This book is a philosophical exploration of the theoretical causes behind the collapse of classical cybernetics. Alcibiades Malapi-Nelson advances the idea that the cybernetic understanding of the nature of a machine entails ontological and epistemological consequences that create both material and theoretical conundrums. He proposes that, given our current state of materials, research, and practices, there might be a way for cybernetics to flourish. The book starts with a historical treatment of cybernetics, and proceeds with a philosophical explanation of (...) its collapse-emphasizing the work of Turing, Ashby and von Neumann-and connects it with the emerging technologies carrying its signature. The transhumanist metaphysics of both cybernetics and NBIC is then unveiled. Finally, avenues of research that may allow these technologies to circumvent the cybernetic fate are indicated. It is advanced that emerging technologies ultimately entail an affirmation of humanity. (shrink)

In this essay, I engage the foreseeable consequences for the future of humanity triggered by Emerging Technologies and their underpinning philosophy, transhumanism. The transhumanist stance is compared with the default view currently held in many academic institutions of higher education: posthumanism. It is maintained that the transhumanist view is less inimical to the fostering of human dignity than the posthuman one. After this is established, I suggest that the Catholic Church may find an ally in a transhumanist ethos in a (...) two-fold manner. On the one hand, by anchoring and promoting the defense of “the human” already present in transhumanism. On the other, rethinking the effectiveness of the delivery of sacraments in a humanity heavily altered by these technologies. (shrink)

The behavior/structure methodological dichotomy as locus of scientific inquiry is closely related to the issue of modeling and theory change in scientific explanation. Given that the traditional tension between structure and behavior in scientific modeling is likely here to stay, considering the relevant precedents in the history of ideas could help us better understand this theoretical struggle. This better understanding might open up unforeseen possibilities and new instantiations, particularly in what concerns the proposed technological modification of the human condition. The (...) sequential structure of this paper is twofold. The contribution of three philosophers better known in the humanities than in the study of science proper are laid out. The key theoretical notions interweaving the whole narrative are those of mechanization, constructability and simulation. They shall provide the conceptual bridge between these classical thinkers and the following section. Here, a panoramic view of three significant experimental approaches in contemporary scientific research is displayed, suggesting that their undisclosed ontological premises have deep roots in the Western tradition of the humanities. This ontological lock between core humanist ideals and late research in biology and nanoscience is ultimately suggested as responsible for pervasively altering what is canonically understood as “human”. (shrink)

Sheldon Richmond has written an insightful and exhaustive review of my book The Nature of the Machine and the Collapse of Cybernetics: A Transhumanist Lesson for Emerging Technologies. Richmond voices concerns regarding some suggestions I made about the future of humanity vis-à-vis a contemporary cybernetic reinstantiation in the form of Emerging Technologies. He suggests that future cybernetically rooted sciences can pose peril for the human condition. This reply is intended to clarify certain points that Richmond brings up, by means of (...) responding to his suggestion that cybernetics and transhumanism could be independently understood, and unveiling a metaphysical and ethical stance, shared by Richmond, critical to the observations I made regarding a “cybernetically organized mankind” made possible by Emerging Technologies. I identify Richmond’s position as precautionary in nature, for reasons perhaps m... (shrink)

This volume is the first to articulate ethical foundations of transhumanism from perspectives focused on transhuman flourishing, as opposed to utilitarian or deontological approaches. Transhumanism is typically framed as a quest for “transcending biological limitations” and “unlocking human potential”—and thus perceived to be at odds with ethical conceptions of a “good life” that are substantively defined in terms of “human nature.” However, the concept of “human nature” is not a biological given but deeply bound up with metaphysical conceptions about what (...) (trans)human futures are possible, desirable, and good. It invites ethical reflection on who we are, the value of embodiment and community to (trans)human existence, and who we might hope to become. The contributions collected in this volume offer a wide spectrum of visions for shaping the techno-progressive agenda of transhumanism in ethically grounded and socially responsible ways. (shrink)

Sociology professor Steve Fuller’s latest book deals with contemporary treatments of the notion of ‘the human’, with an eye set on its future developments, anchored on disruptively pervasive technologies that are already being felt. A contextual account of its historical unfolding is provided, so that the reader can locate the evolution of the notion within the bigger setting of the evolving philosophical landscape in the West.

Through cyber enhancement employing artificial intelligence (AI) and intelligence amplification (IA), transhumanists—transhumanism is also known as Humanity Plus or H+—look forward to superintelligence and a posthuman species living in a techno-utopia. Might this resemble in any way the biblical promise of transformation of the Old Adam into the New Adam? Might cyber enhancement contribute to spiritual transformation understood in terms of sanctification or deification? Even though H+ prizes intelligence and followers of Jesus value love, might there still be any overlap (...) between human flourishing as envisioned by transhumanists and by Christian theologians? (shrink)

Technology is placing unprecedented power in human hands. Existing ethical frameworks are challenged by the arrival of profound new possibilities that transcend our prior intuitions. Human societies face urgent decisions regarding the development and deployment of technologies that are being combined and improved at a bewildering speed. What restrictions should be placed on the freedoms of individuals and corporations? Which actions should be discouraged or even forbidden? Which other actions should be accelerated? In which areas of life should a diversity (...) of approaches be encouraged? And which guiding principles should be upheld as sacrosanct, despite all the disruption and turbulence?In answer to these questions, this chapter highlights an emerging framework of ethical principles described as “active transhumanism”. I argue that these principles will increase the likelihood that humanity can advance, within just a few decades, into a transhumanist state of sustainable superabundance, whilst avoiding many dangerous landmines that might explode, literally or metaphorically, along the way to that destination. In summary, the recommended principles are: radical opportunity, existential danger, human agency, no easy options, all-round wellbeing, individual sanctity, mutual welfare, science and data, openness, proactive vigilance, sustainability, consciousness, and diversity.All these principles are needed. Omitting one or more of them would result in a dangerous mix of ideas. Omissions might be motivated by a desire to champion human flourishing, but the only reliable route to sustainable human flourishing is via adopting the full insights of transhumanist flourishing. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the Christian concern that transhumanism is a wrong-headed project because it aims at transforming our God-given human nature in the wrong way. My goal is to show there is no need for a blanket refusal of the transhumanist project. First, I argue that unlike Western Christianity, the teachings of Orthodox Christianity make no ontological commitments to the idea of a God-given fixed human nature. To make my case, I explore the concept of theosis in Eastern (...) Orthodoxy and the concept of matter in the work of Pavel Florensky. The Orthodox concept of theosis presupposes that our human nature is ontologically incomplete. According to Florensky, matter is not reducible to its components and mechanical laws and is always shaped (top-down) by (divine/spiritual/live) form. When combined, these points show there is nothing inherently sinful about human attempts to physically modify/improve. Second, I argue that the demarcation between improvements to our nature that we should pursue and those we should worry about can be found in the Christian imperative to be compassionate with and alleviate the suffering of others. Florensky’s metaphysics of love offers a metaphysical framework for thinking about the ways in which compassion shapes our own nature. (shrink)

Transhumanism and posthumanism are nowadays challenging the normative standing of the ‘human’, albeit from opposing directions. Taken together, they are dislodging the equation of ‘human being = Homo sapiens’ that was first forged by Carolus Linnaeus in the mid-eighteenth century. This chapter considers the stakes in what I regard as a world-historic ‘transvaluation’ of the concept of humanity in the face of competing pressures from, so to speak, ultrahuman machines and infrahuman nature. The chapter begins by revisiting the original context (...) in which Michel Foucault presented the ‘Death of Man’ thesis in the 1960s, including its Nietzschean heritage. This line of thought is extended into the contemporary period, in which we are increasingly forced to judge what is worth preserving of the ‘human’, as well as where and how it should be preserved. In many respects, this radical repositioning of the value of the human returns us to the problem of cosmic justice, or ‘theodicy’. Drawing on the work of Georg Simmel and Kurt Lewin, the chapter generally concludes that humanity should be regarded as a style of being in the world that may be subject to a variety of quite different material realizations. (shrink)

The chapter highlights twelve differences between classic transhumanism (=CT) and euro-transhumanism (=ET) to stress that transhumanism does not have to be identified with the visions proposed by Elon Musk and his friends.CT upholds utopias; ET rejects the affirmation of utopias.CT has an optimistic worldview; ET regards Dukkha as plausible, and consequently a version of philosophical pessimism.CT affirms the universal validity of certain values and norms, which can have neo-colonial implications; ET regards perspectivism as plausible, which undermines the possibility of neo-colonial (...) implications.CT affirms a version of utilitarianism ; ET embraces a hermeneutic understanding of ethics.CT argues for libertarianism; ET embraces a social-democratic version of liberalism.CT aims for immortality; ET aims for an increased health span.CT can be identified with a silicon-based transhumanism which is focused on mind-uploading; ET can be associated with a carbonate-based transhumanism which has realized that “We have always been cyborgs”, and it is highly unlikely that “singularity is near”.CT is centrally concerned with the risks of superintelligence; ET is doubtful concerning the coming about of artificial general intelligence as well as superintelligence in the near future.CT is concerned with the overcoming of suffering; ET recognizes the inevitability of suffering.CT sees itself in the tradition of the Enlightenment; ET is highly critical of the logocentric Enlightenment tradition and stresses an ambiguous relationship with the philosophical foundations of the Enlightenment.CT denies that Nietzsche is an ancestor of transhumanism; ET regards Nietzsche as ancestor of transhumanism. (shrink)

The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle is a “perfectionist” philosopher, one who believes that humans should reach for the highest perfection possible. But Aristotle was also mindful of fulfilling and cultivating human nature rather than opposing or reconstructing it. Thus, within the works of Aristotle, there is a tension between the normativity of nature and the normativity of transcending nature, and this tension can be placed in dialogue with contemporary debates on the normativity of current human nature versus the normativity of (...) human enhancement. To further that end, this paper provides an Aristotelian typology of transhumanism; first dividing transhumanism into two strands: embodied, which maintains a human body, and disembodied, which does not. Then, embodied transhumanism is subdivided into transhumanism which cultivates and fulfills human nature, and transhumanism which replaces or reconstructs human nature. In light of this typology, I will then investigate the tension between the normativity of the natural and the perfect in Aristotle’s works, and morally evaluate each type. (shrink)

This chapter explores the possibility of posthumanist ethics that can help us actually embrace and respond to complex challenges in the present-day world, such as rapid technological and environmental transformations. This exploration is grounded in post-dualistic and relational frameworks, where the dialogue between theory and practice is central. The very way this piece was crafted reflects this search: pluralistically conceived, it emerges from the merging of individual and collective writing, challenging the notion of solitary authorship and affirming knowledge production as (...) a relational practice. Building the concept of ‘ethix’, this chapter seeks to illustrate ways to translate widespread posthumanist ideas into tangible actions and behaviours, engaging with everyday life experiences and issues, in the understanding that the how is the what: the praxes we embrace in our lives are our ethical manifestations. This chapter offers a toolkit for our life journey, exploring notions such as chaosmos, connection, respect, embodied experiences, wholeness, creativity and silence in non-analytical ways. In line with this perspective, ‘ethix’ is realized through the development of a rhizomatic plurilogue, which intertwines excerpts from different authors across several writing styles, such as tales, poems, academic short essays and journal entries. Based on the activities developed during the Posthuman Summer Camp (Naturama, Italy, 9–13 August 2024), this chapter advocates for a shift towards ethics as a lived practice that recognizes the mutual impact of actions and reactions of, and on, all entities, both human and nonhuman, in our dynamics of coexistence. This is a journey of self-exploration: enjoy it. (shrink)

Advancing technological developments have forced humans to evaluate whether prior considerations surrounding questions of origin, being, purpose, and future possibilities have been adequately framed from philosophical and theological perspectives. Intertwined with these technological advancements, transhumanist thought provides a myriad of new hermeneutical possibilities for human beings to delve more fully into discovering and cocreating the answers to such questions. In contrast to such emerging possibilities, prominent American evangelical Andy Crouch has raised concerns about the present and future dangers of technological (...) development on the human person. This chapter will specifically address such claims by comparing theological perspectives, contrasting what a Christian Transhumanist approach would look like by providing a new hermeneutical lens to view the cosmos and our emerging technological future. (shrink)

In this piece, I consider various problematic themes of the transhumanist literature that carry significant ethical import, to point out that traditional utilitarian approaches, the ones standardly preferred by transhumanism, reveal some grave conundrums, and are thus unable to satisfactorily address several pressing issues that afflict the movement. Instead of aiming at solving each one of them, I propose rethinking the novel ethical problems triggered by transhumanism via a consideration of divergent ethical frameworks, as opposed to the utilitarian one used (...) by default. I advance that alternative ethical positions, such as duty and virtue ethics, deserve to be seriously examined as viable systems of moral reasoning for this pervasive phenomenon. In this vein, I jump-start the articulation of deontological and aretaic narratives applied to transhumanism. I conclude by urging further investigation on alternative ethical outlooks applied to the movement, suggesting further scholarship on the intersection of these with the shared aim of human flourishing. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the relationship between human enhancement technologies (HETs) from a feminist Christian theological perspective. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of feminism as it informs the methodological approach of the chapter. Taking a fourth-wave feminist approach, I emphasize the theological values of relationship, interdependence, and social justice through engagement with a few examples of emergent and possible future HETs. My modest and limited goal is to identify a few ethical issues at the intersection of HETs (...) and what it means to be better, through a feminist Christian theology lens. (shrink)

From the perspective of Christian theology, three concepts provide the framing for human identity and transformation: the notion of imago Dei, the incarnation of Christ, and the eschatological vision of Christian tradition. Transhumanism has always drawn on these concepts, from the scientific theology of Sir Francis Bacon, to the eschatology of Nikolai Fedorov, to the evolutionary vision of Teilhard de Chardin which inspired “father of transhumanism” Julian Huxley. This influence continues today—as philosopher and social epistemologist Steve Fuller declared at a (...) popular transhumanist conference in 2019, “Transhumanism is about the image of God!” In this paper, I examine each of these Christian concepts in terms of how they may inspire transhumanist visions, and how they may interface with transhumanist ethical questions. Grappling with some existing transhumanist shortcomings, I attempt to point the way towards a more fully Christian transhumanist ethic, and illustrate how transhumanism may locate itself within the larger Christian tradition. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence poses a number of significant challenges to human evolution today, primarily because its exponential rise and success have not allowed sufficient time for critical reflection on what we are becoming with technology and what we desire with it. Can computer technology be seen as part of a larger process of biological and spiritual development? In this chapter, I will expound on Teilhard de Chardin’s vision of technology and evolution and the richness it offers us in thinking about how (...) to bring spiritual intelligence to AI, pushing evolution forward through ongoing discovery toward greater unity. (shrink)

The transhumanist project is typically framed as a quest for “overcoming human limits”, “transcending biological limitations”, and “unlocking human potential” – and thus perceived to be at odds with ethical conceptions of the “good life,” such as eudaimonism, that are substantively defined in terms of “human nature”. However, the notion of “human nature” is arguably not a biological given but deeply bound up with normatively salient metaphysical conceptions about what (trans)human futures are possible, desirable, and good. It invites ethical reflection (...) on who we are, the value of embodiment and community to human existence, and who we might hope to become. In this opening essay, we provide a philosophical introduction to some of these key transhumanist leitmotifs straddling science, religion, and technology that hold together the chapters of our volume. (shrink)

This essay seeks to articulate the experience of philosophic enchantment to which Alcibiades refers in his praise of Socrates in the closing section of the Symposium. Through a dual analysis of the fantastical images he provides of his former lover (Socrates is likened to a Silenus-statue, as Marsyas the mythical aulos player, to a siren, and finally to a viper) and three implicit self-images of Alcibiades regarding his relation to philosophy, we gain a vantage from which to grasp (...) that special form of possession to which a soul is subject under the sway of philosophical development. I argue that such development, involving images of oneself arising out of both elenchtic examination and the imaginative transport of Socrates' myth making, is at bottom an expression of eros, with its drive toward fulfillment and self-completion. (shrink)

Alcibiades had the right nature to become a philosopher-king. Yet despite having Socrates as a lover and teacher, he failed to become one. Through a close reading of the _Symposium_, this chapter shows how Plato came to understand this failure as primarily political in nature.

The Alcibiades was widely read in antiquity as the very best introduction to Plato. Alcibiades in his youth associated with Socrates, and went on to a spectacularly disgraceful career in politics. When Socrates was executed for 'corrupting the young men', Alcibiades was cited as a prime example. This dialogue represents Socrates meeting the charming but intellectually lazy Alcibiades as he is about to enter adult life, and using all his wiles in an attempt to win him (...) for philosophy. In spite of its ancient reputation, many modern scholars have thought that the Alcibiades is not by Plato and it has therefore lacked a decent commentary. This edition remedies that lack. The notes explain difficulties of linguistic, literary and philosophical detail. The introduction includes a discussion of the dialogue's authenticity, and of the consequences that acknowledging its authenticity has for our conception of Plato's intellectual development. (shrink)

Comment se connaître soi-même? La discussion menée dans l'Alcibiade rencontre rapidement cette question, alors qu'elle s'interroge sur les conditions psychologiques du gouvernement de soi et du gouvernement de la cité, ou encore de l'éthique et de la politique. A la recherche d'une définition de ce qu'est l'homme guidé par la quête de l'excellence, Alcibiade et Socrate conclueront que l'âme, dans ce qu'elle a de meilleur, c'est-à-dire l'intellect, doit être l'objet de tous nos soins. Considéré pendant des siècles comme une introduction (...) à l'ensemble de la philosophie platonicienne, l'Alcibiade est aujourd'hui un carrefour d'interprétations du platonisme. Le lecteur trouvera ici les éléments du dossier qui ont amené à soupçonner l'authenticité du dialogue, et de bonnes raisons d'en recommencer plus que jamais la lecture aujourd'hui. (shrink)

The Platonic dialogues allow us to delve into the philosophical questions and reflections that permeated the Greek world of the classical period. Its content richness has permeated time, encouraging us to learn about and reflect on themes that are independent of time, as they remain relevant in our contemporary times, among them the theme of temperance. Thus, this article has as its reference Alcibiades' praise for Socrates, in the dialogue The Symposium, and aims to investigate the condition of the (...) famous Athenian strategos from the category of temperance. For this investigation we have as references the virtue of sophrosyne (temperance) in the archaic and classical periods of Greek culture. We present the meaning and changes that this sophrosyne virtue underwent during these periods in the Athenian polis, as well as its conceptualization by Plato. (shrink)

This chapter starts with the Socratic definition — loving knowing that you do not know — and explains what it would be to make loving anything a way of life. It examines what is Alcibiades in love with? What is the moral beauty that overwhelms Alcibiades? To encounter philosophy is first to discover that we are not what we thought we were: that what we think most important has little to do with our true nature. The chapter relates (...) that moral beauty is the paradoxical combination of vulnerability and integrity, a clarity and directness of vision, a limpid honesty that results when the skill is exercised. What makes that beauty possible is the same analytic and discriminatory expertise that we cultivate in attempts to determine how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. That expertise is at the heart of the elenkhos, which we still must practice. (shrink)

In the Platonic work Alcibiades I, a divinely guided Socrates adopts the guise of a lover in order to divert Alcibiades from an unthinking political career. The contributors to this carefully focussed volume cover aspects of the background to the work; its arguments and the philosophical issues it raises; its relationship to other Platonic texts, and its subsequent history up to the time of the Neoplatonists. Despite its ancient prominence, the authorship of Alcibiades I is still unsettled; (...) the essays and two appendices, one historical and one stylometric, come together to suggest answers to this tantalising question. (shrink)

This study examines an implicit reference to Egyptian ethics in the Second Alcibiades, focusing on the mention of Amun, the Lord of the silent ones. The Egyptian “silent man” parallels the Platonic concept of euphemia, extending ritual silence into ethico-political conduct. While the dialogue contrasts euphemia and blasphemia through Spartan and Athenian behavior, Egyptian texts similarly oppose the “silent” to the “feverish” or “talkative” man. This intercultural parallel suggests a deeper Egyptian influence previously overlooked. Thus, this study explores Egyptian (...) ethics, Greek contact with the Oracle of Amun in Siwa, Plato’s adaptation of euphemia, and the implications for the dialogue’s authenticity. (shrink)

Socrates’ admirers and successors in the fourth century and beyond often felt the need to explain Socrates’ reputed relationship with Alcibiades, and to defend Socrates against the charge that he was a corrupting influence on Alcibiades. In this paper I examine Plato’s response to this problem and have two main aims. First, I will argue in Section 2 that <span class Plato’s diagnosis of the problem—his explanation of why Socrates failed to convert Alcibiades to the life of (...) philosophy—consists in two central points: that motivations associated with the spirited part of the soul play a decisive role in moral education, particularly in the case of exceptionally ambitious and talented individuals; and that the democratic Many themselves, not Socrates, are primarily responsible for the corruption of promising young men like Alcibiades. These points are connected, moreover: the Many exert a moral influence on the young by shaping and exploiting their spirited motivations. I aim to show that Plato develops and dramatizes this diagnosis of the problem of Alcibiades in three earlier dialogues—Protagoras, Gorgias, and Symposium—as well as in Book 6 of the Republic. My second main claim will be that the psychological and educational theories of the Republic are informed by Plato’s diagnosis of the problem of Alcibiades, and that they are conceived, at least in part, as a solution to that problem. (shrink)

Assuming that Alcibiades was deemed a failure in Socrates’ pedagogical project, I intend to revisit Plato’s Symposium, juxtaposed with Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades and Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, to analyze the role of passions in the controversial Athenian general and politician. Alcibiades is a passionate disciple of Socrates whose psychological structure lay between the realm of desires directed towards appetites and individual glory. In his eagerness to live intensely, Alcibiades reveals a conscious pleasure in (...) being a non-philosopher who engages in dialogue but fears the discourse of the philosopher, represented by Socrates. Therefore, I propose that Alcibiades’ inability to become a philosopher is due to his failure to reach the final stage of the scala amoris, despite his intense desire for Socrates, his beloved, who lacked physical beauty. Nevertheless, Alcibiades recognized and praised Socrates’ virtuous actions, which suggests that he attained the sphere of the beauty of the souls. (shrink)

This text maps the history of debate on the authenticity of Plato's or pseudo-Plato's Alcibiades I.

Abstract The aim of this article is to make use of recent research on `political eros ' in order to clarify the connection that Plato establishes between eros and tyranny in Republic IX, specifically by elucidating the intertextuality between Plato's work and the various historical accounts of Alcibiades. An examination of the lexicon used in these accounts will allow us to resolve certain interpretive difficulties that, to my knowledge, no other commentator has elucidated: why does Socrates blame eros for (...) the decline from democracy into tyranny? What does he mean by ` eros ' here, and what link existed between eros and tyranny in the minds of his contemporaries? And finally, who are the mysterious `tyrant-makers' ( turannopoioí , 572e5-6) who, according to Socrates, introduce a destructive eros in the soul of the future tyrant? After a careful examination of the passage from book IX on the genesis of the tyrannical man (focused on the last stage of the metamorphosis, which is concerned with éros túrannos , 572d-573b), I will offer answers to these questions by turning to the writings of Thucydides, Aristophanes and Plutarch while examining the portrait of Alcibiades that Plato paints in the Alcibiades I and Symposium. (shrink)

Many of Socrates’ admirers and successors in the fourth century and beyond felt the need to explain Socrates’ reputed relationship with Alcibiades and to defend Socrates against the charge that he was a corrupting influence on the young man. This chapter examines Plato’s response to this problem and defend two main aims. First, it argues that Plato’s explanation of why Socrates failed to convert Alcibiades to the life of philosophy consists in two central points: that motivations associated with (...) the spirited part of the soul play a decisive role in moral education, particularly in the case of exceptionally ambitious and talented individuals; and that the democratic Many _themselves_, not Socrates, are primarily responsible for the corruption of promising young men like Alcibiades. These points are connected, moreover: the Many exert a moral influence on the young by shaping and exploiting their spirited motivations. It shows that Plato develops and dramatizes this diagnosis of the problem of Alcibiades in three earlier dialogues—_Protagoras_, _Gorgias_, and _Symposium_—as well as in Book 6 of the _Republic_. The chapter’s second main claim is that the psychological and educational theories of the _Republic_ are informed by Plato’s diagnosis of the problem of Alcibiades, and that they are conceived, at least in part, as a solution to that problem. (shrink)

Can virtue be taught by the many? Socrates insists that the perfection of our souls is of supreme importance, he defines virtue as that which will make our souls good if it comes to be present, and he claims that, if we do not already possess virtue, then we should seek some teacher of it. We shall assume that he is basically right: that if our ultimate aim is to live well, if this requires us to know how to do (...) so, and if we are unsure whether we already possess this know-how, then we should in the first instance seek some teacher in good living. 1 Who should it be? Not the many, according to Socrates.2 As a general rule, and especially on matters of virtue, he asserts that we should be guided by the one with expert knowledge rather than the many, who lack such knowledge. Unlike other interlocutors in other dialogues, Alcibiades disagrees. Having suggested that he has learnt justice from people in general, he meets Socrates' stock assertion that '[w]hen you give the credit to "people in general", you're falling back on teachers who are no good', and he responds with the thought that the many can teach lots of different things. If we aim to live well, this issue is of vital importance. Together with the Great Speech in the Protagoras, the ensuing discussion in the Alcibiades is the most extensive treatment in the Socratic dialogues of the competence of the general public to teach virtue. Accordingly, we shall approach the issue of whether the general public can teach virtue by examining Socrates' arguments, in particular, that the Greek public did not teach Alcibiades justice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary PresentationW. J. MccoyDavid Gribble. Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary Presentation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. xii + 304 pp. Cloth, $75.In the wake of Hatzfeld's seminal study (1940), the life of Alcibiades has been examined and reexamined with a historical fine-tooth comb. Here Gribble offers, in a revised version of his Oxford D.Phil. thesis, a palette of (...) Athenian literary portraits (he opts not to deal with the later, non-Athenian tradition, 26) in an effort "to trace the extraordinary reaction excited by Alcibiades in contemporaries and in contemporary texts" (viii), with particular emphasis on the year 416-15, "when Alcibiades is at his most loved but also his most feared"--the moment "that is the focus of the most important ancient depictions" (vii), namely Thucydides 6.15, [Andocides] 4, and Plato's Symposium.In his introduction (1-28), Gribble explores the relationship between the "great" or "superlative" individual and his city and the inevitable clash of wills which typically ensued. Heroes and victors of whatever sort, however admired and honored by fellow citizens, usually posed a problem of accommodation within the Greek community. Some, such as Alcibiades, even became "city-threatening," thereby setting the stage for a love-hate scenario which played itself out not only in the day-to-day realities of late-fifth-century public life and policy but in the accompanying literary record. As defined by Gribble, the "great individual" possessed superlative natural gifts (13), "a massive sense of personal worth" (14), insatiable ambition (16-17), and "superlative status"--a combination of attributes which, if pursued aggressively, could pose "a threat to the concept of political equality which is the very basis of polis life" (18), especially when the polis in question was a democracy like Athens. And so it was with Alcibiades. [End Page 278]In chapter 1 (29-89), Gribble examines not "the story of Alcibiades' life,... but the way he lived his life (i.e., his bios)--or at least the way this lifestyle is presented in the surviving texts" (29). Such works stand apart from "ancient political-military historiography" and belong instead "to a tradition which, for the most part, is later in origin and far less reliable," one that "does not provide us with a single version of Alcibiades, but with layers of developing images, building on and transforming the picture transmitted from the late fifth and early fourth centuries" (29). Whereas distortion took root almost immediately at the hands of comic poets, orators, and Socratics, the Hellenistic writers (especially their penchant for "inventing" anecdotal detail pertaining to his private life) contaminated the story of the historical Alcibiades beyond repair. This mix of history and anecdote is preserved in Plutarch's Vita, which, according to Gribble, holds a key to understanding "the tradition of Alcibiades stories" (31, and conclusion, 263-82).Still Gribble does not harbor the illusion that he can ever find the real Alcibiades (in terms of his "actual behaviour"), for even amid the pages of contemporary authors this son of Cleinias had become a manipulable object of discourse as well as an appropriate pawn for arguments, both pro and con, which scrutinized the "relationship between the elite individual and the city" (43). It was a rare feat for any leader to keep such a relationship (marked both by distance from and solidarity with the demos) in balance; in the case of Alcibiades, there was teetering and tension from the beginning. His vainglorious and luxurious licenses doubtless aroused resentment in many circles, but more controversial was his "excessive and dangerous ambition" (59), coupled with a "contempt for normal convention displayed in (his) personal life" (70), that seemed to threaten the very stability of the state.Gribble begins his probe of contemporary texts in chapter 2 (90-158, including two appendices) with the four surviving rhetorical works (Isocrates 16, Lysias 14 and 15, and [Andocides] 4), which provide evidence of serious and ongoing debate about Alcibiades in the years following his death in 404-403. He begins part A ("Background") by discussing the "reality" of the first three speeches (all of which technically deal with the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 265-266 [Access article in PDF] Plato. Alcibiades. Edited by Nicholas Denyer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xi + 254. Cloth, $64.95. Paper, $22.95. This volume is a new addition to the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series. It offers an introduction (twenty-nine pages), a revised Greek text with apparatus criticus (fifty pages), a commentary (167 pages), and indices (...) (general, proper names, and Greek words together taking just over four pages).The editor acknowledges his dependence on the manuscripts and indirect evidence as reported by Carlini. The apparatus is second order: rather than identifying a reading to a manuscript or other source by name, the author indicates that the reading is the only one found in the manuscripts, that it is one among two or more found in the manuscripts, that it is found in the indirect evidence, or that it is conjectural. Thus the textual support is given, as he says, in a "ruthlessly summary form."The apparatus includes sixty-eight line references underneath the text. Of the passages corresponding to these references, thirty-six differ from Burnet's Oxford Classical Text, especially by deletion, rearrangement, and addition. Deletions make up a third: two of Burnet's additions to the text in acute brackets are dropped, including all of 133C8-17, and material that Burnet had printed in the text in square brackets disappears entirely in three cases; five pairs of acute brackets are dropped where Burnet's text is retained, with four of these items marked as conjectures; and finally, Burnet's unbracketed text simply is dropped in two places. The rearrangements vary in character: at one place, three lines of text are moved down "to ease the flow of the argument," and at another place a line that Burnet assigns to Alcibiades is given to Socrates. The editor's additions sometimes are presented as matters of linguistic or other intuition: at 115D2 (in his lineation), for example, an addition adopted by Burnet is dropped in favor of the author's own conjectural addition as "the easiest way to break up the very awkward double question that the manuscript tradition ascribes to Socrates"; at 128E10 the editor replaces the reading of "all the manuscripts" with a word which "was often abbreviated" and whose abbreviation "was easily misread as some shorter word beginning with alpha"; and at 131A2 the editor conjectures the addition of a word supported by neither the direct nor the indirect tradition in order to make it "possible to derive the conclusion of 131A5-6 that the professional knowledge of doctors and trainers is not knowledge of themselves." These arguments, though less than airtight, are thought provoking, even if they leave one's view of the text largely intact.The commentary offers historians of philosophy food for thought in other ways, too, since it goes beyond arguing for changes to the text. It makes extensive use of observations on grammar, style, usage, and other literary materials to shed light on the argument of the dialogue and on the dramatic elements which overlay the argumentative material and make the dialogue a coherent whole.The introduction offers something else again, especially in its twelve pages on authenticity. The editor does not prove that the dialogue is authentic, but he does show that the modern arguments against its authenticity are weak. Because of Schleiermacher's influence, he suggests, subsequent writers have not bothered to argue the case seriously against authenticity; he labels their arguments "frivolous." He notes that some argue for inauthenticity on the grounds that the Alcibiades lacks parallels with the other dialogues, [End Page 265] some on grounds that it is too similar to the other dialogues, and some ("weakest of all") on both grounds at once. He then goes on to argue that "stylometric studies cannot tell us whether or not Plato wrote the Alcibiades" and to challenge the standard chronology of the dialogues so far as it bears against authenticity. "If," he concludes, "the Alcibiades is authentically Platonic, then we need of course to abandon the conceptions, or misconceptions... (shrink)

Thucydides' account of the Athenian general Phrynichus' secret correspondence with the Spartan admiral Astyochus is both troubling and obscure. It may be summarized as follows: Phrynichus, having eloquently opposed Alcibiades' efforts to be recalled from exile and fearing that a repatriated Alcibiades would take vengeance on him, wrote to Astyochus revealing Alcibiades' pro-Athenian activities. Astyochus handed the letter to Alcibiades, who then wrote to the ranking Athenians on Samos concerning Phrynichus' ‘treason’ and demanded his execution. Phrynichus (...) then wrote again to Astyochus, now proposing to make it possible for the Spartans to destroy the whole Athenian force at Samos. (shrink)

This translation and commentary is based on the Critical Text and Indices of Proclus: Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato, Amsterdam 1954, by L. G. Westerink. Index II has been of great help in the translation, and the commentary is much indebted to the critical apparatus. Dr. Westerink has also been kind enough to forward his views on the relatively few problems which the Greek text has presented. A further debt is owed to the review of Dr. Westerink's (...) text by Prof. E. R. Dodds in GNOMON 1955 p. 164-1, chiefly for some references and some emendations to the Greek text. W. R. M. Lamb's Loeb translation of Alcibiades I has helped considerably in construing the lemmata, which Signor Antonio Carlini has found to have been inserted by a later hand from a Plato MSS. of the W family. Evidence for this is their discrepancy with the text as read in the main body of the commentary (d. Studi Classici e Orientali, vol. x, Pisa 1961). On the personal side, the whole work has received the benefit of constant advice from Prof. A. H. Armstrong. It was he who first suggested the undertaking, and he has been kind enough to read through the translation and commentary, making many corrections and helpful suggestions. In particular lowe him the parallels with Plotinus and thanks for a Socratic patience in my more obtuse moments. (shrink)

This is a story about Alcibiades, about Athens, and about the politics of rumor. When rumor set its claws into Alcibiades, it contributed not only to his own downfall, but to the downfall of Athens. The very traits that made Alcibiades an effective public figure also made him vulnerable to rumor. In the end, Thucydides himself excised rumor from his own histories because he came to see its destructive force.

Although there is a long tradition, going back at least to the tenth century, that would see Aristophanes' Birds as somehow related to the exile in Lacedaemon of Alcibiades, and to the fortification of the Attic township of Decelea by his Spartan hosts , current scholarship surrounding Birds is firmly in the hands of those who are antipathetic to seeing the creation of Cloudcuckooland in terms of a political allegory. ‘The majority of scholars today…flatly reject a political reading’; Birds (...) has ‘no strong and obvious connection with a topical question of public interest’; ‘attempts to find in Birds any extensive allegorical comment…are unconvincing’. Not only is it widely believed that ‘Birds… is strangely free of political concerns’. but also that ‘the theme of the Birds is absurdity itself…it is about meaninglessness’ . This is a tradition that descends from A. W. von Schlegel, for whom Birds was ‘merely a “Lustspiel”, full of imagination and the marvellous, with amusing touches at everything, but with no particular object’. This approach was reinforced by the fact that by the second half of the nineteenth century, the allegorists had apparently spun out of control. By 1879, there were no fewer than 79 accounts of the Tendenz of the Birds —some political, some ‘escapist fantasy’–on offer. The most influential allegorical interpretation of Birds was J. W. Suvern's study of 1826, but which is now generally dismissed, and only mentioned to be held up as a warning to those who might be tempted to take the allegorical route. This paper takes a different point of departure, namely Pierre Brumoy's Le thétre des grecs , an allegorical treatment that is full of good sense, and which was too hastily dismissed by Suvern, and ignored by others. (shrink)

Alcibiades is one of the most explicitly sexualized figures in fifth-century Athens, a "lover of the people" whom the demos "love and hate and long to possess" (Ar. Frogs 1425). But his eros fits ill with the normative sexuality of the democratic citizen as we usually imagine it. Simultaneously lover and beloved, effeminate and womanizer, Alcibiades is essentially paranomos, lawless or perverse. This paper explores the relation between Alcibiades' paranomia and the norms of Athenian sexuality, and argues (...) that his eros reveals an intrinsic instability within the sexual economy of the democracy: the desire he embodied blurred the categories that defined Athenian masculinity; the desire he inspired rendered the demos passive and "soft." This same instability can be seen in Thucydides' juxtaposition of the mutilation of the Herms and the legend of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. These two episodes (obscurely linked by Thucydides) together tell of an idealized citizen body under threat. The tyrannicide story figures the democratic citizen as an elite lover, whose sexual dominance is vital to his political autonomy. The Herms, with their prominent phalloi, symbolized this citizen-lover, and thus their mutilation was an assault on the masculinity, as well as political power, of the demos. The tyrannicide legend seems to promise a defense against this threat of civic castration; but instead of shoring up the sexually-dominant citizen, Thucydides' version of the legend merely reveals his frailty and fictionality: even in Athens' heroic past there is no inviolable democratic eros to cure the impotence of mutilation and tyranny. Reading these two episodes against the backdrop of Alcibiades' paranomia (as described by Plutarch and Plato), this paper examines the nature of democratic masculinity, the (eroticized) relation between demagogue and demos, and the place of perverse desire within the protocols of sex. (shrink)

Although it was influential for several hundred years after it first appeared, doubts about the authenticity of the Platonic Alcibiades I have unnecessarily impeded its interpretation ever since. It positions itself firmly within the Platonic and Socratic traditions, and should therefore be approached in the same way as most other Platonic dialogues. It paints a vivid portrait of a Socrates in his late thirties tackling the unrealistic ambitions of the youthful Alcibiades, urging him to come to know himself (...) and to care for himself. François Renaud and Harold Tarrant re-examine the drama and philosophy of Alcibiades I with an eye on those interpreters who cherished it most. Modern scholars regularly play down one or more of the religious, erotic, philosophic or dramatic aspects of the dialogue, so ancient Platonist interpreters are given special consideration. This rich study will interest a wide range of readers in ancient philosophy. (shrink)

L'Alcibiade est sans doute l'un des dialogues platoniciens qui a ete le plus lu et le plus apprecie dans l'antiquite: a preuve les multiples citations que l'on en trouve un peu partout ou encore le fait exceptionnel que l'on en a conserve deux commentaires neoplatoniciens. C'est que jamais, a la difference des modernes, les anciens n'ont doute de l'authenticite de ce dialogue, dans lequel certains voyaient meme, comme Jamblique, un resume parfait de la philosophie de Platon.

Socrates' promise and Alcibiades' failure (Alcibiades 103-116) -- The exaltation of virtue (Alcibiades 116-135) -- Rescuing Alcibiades (Second Alcibiades) -- A puzzling retrospective (Symposium 211-222).

In Plato’s Symposium eros and paideia draw the fabric of dramatic and rhetorical speeches and, especially, the picture of the relation between Socrates and Alcibiades. This paper will focus, firstly, on two important facts, which are essential for the correct understanding of the dialogue, both of which appear at the beginning. First, it is said that Socrates, Alcibiades and the others were present at the famous banquet, and second, that the banquet and the erotic speeches of the participants (...) were so celebrated as to attract the attention for several decades to come. So, the memory of that symposium is thus the memory, far beyond the other symposiasts, and through the erotic speeches, of something precise: that is, a particularly significant relationship, that between Socrates and Alcibiades. What matters most for the aim of this paper is the fact that Alcibiades is considered one of the major reasons for the defeat of Athens and the main cause of the crisis into which the city was plunged during the last years of 5th century BC. Due to the distrust of the city towards the groups of ‘philosophers’ that remitted to Alcibiades’ group, it is no surprise that the so-called Socratics committed themselves to refuting the accusation of Socrates having been Alcibiades’ mentor, to the point of reversing the charge. In the same way as the others Plato, also a Socratic, concerns himself with what might be called the ‘Alcibiades’ Connection’. Realizing there obviously was no way to deny the deep connection between Socrates and Alcibiades, he uses a clever dramatic construction with the intention of operating a political intervention upon the memory of this relationship, that is, of rewriting history, with the intent of relieving him of a more precise charge, which must have especially weighed upon Plato andupon Socrates’ memory: of him having been Alcibiades’ lover/mentor. This Platonic apology is based, ultimately, in a clever rhetorical strategy, which emphasizes the now traditional sexual paranomia of Alcibiades, in order tomake him guilty of an attempted excessive and outrageous seduction not only of Socrates, but of the polis itself. Reusing comic and oratorical/rhetorical motifs of his time, therefore, Plato deepens the J’accuse against Alcibiades, trying to withdraw him from the orbit of Socrates and the Socratics. (shrink)

This work provides a challenging new interpretation of the Second Alcibiades from the Platonic corpus, seeing it not only as a work of philosophic ethics, but also as one steeped in ancient literature, particularly Euripidean tragedy. The dialogue's philosophy is underpinned by an epistemology paying special attention to one's personal viewpoint, as its language shows. Dramatically, it presents a Socrates who falls into a similar trap from the one he steers Alcibiades away from, facing the dangers of a (...) tragic character thanks to their mutual attraction. Understood in this way the dialogue, here re-translated to bring out such features, is revealed as the work of an author with linguistic and literary gifts who is deeply conscious of the human condition. While reminiscent of the Academic Skeptic picture of Plato, it is the work of somebody still moving cautiously in that direction. (shrink)

This book is a fresh examination of Thucydides' treatment of Alcibiades in his History of the Peloponnesian War, Alcibiades' significance in the History, and his relation to Thucydides' political themes.