warding off the assault by activating established reflexes in mainstream politics and society. The failure, on the other hand, of the multi-layered confrontation between allied feminist forces and the new “men’s movement” around the law on “mandatory joint custody” sheds light on new challenges for counter-hegemonic contestation. The antifeminist campaign was carried out by well-organized male lobbies and vested economic interests. It deployed the communicative strategies of the international alt-right, appropriated the discourse of rights and equality, and relied upon the institutional power of a stable conservative government. (shrink)

This article deploys Spinoza’s ethic of joy alongside Deleuze and Guattari’s exposition of micropolitics to expose how fascist desires and affects bloom and circulate through digital communications ecosystems that generally promote a diffusion or decentralisation of power. Beyond the steady barrage of alt-right content conscientiously documented by liberal journalists and progressive watchdogs, a more persistent and widespread fascist impulse permeates the very forms of some of our most banal digitally mediated acts and encounters. Rather than a sole looming authoritarian (...) figurehead, the network itself – particularly with the new image paradigms propelled by apps such as Instagram and TikTok – has become the rallying point for the circulation of fascistic affects, burnished through the art and ethos of following: of rules, routines, protocols, accounts. I contend that a joyful passion accompanies much of this everyday experience of keeping up with one’s feeds, engaging the platforms, participating in the spectacles. This is what Sontag, interrogating the appeal of the Third Reich, calls the ‘joy of followers’, a joy in fascist belonging, which is to suggest that fascist movements thrive not only on the circulation of negative affects like hatred and fear, but also on the profusion of pleasure and affiliation. Deleuze’s Spinoza, resolutely anti-fascist, helps us parse this situation as it plays out in the social media sphere. Spinoza offers a bipartite conceptualisation of joy that allows us to diagnose the pleasures particular to fascist belonging and network belonging alike as passive, partial and indirect. Ultimately, what we today share with historical fascisms is a ubiquitous aesthetic that merges art with life and bodies with information, and a corresponding ethos that cultivates conformism, barbarises critical thought and redirects joyful impulses into reactionary social forms. As fascistic power relations spread anew through digital cultures’ newly evolving modes of visuality, hapticity, vibration and expression, one can observe something of what Deleuze calls ‘sad joy’, a sort of joy rooted in conquest and domination. The aim of this article is to root out such sad joys, to appreciate their appeal, and ultimately to reject them in all their various forms. (shrink)

This article proposes that Deleuze’s psychoanalytically inspired theory of humour and irony provides an underappreciated way to theorize acts of resistance that adopt a structurally perverse position towards a law or authority. In his books Coldness and Cruelty and Difference and Repetition, Deleuze explains that the law is susceptible to two kinds of subversive procedure. The first, which he calls irony and which he aligns with sadism, reveals a gap between the law and its principles. The second, which he calls (...) humour and which he aligns with masochism, exposes a gap between the law’s interdictions and their consequences. For Deleuze, humour and irony harbour the potential to overturn or overthrow the law. Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and contemporary examples – alt-right ‘free speech’ demonstrations in the United States and protests surrounding Russia’ s 2012 parliamentary elections – the article argues that Deleuze overstates the transformative potential of perversion. Nevertheless, his account remains useful for showing the circuitous routes that some subjects take to enjoy their position within the law. Given the global rise in right-wing authoritarianism in recent years, this may prove to be an important insight. (shrink)