How does human agency relate to the good? According to a thesis with ancient pedigree, the connection is very tight. Known as “the Guise of the Good” (GG), it states that human action or motivation to act, of some special kind or another, is only possible insofar as the agent performs or is motivated to perform the act because of the good she sees in so acting. But how might agents see their actions as good? Recent research in moral psychology, (...) the philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences suggests that affective states may play a deep role in cognition and action as representations of value: for instance, pain may represent an injury as bad for one. This dissertation begins by defending just such an evaluationist account of unpleasant pain from an objection, and then develops and defends an affect-based version of GG. The first part of the dissertation (Chapter 2) considers a foundational problem for an evaluationist theory of affect. The theory is motivated by its ability to make sense of our aversive intentional responses to pain as responses to value, but the shooting the messenger objection charges that it is unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves. I propose a solution to this problem on behalf of the evaluationist: when we introspect our pains we also turn our emotional distress inwards, enabling it to represent our pains as bad. One crucial question GG theorists must face is just what the good of GG is. Chapter 3 argues that, lest the thesis be too weak, it must hold that actions must appear to their agents to meet a standard of practical reason. The chapter then shows how the intelligibility motivation for GG can lead naturally to the view that the standards so presented are shared publicly. Chapter 4 argues against the standard understanding of GG in terms of essentially evaluative desires and contends that it should be replaced by hard-line affectivism, the view that GG is true because actions are based on affective states that represent there as being reason for those actions. (shrink)

We are now in the age of affectivism (Dukes et al., 2021): while emotions have long been contrasted with cognition, they are now seen as a central element of our rational life. Samuel Lepine joins this paradigm, arguing that emotions are cognitive states, source of axiological knowledge, and even an essential component of values. Lepine’s original contribution consists of an extremely cautious and impressive interweaving of psychological and philosophical discussions of emotions as well as of values. We may take (...) from La nature des émotions a set of entangled statements: (i) emotions are cognitive states distinguished by their evaluative nature; (ii) they are sui generis psychological modes that focus our attention and prepare our body for action; (iii) they are evaluative since we can ascribe a correspondence between the emotion and the value instantiated by the emotion’s intentional object (i.e., correctness conditions); (iv) the correctness and justification conditions of emotions partially depend on the background motivations on which every emotion is based, because (v) values depend on some non-evaluative properties of external objects as well as on the agents’ motivations. These different points fit together to form the most comprehensive introduction to emotions I’ve read since Deonna & Teroni’s The Emotions (2012). Let us examine how. (shrink)

We are now in the age of affectivism (Dukes et al., 2021): while emotions have long been contrasted with cognition, they are now seen as a central element of our rational life. Samuel Lepine joins this paradigm, arguing that emotions are cognitive states, source of axiological knowledge, and even an essential component of values. Lepine’s original contribution consists of an extremely cautious and impressive interweaving of psychological and philosophical discussions of emotions as well as of values. We may take (...) from La nature des émotions a set of entangled statements: (i) emotions are cognitive states distinguished by their evaluative nature; (ii) they are sui generis psychological modes that focus our attention and prepare our body for action; (iii) they are evaluative since we can ascribe a correspondence between the emotion and the value instantiated by the emotion’s intentional object (i.e., correctness conditions); (iv) the correctness and justification conditions of emotions partially depend on the background motivations on which every emotion is based, because (v) values depend on some non-evaluative properties of external objects as well as on the agents’ motivations. These different points fit together to form the most comprehensive introduction to emotions I’ve read since Deonna & Teroni’s The Emotions (2012). Let us examine how. (shrink)

Intuitively, affect plays an indispensable role in self-deception’s dynamic. Call this view “affectivism.” Investigating affectivism matters, as affectivists argue that this conception favours the non-intentionalist approach to self-deception and offers a unified account of straight and twisted self-deception. However, this line of argument has not been scrutinized in detail, and there are reasons to doubt it. Does affectivism fulfill its promises of non-intentionalism and unity? We argue that it does, as long as affect’s role in self-deception lies (...) in affective filters—that is, in evaluation of information in light of one’s concerns. We develop this conception by taking into consideration the underlying mechanisms governing self-deception, particularly the neurobiological mechanisms of somatic markers and dopamine regulation. Shifting the discussion to this level can fulfill the affectivist aspirations, as this approach clearly favours non-intentionalism and offers a unified account of self-deception. We support this claim by criticizing the main alternative affectivist account—namely, the views that self-deception functions to reduce anxiety or is motivated by anxiety. Describing self-deception’s dynamic does not require intention; affect is sufficient if we use the insights of neuroscience and the psychology of affective bias to examine this issue. In this way, affectivism can fulfill its promises. (shrink)

En tant qu’acteur important dans la gouvernance rurale, les organisations économiques collectives jouent un rôle primordial dans le processus d’urbanisation rurale et constituent un point de vue important pour comprendre l’évolution des relations entre zones urbaines et zones rurales en Chine. En même temps, ces organisations constituent le noyau de la communauté locale, qui représente les individus sur la base d’une même appartenance ethnique, par proximité locale ou par proximité de valeurs communes, voire par proximité économique. Ainsi, les individus partagent (...) une forme de cohésion solidaire, fondée affectivement. Toutefois, au fur et à mesure du développement économique et social, le système, la notion et la nature de l’économique s’évoluent et les valeurs des individus changent, tandis que ces organisations s’adaptent mal au changement économique et social, ce qui provoque la controverse de la société chinoise rurale au cours de la modernisation de la Chine. S’appuyant sur une recherche de terrain et l’analyse des données du village de Liede à Guangzhou, cet article porte sur le processus d’intégration urbaine-rurale du village urbain et explore l’intégration du village urbain dans la ville à travers l’organisation économique collective de Liede, notamment Liede Economic Development Co., Ltd. Dans ce processus, il existe des contradictions entre le rôle du village et le rôle des organisations économiques collectives. Les organisations collectives ont des fonctions économiques, mais elles assument toujours aussi des coûts importants concernant des fonctions publiques telles que la sécurité sociale. On verra que la réforme de la « séparation politique et économique » après la période de l’économie planifiée des années 1980 n’a pas eu d’effet au niveau local. L’évolution du rôle des organisations économiques reflète la mutation de l’économie chinoise, c’est-à-dire, le passage de l’économie communiste à l’économie de marché. Toutefois, l’engagement solidaire existe toujours dans l’économie collective et celle-ci essaie de limiter la cupidité et soutenir l’intérêt commun au lieu de le marginaliser, ce qui constitue un caractère spécifique de l’économie collective en Chine. Classification JEL : A23, B25, H32. (shrink)

This article provides an account of intuitions: Affectivism. Affectivism states that intuitions are emotional experiences. The article proceeds as follows: first, the features that intuitions are typically taken to have are introduced. Then some issues with extant theories are outlined. After that, emotional experiences and their central features are brought into view. This is followed by a comparison of intuitions and emotional experiences, yielding the result that emotional experiences fit and elucidate the feature profile of intuitions. Finally, it (...) is specified what kind of emotional experiences intuitions are: intuitions are typically mild emotional experiences that belong to the subclass of epistemic feelings. (shrink)

Using an analysis of two of Sartre's biographies, and , I will show how freedom can be inverted into captivity in order to constitute an affective destiny. If every choice, act and affect of an individual is, through its “original project,” confined to a specific framework, the schema of freedom positing its choice of existence seems to resemble a circle of captivity: total freedom at the outset, and then a trapped freedom, limited by itself. At the basis of this alienating (...) circle lie original emotions: consciousness reacts affectively to its initial situation, before even constituting itself as a , and adopts these emotions as integral parts of its project, as the structure of its relationship to the world. But the empirical affects which follow are then captured in the vortex of captivity, in accordance with a two-fold criterion: participating in the ultimate end of the individual while at the same time being inscribed in the affective structure which follows from it. Originally the very source of the original project, emotion then becomes its slave. French À travers l'analyse de deux biographies sartriennes, Baudelaire et Mallarmé , nous mettons en évidence la manière dont la liberté s'inverse en captivité pour se constituer un destin affectif. Si tout choix, acte et affect de l'individu est, par son projet originel , circonscrit à un cadre d'action précis, le schéma de la liberté posant son choix d'existence paraît assimilable au cercle de la captivité : une liberté totale à l'origine, une liberté piégée, limitée par elle-même, ensuite. Au fondement même de ce cercle aliénant, des émotions originelles : la conscience réagit affectivement à sa situation initiale, avant même de se constituer en personne , et assume ces émotions comme partie intégrante de son projet, comme structure de son rapport au monde. Mais les affects empiriques qui s'ensuivent sont alors pris dans le tourbillon de la captivité, devant répondre à un double critère : participer à la fin ultime de l'individu tout en s'inscrivant dans la structure affective qui en découle. Source même du projet originel, l'émotion en devient l'esclave. (shrink)

Un fondement putatif dunon-cognitivisme à propos des valeurs, réside dans une conception qui voudrait que les descriptions du monde soient intelligibles sans se placer à un point de vue spécial, là où les assignations de valeur seraient par essence effectuées du sein d’une forme de vie affectivement et conativement informée (§ 1). J’émets plus que des réserves quant à l’idée qu’on puisse faire passer une suite d’applications d’un concept axiologique pour des cas de continuer de la même manière, sur un (...) mode qui soit cohérent avec ce genre de non-cognitivisme, en les expliquant comme une suite de réponses à des instances d’une espèce identifiable sur un mode non-axiologique (§ 2). L’examen par Wittgenstein de ce que c’est que suivre une règle sape l’un des motifs de supposer que l’application d’un concept axiologique ne saurait avoir d’autre cohérence qu’une cohérence de ce genre (§ 3). Je m’attache au lien que cela a avec un argument récurrent qui argue de ce que les jugements moraux sont des guides de l’action pour préconiser le non-cognitivisme (§ 4). Je conclus par la recommandation suivante : cette conception de la cohérence de la pensée axiologique ne saurait être aisément désavouée par les partisans du non cognitivisme (§ 5). (shrink)

Bien étudiée par les sociologues nord-améri-cains, spécialement par des féministes, la problématique des femmes battues qui tuent appelle une compréhension clinique. Centré sur huit cas, cet article montre comment leur aptitude à la symbolisation a été systématiquement entravée. Grandissant dans des familles où les femmes étaient strictement confinées à la sphère domestique, où un strict contrôle de leur sexualité n’empêchait pas de sévères négligences, qui parfois allaient jusqu’à les exposer à des abus sexuels, elles ont été confrontées à un véritable (...) interdit de s’appartenir. Essentiellement, ces femmes ne se sont senties protégées ni réellement par la constance de leurs parents, ni affectivement par leur bienveillance, ni symboliquement par leur soumission à la Loi. (shrink)

In Imagining Salvation: The Narratives and Imaginaries of Spinoza’s Philosophy, I propose a philosophical theory of imagination founded on Spinoza’s philosophy. Moving away from a philosophical tradition that considers imagination as a power of illusion, fantasy, and falsity, I suggest that imagination, in a Spinozan perspective, is a power to signify reality. This means that imagination is different from reason, without having to be overcome by the latter. Rather, my work shows that to imagine is to interpret the world through (...) narratives representing human power. The importance and ambivalence of such narratives in human experience are the guiding thread of my research. In the first half of the dissertation, I root my theory of imagination in Spinoza’s ontology and philosophy of mind. My claim is that through imagination, we make sense of reality by organizing it as a coherent whole. Furthermore, we are affectively invested in this narrative of reality: we naturally strive to see the world as offering possibilities for empowering ourselves. The second half of the dissertation builds on this theory of imagination to see its political effects. Starting with a presentation of the role of imagination in Spinoza’s political philosophy, I ultimately show how different kinds of narratives play an important role in our representation of political identity. Considering the dangers of utopianism and the resources of historical narratives, I ultimately show how imagination should be seen as a powerful human power – one through which we can empower ourselves and others. -/- ans 'Imagining Salvation: The narratives and Imaginaries of Spinoza's Philosophy', je propose une théorie philosophique de l'imagination, fondée dans la pensée de Spinoza. Dans cette proposition, je m'éloigne d'une tradition philosophique qui caractérise l'imagination comme une puissante source d'illusions, de fantaisies, et de faussetés, suggérant plutôt que dans une perspective spinozienne, imaginer, c'est signifier la réalité. Ceci veut dire que l'imagination diffère de la raison, sans toutefois devoir être dépasser par cette-dernière. Au contraire, mes recherches démontrent qu'imaginer, c'est interpréter le monde à l'aide de récits afin de représenter la puissance humaine. L'importance et l'ambivalence de ces récits dans l'expérience humaine constituent les fils conducteurs de mon interprétation. Dans la première moitié de cette dissertation, je fonde ma théorie de l'imagination dans l'ontologie et la philosophie de l'esprit de Spinoza. Ma thèse principale est qu'à l'aide de l'imagination, nous donnons un sens à la réalité en l'organisant comme un tout cohérent. De plus, nous sommes affectivement investis dans cette narrativité de la réalité: nous cherchons naturellement à représenter le monde comme nous offrant des possibilités pour augmenter notre puissance. La seconde moitié de mon travail se base sur cette théorie de l'imagination afin de détailler ses effets dans la vie politique. Commençant par une présentation du rôle de l'imagination dans la philosophie politique de Spinoza, je démontre ultimement comment différents types de récits jouent un rôle important dans notre représentation des identités politiques. Considérant les dangers de l'utopisme et les ressources offertes par les récits historiques, je suggère que l'imagination devrait être pensée comme une grande puissance humaine -- une puissance qui permet de libérer soi-même et les autres. (shrink)

L’auteure rend compte de son expérience auprès de collégiens et lycéens, dans le cadre des interventions d’« éducation à la vie affective, relationnelle et sexuelle », sur l’abord avec eux de la thématique de l’identité de genre. Elle essaie de sensibiliser les adolescents au processus de construction progressive de cette identité à partir des éléments corporels, psychiques et sociaux, en introduisant la notion d’identification aux figures masculines et féminines investies affectivement dans leur environnement. Il lui paraît important, par ailleurs, de (...) faire entrevoir ce processus d’identification comme un jeu au sens winnicottien du terme, pouvant contenir une dimension de plaisir. Cet apprivoisement de leur identité de genre par la pensée et l’échange avec d’autres, parce qu’il peut avoir une dimension angoissante à un moment donné, a tout à gagner à être proposé aux élèves tout au long de leur scolarité, comme le prévoit la loi, pour prendre en compte l’évolution de leur maturité psychique. (shrink)

Kant’s theory of moral action faces a serious difficulty concerning motivation: how do commands of pure practical reason solely move human agents to perform moral actions? In his response, Kant claims that human agents perform moral actions out of a feeling of respect for the moral law. However, attempts to accommodate a feeling of respect into Kant’s rigorously rationalist ethical theory have led to two diverging strands of interpretation in the secondary literature: intellectualism and affectivism. Against this context, this (...) paper proposes an interpretation of Kantian moral motivation with an appropriate place for the notion of respect within it to resolve the motivational problem concerning moral actions. According to the model of Kantian moral motivation that this paper develops, motivation to act morally takes place in two sequential stages, each involving the positive role of respect as a motive. By arguing for a positive role of the feeling of respect in the process of moral motivation, this model aligns with the affectivist school of interpretation. (shrink)

Building on the affectivism approach, we expand on Binz et al.'s meta-learning research program by highlighting that emotion and other affective phenomena should be key to the modeling of human learning. We illustrate the added value of affective processes for models of learning across multiple domains with a focus on reinforcement learning, knowledge acquisition, and social learning.

Kant has little to say about moral frailty or weakness. But for his readers, the topic is a fruitful site of interpretive projection that deserves focus. How we approach it reveals much about Kant’s theory of motivation and his general metaphysics of mind as it relates to the practical philosophy. Prominent views on the subject range from affectivism, which holds that sensible incentives motivate weak action independently of reason’s activity, to intellectualism, which holds that weak actions are ultimately grounded (...) in reason, reflecting the subject’s true maxims. After briefly unpacking two well-known versions of each position, I will argue that neither can succeed. For in both cases, reason and sensibility are too dualistically opposed and insulated from one another to capture Kant’s view. I propose, instead, that we must completely reconsider the relationship between these capacities, and the role that sensible desire plays in light of our ability to reason. The result is a more desirable account of weakness that can both invoke the role that reason plays in determining human action, and appeal to strong sensible desires and their ability to disrupt our practical lives. (shrink)

This chapter forms the next main thesis of the present study: the synthetic path of the second _Critique_ is broader in scope, since Kant seeks to reveal a necessary connection between our consciousness of the moral law and our capacity to feel pleasure and displeasure. The chapter picks up where Chapter 3 left off by providing a close reading of Kant’s theory of moral sensibility in the _Critique of Practical Reason_. Two important results follow. First, it is argued that debates (...) over the role of moral feeling in Kant’s moral psychology have failed to acknowledge Kant’s emphasis on the first-personal character of feeling as a feature of our common experience of morality. Second, these debates have failed to connect Kant’s theory of moral sensibility to his project of justification, which the present chapter aims to remedy. (shrink)

To vindicate morality against skeptical doubts, Kant must show that agents can be moved to act independently of their sensible desires. Kant must therefore answer a motivational question: how does an agent get from the cognition that she ought to act morally to acting morally? Affectivist interpretations of Kant hold that agents are moved to act by feelings, while intellectualists appeal to cognition alone. To overcome the significant shortcomings of each view, I develop a hybrid theory of motivation. My central (...) interpretive claim is that Kant is a special kind of motivational internalist: on his view, agents are moved to act by a feeling of intellectual pleasure at the prospect of accomplishing a task they have set for themselves, a feeling that originates in free choice. The resulting theory is immune to the challenges facing intellectualism and affectivism, thus strengthening the prospects of Kant’s justification of morality. (shrink)